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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of the concept of dangerous and severe personality 
disorder (DSPD) in England and Wales and its subsequent interactions with criminal 
justice and health policy, mental health law and the law of sentencing. It also presents a 
normative critique of the promise of rehabilitation as a limit on the preventive detention 
of offenders perceived to be dangerous and personality disordered. In the first part of 
the thesis it is argued that the DSPD initiative was a compromise between the objectives 
of the Home Office and Department of Health intended to provide a solution to the 
long-standing problems personality disordered offenders presented for the prison and 
secure hospital systems. The plans also sought to strike a “balance” between the 
recognised rights of the offender to liberty and the more contested and nebulous “right” 
of the public to protection against harm. In essence, the bargain struck meant that, in 
exchange for their detention to protect the public, dangerous offenders with severe 
personality disorders would be offered tailored treatments aimed at alleviating their 
personal distress and reducing the risks they posed to the public so that they could 
eventually be released. Problematically, however, the effectiveness of the treatments on 
offer in reducing risk has not yet been proven. In the second part of the thesis, it 
emerges that the domestic and European legal framework governing the DSPD group 
takes a similar approach to “balancing” competing rights. In the final analysis, however, 
the legal and policy framework prioritises the pursuit of public security over the rights 
of the offender and risk subjecting the latter to disproportionate punishment. In this 
context, it is argued that the promise of rehabilitation may be more accurately 
characterised as means of rendering the coercive practice of preventive detention more 
palatable for liberal governments than as a true safeguard against the violation of 
prisoners’ rights. Finally, some suggestions for a new normative framework that is more 
responsive to the risks of disproportionate punishment presented by the current system 
are put forward. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1. Introducing the DSPD Programme and the OPDP 
In 1999, Tony Blair’s Labour government published radical proposals aimed at 
protecting the public from dangerous individuals suffering from severe forms of 
personality disorder (Home Office and Department of Health 1999). Individuals in the 
newly-created “Dangerous and Severe Personality Disordered” (DSPD) category were 
presented by politicians and policymakers as having fallen through the cracks in the 
mental health and criminal justice systems due to gaps in the law and the refusal of 
some psychiatrists to take responsibility for patients they considered to be “untreatable”. 
The plans were widely interpreted by the media as a response to the case of Michael 
Stone, convicted of the horrific murders of Lin Russell and her younger daughter 
Megan and the attempted murder of Lin’s elder daughter, Josie, in Chillenden, Kent in 
July 1996 (Francis et al. 2006, p.11). Following his arrest, media reports described 
Stone as a “psychopath” left free to kill after psychiatrists had refused to admit him to 
hospital on the grounds that he was “untreatable” or “too dangerous” (Francis et al. 
2006, Table 1.14).  
The government’s plans were outlined in a joint Home Office and Department of Health 
consultation paper entitled Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality 
Disorder published in 1999. The paper asserted that a significant number of individuals 
in the DSPD group had been given determinate sentences by the courts and had to be 
released from prison at the end of their sentences despite the risks they posed to the 
public due to “serious anti-social behaviour resulting from their disorder” (Home Office 
and Department of Health 1999, p.12). At the time, the Mental Health Act (MHA) 1983 
only permitted the detention of individuals suffering from “psychopathic disorder” in 
psychiatric institutions if it could be shown that treatment was “likely to alleviate or 
prevent a deterioration” in their condition (former s.3.(2)(b)). As personality disorders 
were considered “untreatable” by some psychiatrists, the “treatability” criterion was 
presented as a stumbling block to the detention of dangerous individuals to protect the 
public (Seddon 2008 p.304; Peay 2011b, p.176).   
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The paper put forward proposals to establish new powers for the detention of 
individuals in the DSPD group in a dedicated institution, separate from prisons and 
secure hospitals, for as long as they posed a risk. Detention would not depend on a 
criminal conviction but would instead fall within the state’s power to detain individuals 
“of unsound mind” under Article 5.1(e) of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). The DSPD group would not merely be detained, however, but would also be 
“helped and encouraged to co-operate in therapeutic and other activity designed to help 
them return safely to the community” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, 
p.9). By allocating significant funding to research into tailored treatments, the 
government aimed to strike a “balance” “between the human rights of individuals [in 
the DSPD group] and the right of the public to be protected from these very dangerous 
people” (Boateng and Sharland 1999, p.7). If the risks posed by those in the DSPD 
group were found not to be reduced through treatment, however, there would be “no 
alternative but to continue to detain them indefinitely” (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p.9). 
The proposals faced strident opposition from psychiatrists, lawyers, patient groups and 
civil liberties charities. In particular, psychiatrists were concerned about the ethical 
implications of detaining a group in hospital that was unlikely to benefit from treatment. 
Some feared that they would be expected to perform the role of “judges and jailers” and 
perform the function of maintaining social order (Mullen 1999, p.1146). Legal 
commentators expressed the suspicion that the government aimed to circumvent the 
provisions of the ECHR and detain suspected offenders without the need for a criminal 
trial and conviction (Eastman 1999a). The plans were eventually shelved. Instead, a 
number of pilot units were established in prisons, secure hospitals and in the community 
to develop and test assessment and treatment processes for the DSPD group within 
existing legal frameworks (Department of Health 2000b).  
Meanwhile, the government pushed forward reforms to mental health legislation, which 
eventually resulted in the implementation of the MHA 2007. Amongst other changes, 
the MHA 2007 replaced the “treatability” criterion with a requirement that “appropriate 
medical treatment” be “available” to the patient and that the “purpose” of this treatment 
be “to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms 
or manifestations” (MHA1983, s.145(4)). Thus the test became “not predictive but 
aspirational” (Peay 2011a, p.238). A parallel development was the introduction of the 
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sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP) by the Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 
2003. Like the DSPD proposals, the IPP targeted the problem of dangerous offenders 
released from determinate prison sentences (Annison 2015). Unlike the reforms to the 
MHA 1983, the IPP was prospective and applied after conviction to individuals who 
had a previous conviction for a listed offence and who were judged to pose a 
“significant risk” of “serious harm” to the public (CJA 2003, s.225(1)(b)). Like a life 
sentence, the IPP was composed of a punitive tariff and a period of preventive detention 
that would continue until the Parole Board was “satisfied that it [was] no longer 
necessary for the protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined” (Crime 
Sentences Act 1997, s.28(6)(b)). Control was also extended over the DSPD group in the 
community through post-release supervision requirements and a raft of civil preventive 
orders with criminal penalties for breach, such as Violent Offender Orders (VOOs) and 
Sexual Offences Prevention Orders (SOPOs). Taken together, these incremental 
developments have largely accomplished what the 1999 proposals set out to achieve but 
with comparatively little scrutiny or controversy. 
Early evaluations of the ability of the DSPD programme to assess and treat the 
offenders in its care were predominantly negative (Barrett et al. 2009; Tyrer et al. 2007; 
2009; 2010). Professor Peter Tyrer and others in the IMPALOX (Imperial College, 
Arnold Lodge and Oxford University) group expressed concerns that only 10% of the 
time spent by prisoners on the DSPD programme could be classified as therapy (Tyrer 
et al. 2010). In view of their findings, the authors expressed the suspicion that the 
programme was engaged in the mere “warehousing” of offenders the government was 
too afraid to release and that public protection would triumph over treatment in the 
event of conflict (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97). In sum, they concluded that their “findings, 
together with concerns about treatability, raise[d] more fundamental concerns about 
whether medical management of people with these problems is a justifiable use of 
resources and ethically appropriate” (Tyrer et al. 2009, p.144).  
Later evaluations appeared to give some weight to the accusation of “warehousing” 
(Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97). The Inclusion for DSPD: Evaluating Assessment and 
Treatment (IDEA) study conducted by researchers at the University of Oxford reported 
the surprising finding that formal therapy took up an average of less than two hours per 
week in the DSPD units (Burns et al. 2011, p.237). The Multi-method Evaluation of the 
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Management, Organisation and Staffing in High Security Treatment Services for People 
with Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (MEMOS) conducted by researchers 
at Imperial College found that movement through the hospital and prison DSPD units 
was slow and that the hospital units were being used to detain prisoners who had passed 
the date at which they could be expected to be released from a determinate prison 
sentence (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 2010b). More positive findings included a 
reduction in actuarial risk of violence scores across the sample and fewer violent 
incidents than would have been expected given the profile of those detained 
(Department of Health 2011). Due to the lack of a control group, however, it was not 
clear if these changes could be attributed to treatment or to other factors affecting the 
participants (Burns et al. 2011).  
The findings of the IDEA and MEMOS studies in relation to treatment are surprising 
given the emphasis on therapy in policy documents and programme delivery guides (see 
Home Office and Department of Health 1999; DSPD Programme et al. 2008a; 2006). 
As I have argued in earlier work, they also raise the possibility that the DSPD 
programme may have been a means of justifying the extended detention of offenders in 
secure hospitals purely for public protection (O’Loughlin 2014). On the other hand, 
those involved in the development and implementation of the DSPD programme have 
strongly refuted accusations that the programme was engaged in mere “warehousing” 
(Howells et al. 2011, p.131-2). The vast sums of money expended on developing 
interventions and purpose-built therapeutic environments also indicate that the 
programme is unlikely to have been a mere cover for preventive detention. 
Nevertheless, the results of the evaluations indicate that the DSPD programme failed in 
some respects to live up to the expectations set for it by policymakers. 
Despite the results of the evaluations, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
government that succeeded Labour in 2010 promised to continue and even expand the 
DSPD programme in prisons while dismantling the hospital units under the new, less 
stigmatising title of the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway (OPDP) (Department of 
Health and NOMS 2011a; 2011b). The plans for the OPDP form part of a broader 
strategy of reviving rehabilitation as an aim of the criminal justice system pursued by 
the Coalition and continued by the Conservative government that took over in 2015 
(Ministry of Justice 2010a; 2013a; 2015d). The choice to expand the programme in 
prisons appears questionable, however, in light of the evaluations and of the continuing 
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ethical and legal difficulties associated with the detention and treatment of personality 
disordered offenders.  
 
2. Research Aims  
This thesis will examine the DSPD programme and the OPDP as a recent set of 
responses to the longstanding and complex dilemmas presented by personality 
disordered individuals who are considered dangerous. The initiatives offer an important 
opportunity for testing the explanatory power of the claims of the current criminological 
literature on broader trends in criminal justice policy. Most notably, they cut across the 
interface between the mental health and criminal justice systems and appear as 
examples of the recent revival of rehabilitation with a “late-modern” flavour (Robinson 
2008). Through the OPDP, the legacy of the DSPD initiative continues to have an 
impact on the rights and interests of offenders in the current system and one that is 
constantly evolving. The OPDP is therefore an important object of study in itself as it 
interacts with the intricate web of sentencing provisions, mental health legislation and 
administrative powers that has come to govern the DSPD group since its creation in 
1999.  
The work presented in this thesis is primarily exploratory in nature as it attempts to 
build a picture of how high risk personality disordered offenders are governed across 
two large and complex systems. It also seeks to unearth the assumptions underlying the 
current framework governing personality disordered offenders judged to be dangerous 
in order to expose them to critique. Finally, it puts forward some modest suggestions for 
a normative framework that is better equipped to avert the risks of excessive 
punishment posed by the current system and to take greater account of the particularities 
of personality disordered offenders. 
 
3. Research Questions 
The thesis addresses a number of key research questions. First, it investigates where the 
DSPD initiative came from, why it came about when it did, and what factors shaped it. 
Second, it asks whether criminological and penal theory can explain the seemingly 
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“hybrid” “tough” and “progressive” approach of the DSPD initiative and the tensions 
within it (Seddon 2008). Third, it explores why the initiative seems to have failed to live 
up to the expectations set for it and what lessons may be drawn from this for health and 
criminal justice policymaking. Fourth, it examines whether the reforms introduced by 
the OPDP and the combination of current law and policy is an appropriate response to 
the practical and normative problems posed by personality disordered offenders who are 
judged to be “dangerous”. In particular, the thesis will critically examine whether the 
current legal framework may be said to strike an appropriate “balance” between the 
“right” of the public to protection from dangerous individuals claimed by the 
government (Boateng and Sharland 1999) and the competing rights of personality 
disordered offenders not to be subjected to arbitrary detention or disproportionate 
punishment.  
 
4. Structure of the Thesis 
The first half of the thesis explores the origins of the DSPD concept and its underlying 
assumptions. In so doing, it develops a critique of the DSPD programme and the OPDP 
in light of historical attempts to deal with personality disordered offenders and the 
evidence for the effective management and treatment of their disorders. This will set the 
scene for the second half of the thesis, which critically examines the manner in which 
personality disordered offenders are currently dealt with by the law and the criminal 
justice and mental health systems. The final substantive chapter, Chapter 7, draws 
together both halves in examining the assumptions that underlie law, policy and practice 
and the implications of the current framework for the rights and interests of personality 
disordered individuals who have offended. Finally, some suggestions will be put 
forward as to how the risks posed to the rights and interests of personality disordered 
offenders by the current system could be better managed and indicate the lines future 
research in this field could take.  
This chapter will outline the methodological approach taken to answering the key 
research questions and introduce the main arguments of the thesis. It will also indicate 
how the research will refine and add to the body of existing empirical, normative and 
critical studies of the state’s approach to managing those considered to be dangerous 
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and disordered. Before proceeding further, however, it is necessary to discuss the 
scientific, ethical and legal controversies surrounding the detention and treatment of 
personality disordered offenders considered to be dangerous and the challenges they 
present for law, policy and practice in further detail. This will provide the context for 
the evaluation of the current framework presented in the substantive chapters of the 
thesis. 
 
5. Personality Disorder: Scientific, Ethical and Legal Controversies 
(a) Contested diagnoses 
The revised fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders, DSM-IV-TR, defines personality disorder as “an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behaviour that deviates markedly from the expectations of the 
individual’s culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in childhood or early 
adolescence, is stable over time, and leads to distress or impairment” (American 
Psychiatric Association 2000, p.685). The more recent DSM-V contains a definition 
similar to that found in DSM-IV-TR and an alternative experimental set of “general 
criteria for personality disorder” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.646-7; 
p.761). In the latter, the “essential features” of personality disorder are defined as 
“moderate or greater impairment in personality (self/interpersonal) functioning” and the 
presence of “one or more pathological personality traits” (American Psychiatric 
Association 2013, p.761). These features are “relatively inflexible and pervasive across 
a broad range of personal and social situations” and “relatively stable across time” 
(American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.761). The inclusion of “relatively” reflects 
developments in research showing variation and remission in the symptomatology of 
personality disorders over the life-course (Zanarini et al. 2003; Gutiérrez et al. 2012). 
This indicates that the disorders may not be as “enduring” and “inflexible” as previously 
thought. 
DSM-V identifies three clusters of personality disorder: Cluster A: the “odd or 
eccentric” types; Cluster B: the “dramatic, emotional or erratic” types; and Cluster C: 
the “anxious and fearful” types (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.646). Cluster 
B, which includes histrionic, narcissistic, antisocial and borderline personality disorders, 
  
19 
is of most relevance to criminality (Jones 2008, p.63). Antisocial personality disorder 
(ASPD) is described in the DSM-V as “a pattern of disregard for, and violation of, the 
rights of others”. Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is characterised by “a pattern of 
instability in interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and marked 
impulsivity” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.645). The traits and behaviours 
associated with ASPD include a failure to conform to social norms, deceitfulness, 
impulsivity, irritability and aggression, reckless disregard for the safety of self or others, 
irresponsibility and a lack of remorse (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.659). 
The distinguishing features of BPD, on the other hand, include frantic efforts to avoid 
real or imagined abandonment, a pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal 
relationships, identity disturbance, impulsivity, recurrent suicidal or self-mutilating acts, 
gestures, or threats, affective instability, chronic feelings of emptiness, inappropriate, 
intense anger or difficulties in controlling anger demonstrated by recurrent physical 
fighting, and transient, paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms in times of 
stress (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.663).  
ASPD and narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) to some extent overlap with the 
construct of psychopathy. NPD is characterised by a pattern of “grandiosity, need for 
admiration, and lack of empathy” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.645). 
Psychopathy is defined by Robert D. Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) 
(Hare 1991), a diagnostic tool divided into two factors: Factor 1 
(interpersonal/affective) and Factor 2 (unstable and antisocial lifestyle). Factor 1 is 
further divided into an interpersonal facet, comprising the traits of glibness/superficial 
charm, grandiose sense of self-worth, pathological lying, conning and manipulativeness; 
and an affective facet, including lack of remorse or guilt, shallow affect, 
callousness/lack of empathy, and failure to accept responsibility for one’s own actions. 
Factor 2 divides into a lifestyle facet, which includes a need for stimulation/proneness 
to boredom, parasitic lifestyle, lack of realistic long-term goals, impulsivity, 
irresponsibility; and an antisocial facet, comprising poor behavioural controls, early 
behavioural problems, juvenile delinquency, revocation of conditional release and 
criminal versatility (Hare 1991).  
The prevalence of personality disorders amongst prisoners is up to ten times higher than 
that found in the general population (Fazel and Danesh 2002). A systematic review of 
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28 surveys on prisoner mental health from 12 countries found that 65% of male and 
42% of female prisoners surveyed had been diagnosed with a personality disorder 
(Fazel and Danesh 2002). Of these, 47% of adult male prisoners had been diagnosed 
with ASPD and 21% and 25% of adult female prisoners had been diagnosed with ASPD 
and BPD respectively (Fazel and Danesh 2002). A survey of prisoners in England and 
Wales conducted by the Office of National Statistics found that 78% of male remand, 
64% of male sentenced and 50% of female prisoners fulfilled the criteria for at least one 
personality disorder (Singleton et al. 1998, p. 10). Among a subset of prisoners who 
were clinically interviewed, 63% of male remand, 49% of male sentenced and 31% of 
female prisoners were assessed as having ASPD. Paranoid personality disorder (PPD), 
characterised by “a pattern of distrust and suspiciousness such that others’ motives are 
interpreted as malevolent” (American Psychiatric Association 2013, p.645), was the 
second most prevalent personality disorder and affected 29% of male remand prisoners, 
20% of male sentenced prisoners and 16% of sentenced female prisoners. At 20%, BPD 
was more prevalent than PPD amongst female prisoners (Singleton et al. 1998, p. 10).  
These figures may come as no surprise as both ASPD and BPD incorporate offending 
behaviours into their diagnostic criteria. ASPD and psychopathy have been criticised for 
their circularity, as “the psychopath’s mental disorder is inferred from his anti-social 
behaviour while the anti-social behaviour is explained by mental disorder” (Wootton 
1981, p.90). According to one commentator, a diagnosis of ASPD or psychopathy 
“often does little more than recycle the history of prior offending behaviours in a 
different form, producing a potentially spurious association between personality 
disorder and offending” (Mullen 1999, p.1147).  This begs the question of whether 
these disorders cause, explain or merely describe the socially undesirable acts and 
tendencies of those who are so diagnosed. The ASPD construct has also been criticised 
for its “moral overtones” (Gunn 2003) and one commentator has branded it as “a moral 
judgement masquerading as a clinical diagnosis” (Blackburn 1988, p.511). The finding 
of an “abnormal” personality that is stable and not amenable to change has also been 
characterised as “a clear moralistic position involving a long-term lack of confidence in 
those individuals who recurrently act in ways that others find offensive, disappointing 
and troublesome” (Pilgrim 2007, p.84). It has also been suggested that the diagnosis is 
tantamount to a declaration of dislike (Bowers et al. 2005, p.172; Lewis and Appleby 
1988). 
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(b) Treating personality disorder 
The law tends to find individuals diagnosed with personality disorders to be criminally 
responsible for their actions and they rarely benefit from defences available to mentally 
disordered offenders. Yet, as Jill Peay argues, some of the traits associated with their 
disorders indicate that “their ability to exercise control as others might over their 
behavio[u]r is impaired, albeit not extinguished” (Peay 2011a, p.232). Furthermore, 
owing to their emotional deficits, such individuals “may experience problems with 
feeling guilt, empathizing with their victims [and] learning from their experiences” and 
may therefore not respond to punishment and rehabilitative interventions in the 
expected ways (Peay 2011a, p.233).  
The Court of Appeal in the recent case of R. v. Vowles [2015] EWCA Crim 45; [2015] 2 
Cr. App. R. (S.) 6 advised that psychopathic or personality disordered offenders should 
be given prison sentences rather than hospital disposals. However, such individuals can 
prove very difficult to manage in prison as they are prone to manipulative, violent and 
self-harming behaviours and pose risks to themselves, staff and other prisoners. Neither 
do they fit easily into the mental health system. Psychiatrists see treating personality 
disordered patients as lengthy, intensive, expensive, of marginal benefit to patients, 
damaging to staff and services and disruptive of the treatment of others (Cawthra and 
Gibb 1998, p.8). Mental health care professionals have described them as “extremely 
difficult”, “frustrating”, “irritating, attention-seeking, difficult to manage and unlikely to 
comply with advice or treatment” (Kendell 2002), indicating that the presence of such 
patients has a negative impact on staff morale. Furthermore, treatment in hospital is of 
questionable benefit to those with ASPD as there is little robust evidence for effective 
psychological treatments (Warren et al. 2003; Gibbon et al. 2010). While there are more 
studies showing some support for interventions with BPD, the evidence continues to be 
limited by small sample sizes, short follow-up periods, the wide range of outcome 
measures used and poor controlling for comorbid psychopathologies (Bateman et al. 
2015).  
On the other hand, there is a growing literature on treatments that have shown some 
potential in treating personality disorders and a number of treatment models have 
emerged from the DSPD programme itself (e.g. Saradjian Murphy and McVey 2010; 
Tew and Atkinson 2013; Tennant and Howells 2010). Recent guidelines from the 
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National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) recommend challenging 
therapeutic pessimism and negative attitudes towards ASPD patients and encouraging 
staff to develop “a stronger belief in the effectiveness of their own personal skills” 
(NCCMH et al. 2010, para. 4.3.1). NICE also recommends exploring treatment options 
with BPD patients “in an atmosphere of hope and optimism, explaining that recovery is 
possible and attainable” (NCCMH et al. 2009, para. 4.6.2.1). The effectiveness of 
treatment may, however, be impeded by the fact that both offenders and those with 
personality disorders tend to have low motivation for treatment (Howells and Day 
2007). In particular, those with ASPD tend to actively resist accepting help for their 
disorders (NCCMH et al. 2010, para. 2.4).  
(c) Personality disorder and dangerousness 
Mental disorder tends to be associated with dangerousness, violence and 
unpredictability in the mind of the public and in the media (see generally Thornicroft 
2006; Peay 2011b). This can give rise to anxieties about the release of mentally 
disordered offenders from prisons and secure hospitals. When individuals previously in 
contact with the health and criminal justice systems go on to reoffend, the response of 
the public and media is often to blame those responsible for their care and to call for the 
government to “do something” about the problem. However, the limits of current 
scientific knowledge in estimating and predicting risk means that formulating rational 
policies in response to these calls is a difficult business. 
There is evidence showing that the risk of violent offending amongst those with 
personality disorder is about three times that of the general population (Yu et al. 2012, 
p.784). The risk of violence amongst those with ASPD is particularly high, at around 
12.8 times that of the general population (Yu et al. 2012, p.784). However, this is 
similar to the risk of violence amongst drug and alcohol abusers (Yu et al. 2012, p.784) 
who tend to receive less attention than the mentally disordered. Furthermore, the nature 
of the relationship between personality disorder and violence is unclear. The circularity 
of the ASPD diagnosis may mean that the association with antisocial behaviour is 
merely “trivial” or descriptive (Howard 2006). Furthermore, causality is difficult to 
establish due to the multiplicity of confounding factors affecting personality disordered 
offenders, including comorbid substance abuse and histories of comorbid mental 
illnesses and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Duggan and Howard 2009).  
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Preventively detaining individuals on the grounds of a personality disorder diagnosis is 
difficult to justify in the absence of a clear causal link. This is compounded by the low 
predictive accuracy of actuarial risk assessment instruments when applied to 
individuals. Violent offending is a rare event, including amongst those with mental 
disorder, and has a low base rate (Szmukler 2003). The result is that actuarial 
instruments return a high number of both false positives (individuals identified as high 
risk who would not go on to be violent) and false negatives (individuals wrongly 
identified as low risk who would go on to be violent) (Szmukler 2003). It has been 
estimated that in order to prevent one violent act, six individuals in the DSPD category 
would have to be detained (Buchanan and Leese 2001). Even if the relationship between 
personality disorder and offending were more straightforward, the limited evidence for 
the effectiveness of the treatments on offer and the difficulties associated with 
demonstrating a reduction in risk in high security settings may be expected to result in 
long stays in preventive detention and little progress for the DSPD group. This has long 
been the experience of both prisons and secure hospitals in relation to high risk 
personality disordered prisoners and patients and one that the DSPD programme 
appears to have perpetuated. 
 
6. Part I: Policy and Practice Governing Dangerous Offenders with Severe 
Personality Disorders 
The first part of this thesis will examine the reasons for the seeming failure of the DSPD 
programme to meet expectations and question whether the programme can be rightly 
accused of deliberately holding back prisoners and patients the government is too afraid 
to release. It will also examine the basis for the reforms to the DSPD programme under 
the OPDP and question whether the decision to focus on treatment provision in prison 
brings us any closer to resolving the longstanding dilemmas presented by offenders with 
personality disorders.  
(a) Reconstructing the story of the DSPD Programme and the OPDP    
Drawing inspiration from the work of Ian Loader (2006) on the “platonic guardianship” 
that characterised penal policy-making in the mid-20
th
 century, the first half of the thesis 
develops a “critical reconstruction and reinterpretation” (Loader 2006, p.561) of the 
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origins of the DSPD proposals and the implementation and evaluation of the DSPD 
programme. It also draws inspiration from Harry Annison’s “interpretive political 
analysis” of the “story” of the IPP sentence and the “lessons” it holds for understanding 
penal politics and policymaking (Annison 2015, p.3; p.28). The DSPD “story” will help 
to shed light on the nature of political and institutional responses to the dilemmas posed 
by personality disordered offenders and the continuing influence of historical 
approaches to the management of dangerous individuals. It will also draw out the 
lessons to be learned from the DSPD “experiment” for future policymaking in this 
difficult area. 
Together, the first three chapters of the thesis weave a story that reflects the “struggles” 
and “messiness” of the history of penal policy, which cannot be reduced to “a 
succession of clearly defined periods, each unified by a distinct dominant ethos” 
(Loader and Sparks 2004, p.15). In building this account, the research draws on a broad 
range of contemporary policy documents, the reports and minutes of evidence of 
committees of inquiry, parliamentary debates, newspaper articles, and descriptive and 
outcome studies of the DSPD programme and related initiatives. The evidence and 
insights gathered from these documents are supplemented by a select number of 
interviews conducted by the author. Those interviewed include some of the 
policymakers involved in formulating and promoting the DSPD and OPDP proposals 
and putting the plans into action, a number of academics who gained insider knowledge 
of the workings of the DSPD programme as independent evaluators, and some of the 
practitioners responsible for setting up and running the DSPD units in prisons and 
secure hospitals. Seventeen individuals were interviewed in total and the final sample 
was made up of seven practitioners, five policymakers (civil servants or politicians) and 
five academics.  
The aim of gathering the interview data was not to present a set of empirical findings 
but rather to use interviewees’ accounts to guide the research process, to aid in the 
interpretation of pertinent events and to gain insights into the workings of policymaking 
and practice not readily available from documentary sources. Insights from interviewees 
are woven throughout the thesis and quotations are cited along with the group to which 
they belong (practitioner, academic, civil servant or politician). Interviewees were given 
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assurances of anonymity, and the categories are accordingly broad so that individuals 
are not easily identifiable in a small field.  
The story reconstructed from documents and interviewee accounts is critically evaluated 
in light of the history of efforts to deal with these difficult individuals, what was known 
about their clinical characteristics and their amenability to treatment. This approach 
exposes the assumptions underlying the proposals and the ideologies that influenced the 
plans and opens them up to critique. It will be argued in this thesis that rather than a 
“populist law and order reaction” (Mullen 2007, s.3) to a handful of high profile cases, 
the DSPD initiative was an attempt to respond to long-standing problems within the 
criminal justice and health systems given greater impetus by a perceived need to “do 
something” in response to public concerns. In seeking to break with the failures of the 
past, however, those behind the initiative disregarded some important lessons and 
developed unrealistic expectations of what it could achieve. 
(b) Analysing inclusive and exclusionary approaches to personality disordered 
offenders 
Much has been written on the DSPD initiative from the point of view of psychiatrists 
and other practitioners in the mental health field. There are few criminological studies 
tackling the issues raised by this controversial development and those that do exist tend 
to concentrate on the exclusionary character of the DSPD initiative and the proposals 
for preventive detention. Less regard has been had to the important aim of reintegrating 
personality disordered offenders into society and the claim that the provision of 
treatment could “balance” their rights against those of the public. This thesis aims to fill 
this gap by presenting a critical analysis of the inclusive or “progressive” elements of 
the DSPD proposals, the subsequent DSPD programme and the OPDP. This will allow 
for the elaboration of a more comprehensive understanding and critique of the 
normative justifications put forward for these developments.  
Previous criminological critiques of the DSPD initiative and the DSPD programme have 
focused on interpreting and explaining the initiative in light of trends in penal policy, 
political ideologies and theories of punishment. In particular, analyses have drawn on 
the concept of “governmentality” inspired by the work of Michel Foucault (1977; 1979) 
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and continued by influential criminological theorists, including David Garland, Nikolas 
Rose and Pat O’Malley. 
Drawing on the work of Pat O’Malley, Toby Seddon argues that the key to 
understanding the DSPD initiative is to view it in a “substantively political light” 
(O’Malley 1999, p.189, quoted in Seddon 2008, p.309). Seddon sees DSPD as a 
“hybrid” development that signifies a “coupling together of a novel focus on risk with a 
more archaic concern about dangerous subjects” (Seddon 2008, p.301; p.309). Although 
he acknowledges its “progressive” elements, Seddon’s analysis of DSPD policy and 
practice focuses particularly on its exclusionary aspects. For Seddon, as personality 
disorder “is essentially an unchanging characteristic” “the perceived causal link between 
their personality traits […] and their potential for serious violence” marked those in the 
DSPD group as “‘monsters’ requiring an exclusionary response” (Seddon 2008, p.309). 
In the 1999 proposals, however, personality disorder and dangerousness were conceived 
as potentially mutable qualities. This casts doubt on Seddon’s characterisation of DSPD 
as a set of unchanging characteristics that “are the person” (Seddon 2008, p.309). 
Furthermore, the salience of enhancing offender wellbeing or welfare suggests that there 
is more to the DSPD initiative than social or spatial exclusion. There is therefore a need 
to look beyond “dividing practices” to the assumptions underlying the “hybrid” 
exclusionary and inclusive approach of the DSPD initiative. 
The limitations of Toby Seddon’s account may be partially attributed to the theoretical 
framework adopted by his book Punishment and Madness (Seddon 2007) which draws 
on Michel Foucault’s theory of “dividing practices”: 
Essentially “dividing practices” are modes of manipulation that combine the 
mediation of a science (or pseudo-science) and the practice of exclusion – 
usually in a spatial sense, but always in a social one. (Rabinow, 1984, p.8, 
quoted in Seddon 2007, p.14)   
For Seddon, the pseudo-science was the creation of the category of DSPD, a “neologism 
that has no legal or medical status” (Seddon 2007 p.139, quoting Farnham and James 
2001, p.1926). By focusing on the spatial and social exclusion of dangerous “monsters”, 
Seddon’s compelling analysis misses out the centrality of treatment and social re-
integration to the DSPD scheme. By contrast to Seddon, Leon McRae focuses on the 
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inclusive aspects of programmes such as the DSPD initiative and sees them as a form of 
“discipline” through which offenders absorb norms and come to engage in “pro-social 
behaviour” that is “self-regulating”  (McRae 2013, p.67). McRae’s explicitly 
Foucauldian lens underplays the survival of competing rationalities left over from 
earlier eras, however, that conflict with the claim that a “loss of faith in the capacity of 
psychiatric experts to reform offenders” has resulted in “increasingly pessimistic modes 
of crime control” (McRae 2013, p.53). 
Fergus McNeill and colleagues argue that empirical studies of the practice of 
punishment have revealed a “governmentality gap” between macro-level accounts of 
“penal transformation and reconfiguration in late modern western societies” (McNeill et 
al. 2009, p.420) and the realities of “frontline” penal practices and discourses (McNeill 
et al. 2009, p.421). In their view, empirically-grounded accounts of punishment “may 
be best understood not as a counter-example to accounts of penal transformation but as 
evidence of an incompleteness in their analyses” (McNeill et al. 2009, p.420). It will be 
argued in this thesis that the DSPD story demonstrates that broad trends identified in 
macro-studies of penal “rationalities and technologies” (Garland 1997, p.174) such as 
the rise of “actuarial justice” (Feeley and Simon 1992), the supposed decline of the 
rehabilitative ideal (Garland 2001) and policies of expressive punitiveness (Pratt 2007) 
are “braid[ed]” (Hutchinson 2006, p.460) together with older strategies such as penal 
welfarism (Hannah-Moffat 2005) and governing criminal characters (McNeill 2009). By 
focusing on the claim of the DSPD initiative to pursue the social reintegration of the 
dangerous personality disordered offender, the present work will further interrogate the 
gaps between “dystopian” (Zedner 2002) accounts of the official abandonment of 
welfarism and the evidence for its survival in both policy and practice.   
(c) Finding the dangerous and disordered subject 
Andrew Rutherford has described the DSPD initiative as an example of the “vigorous 
renaissance of positivism towards offenders” (Rutherford 2006, p.51). As noted 
previously, the underlying premise of the DSPD proposals was that the risks the DSPD 
group posed to others “result[ed] from their disorder” (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p.12). This implied a causal connection between personality disorder and 
offending and seems to align with a view of the DSPD offender as a dangerous “alien 
other” (Garland 1996, p. 461) who must be segregated from the normal population. On 
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the other hand, the psychological and behavioural therapies deployed by the DSPD 
programme and its successor, the OPDP, operate under the assumption that offenders 
can be taught how to manage and reduce their own risk of recidivism “by acquiring the 
requisite skills, abilities, and attitudes needed to lead a pro-social life” (Hannah-Moffat 
2005, p.42). The “transformation of the risky subject into a prudent and rational risk 
managing subject” (Hannah-Moffat 2005, p.34) through rehabilitative intervention 
conflicts with conceptions of the DSPD offender as an intractable “monster” (Seddon 
2008, p.309).  
The majority of those detained in the DSPD units have been judged to be criminally 
responsible (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a). However, the use of preventive detention 
with this group and scientific conceptions of the personality disordered offender as 
someone who has difficulty exercising control over his behaviour sit uneasily with the 
“classical” legal conception of the offender as a rational actor who freely chooses to 
commit crime and therefore deserves to be punished for it (Bottoms 1977). The 
seemingly conflicting conceptions of the personality disordered offender deployed by 
law, policy and practice require further investigation with a view to unearthing the 
assumptions underlying the current framework governing this group. This approach will 
inform the normative critique undertaken in the second half of this thesis. 
 
7. Part II: Dangerous Offenders with Severe Personality Disorders and the Legal 
Framework 
Building on the analysis presented in the first part of the thesis, the second half aims to 
develop a clearer picture of how personality disordered offenders who are considered 
dangerous are dealt with in the criminal justice and mental health systems. It will also 
develop a critique of the proposition that rehabilitation can serve as a limit on the use of 
preventive detention, seen in both the DSPD initiative and in subsequent case law from 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). By taking into account criminological 
and sociological insights into the practice and experience of punishment it will be 
argued that rehabilitation is not a sufficient brake on the disproportionate punishment of 
the DSPD group. This is because the delivery of rehabilitative treatments in a coercive 
environment is likely to increase the “hard treatment” experienced by prisoners. 
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Furthermore, the detention of the DSPD group on the grounds of risk in prisons and 
secure hospitals may be experienced as a punitive deprivation of liberty despite its 
preventive intentions.  
(a) Reconstructing the legal framework 
In reconstructing the interactions between law, practice and policy, the second half of 
the thesis draws on policy documents, insights from interviewees, evaluations of the 
DSPD programme and related interventions and relevant case law and legislation. A 
socio-legal methodology is adopted and the research seeks to interrogate the effects of 
the combination of law, policy and practice on personality disordered offenders and 
evaluate its appropriateness in light of their clinical characteristics. The work draws on 
the approach taken by Jill Peay in incorporating insights from psychology and 
psychiatry to analyse the many “awkward questions” personality disordered offenders 
pose for the law (Peay 2011a) and the relationship between mental disorder and crime 
(Peay 2011b). It is also inspired by Nicola Lacey’s (2016) socio-historical analysis of 
criminal responsibility and Lucia Zedner’s (2016) proposition that criminological 
insights into the subtle workings of penal power can be usefully combined with 
normative theory to trace boundaries around state punishment. This methodological 
approach opens up the possibility of creating a normative framework that can respond to 
the particularities of the personality disordered offender and protect against the risk of 
harsh treatment presented by current structures.   
(b) Human Rights 
(i) Preventive detention under the ECHR 
Previous critical legal analyses have focused on the question of whether the DSPD 
proposals were human rights compliant and Nigel Eastman (1999a) notably voiced the 
concern that the plans were a means of circumventing the ECHR. Personality disordered 
offenders have long been included within the remit of mental health law, however, first 
under the rubric of “moral defectives” in the Mental Deficiency Act 1913 and then 
under the “psychopathic disorder” category in the MHA 1959 and the MHA 1983. In 
addition, as highlighted by Jill Peay, the ECHR presents few barriers to the use of 
preventive detention for those of unsound mind, provided the criteria in Winterwerp v. 
the Netherlands [1979] ECHR 4 are fulfilled (Peay 2011a, p.242). Indeed, the ECtHR 
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has acknowledged that the Convention has no equivalent to the treatability criterion in 
the MHA 1983 (Hutchison Reid v. UK [2003] ECHR 94). This sets a more lenient 
standard than the new “appropriate medical treatment test” introduced by the MHA 
2007. 
In this thesis, it will be argued that the concept of “treatability” continues to play a role 
in relation to personality disordered offenders despite the reforms introduced by the 
MHA 1983. Following the recent landmark decision of the Court of Appeal in Vowles, 
treatability acts as a double-edged sword. A narrow conception of treatability is 
deployed in order to prioritise punitive outcomes for personality disordered offenders at 
sentencing while a broad interpretation is used to facilitate their detention in hospital to 
protect the public. Given that their disorders affect their ability to exercise control over 
their impulses and act towards others “in the spirit of brotherhood” (Peay 2011a, p.232), 
it will be argued that this focus on punitive outcomes and reliance on rehabilitation as a 
limit on the use of preventive detention largely fails to provide an adequate response to 
the emotional and volitional deficits of personality disordered offenders.  
The case law of the ECtHR also presents few barriers to the preventive detention of 
dangerous offenders in the prison system. The Court has approved the use of life 
sentences passed in order to protect the public from dangerous offenders even where the 
sentence would otherwise constitute disproportionate punishment in violation of Article 
3 ECHR (Weeks v. UK [1987] ECHR 3). It is notable that the downfall of the IPP 
sentence before the ECtHR was not due to the risk of disproportionate punishment 
presented by short tariff IPP sentences but rather due to the government’s failure to 
provide the rehabilitative interventions that the prisoners needed to progress towards 
release (James, Wells and Lee v. UK [2012] ECHR 1706). The potential for 
rehabilitation to provide a safeguard against the overuse of preventive detention may be 
questioned in the DSPD context, however, in light of the limited evidence base for the 
effectiveness of interventions in reducing risk. 
(ii) A right to security and a duty to engage in rehabilitation 
As noted previously, the DSPD proposals sought to “balance” the right of the public to 
be protected from dangerous offenders against the right of the offender not to be 
subjected to disproportionate punishment or arbitrary detention. The existence of a 
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“right to security” is controversial and has the potential to undermine human rights 
guarantees (Lazarus 2007; 2012). It has also been suggested that offenders serving 
indeterminate sentences have a “right” of access to rehabilitation under the ECHR (Van 
Zyl Smit et al. 2014). Building on Peter Ramsay’s argument that “the reflex of a 
citizen’s ‘right to security’ is the duty to reassure others of your good intentions” 
(Ramsay 2012c, p.146) it will be argued in this thesis that rather than having a “right” 
of access to rehabilitation, offenders who are presumed dangerous due to a personality 
disorder instead have a “duty” to engage with rehabilitation. This is because, building 
on the work of Mark Neocleous, the security of the public, and of the state, takes 
precedence over the liberty of the offender.  
(c) A normative analysis of punishment and detention 
While Toby Seddon (2008) acknowledges the tendency of criminological analyses of 
risk-based developments in penal policy to predict seemingly inevitable “dystopian” 
futures without offering a means of reversing destructive trends (Zedner 2002), his own 
account does not engage much further with the normative claims put forward in support 
of the DSPD initiative. Andrew Rutherford, on the other hand, analyses the DSPD 
proposals in terms of the exclusion of dangerous offenders and links the development to 
the “renaissance” of positivist criminology and a retreat from the retributivist “just 
deserts” model of punishment, which emphasises proportionality in punishment 
(Rutherford 2006, p.85). While implicitly preferring the idea of proportionate 
punishment, Rutherford does not offer a suitable response to the “legitimate anxieties” 
identified by Seddon that the DSPD initiative aimed to address.  
The normative limitations of the accounts presented by Seddon and Rutherford may be 
attributed to their theoretical roots in Foucault’s concept of “governmentality”. 
According to David Garland, the “governmentality” literature in criminology:  
Aims to anatomize contemporary practices, revealing the ways in which their 
modes of exercising power depend upon specific ways of thinking (rationalities) 
and specific ways of acting (technologies), as well as upon specific ways of 
“subjectifying” individuals and governing populations. It also problematizes 
these practices by subjecting them to a “genealogical” analysis – a tracing of 
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their historical lineages that aims to undermine their “naturalness” and open up a 
space for alternative possibilities (Garland 1997, p.174).   
As the law is conceived as a “technology” of power in the Foucauldian lens, accounts 
drawing, implicitly or explicitly, on the concept of “governmentality” are less 
concerned with normative questions such as the source of the state’s legitimacy to 
govern and how its powers should be limited (Ramsay 2012a, p.7; Zedner 2016, p.7). 
Rather, the aim of the governmentality literature is to expose the workings of systems of 
social control and to open up space for power to be contested and resisted (Rose 1996; 
2000). The governmentality literature offers a useful means of deconstructing the legal 
framework governing the DSPD group and revealing “how far punishment is the 
exercise of state authority or governmental power” (Zedner 2016, p.7). However, the 
scepticism of the Foucauldian approach to normative questions means that it offers 
limited tools for developing a normative framework that responds to the rights, 
interests, and clinical characteristics of personality disordered offenders.  
Normative theorising in relation to the criminal law is dominated by legal and penal 
theory in the philosophical tradition (Lacey 2016; Zedner 2016). According to Tadros, 
the “liberal understanding of power”, which “opposes the areas controlled by social and 
state power to a space of freedom”, fails to account for the “multiplicitous operations of 
power” identified by Foucault (Tadros 1998, p.77). Forms of punishment that fall 
outside the bounds of liberal conceptions of the criminal law and the exercise of state 
power therefore escape the normative constraints of the liberal philosophical tradition. 
This literature is also limited by its focus on “censure and sanction” as the fundamental 
elements of punishment (Zedner 2016, p.6).  
Coercive measures taken by the state against individuals that are not officially 
designated as sanctions and do not involve the expression of censure can nevertheless 
be punitive in their effects and therefore deserve the scrutiny of normative theory 
(Zedner 2016). Detention in hospital at the end of a prison sentence, for example, is not 
officially designated as a form of punishment but it is likely to be experienced by the 
individual detained as an extension of the punitive deprivation of liberty imposed at 
sentencing. Similarly, the portion of a life sentence that follows the expiry of the tariff is 
intended to be preventive rather than punitive but it is served in the punitive prison 
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environment. Thus, extended detention on the grounds of risk to the public is likely to 
be experienced as punitive but may escape notice by legal and penal theorists. 
Leon McRae’s (2013; 2015) work on dangerous personality disordered offenders 
combines an explicitly Foucauldian analysis of rehabilitative practices with a normative 
analysis of sentencing structures and mental health legislation and case law. However, 
the latter is limited by a focus on the implications of sentencing reforms for the 
effectiveness of rehabilitative interventions. McRae argues that the abolition of the IPP 
sentence and its replacement with determinate sentencing structures threatens the 
effectiveness of personality disorder treatment by the removing the “legal coercion” 
acting on prisoners that induces them to cooperate with rehabilitative interventions in 
order to meet parole requirements (McRae 2013, p.66). This analysis neglects the larger 
normative question posed in this thesis of whether personality disordered offenders 
should be coerced into accepting rehabilitative treatments. The histories of trauma, 
neglect and deprivation common to personality disordered offenders make them 
vulnerable to re-traumatisation by psychological interventions conducted in the prison 
environment (Genders and Player 2014; Jones 2015). Furthermore, current rehabilitative 
interventions may be characterised as re-moralising and communicative of censure 
(Robinson 2008), raising the possibility that such interventions constitute additional 
punishment. 
By combining the strengths of the criminological and liberal philosophical approaches 
to punishment, methodological approaches that fuse legal and penal theory with 
criminological insights “have significant potential to limit state power by identifying 
where punishment’s boundaries ought to lie” (Zedner 2016, p.7). By adopting this 
approach, this thesis draws attention to the extent of the coercion acting upon 
personality disordered offenders judged to be dangerous and calls into question the 
potential for “preventive” detention combined with rehabilitative opportunities to 
“balance” the rights of the public against those of the individual.  
(d) A socio-historical analysis of criminal responsibility  
Previous analyses of the role of the law in the DSPD initiative tend also to focus on its 
exclusionary aspects. Andrew Rutherford saw the DSPD proposals as an example of 
Nikolas Rose’s (2000) “risk thinking” in which the “excluded are not merely cast out 
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but become subject to strategies of control” and measures are taken to “neutralise” those 
who for whom “social inclusion” is “impossible” (Rutherford 2006, p.82). Within these 
“exclusionary circuits” “a whole variety of paralegal forms of confinement” are devised 
for those who appear “intractably risky” and “may require waiving the rule of law” 
(Rutherford 2006, p.82, quoting Rose 2000, p.333-334). Similarly, Toby Seddon and 
Bill Hebenton (2009) saw the DSPD initiative as an example of “counter-law” deployed 
to circumvent traditional legal safeguards that were seen to present barriers to the pre-
emption of harms.  
The concept of “counter-law” requires further examination in light of the legal 
framework that has come to govern the personality disordered group. The story of the 
DSPD programme shows that existing legal structures were flexible enough to allow the 
DSPD group to be detained in hospital even before the removal of the treatability 
criterion from the MHA 1983 (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a). Furthermore, forms of 
subjective capacity-based criminal law with their attendant due process guarantees are 
not the only forms of “law” currently in operation. Liability for defective criminal 
character significantly pre-dates and continues to co-exist alongside these more “liberal” 
forms of criminal law (Lacey 2001a; 2001b; 2011; 2016).  
Liberal criminal law theory’s emphasis on capacity and moral culpability as the basis 
for criminal responsibility means that it has difficulty accounting for the survival of 
forms of criminal responsibility based on liability for defective criminal character 
(Lacey 1987). Rather than characterising forms of law that do not fit with liberal 
criminal law theory as “counter-law”, a more productive approach is to view the law in 
its socio-historical context. For Lacey, such an approach opens up the possibility of 
seeing “the contingency of particular legal arrangements” and “the role, function and 
characteristics of criminal law as a form of power in modern societies” (Lacey 2016, 
p.12). Rather than something to be dismissed as an anomaly that is out of step with 
principles such as the rule of law, attention must be paid to the claims of forms of 
character and risk-based responsibility (Lacey 2016) to fulfil the social function of 
protecting the public from danger.  
The analysis presented in this thesis also exposes the problematic nature of systems that 
combine both retributive and consequentialist principles and allow for individuals 
categorised as “dangerous” to be punished both for their past crimes and the risks of 
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future danger they pose. The exploration of the historical relationship between 
character, punishment and “reform” presented in this thesis will also serve to highlight 
the coercion underlying attempts at the rehabilitation of personality disordered offenders 
within the criminal justice system. The coercive or punitive nature of rehabilitative 
interventions with personality disordered offenders may also undermine their 
effectiveness, leading to increased use of preventive detention and increasing 
punishment. 
 
8. The Significance of the Research 
This thesis presents an in-depth, up-to-date and comprehensive critique of the law and 
policy governing personality disordered offenders that builds on and expands previous 
analyses, particularly the work of Jill Peay (2011a; 2011b; 2014; 2015; 2016). In 
addition, the thesis makes a significant contribution to developing an understanding of 
the under-researched interactions between sentencing decisions, selection for the DSPD 
programme or OPDP and the administrative processes of managing offenders in prisons 
and secure hospitals. It highlights the degree to which control has been extended over 
personality disordered offenders through administrative means and the pitfalls of 
relying on rehabilitative treatment as a means of limiting preventive detention. These 
insights have relevance to “dangerous” offenders beyond the DSPD group. 
The thesis contributes to a growing literature on forms of “preventive justice” 
(Ashworth and Zedner 2014) in which rights are increasingly “securitised” (Lazarus 
2012) in a fundamental state of public “insecurity” (Ramsay 2012a). It also traces the 
contours of a form of “late-modern rehabilitation” (Robinson 2008) that has perhaps 
more in common with Victorian approaches to reforming criminal characters (see Lacey 
2011; 2016; Garland 1985) than the literature on macro-level trends in penal policy 
acknowledges. The research presented here also demonstrates the continuing influence 
of penal rationalities left over from the earlier “era” of “penal-welfarism” which was 
“animated by the practice of classifying and treating offenders in order to return them to 
the fold of citizenship” (Loader and Sparks 2004 p.6-7). Furthermore, it highlights the 
coercion underlying seemingly “liberal” (Moore and Hannah-Moffat 2005) criminal 
justice policies. Finally, it puts forward some suggestions for a normative framework 
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that can better respond to the particularities of the personality disordered offender and 
avoid the risk of disproportionate punishment presented by the use of preventive 
detention and rehabilitative interventions in the current system. 
 
9. Thesis Outline  
Part I: Policy and Practice in Relation to Dangerous Offenders with Severe 
Personality Disorders 
Chapter 2: The Origins of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder  
This chapter traces the origins of the DSPD initiative. It is argued that the policy was 
not merely a law-and-order reaction to one or two “high profile cases” but rather an 
attempt to respond to the long-standing problems presented by personality disordered 
offenders. This was given greater impetus by a perceived need to “do something” in 
response to public concerns. The “hybrid” (Seddon 2008) nature of the DSPD initiative 
may be partly explained by its interdepartmental roots, as early policymakers sought to 
marry together the objectives of the Home Office and Department of Health. The 
proposals also sought to strike a “balance” between the right of the offender to liberty 
and the purported “right” of the public to protection from dangerous offenders. The 
resulting compromise had a progressive or liberal appearance and was heavily 
dependent on the discovery of treatment and management techniques that would both 
reduce the distress of the DSPD group and help them to progress towards release. It also 
demonstrates the continuation of the rationales that underpinned the penal welfare era 
and highlights the coercion underlying the pursuit of rehabilitation.  
Chapter 3: The Pilot DSPD Programme  
Early assessments of the DSPD programme were disappointing, particularly in terms of 
the number of treatment hours inmates received and their slow movement through the 
system. In this chapter it is argued that the programme was not a cynical exercise in 
“warehousing” dangerous prisoners (Tyrer et al. 2010, p. 97), however, but rather that a 
combination of factors, including unrealistic expectations, operational issues, the 
characteristics of the patient group, and the premature commissioning of evaluations, 
led to an appearance of “warehousing” despite a commitment to treatment. On the other 
  
37 
hand, the programme also performed a risk monitoring function that could operate to 
hold patients and prisoners back where treatment did not reduce the risks they posed.   
Chapter 4: The Offender Personality Disorder Pathway  
At first, the OPDP appears to be a more concerted effort to follow through on the 
original aims and methods of the DSPD programme. On closer examination, however, it 
emerges that the plans for the OPDP appear to uncouple the goal of enhancing 
wellbeing from that of reducing risk. Nevertheless, the OPDP continues to 
accommodate more holistic treatment approaches that target the causes of personality 
disorder. In this sense, the OPDP remains ambivalent towards the nature of personality 
disordered offenders and does not seem much closer to resolving the dilemmas that led 
the early DSPD policymakers to propose a separate system. The analysis presented in 
this chapter sets the scene for a consideration of the implications of the OPDP and the 
current legal structure for the human rights and civil liberties of personality disordered 
offenders in the second half of the thesis. 
Part II: Dangerous Offenders with Severe Personality Disorders and the Legal 
Framework  
Chapter 5: Dangerous Personality Disordered Offenders in the Criminal Justice 
System  
This chapter examines the complex web of sentencing provisions and administrative 
rules that have come to govern personality disordered offenders in the criminal justice 
system. The increasing use of indeterminate and lengthy determinate sentences, 
supervision requirements and civil preventive orders with dangerous offenders all point 
towards a revival of liability for defective criminal character. In the case law of the 
ECtHR, the public’s “right to security” (Lazarus 2007; 2012; Ramsay 2012a; 2012b; 
2012c) takes precedence over the offender’s “right to rehabilitation” (Van Zyl Smit et 
al. 2014). It is argued that, instead of having a “right to rehabilitation”, offenders who 
are presumed dangerous due to a personality disorder have a “duty” to engage in 
treatment. The priority given to the “right” of the public to security over the rights of 
individual offenders suggests that liberalism pursues “security” over liberty (Neocleous 
2007). In this context, rehabilitation emerges as a means of rendering the coercive 
practice of preventive detention more palatable for liberal governments (Loader 2006). 
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Chapter 6: Dangerous Personality Disordered Offenders in the Mental Health 
System  
This chapter examines the application of mental health legislation to individuals in the 
personality disorder category. Access to defences and pleas on the grounds of mental 
disorder, including unfitness to plead, insanity and diminished responsibility, is 
particularly limited for personality disordered offenders due to the focus on cognitive 
rather than volitional deficits. Following the decision of the Court of Appeal (CA) in 
Vowles, prison sentences are to be prioritised for personality disordered offenders, who 
are judged to be unsuitable for hospital disposals due to the dubious “treatability” of 
their disorders. Conversely, a broad understanding of treatability is used to allow the 
detention of personality disordered offenders in hospital on the grounds of risk. The 
result is that personality disorder operates as a double-edged sword in the service of 
punishment and the protection of the public. Furthermore, detention in hospital at the 
end of a determinate prison sentence may be understood as an extension of punishment. 
Chapter 7: The Role of Rehabilitation in the Management of Dangerous Severely 
Personality Disordered Offenders 
In this chapter it will be argued that neither classical nor positivist theories of 
punishment on their own can provide an adequate explanation for the contradictory 
conceptions of the personality disordered offender deployed by law, policy and practice. 
It is suggested that the concept of responsibility for defective criminato l character 
described by Nicola Lacey (2001a; 2001b; 2011; 2016) may provide a means of 
reconciling judgments of criminal responsibility with the use of preventive detention. 
This also provides an explanation for why the personality disordered offender must 
engage in rehabilitation in order to secure his release. Any proposals to reform the 
system would have to take into account the risks the delivery of rehabilitative 
interventions in coercive settings poses to the wellbeing of personality disordered 
offenders and the prospect of disproportionate punishment arising from the use of 
preventive detention. Attention must also be paid, however, to the symbolic nature of 
efforts to reassure the public that they are protected against those who provoke fear.  
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Part I: Policy and Practice Governing Dangerous Offenders 
with Severe Personality Disorders 
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Chapter 2: The Origins of Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder 
 
1. Introduction 
The first half of this thesis, beginning with this chapter, traces the origins and 
subsequent development of the Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder programme 
and its successor, the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway. In this chapter it will be 
argued that the DSPD initiative was more than a “populist law and order” (Mullen 
2007) response to a group of dangerous “monsters” (Seddon 2008). The initiative 
emerges as the latest in a line of failed attempts to deal with longstanding problems, 
including the premature release of dangerous offenders from prison and the 
unproductive “custodial” care given to personality disordered offenders in the health 
system.  
Furthermore, it will be argued that the DSPD proposals cannot be characterised as a 
means of disguising the preventive detention or “warehousing” of troublesome 
offenders (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97). Instead, the plans sought to marry together health 
and criminal justice aims and to “balance” the interests of the public against those of 
personality disordered offenders (Home Office and Department of Health 1999). This 
arrangement depended heavily on the development and provision of treatment and 
management techniques that would improve the mental health of the DSPD group and 
reduce the risks they posed so that they could eventually be reintegrated into the 
community. Nevertheless, it was clear that the right of the offender to liberty would be 
subordinate to the purported right of the wider public to be protected from harm 
(Boateng and Sharland 1999). This calls into question the true nature of the “balance” 
being struck between competing interests. This theme will be returned to in the second 
half of this thesis.  
 
2. The Advent of the DSPD Proposals 
In several accounts, the immediate origins of the DSPD proposals are traced back to the 
arrest of Michael Stone in July 1997 and his subsequent conviction in October 1998 
(Seddon 2008; Howells et al. 2007; Peay 2011b; Freestone 2005; Beck 2010; 
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Pickersgill 2012). Lin Russell and her daughters Megan, aged six, and Josie, aged 9, 
were brutally attacked with a hammer on a country lane in Chillenden, Kent on 9th July 
1996. Lin and Megan were killed while Josie survived despite sustaining serious 
injuries. A psychiatrist and other staff who had treated Stone at a medium secure 
hospital unit contacted police after seeing a televised reconstruction of the murders and 
developing the view that Stone resembled the man sought by police (Francis et al. 2006, 
para. 21.1). Stone was arrested and subsequently tried and convicted of two counts of 
murder and one count of attempted murder and given three life sentences. A subsequent 
appeal against his conviction was rejected.
1
 Michael Stone continues to maintain his 
innocence. The grounds for his conviction appear questionable as there was no forensic 
evidence tying him to the scene of the crime and he was convicted principally on the 
grounds of a confession made to a fellow prisoner.
2
  
At the time of his trial for murder, Stone was presented in the media as a man who was 
known by mental health services to pose a danger to the public but who could not be 
detained because he was thought to be “too dangerous” or “untreatable” by psychiatrists 
(Francis et al. 2006). Some reports even stated that he had told doctors he had fantasies 
of killing children in the days before the attack and had begged to be admitted to 
hospital (Francis et al. 2006, Table 14.1). The later Report of the Independent Inquiry 
into the Care and Treatment of Michael Stone (Francis et al. 2006) exposed these and 
other claims as glaringly inaccurate. The Inquiry noted that while Stone posed problems 
of diagnosis and there had been some failings in his care, this was “emphatically not a 
case of a man with a dangerous personality disorder being generally ignored by 
agencies or left at large without supervision” (Francis et al 2006, p.5). Furthermore, the 
Inquiry stated that if Stone had indeed perpetrated the horrific crimes of which he had 
been convicted, it “found no evidence that they would have been prevented if failings in 
provision of treatment, care, supervision or other services to Mr Stone had not 
occurred” (Francis et al 2006, p.4).  
                                                 
1
 R. v. Michael John Stone [2001] EWCA Crim 297; R (Michael Stone) v. CCRC [2011] EWHC 3995. 
2
 According to a website campaigning for Stone’s release, the confession relayed by Damien Daly 
contained no more information than could have been gleaned from newspaper reports available at the 
time (see http://www.michaelstone.co.uk). Stone’s application to the Criminal Cases Review Commission 
(CCRC) was rejected on the grounds that it was unlikely the Court of Appeal would admit new evidence 
from a witness claiming that Daly had told him eight years previously that he had lied in court. The High 
Court also rejected Stone’s application for judicial review of the decision on the grounds that it was one 
the CCRC was entitled to reach. 
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Toby Seddon points to the Michael Stone case as having “raised concerns about the 
effectiveness of the penal and mental health systems in protecting the public” (Seddon 
2008, p. 301-302). For other commentators, the Stone case provoked a “national 
political debate” on “the medical response to personality disorder” (Eastman 1999b, p. 
206) and “ignited a war of words between the Home Office and the psychiatric 
profession” (Rutherford 2010, p.49). Martyn Pickersgill situates the Stone case in the 
broader context of “public fears about predatory paedophiles and serial killers” 
provoked by “media constructions of a dangerous individual abandoned by mental 
health professionals as a consequence of legal constraints” (Pickersgill 2012, p.6). 
Others saw the DSPD proposals more generally as a political response to public fears 
provoked by a handful of high profile cases (Mullen 1999; White 2002; Law Society 
2000. See also Treasaden and Weller 2004, Eastman 1999a). These included the cases 
of Robert Oliver and Sidney Cooke, two paedophiles convicted of the manslaughter of 
14 year old Jason Swift. Oliver was released in April 1998 after serving two thirds of a 
15 year sentence and Cooke was released in September 1997 after serving 11 years. 
Their release caused public outcry and sparked off protests and vigilante attacks (BBC 
News 2013; BBC News 1998; Wainwright 1999).   
Tony Maden, on the other hand, acknowledges that while “the announcement of a new 
service coincided with the conviction of a notorious offender, Michael Stone” “it is a 
mistake to attribute too much significance to this piece of political theatre” (Maden 
2007, s.8). For Maden, the “true motivation” for the proposals “was not a single case 
but longstanding frustration within government at the refusal of psychiatrists to address 
the problem of high-risk offenders with personality disorder” (Maden 2007, s.8). 
Andrew Rutherford also points to earlier roots and argues that the Stone case did not 
prompt the development of the DSPD proposals but was a convenient “presentational” 
tool that provided “a narrative into which embryonic proposals might be located 
alongside the rationale and justification to carry them forward into the political arena” 
(Rutherford 2006, p.80). Rutherford points to the formation of a small group of officials 
drawn from the Home Office and Department of Health shortly after the election of the 
New Labour government in May 1997. The research presented in this thesis shows, 
however, that the origins of the proposals can be traced much further back.  
The links made to the Stone case in the literature are not surprising given that then 
Home Secretary Jack Straw announced that he and the Minister for Health, Frank 
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Dobson, were “urgently considering” “changes in law and practice” in relation to 
dangerous mentally disordered offenders three days after Stone was convicted (HC Deb, 
26 October 1998, col. 9W). In the House of Commons on 26 October 1998, A.J. Beith 
of the Liberal Democrats asked Straw whether he believed that “further measures” were 
“needed to deal with offenders who are deemed to be extremely violent because of 
mental illness or personality disorder, but whom psychiatrists diagnose as not likely to 
respond to treatment” (HC Deb, 26 October 1998, col. 9W). Beith explained that 
concerns had arisen not only following the conviction of Michael Stone but because 
there had been “a tendency in recent years for psychiatrists to diagnose a number of 
violent people as not likely to respond to treatment” (HC Deb, 26 October 1998, col. 
9W). In response, Straw launched a public attack on the psychiatric profession for their 
perceived failure to deal adequately with dangerous patients:  
Quite extraordinarily for a medical profession, the psychiatric profession has 
said that it will take on only patients whom it regards as treatable. If that 
philosophy applied anywhere else in medicine, no progress would be made in 
medicine. It is time that the psychiatric profession seriously examined its own 
practices and tried to modernise them in a way that it has so far failed to do (HC 
Deb, 26 October 1998, col. 9W). 
A further public attack was made on 8 December 1998 by Frank Dobson on the policy 
of “care in the community” introduced by the previous Conservative government. 
Dobson claimed that the policy had “failed” and its “failure to deal effectively with the 
most severe cases [...] [had] dealt a blow to all mental health efforts and lost the 
confidence of the public” (HC Deb, 8 December 1998, col. 145). Dobson informed the 
Commons that he and Straw were considering proposals “to create a new form of 
renewable detention for people with a severe personality disorder who are considered to 
pose a grave risk to the public” (HC Deb, 8 December 1998, col. 146).  
Dobson’s statement reflected the claims made in a White Paper entitled Modernising 
Mental Health Services published the same day (Department of Health 1998). As a hint 
of what was to come, the White Paper mentioned that proposals for the reviewable 
detention of personality disordered offenders were “likely to require the development of 
specialist programmes under conditions providing both appropriate security and 
interventions designed to reduce and manage risk” (Department of Health 1998, para. 
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4.32). It was also clear that “the safety of the public” would be “of prime concern” 
(Department of Health 1998, para. 4.33). 
In July 1999, a Green Paper entitled Managing Dangerous People with Severe 
Personality Disorder appeared. The Paper described a small group of serious offenders 
suffering from severe forms of personality disorder who presented a risk to the public. 
“The overwhelming majority” of the DSPD group had “committed serious offences 
such as murder, manslaughter, arson, serious sex offences, or grievous bodily harm” 
(Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.12). It was estimated that around 1,400 
men in the DSPD group were detained in prison while about 400 were detained in 
psychiatric hospitals. A small group of between 300 and 600 men who were “generally 
well known to local police, health and social services because of their dangerous and 
demanding behaviour” but who had not been convicted of a recent offence were 
estimated to be abroad in the community (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, 
p.12). The numbers of women were expected to be much lower, later estimated at 
around 50 in total (DSPD Programme et al. 2006, p.8). 
At the time the Green Paper was published, individuals in the DSPD category could not 
be detained beyond the prison sentence imposed for their last offence and could not be 
civilly committed to a psychiatric institution following the expiry of that sentence 
unless they were certified as suffering from mental illness, psychopathic disorder or 
mental impairment under the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA 1983). “Psychopathic 
disorder” was defined as “a persistent disorder or disability of mind (whether or not 
including significant impairment of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive 
or seriously irresponsible conduct on the part of the person concerned” (former s.1(2) 
MHA 1983). Compulsory committal to psychiatric hospital on this ground was 
contingent on treatment being “likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration of [the 
patient’s] condition” (former s.3(2)(b) MHA 1983). As psychopathic disorder was 
considered untreatable by some psychiatrists, the “treatability” criterion was presented 
by the government as a stumbling block to the detention of these individuals in 
psychiatric hospital (Peay 2011b, p. 176). 
“DSPD” was not a recognised clinical diagnosis but rather an administrative category 
describing a troubled and troubling group with multiple complex problems. In addition 
to posing a risk to the public upon release, the DSPD group were also described as 
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“highly disruptive” and were said to pose “significant management challenges in 
institutional settings” and a “constant threat” to staff and other inmates (Home Office 
and Department of Health 1999, p.12). They were also “adept at undermining 
management regimes” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.12). This small 
group of offenders was not only portrayed as dangerous and disruptive, however, but 
also as distressed and in need of help for their disorders (Home Office and Department 
of Health 1999, p.49).  
“Severe personality disorder” was defined in the 1999 Green Paper as an “inability to 
relate to others, poor control of impulses and difficulty in learning lessons from 
previous experience” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.7). This 
definition did not appear in any diagnostic manuals but seemed to describe a particular 
subset of individuals diagnosed with antisocial or dissocial personality disorders. In 
addition, those in the DSPD group were said to be affected by high rates of substance 
misuse, suicide, depression, anxiety, illiteracy, poor relationships, unemployment and 
homelessness (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.48).  
The 1999 Green Paper put forward two options for addressing the issues identified. 
Option A would retain the existing legal framework with some changes aimed at 
facilitating the preventive detention and extended supervision of the DSPD group. The 
treatability criterion would be removed from the MHA 1983 and there would be new 
powers for assessing prisoners on remand for DSPD and for the supervision and recall 
of DSPD patients following their release from hospital. Judges would be encouraged to 
make greater use of the discretionary life sentence with those identified as DSPD in 
order to avoid their premature release. On the operational side, specialist treatment 
facilities would be established within existing structures, those services already in place 
would be improved and joint working between the prison and hospital estates 
encouraged.  
Option B went significantly further. It proposed the creation of a dedicated service for 
the DSPD group that would be separate from the existing prison and secure hospital 
systems. Individuals in the DSPD group would be detained and treated in the new 
facility under a “DSPD direction” available to courts ruling in criminal or civil 
proceedings. There would also be powers to supervise and recall those released from the 
new service into the community. Under this regime, the location of detention “would be 
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based on the risk that the person represented and their therapeutic needs rather than 
whether they had been convicted of an offence” (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p. 5). Notably, and controversially, this indicated that detention could take 
place without the need for a criminal trial and conviction. Option B, also referred to as a 
“third service” or “Third Way” for the DSPD group (Fallon 1999, para. 7.12.1), was the 
preferred option of the ministers and civil servants behind the proposals.  
 
3. Historical Approaches to Longstanding Problems  
(a) Treatability in mental health law  
A discussion was put forward in the 1999 Green Paper of the history of attempts to deal 
with problematic individuals similar to those in the DSPD group. This brief history 
began with the 1904 Royal Commission on the Care and Control of the Feebleminded 
which proposed that State care and control be extended to “moral imbeciles”. These 
individuals were not easily categorised as “feebleminded” as their intellectual 
functioning was generally unimpaired but yet they were perceived to be “mentally 
defective” due to their propensity for antisocial behaviour. They were described as 
“absolutely devoid of all moral and altruistic feeling” and lacking in the “capacity for 
mental comparison and discrimination, for forming judgments, and for looking ahead” 
(Tredgold 1926, p.5). This group was eventually incorporated into the Mental 
Deficiency Act 1913 as “moral defectives, that is to say, persons in whose case there 
exists mental defectiveness coupled with strongly vicious or criminal propensities and 
who require care, supervision and control for the protection of others” (Mental 
Deficiency Act 1919, s.1(1)(d)).  
In 1957, the Percy Commission on Law relating to Mental Illness and Mental 
Deficiency proposed the abolition of the category of moral defectives and the creation 
of a new category of “psychopathic patients”. The Commission could not agree on a 
definition of psychopathic disorder, however, and consequently the Ministry of Health 
elaborated the following: “a persistent disorder of personality (whether or not including 
subnormality of intelligence) which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously 
irresponsible conduct on the part of the patient”. This became a ground for compulsory 
detention and treatment under the MHA 1959 (s.4(4)).  
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According to the Home Office in its Memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee 
examining the DSPD proposals, the inclusion of the “treatability criterion” in the MHA 
1983 “marked a fundamental shift away from the previously-held view that the 
management and, where possible, treatment of people with psychopathic disorder […] 
was a legitimate function of the health service” (Home Office 2000, para. 6). However, 
it should be noted that “psychopathic disorder” was further defined in the MHA 1959 as 
a condition that “requires or is susceptible to medical treatment” (MHA 1959 s.4(4)). 
This stemmed from the recommendation of the Percy Commission that compulsory 
powers should not apply to adult psychopaths unless their behaviour was serious 
enough to bring them into conflict with the law and treatment was the most appropriate 
disposal (Fallon 1999, para. 6.1.18).  
The inclusion of a treatability test in the MHA 1959 casts doubt on Jack Straw’s claim 
in Parliament on 26 October 1998 that there had been a “change in the practice of the 
psychiatric profession which, 20 years ago, adopted […] a common-sense approach to 
serious and dangerous persistent offenders” (HC Deb, 26 October 1998, col.9W). 
Furthermore, Jack Straw’s “common-sense” approach does not line up with the 
concerns of the 1961 Report of the Working Party on the Special Hospitals (Ministry of 
Health 1961). The Working Party was nervous of the implicit assumption in the MHA 
1959 that psychopathic disorder could be treated and worried that the NHS would be 
forced to take on potentially large numbers of new patients whose care and treatment 
was problematic (see Fallon 1999, para. 6.1.24-28). This is in stark contrast with the 
concern of Straw’s government that the treatability test was being used to exclude 
patients and demonstrates a change in the concerns of governments towards personality 
disordered patients. 
The MHA 1983 retained the category of psychopathic disorder, defined in similar terms 
to the MHA 1959, but the explicit reference to treatability was removed. Instead, a 
subsection specified that detention in hospital would only be permissible in cases of 
psychopathic disorder or mental impairment where medical treatment was “likely to 
alleviate or prevent a deterioration in [the patient’s] condition” (original MHA 1983 
s.3(2)(b)). This clause was intended “to allow clinicians to discriminate between those 
who were and were not treatable and to protect patients from inappropriate detention in 
hospital” (Fallon 1999, para. 6.1.50).  
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(b) The Butler Committee and the reviewable sentence 
The Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders was established by the Home 
Office and Department of Health and Social Security (DHSS) in 1972 to investigate the 
criminal and mental health law applying to mentally disordered offenders, examine 
expert evidence and make recommendations. The Committee conducted its review in 
the wake of two high profile cases involving serious reoffending by two patients given 
conditional release from Broadmoor hospital. Graham Young, known as “The Teacup 
Poisoner”, carried out further poisonings, and Terence Iliffe, who had seriously 
assaulted his former wife, went on to strangle his new wife (Bowden 1996). At their 
respective trials, both were found not to be suffering from mental disorder and were 
convicted and sentenced to prison (Butler 1975, para. 4.1).  
In a review of the evidence that does not differ greatly from that conducted by the 
Fallon Inquiry (1999) almost 25 years later (see below), the Butler Report (1975) noted 
that the accuracy of clinical and actuarial predictions of reoffending by mentally 
disordered individuals was very limited. It also noted that there was not necessarily a 
link between dangerousness and mental disorder and individuals could remain 
dangerous even after their mental disorder had been successfully treated. The 
Committee also concluded that “the great weight of evidence” tended “to support the 
conclusion that psychopaths are not, in general, treatable, at least in medical terms” 
(Butler 1975, para. 5.34).  
In their memorandum of evidence to the Butler Committee, the Home Office and DHSS 
drew attention to “the problem of the legal obligation to release, at the end of 
determinate prison sentences, a small number of men who are probably dangerous but 
who are not acceptable for treatment in hospital” (Butler 1975, para. 4.34). This 
indicates that interdepartmental work in relation to the dilemmas presented by the 
DSPD group had begun at least 24 years prior to the publication of the 1999 Green 
Paper. In response to this problem, the Butler Committee recommended the introduction 
of a reviewable sentence for dangerous offenders, defined as those with “a propensity to 
cause serious physical injury or lasting psychological harm” to others (Butler 1975, 
para. 4.10). The sentence would not be “punitive in intent but designed to enable the 
offender to be detained only until his progress under treatment […] [would] allow him 
to be released under supervision without serious risk to the public” (Butler 1975, para. 
  
49 
4.39). The sentence would be discretionary and reserved for offenders convicted of a list 
of offences which “had caused or might well have caused grave harm to others” (Butler 
1975, para. 4.41).  
In the view of the Butler Committee, the secure containment of psychopathic offenders 
was best carried out within the prison service. The Committee further proposed the 
establishment of prison “training units” for dangerous psychopaths that would allow 
suitable volunteers to take advantage of a structured regime and vocational training 
opportunities that would encourage the process of maturation and lead to their eventual 
release (Fallon 1999, para. 6.1.42). The Committee did not recommend the use of 
hospital as a place of preventive detention but it did support the use of hospital orders 
for psychopathic offenders where treatment in hospital could be expected to be of 
benefit to the patient.  
The 1999 Green Paper commented that Butler’s reviewable sentence proposals “were 
not really consistent with the stated aim of tackling future dangerousness” because the 
sentence could only be imposed where the individual had previously been convicted of 
an offence for which a life sentence was available (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p.38). The new sentence never came to pass “because it appeared to add 
little to what could be achieved through the mechanism of the discretionary life 
sentence” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.38). Furthermore, as the 
sentence would have been prospective in nature it would not have resolved the more 
immediate problem of the release of prisoners from determinate sentences. Thus the gap 
identified by the government remained and interdepartmental work on the issue of 
dangerous personality disordered offenders continued. 
(c) Interdepartmental working groups 
In 1986, a joint Home Office and DHSS working group was established to consider 
changes to the recently introduced MHA 1983 to deal with another problem presented 
by offenders suffering from psychopathic disorder. Here the concern was with restricted 
patients being discharged from special hospitals by Mental Health Tribunals where they 
were “no longer suffering from psychopathic disorder or no longer suffering from it to a 
nature or degree which made it appropriate for [them] to be liable to be detained in a 
hospital for medical treatment but the public was nevertheless felt to be at risk.” (Home 
Office and DHSS 1986, para. 15(iii). Original emphasis). Again, this anxiety had been 
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provoked by a “small number of cases” (Home Office and DHSS 1986, para. 15(iii)). 
As highlighted by Jill Peay, the “theoretical legal lacuna” underlying this problem was 
that once an offender had been diverted into the hospital system and away from the 
penal system, his continued detention depended on the fulfilment of the terms of the 
MHA 1983. Consequently, “considerations of protective custody and retribution, either 
explicit or covert” could no longer play a part in decisions governing his release (Peay 
1988, p. 69).  
The Working Group put forward three legislative options. The first would have replaced 
the s.37 hospital order with a provision that would allow the court to sentence a 
mentally disordered offender to imprisonment but to direct that he be admitted directly 
to hospital. The second proposal was to remove the option of a hospital order for 
offenders with psychopathic disorder so that only a penal disposal could be given at 
sentencing with the option of a later transfer to hospital. The third would have confined 
the use of hospital orders to offenders with psychopathic disorder who would not have 
merited a restriction order. As noted by Peay (1988), if adopted, the proposals could 
have exposed the public to a greater level of danger. Unless courts were encouraged to 
make greater use of the discretionary life sentence, the removal of the hospital order 
option would entail greater numbers of psychopathic offenders being given determinate 
sentences and released without supervision while potentially dangerous. Responses to 
the consultation paper from professionals in the field were largely negative and the 
proposals were quietly dropped (Peay 1988).  
The subsequent Review of Health and Social Services for Mentally Disordered 
Offenders and Others Requiring Similar Services, chaired by Dr John Reed (1992), led 
to the establishment of a Department of Health and Home Office working group on 
psychopathic disorder (Reed 1994). Reed commented in his evidence to the Fallon 
Inquiry that psychopathic disorder “was by far the most difficult topic he had taken on 
to review” (Fallon 1999, para. 6.1.75). It was a subject upon which it was 
“extraordinarily difficult […] to produce very positive conclusions” and “it had proved 
extremely difficult to get agreement on a wide range of issues” (Fallon 1999, para. 
6.1.75). In sum, he concluded “we do not know what [the disorder] is caused by, we do 
not know how to measure it, we do not know what interventions are effective and we do 
not know very well how to measure the consequences of intervention” (Fallon 1999, 
para. 6.1.75).  
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It may come as no surprise that the principal recommendation of the Working Party’s 
report was to instigate “a comprehensive programme of research” on interventions for 
the disorder (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p. 38). However, it also put 
forward proposals for a “hybrid order” intended for psychopathic offenders of uncertain 
treatability not far removed from the first proposal of the 1986 Working Group. 
According to Jill Peay and Nigel Eastman, the hybrid order was conceived to 
“encourage psychiatrists to ‘have a therapeutic go’ in the knowledge that, should the 
offender prove untreatable, patient and doctor would not remain locked (literally) long 
term in a non-therapeutic relationship” (Eastman and Peay 1998, p. 96). The proposals 
led to the creation of the hospital and limitation direction, introduced into the MHA 
1983 by the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. This order, available under s.45A, allows 
offenders to be given a prison sentence but sent straight to hospital for treatment. The 
provision has been little used but may grow in importance following the guidance 
issued by the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Vowles, discussed in Chapter 6. 
The joint memorandum of the Home Office and DHSS to the Butler Committee in 1975 
and the establishment of the interdepartmental Working Group in 1986 demonstrate that 
officials from the Home Office and DHSS had been working together on longstanding 
problems in the decades prior to the publication of the 1999 Green Paper. This indicates 
that the controversial DSPD proposals have a long history that significantly pre-dates 
the Michael Stone case and even the election of the New Labour government in May 
1997.  
 
4. Concurrent Reviews  
 (a) The Fallon Inquiry 
The Fallon Inquiry was appointed in February 1997 by Stephen Dorrell, then Secretary 
of State for Health under John Major’s Conservative government. The remit of the 
Inquiry was to investigate allegations made by Steven Daggett, a former patient of the 
personality disorder unit (PDU) at Ashworth. These included “possible paedophile 
activity on one of the wards of the PDU, the availability of pornography, drugs and 
alcohol, and financial irregularities” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.1.1). The Inquiry was 
encouraged by both Dorrell and his New Labour successor, Frank Dobson, “to look 
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more widely than [its] relatively narrow brief to focus on matters of broad policy 
interest” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.2.3). As part of its broader task, the Inquiry examined in 
detail “the controversies surrounding the diagnosis, treatment and treatability of 
personality disorder and the right services for individuals with personality disorder” and 
focused particularly on “the severe end of the spectrum” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.2.3). In 
addition to hearing evidence from a number of witnesses, the Inquiry arranged seminars 
with experts on these broader issues and visited a number of specialist services in the 
UK, Holland, Germany and Switzerland.  
The Report of the Fallon Inquiry summarises evidence from nine patients at the PDU. 
Overall, the patients’ evidence “gave a sense of time passing with precious little 
progress” and “an atmosphere of inertia […] in which poor practice, apathy and 
corruption [could] flourish” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.25.34). The bulk of the clinical input 
into the patients’ treatment at Ashworth was psychological, and this appeared to be 
standard practice with personality disordered patients. Some of the Inquiry’s expert 
witnesses asserted in their evidence, however, that the diagnosis and assessment of 
patients remained the job of psychiatrists. This was because the psychologists were not 
trained to conduct medical assessments of patients and were not authorised to prescribe 
medication (Fallon 1999, para. 4.5.6 - 7). While the Inquiry recommended that the 
“input of clinical psychology to the PDU should be sharply increased” (Fallon 1999, 
para. 4.9.6) it also noted the limits of the psychologists’ abilities, commenting that “the 
effectiveness of much of what they do is still under-researched” (Fallon 1999, para. 
4.9.3).  
In his account of the origins of the DSPD proposals, Andrew Rutherford argues that the 
Fallon inquiry raised the prospect that personality disorder could be treated by giving a 
voice to forensic psychologists who were optimistic about the contribution their skills 
could make. He also asserts that the conviction of Michael Stone was an important 
presentational tool that illustrated the urgency of the problems the government proposed 
to address (Rutherford 2006). For Rutherford, the scandals and inquiry at Ashworth and 
the arrest and conviction of Michael Stone were “events” that “gave shape and direction 
to the policy-making process” and “were, themselves, also shaped by it” (Rutherford 
2006, p.64). The central role played by psychologists at Ashworth casts some doubt on 
Andrew Rutherford’s (2006) assertion that the Fallon Inquiry allowed this professional 
group to rise to prominence, however. It is clear from Fallon that psychological 
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treatments were acknowledged to be the most appropriate interventions for personality 
disorder.  
The attack Jack Straw launched on psychiatrists in the House of Commons on 26 
October 1998 contrasted starkly with the deferential tone of the previous government. 
On the appointment of the Fallon Inquiry, Stephen Dorrell, then Secretary of State for 
Health, indicated that questions regarding the treatment of patients “suffering from 
long-term personality disorders” were being considered by the psychiatric profession 
and were “best dealt with in that context, as it is the clinicians who ultimately have to 
make the decisions about the treatment of individuals” (HC Deb, 10 February 1997, col. 
24). In the same vein, Dorrell, while acknowledging the existence of “a serious question 
about the proper provision for people with severe personality disorders” suggested “that 
lay Members of this House should approach this question by taking the advice of 
trained psychiatrists, who have a proper understanding of what is and is not possible 
with modern psychiatric science” (HC Deb, 10 February 1997, col. 29). While 
psychologists already appeared to have a prominent position in practice, Jack Straw’s 
interventions in Parliament demonstrate that the government had become frustrated with 
the scepticism of some psychiatrists and that it was looking to other professions for a 
more optimistic view on treatment. Straw emphasised that society “should not write 
anybody off” and “somebody may be deemed untreatable by a particular group of 
psychiatrists, but be susceptible to treatment by clinical psychologists, psychoanalysts 
or psychotherapists, or just within a therapeutic community” (HC Deb, 15 February 
1999, col. 605).  
The DSPD initiative cannot be characterised as stemming from a “loss of faith in the 
capacity of psychiatric experts to reform offenders” linked to “increasingly pessimistic 
modes of crime control (such as punitive sentencing)” (McRae 2013, p.53). Rather than 
shunning or breaking with expertise, the government wished to harness those experts 
who shared its optimistic stance on treatment. This is in contrast with the “new 
penology” that Jonathan Simon and Malcolm Feeley argue has come to replace the “old 
penology” which was concerned with reforming offenders (1992). The task of the new 
penology is “managerial, not transformative” (Feeley and Simon 1992, p.452). It seeks 
to “identify, classify, and manage groupings sorted by dangerousness” in order “to 
deploy control strategies rationally” rather than to “intervene or respond to individual 
deviants or social malformations” (Feeley and Simon 1992, p.452). The DSPD 
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initiative, however, had much loftier ambitions than mere classification and risk 
management. In the DSPD proposals, “dangerousness” and personality disorder were 
purposely constructed as potentially mutable qualities and the message was one of 
therapeutic optimism.  
The DSPD story also illustrates a “turf war” between psychologists and psychiatrists 
that was well underway before the 1999 Green Paper appeared. The theme of 
professional rivalry between these two groups was raised by several interviewees. In the 
view of one civil servant involved in developing the DSPD proposals: 
The psychiatrists were much more powerful than the psychologists, and we 
sometimes did have a bit of a feeling that the psychiatrists were wanting to have 
their cake and eat it. That they wanted to maintain that managing and everything 
to do with this group of people was something for them rather than 
psychologists, but at the same time wanted to be able to say that there was no 
treatment you could give so they could say “no, go away”.  
Similarly, a practitioner remarked:  
Most psychiatrists would not have had anything to do with a personality disorder 
service. And that is a split that runs through the professions in a way because I 
think psychologists can see that this is a lot of work that they could do, a 
massive opportunity, whereas all psychiatrists could see was a problem, for all 
sorts of reasons. They were very negative about it.  
It is clear from Fallon, however, that there was a range of views amongst psychiatrists 
and other mental health practitioners as to whether or not personality disorder could be 
treated. This indicates that the “split” was not necessarily along professional lines. One 
survey of forensic psychiatrists conducted in 1992 noted by the Fallon Inquiry found 
that about 10% of respondents “were totally dismissive of psychopaths and their 
treatability” while another 10% “stated equally vehemently that psychiatrists had a duty 
to treat this group of patients who caused suffering to themselves and society” (Fallon 
1999, para. 6.6.4). The rest were “somewhere in between” (Fallon 1999, para. 6.6.4). 
The Inquiry heard evidence from psychiatrists who were optimistic about treatment 
“who deem[ed] it right never to give up, and never to stop trying” and others who 
believed that treatment may succeed with some personality disordered individuals but 
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not those at the more severe end of the spectrum (Fallon 1999, para. 6.65). It concluded 
that “there continues to be a wide diversity of opinion among experts from all the 
professions about the treatment and management of personality disorder and particularly 
severe personality disorder” (Fallon 1999, para. 6.10.1). However, it seemed that, due to 
a lack of robust empirical evidence, scepticism about the effectiveness of the range of 
treatments on offer at the time appeared to hold sway.  
Although the 1999 Green Paper had yet to be published, the Fallon Inquiry considered 
the option of a “third service” for personality disordered offenders similar to that 
proposed in Option B. In the Inquiry’s view, such a service would have a number of 
advantages. It would relieve prisons and hospitals of difficult individuals and be free 
from “the weight of history and accumulated failures” of both types of institution in 
relation to this group (Fallon 1999, para. 7.12.4). Furthermore, the units would present 
an opportunity for research and the development of clinical skills in treating personality 
disorder. Ultimately however, the Inquiry did not support the third service due to its 
potentially negative effects. These included additional bureaucracy and the likelihood of 
rivalry between the Department of Health and the Home Office over who owned the 
service. There were also concerns that the new service would be neither a “true 
healthcare service nor a proper penal one” (Fallon 1999, para. 7.12.9). The Inquiry also 
noted that the service had the potential to become isolated from the therapeutic 
mainstream and have difficulties in attracting good staff. Finally, it commented that 
“concentrating the most problematic people in the system could be a recipe for disaster” 
(Fallon 1999, para. 7.12.12). Several of these remarks appear prophetic in light of the 
problems that were to surface in the implementation of the DSPD pilot programme, 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Like the government, however, the Fallon Inquiry was of the opinion that “doing 
nothing” about the problem of dangerous personality disordered offenders being 
released from prison “[was not] an acceptable policy” (Fallon 1999, para. 7.4.4). The 
Inquiry disapproved of the use of the MHA 1983 to effect preventive detention, 
expressing the view that “hospitals are not prisons” and “only those who are willing and 
able to benefit should be transferred to and remain in hospitals” (Fallon 1999, para. 
7.2.1). Like the 1986 Working Group, it suggested that hospital orders should no longer 
be an option for personality disordered offenders and it also recommended replacing 
“psychopathic disorder” in the MHA 1983 with the less stigmatising term of 
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“personality disorder” (Fallon 1999, para. 7.6.8). The Inquiry also recommended the 
introduction of a reviewable prison sentence similar to that proposed by the Butler 
Committee. This sentence would be available where a life sentence was not and 
composed of a determinate tariff followed by the option to renew detention for up to 
two years at a time. Perhaps foreshadowing the introduction of the broader-based 
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment for public protection (IPP), introduced by the 
Criminal Justice Act 2003, the Fallon Inquiry commented that the government could 
choose to expand the application of the reviewable sentence to other “dangerous 
offenders” who did not suffer from personality disorder but who nevertheless posed “a 
substantial risk of causing harm to others after release from prison” (Fallon 1999, para. 
7.5.7). 
(b) The Richardson Committee 
In October 1998, Ministers at the Department of Health appointed an Expert Committee 
to conduct a review of the Mental Health Act 1983, chaired by Professor Genevra 
Richardson. In its report, the Richardson Committee presented a vision of a new Mental 
Health Act based on the concept of capacity and the principles of patient autonomy, 
reciprocity, and non-discrimination (Department of Health 1999a). Under the scheme, a 
patient could be detained for treatment where he was found to be suffering from a 
mental disorder, broadly defined, that was sufficiently serious to require medical care 
and treatment under the supervision of specialist mental health services and where he 
lacked capacity to consent to such care and treatment. Treatment would not be imposed 
on the patient unless it was “necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the 
protection of others from serious harm or for the protection of the patient from serious 
exploitation” and the treatment could not be delivered without compulsion (Department 
of Health 1999a, para. 5.95).  
The Committee acknowledged that personality disordered patients, who in general 
retain capacity to make decisions regarding their care and treatment, would fall outside 
the scope of the proposed test (Department of Health 1999a, para. 4.15). To compensate 
for this gap, the Committee proposed that the autonomy of a mentally disordered patient 
with capacity could be overridden where there was “a substantial risk of serious harm 
to the health or safety of the patient or to the safety of other persons if s/he remains 
untreated” and where there were “positive clinical measures included within the 
  
57 
proposed care and treatment which [were] likely to prevent deterioration or to secure an 
improvement in the patient’s mental condition” (Department of Health 1999a, para. 
5.95. Emphasis added). The latter condition was akin to the “treatability” test in the 
MHA 1983. However, the “substantial risk” and “serious harm” requirements set a 
higher threshold than the civil sections of the MHA 1983, which merely required 
compulsory treatment to be “necessary for the health or safety of the patient or for the 
protection of other persons”.  
The Richardson Committee’s concern for patient autonomy and reciprocity presented 
barriers to the risk-based detention of a group for whom there was a scant evidence base 
for treatment. Like the Fallon Inquiry’s proposed reviewable sentence, which was 
prospective in nature, the Richardson Committee’s proposals did not provide an 
immediate solution to the problem of dangerous offenders who had already been given 
determinate sentences. It may not come as a surprise, therefore, that the Committee’s 
proposals were only accepted in part and separate plans were drawn up for the DSPD 
group.  
 
5. Uniting Competing Rights and Interests  
Drawing on insights from contemporary documents and interviews with some of those 
involved in the elaboration of the 1999 consultation paper, it will be argued in this 
section that the DSPD proposals were a response to long-standing problems given 
greater impetus by public concerns about the release of dangerous offenders spurred on 
by oftentimes inaccurate and sensationalist media reporting. The proposals were also a 
compromise between the priorities of the Home Office and Department of Health in 
relation to the DSPD group and aimed to strike a “balance” between the rights and 
interests of the public. Despite efforts to present the proposals in a liberal and 
progressive light, however, they were to prove highly controversial and radical plans for 
a “third service” for the DSPD group were eventually scaled back. 
(a) A civil service initiative  
Andrew Rutherford traces the proposals put forward by the 1999 Green Paper to the 
formation of  “a small group of civil servants, drawn from the Home Office and the 
Department of Health” “within weeks of the Labour Party’s election victory in May 
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1997” (Rutherford 2006, p. 52). No individual authors were named on the face of the 
paper but reference was made to a “joint working group of officials” established by 
Home Office and Health Ministers in the summer of 1997. The remit of this group was 
“to examine the position and make recommendations for changes in the legal and 
operational framework for managing dangerous severely personality disordered people” 
(Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.10). The fact that the interdepartmental 
working group was formed so quickly after the May 1997 election indicates that its 
foundations had been laid in previous years. The working group may also be seen as 
carrying on a tradition of interdepartmental work on the problem of dangerous offenders 
that began as far back as 1975. According to interviewees, the working group was the 
initiative of a group of civil servants keen to continue the work of the Reed Review 
(1994) begun under the previous government. When it was time to brief incoming 
Department of Health and Home Office Ministers following the 1997 General Election, 
civil servants in both Departments sought to keep the issue of personality disordered 
offenders on the agenda.  
Both the Fallon Inquiry and the Richardson Committee’s proceedings were on-going 
while the interdepartmental working group were developing the DSPD proposals and 
there is evidence of exchanges between these bodies (Rutherford 2006). The Fallon 
Inquiry had early access to the plans for a third service for the DSPD group and 
ultimately rejected the proposals in favour of the reviewable sentence. What is most 
notable, however, is the rejection by the 1999 Green Paper of most of the experts’ 
central recommendations and the decision to forge a different path. As noted earlier, this 
decision may be understood in light of the drive to find a solution to the immediate 
problem of the release of dangerous offenders from determinate prison sentences. The 
rejection of Fallon and Richardson’s recommendations is also likely to have played a 
part in the strident opposition to the plans and the subsequent demise of the idea of a 
separate service for the DSPD group, discussed further below.  
While the DSPD initiative was initially sparked off by a group of civil servants eager to 
continue work done under previous governments, interviewees also pointed to a 
“ministerial push” behind the plans. As can be seen from their comments in Parliament, 
the initial push came in particular from Home Secretary Jack Straw and Minister for 
Health Frank Dobson. Interviewees cited Dobson’s conclusion that Care in the 
Community had “failed”, Straw’s desire to take on the psychiatric profession, and Tony 
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Blair’s promise to be “tough on the causes of crime” as part of the political drive behind 
the DSPD proposals. Some interviewees also alluded to an interest taken by “Number 
10” in the issue, which resided mostly in the need to protect the public:  
The [DSPD] Programme came about I think […] largely because of ministerial 
pressure, and from Number 10 it has to be said, ‘oh something needs to be done 
with this difficult group, who we don’t want running around, killing people’, 
crudely (Civil Servant). 
The DSPD problem was also seen as an opportunity for a new government to tackle a 
problem that provoked public fear in a way that previous administrations had failed to 
do. For ministers, here was “a seemingly intractable, intellectual problem”, “a blank 
sheet” “vested interests that […] needed to be taken on, and […] a group of people who 
were at risk and who were a risk to others” (Politician). In other words, there was a gap, 
and Tony Blair’s New Labour government had the opportunity to fill it. This gives 
weight to Rutherford’s view that the proposals contained in the 1999 Green Paper “are 
more appropriately located within a proactive rather than a reactive scheme” 
(Rutherford 2006, p.79-80).  
(b) High profile cases and the “real problem” of dangerous offenders 
Given the findings of the Inquiry into his care and treatment, there are reasons to 
wonder why the Michael Stone case became such a potent “presentational” tool for the 
1999 proposals (Rutherford 2006). As Jill Peay notes, Stone’s problems were complex 
and it is unclear that he would have come within the DSPD criteria (Peay 2011b, p.178). 
At times his behaviour was attributable to personality disorder while at others he 
appeared to show signs of mental illness. In the five years preceding the murders, his 
main difficulties were with drug abuse rather than personality disorder. Delays in 
publishing the Inquiry’s report are likely to have contributed to the continuing 
association between the Stone case and the DSPD proposals. The report was completed 
in November 2000 but was not published until September 2006, some 10 years after the 
crimes had been committed and 8 years following Stone’s conviction.  
The delay left significant time for inaccurate media reporting on the case to influence 
debates on the DSPD proposals. This was clearly true in case of the Home Affairs 
Committee, which reported in 2000 that the Stone case “highlight[ed] such issues as 
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why people are released from prison when they are known still to be dangerous, why 
the courts do not give discretionary life sentences in appropriate cases and why people 
who ask for medical help do not necessarily receive it” (Home Affairs Committee 
2000a, para. 3). In the eyes of the Committee, the Stone case gave rise to the rhetorical 
question of whether it was “right that the State should be powerless to intervene in a 
case where someone has yet to commit a criminal offence and whom the medical 
profession consider to be untreatable, even if that person poses a very real danger to 
society” (Home Affairs Committee 2000a, para. 3).  
Inaccurate media coverage was not confined to the Stone case. An article in The 
Guardian published in 1999 listed a number of “high profile cases of killers who had to 
be released while still deemed dangerous” (Travis 1999). The first mentioned was 
Michael Stone and it was falsely stated that he “told a nurse five days earlier of violent 
fantasies about killing and asked to be admitted to hospital, but he was deemed 
untreatable and refused a place” (Travis 1999). Another case cited was that of Darren 
Carr, who was employed as a live-in babysitter and went on to burn down the house of 
his employer, killing her and both her children. Carr was said to have been “released 
from a mental hospital after being diagnosed as untreatable in 1993” (Travis 1999). In 
contrast, the Report of the Inquiry into the Treatment and Care of Darren Carr 
(Richardson et al. 1997) noted that when Carr was released in October 1993 it was not 
because he was “untreatable” but because he had made progress in treatment and his 
detention was deemed to be no longer necessary. Agencies had previously taken action 
on several occasions where Carr’s behaviour indicated a threat to others. While the 
clinical teams that assessed Carr could have decided that no mental illness was present 
and his psychopathic disorder was not treatable in hospital, they instead chose to admit 
him due to the risks he posed to himself and the public. Similarly to Stone, Carr would 
have been an unlikely candidate for the DSPD programme before the murders due to 
doubts surrounding his diagnosis and the absence of a record of serious offending.  
Other cases cited in support of the DSPD proposals were of dubious relevance. In 
Parliament, Jack Straw referred to convicted sex offenders such as Robert Oliver who 
had been released from prison “with no conditions imposed on what they did or on 
where they lived” (HC Deb, 15 February 1999, col. 601). Minister Paul Boateng 
specified that “violent, predatory paedophiles” would be among the group targeted by 
the government’s measures to tackle dangerous personality disordered offenders (HC 
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Deb, 25 February 1999, col. 394W). Given that the MHA 1983 excluded detention on 
grounds of “sexual deviancy” alone, however, many sexual offenders and paedophiles 
would have fallen outside the DSPD proposals.  
Like the IPP sentence, the DSPD proposals may be better understood as a response to 
what was perceived by officials and ministers as the “perennial ‘real problem’” of 
dangerous offenders being released from determinate sentences rather than to a small 
number of high profile cases (Annison 2015, p.33). Former Minister Paul Boateng 
offered anecdotal evidence of this problem to the Home Affairs Committee. Boateng 
described a visit to HMP Durham where prison officers told him about a man who was 
shortly to be released from a special unit. Prison officers described him as “highly 
dangerous” and “were absolutely convinced” he would reoffend. Although he had “been 
in prison for a long time” his “condition remained as it was and [he] presented a risk to 
the public” (Home Affairs Committee 2000b, Minutes of Evidence, 30 November 1999, 
para. 115).  
One interviewee described the problem as follows: 
The proposition that Michael Stone was knocking on the door of a hospital only 
to be turned away perhaps is a bit apocryphal, but I’ve come across enough 
examples where the health service did not want an offender because they were 
too difficult or too dangerous and the custodial system was incapable of 
managing them properly or humanely because there was not an adequate 
component of health or psychiatric involvement to make sure that that person’s 
needs were properly managed (Civil Servant). 
Toby Seddon suggests that “discussions of actuarial tools, risk ‘scores’ and public 
protection might be taken to imply that the DSPD initiative has been largely an 
instrumental or technical phenomenon”. He argues that the initiative had “powerful 
emotive dimensions too” (Seddon 2008, p.310). Seddon argues that, rather than being 
presented as evidence for ever-tightening social control exercised by a “paranoid” state, 
certain “risk-based strategies” may be better characterised “as pragmatic responses to 
legitimate anxieties” (Seddon 2008, p.313). These “anxieties” include public fears of 
dangerous offenders. This is reflected in the long history of efforts to address the 
“perennial ‘real problem’” of high risk individuals serving determinate sentences 
(Annison 2015, p.33). 
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The proposals may therefore be understood in part as a rational response to individuals 
with a history of serious offending who are judged to pose a danger to the public and 
who could not be adequately managed by the prison and secure hospital systems. It is 
clear that the need to reassure the public also played an important part, however. One 
early policymaker conceded in interview that while the policy was not a reaction to it, 
the Stone case had contributed to an “atmosphere of needing to demonstrate that the 
government was doing something” about the perceived problem of recidivist mentally 
disordered offenders. This contributed a sense of urgency to plans that had in fact been 
in development for some time.  
In this sense, the aim of the DSPD strategy was to enhance the objective and subjective 
security of the public. “Objective” security may be defined as a state of being protected 
from real or actual threats to safety. As a “subjective condition”, on the other hand, 
“security” “suggests both the positive condition of feeling safe, and freedom from 
anxiety or apprehension” (Zedner 2003, p.155). Subjective states of security make no 
“reference to the objective reality to which the feeling may or may not pertain: they 
describe feelings alone” (Zedner 2003, p.155). Nikolas Rose (2010) highlights that 
public fears of the mentally ill and efforts to contain them appear to be out of proportion 
to the levels of risk they actually pose when compared to other groups, such as young 
men who consume alcohol (Rose 2010, p.87). He attributes this to the enduring fear of 
predatory “monsters” and the “fundamental division between ‘we, the public’ who can, 
in our imagination, conduct ourselves responsibly according to the norms of civility, 
and those others that threaten us” (Rose 2010, p.87).  
Jonathan Wolff (2006), on the other hand, explains that the perception that some 
hazards are perceived to be “worse” than others of the same objective magnitude may 
be explained through the fact that they generate greater fear or “moral concern or 
outrage” (Wolff 2006, p.418). Wolff argues that “we blame people and organizations 
where we feel they have violated some moral norm; and an extreme form of blame is 
outrage” (Wolff 2006, p.419). Reoffending by individuals known to the criminal justice 
and mental health systems is apt to provoke blame and public outrage and calls for 
“something to be done” in response. The government appeared to be pressed to respond 
to these calls and put forward a set of radical proposals for preventive detention. 
(c) An interdepartmental narrative 
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Rutherford notes that while the authorship of the 1999 Green Paper was “cross-
departmental”, the concerns of the Home Office and Department of Health in relation to 
the DSPD group “were rather different” (Rutherford 2006, p.56). For him, “the focus of 
the Department of Health was largely upon the quality of care and therapeutic 
interventions offered to the offenders, while that of the Home Office was primarily 
directed at public safety” (Rutherford 2006, p.56). In the early days, public protection 
seems to have been the main driver. In one statement by Jack Straw, treatment for the 
DSPD group has the appearance of an afterthought:  
We need a third approach, under which those who are suffering from severe 
personality disorders and who pose a grave risk to the public can be kept in 
securer conditions as long as they continue to pose that risk. There they may 
have treatment, if such treatment can be identified (HC Deb, 18 January 1999, 
col. 551W).  
Closer to the publication of the plans, however, the tone changed and references to the 
health needs and social reintegration of the DSPD group were given increasing 
prominence. Thus, Jack Straw asserted that while the “key aim” of the proposals was 
“to protect the public”, they were also intended to “[meet] the health needs of [DSPD] 
individuals” and give them “the best possible chance of becoming safe so as to be 
returned to the community, wherever that is possible” (HC Deb, 15 February 1999, col. 
602).  
Subsequent statements issued by the Home Office were careful to highlight the intended 
health benefits. Thus, in a Memorandum submitted to the Home Affairs Committee, the 
Home Office stressed that: 
[The] detention of dangerous severely personality-disordered people for the 
purpose of protecting the public is only one – albeit a very important one – of 
the Government’s objectives in this area. Effecting a significant improvement in 
the way in which these people are treated, and the level of threat they present 
reduced, is a parallel priority. (Home Office 2000, para. 2) 
Thus, there was no bright dividing line between the motivations of the ministers and 
civil servants involved.  
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Junior Minister Paul Boateng took the lead on promoting the proposals: first as 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Department of Health in 1997 and 
subsequently as Minister of State at the Home Office in 1998 (see Boateng and 
Sharland 1999; Rutherford 2006). The plans also traversed the division between the 
health and criminal justice systems. In the words of the 1999 Green Paper, the “security, 
therapeutic and management needs [of the DSPD group] cut across services 
traditionally provided by criminal justice and health agencies [and neither] the prison 
service nor the health service [was] currently well placed to provide the full range of 
interventions they need” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p. 10).  
Given the characteristics of the DSPD population as a distressed and dangerous group, 
for ministers and officials the solution could not be “just about locking them up and 
throwing away the key in the prison service and the prison punitive model, nor […] 
about some sort of therapeutic ideal” (Civil Servant). The resulting proposals were 
located somewhere between the two. The twin aims of the DSPD proposals – risk 
management and treatment provision – were described by one interviewee as an attempt 
to marry together the diverging objectives of the two ministries. 
There was also a sense from policymakers from both the Home Office and Department 
of Health in interview that the institutional constraints and cultures of the health and 
criminal justice systems were part of the problem and there was a need to break out of 
them. On one hand, the prison service saw its role as “fundamentally about humane 
containment” (Civil Servant). Its “focus was about reoffending rather than necessarily 
[…] intervening in the wider sense with prisoners to […] change their personality, 
enable them not just to not offend, but enable them to actually have a more productive 
and rewarding life, even inside their own heads” (Civil Servant). On the other hand, the 
health service was “very reluctant to get their fingers burnt by being saddled with 
responsibility for managing and treating a group of people that the clinicians felt that 
they could do nothing for, and very, very reluctant at having the label being pinned on 
them as being nothing other than jailors, kind of turn-keys” (Civil Servant). This may 
clearly be seen in the opposition to the plans discussed later. 
Exposure to efforts to deal with similar problems in other countries also permitted 
policymakers to envisage a radical solution they saw as fitting with the British context. 
Members of the working group and ministers found visits to clinics in Holland, 
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Germany and the American State of Minnesota particularly illuminating. For these early 
policymakers, the American sexually violent predator laws were very much “focused on 
the issue of management and control [and] much too relaxed about keeping people 
incarcerated for long, long periods” (Politician). On the other hand, the Dutch 
terbeschikkingstelling (TBS) system was perceived to be better suited to the British 
context as it was “much more driven by therapy” (Politician). However, as a result, the 
Dutch were “much more willing to take risks [and] much more willing to spend a lot of 
money driving a therapeutic solution” than would be possible in the British context 
(Politician). Thus, the DSPD proposals “sought to chart a middle course” between the 
two models (Politician). At a time of economic prosperity, there was money available in 
government for the development of a new, ambitious service. In such a context, the idea 
of a separate system for offenders with personality disorders, free from the constraints 
of both the health and criminal justice systems, became feasible.  
(d) Speaking the language of rights  
Any plans to deal with the dangers posed by the DSPD group would have to comply 
with the recently promulgated Human Rights Act (HRA) 1998 (see Boateng and 
Sharland 1999; Home Office and Department of Health 1999). Human rights law 
therefore offered a language through which the compromise between health and security 
concerns could be expressed. In his evidence to the Select Committee on Health, Mike 
Boyle, Head of the Mental Health Unit of the Home Office, argued: 
If you look at the position as it applies at the moment where you have damaged, 
disordered individuals who are not receiving adequate services either from the 
Prison Service or from the NHS, who are distressed themselves, cause distress to 
their families and communities around them, and we are saying in effect there is 
no response to that, that seems to me to be an infringement not only of their 
human rights but of the human rights of the rest of society (Select Committee on 
Health 2000b, Minutes of Evidence,18 May 2000, para. 635). 
The “middle course” was not only a compromise between the competing interests of the 
Home Office and Department of Health but was also presented as an effort to ensure 
public protection while meeting the rights of offenders to treatment and providing them 
with a route towards social reintegration. The perception that the DSPD group was not 
just dangerous but also needy formed the basis for an argument that the DSPD 
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proposals were a win-win situation. This was expressed in terms of a “balance between 
the human rights of individuals and the right of the public to be protected from these 
very dangerous people” (Boateng and Sharland 1999, p.7). The “deal” suggested by the 
government was stated by Paul Boateng as follows:  
Society has both a right and a need to protect itself from the actions of this small 
group of people who because of their disordered personality, pose an 
unacceptable level of risk of causing serious harm to others. But in return for 
taking action to protect itself by detaining these people, possibly indefinitely, 
society incurs an obligation to provide effective services to these people. 
Services designed to help them make the changes they need to so that they can 
return to the community safely. (Boateng and Sharland 1999, p.7) 
In essence, the “balance” or bargain struck by the proposals meant that, in exchange for 
their detention to protect the public, dangerous offenders with personality disorder 
would be offered tailored treatments aimed both at alleviating their personal distress and 
reducing the risks they posed to the public so that they could eventually be released.  
Gwen Robinson argues that current rehabilitative approaches with offenders are “a far 
cry from the rights-based model of offender rehabilitation, which many would wish to 
revive” (Robinson 2008, p.433). This appears to conflict with the central justification of 
the DSPD proposals that the provision of treatment they were a means of “balancing” 
the rights of offenders against those of the public. Viewed in this way, the justifications 
for the DSPD initiative have a great deal in common with the welfarist approaches to 
offenders that David Garland (2001) and Robinson (2008) argue have been displaced in 
“late modern” times.  
The view taken of the DSPD offender by policymakers and practitioners as “damaged” 
and the “obligation” to provide interventions geared towards enhancing their wellbeing 
also suggests that welfarist motivations played an important part in the motivations of 
the policymakers behind the DSPD initiative. The emphasis was not only on treating the 
aspects of the person that led them to be a risk, as in the American model, but also on 
more holistic interventions to improve the offender’s overall wellbeing. The proposals 
also indicate the survival of the rehabilitative ideal, as the proposals did not aim only to 
preventively detain dangerous individuals but also to rehabilitate them so that they 
could be reintegrated into society. This seems to contradict accounts of the decline of 
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penal welfarism (Garland 2001) and the turn towards a “new penology” concerned with 
managing rather than intervening with offenders (Feeley and Simon 1992).   
Toby Seddon contends that the DSPD initiative was “hybrid” in nature as it represented 
the “coupling together of a novel focus on risk with a more archaic concern about 
dangerous subjects” (Seddon 2008, p.309). He also sees the DSPD programme as an 
example of New Labour’s approach to penal policy, in which a “self-conscious 
‘toughness’ has sat alongside a more conventionally progressive faith in the 
transformative potential of interventions with offenders” (Seddon 2008, p. 301). Seddon 
does not look much further into the source of this apparent contradiction, however. The 
“hybrid” appearance may be attributable both to the interdepartmental nature of the 
DSPD proposals and the compromise the proposals sought to strike between competing 
interests, expressed in terms of human rights and civil liberties. 
The DSPD proposals, with their focus on offering treatment to a distressed group, 
appear at first glance to be more progressive and liberal than the IPP sentence, a 
measure also aimed at addressing the “real problem” of dangerous offenders released 
from determinate sentences (Annison 2015, p.33). According to Harry Annison, Home 
Secretary David Blunkett was suspicious of what he regarded as “liberal” civil servants 
(Annison 2015 p.53) and criminal justice Minister Lord Falconer was motivated by the 
desire to take “‘aggressively populist anti-liberal stances’ […] in the name of party 
image and electoral advantage” (Annison 2015 p.48, citing Anderson and Mann 1997, 
p.22). The more “progressive” aspects of the plans for DSPD may be attributable in part 
to the influence of “liberal” civil servants, who were given relatively free rein under 
Paul Boateng. The background of Paul Boateng as a civil rights lawyer is also likely to 
have had an influence on the presentation of the proposals and to have pushed them in 
the direction of a compromise between competing rights. 
It was nonetheless evident from the 1999 Green Paper that where treatment was not 
found to reduce risk, public protection and indeterminate detention would prevail 
(Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p. 6). The need to appear “tough on 
crime” also played a role in the IPP sentence as Home Secretary David Blunkett sought 
to “balance ‘liberal’ or ‘progressive’ measures with ‘tough’ talk and action” to show 
that the  newly elected government was capable of tackling crime issues just as well as 
the Conservatives (Annison 2015, p.46; see also p.47).  
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Dawn Moore and Kelly Hannah-Moffat (2005) argue that the progressive appearance of 
rehabilitative interventions forms a “liberal veil” that obscures the essential punitiveness 
of these practices. Similarly, references to “balancing” rights may serve to obscure the 
essentially coercive nature of preventive detention. The focus of the DSPD proposals on 
the offender’s “right” to therapeutic intervention also serves to draw attention away 
from his right to liberty which is infringed in the pursuit of public protection. The 
analysis of the legal framework governing dangerous offenders with personality 
disorder presented in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis reveals a very similar mode of 
“balancing” competing rights. However, the clear priority given to the protection of the 
public over the rights of the offender calls into question the nature of the “balance” 
being struck. As will be seen later, the rights of individuals who have come in conflict 
with the law to liberty and freedom from disproportionate punishment are readily 
compromised in a model that prioritises the ill-defined “right” of a nebulous “public” to 
protection from dangerous offenders. 
 
6. Controversy and the Demise of the Third Service 
(a) Opposition to the plans 
Opposition to the proposals in the 1999 Green Paper was vociferous and widespread. As 
Jill Peay remarked, “proposals which can unite in opposition MIND, the Law Society, 
Liberty and the Royal College of Psychiatrists suggest that the Government may need to 
reflect further” (Peay 1999, p. 23). Psychiatrists in particular were stridently opposed to 
the plans, and a flurry of critical articles appeared in medical journals such as the British 
Medical Journal, the British Psychiatric Journal and the Lancet. Psychiatrist Paul 
Mullen in an early commentary described the proposals as “glaringly wrong - and 
unethical” given the diagnostic difficulties surrounding personality disorder, 
uncertainties regarding treatment and the vagaries of risk prediction (Mullen 1999). He 
also voiced the profession’s resistance to “the role of judges and jailers charged with 
maintaining public order” (Mullen 1999, p. 1146).  
Psychiatrists were not alone in opposing the plans. Ronald Blackburn, a Professor of 
Clinical Psychology, was also critical of the DSPD concept. He asserted that “the idea 
of a clearly demarcated category of ‘dangerous psychopaths’ or ‘severe personality 
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disorders’ represents a disease entity approach which is at best a gross 
oversimplification and at worst a demonic stereotype” (Blackburn 2000, p. 2). He also 
criticised the DSPD construct as “inherently circular” as it was “likely that clinicians 
would judge the severity of a PD in terms of the serious antisocial behaviour supposedly 
resulting from it” (Blackburn 2000, p.8).  
Concerns were particularly strongly expressed regarding the proposals for preventive 
detention in the absence of a criminal conviction. The Royal College of Psychiatrists, in 
its Memorandum to the Home Affairs Committee, was critical of what it saw as an 
attempt to use mental health legislation “to get around any absence of preventative 
detention in English Law” (Royal College of Psychiatrists 2000). The College further 
argued that it was not the role of the psychiatrist “to extend the sentence of those who 
have committed a crime or to impose one on those who have not” (Royal College of 
Psychiatrists 2000). In its view, “this would have disturbing echoes of the abuse of 
psychiatry in other countries that the College has fought so hard against in the past”. 
Furthermore, it branded the government’s “assumption that [the] proposals [could] be 
made compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights” as “naïve” (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists 2000).   
There was also considerable opposition to the plans on legal grounds. Nigel Eastman 
(1999) voiced the suspicion that the proposals were designed to circumvent the 
prohibition on the preventive detention of persons not convicted of any offence in 
Article 5 of the ECHR by expanding the use of detention on the grounds of unsound 
mind. The Law Society also noted that “although the consultation paper states that the 
Government's proposals are not in breach of the ECHR, this is far from clear” (Law 
Society 2000). The Society was critical of the DSPD construct itself, asserting that “if 
people are to be deprived of their liberty, whether temporarily or indefinitely, because 
they are deemed to be in a particular category, that category must be clearly defined in 
the statute” (Law Society 2000). It further expressed concerns that, in view of the 
paucity of effective treatments, it was “difficult to see how people diagnosed as having 
severe personality disorder, who have also been deemed to pose a risk of dangerous 
behaviour, will ever be able to show they no longer pose a threat to public safety, 
particularly as they will be unable to rely on any clinical intervention to bring about an 
improvement in their condition” (Law Society 2000). It will be argued in the chapters 
that follow that this criticism is still apt today. 
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The Home Affairs Committee conducted an inquiry to examine “the balance” struck by 
the proposals “between protecting the public and respecting the human rights of 
individuals” (Home Affairs Committee 2000a). It ultimately came down in favour of 
Option B, stating “on balance” that “a separate service” was “most likely to protect the 
public, meet the needs of the individuals concerned and satisfy the requirements of the 
European Convention on Human Rights” (Home Affairs Committee 2000a, 
Recommendation 15). The Select Committee on Health performed a similar review but 
came to a very different conclusion. Unable to support either Option A or Option B, it 
recommended instead “that research should be initiated on the treatment of anti-social 
personality disorder, that adequate facilities should be made available within the NHS 
for those suffering from a recognised disorder who are able to benefit from treatment, 
and that further thought should be given to the proposal of reviewable sentences to 
provide those who are deemed a danger to the public but who are genuinely not 
amenable to treatment in the NHS” (Select Committee on Health 2000a, 
Recommendation QQ).  
The controversy and the length of time it took to push through reforms to the MHA 
1983 made it seem unlikely that something as ambitious as a separate service for the 
DSPD group would ever make it off the drawing board. As will be outlined in the next 
chapter, the decision was delayed pending the outcome of a pilot DSPD treatment 
programme and the plans for a “third service” would never be revisited. 
(b) Looking back 
One early policymaker interviewed was wary of the idea of a pilot programme due to 
the fear that “nitty-gritty practical stuff on running pilots and trials and all of that was 
going to turn into a way of kicking the third service idea into the long grass” (Civil 
Servant). Another described the setting up of the pilots as putting the third service “on 
the back burner” (Politician). In addition to outside criticism, resistance to the third 
service was seen to come from the Treasury, which perceived it to be “all too expensive 
and all too uncertain” (Politician). Resistance may also have come from other quarters, 
as one interviewee asserted: “the third service notion was one which was uncomfortable 
for virtually everybody, certainly for the Prison Service because you’d be losing some 
of your prisons and some of your staff and same for the Health Service”. Thus, the idea 
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was “uncomfortable and challenging for lots of entrenched interests for the sake of a 
fairly speculative, long-term benefit” (Civil Servant).  
Those involved in the later stages of the DSPD programme were not in favour of 
revisiting Option B. When I spoke to them almost 15 years after its demise, the third 
service idea was, however, generally still seen by the early DSPD “evangelists” (Peay 
2011a, p.238) as the best solution to the problems identified. One early policymaker 
expressed regret that it had never come to pass. The interviewee attributed this failure to 
the inability of the policy team “to be completely crystal clear about describing this 
group in a way that would resonate with politicians generally and with other opinion 
formers and with the public” (Civil Servant). Another agreed that the third service was 
still the best way of doing things, and that it still hadn’t been “given a sufficient enough 
try” (Politician). A third policymaker was perhaps more realistic, commenting in 
relation to the third service that “you could say, ‘well it was always rose tinted 
spectacles that would have said that you can develop the whole thing’’” (Civil Servant).  
One striking finding to emerge from the interviews was the awareness demonstrated by 
policymakers of the problems with the DSPD initiative and their willingness to pursue 
the scheme despite them. The phrase “dangerous people with severe personality 
disorder” was described by one interviewee as a “compromise” and “an idea to try to 
define something that maybe wasn’t susceptible to being defined in that way” (Civil 
Servant). Another early policymaker remarked on the risk of slippage presented by the 
acronym “DSPD”, which was liable to “become misused as being ‘dangerous severe 
personality disorder’, as if the word ‘dangerous’ was qualifying the personality disorder 
rather than being a separate word to describe the people. And that’s exactly what 
happened” (Civil Servant). Indeed, it is notable that despite the fact that policy 
documents, ministers and officials consistently referred to “dangerous people with 
severe personality disorder”, this was misquoted in several critical accounts as 
“dangerous severe personality disorder” (Mullen 1999, p.1146; Blackburn 2000, p.2; 
Moran 2002). Somewhere along the way, the phrase was adopted as the title of the 
“Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) Programme” (DSPD Programme 
et al. 2006; 2008a; 2008b). As will be argued in the next chapter, the plans for the 
DSPD programme eventually escaped their creators. 
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One policymaker argued that the DSPD label had the undesired effect of reinforcing the 
notion among health professionals that the initiative “was a Home Office driven agenda 
sort of about security and about locking people up” (Civil Servant). The cross-
departmental nature of the compromise at the centre of the DSPD proposals and the 
support expressed by policymakers on both sides in interview and in documentary 
sources indicates that concerns for wellbeing were genuine. However, as noted 
previously, statements by Ministers and the 1999 Green Paper did emphasise that the 
protection of the public was the “prime concern” of the plans for the DSPD group. 
Furthermore, the campaign to remove the treatability criterion from the MHA 1983 may 
have undermined efforts to present the plans as therapeutically-driven.  
The plans to preventively detain dangerous individuals without trial may also have 
contributed to the perception that the plans were punitive in nature. David Garland 
characterises preventive detention and the imposition of lengthy prison sentences on 
certain categories of offender as a “punitive” strategy that denies the limits of the state 
to control crime. He asserts that “together with their expressive or reductionist 
objectives, these ‘law and order’ policies frequently involve a knowing and cynical 
manipulation of the symbols of state power and of the emotions of fear and insecurity 
which give these symbols their potency” (Garland 1996, p.460). Similarly, Andrew 
Rutherford highlights the “instrumental” and “expressive” claims of the “eliminative 
ideal” which “strives to solve present and emerging problems by getting rid of 
troublesome and disagreeable people with methods that are lawful and widely 
supported” (Rutherford 1997, p.117).  
It is questionable whether preventive detention in the DSPD proposals may be 
characterised as “expressive” of punitive sentiments, however. The “third service” was 
conceived as a means of detaining those who posed a danger to the public in a non-
punitive therapeutic environment. Indeed, one interviewee involved in the plans viewed 
the links made by the media to the Michael Stone case as very damaging, as they 
“reinforced all the negative perceptions amongst psychiatric clinicians, that this was just 
a Home Office punitive agenda” (Civil Servant). Others were adamant that the DSPD 
proposals were not just “about locking people up” (Politician) but about finding a 
balance between public protection and meeting the needs of a neglected group of 
offenders. Notably, the policymakers involved with the DSPD proposals mentioned in 
interview that they were not in favour of the IPP sentence. In their opinion, the sentence 
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was too far skewed in the direction of punitiveness and did not strike the right “balance” 
between the rights of offenders and those of the public.  
The centrality of finding effective treatment and management techniques to the 
compromise underlying the DSPD proposals also contradicts accounts that saw the 
initiative as “an ill-conceived attempt to hide the imposition of preventive detention and 
indefinite sentences behind the veneer of respectability provided by a mental health 
context” (Mullen 2007, s.3). These analyses are missing a closer look at the origins of 
the proposals and the programme that would have revealed a concern with enhancing 
offender welfare and providing a route to release shared by officials and ministers in the 
Department of Health and the Home Office.  
The centrality of treatment to the compromise struck between the interests of the Home 
Office and Department of Health and between the rights of offenders and the public also 
casts doubt on claims that the subsequent DSPD programme was engaged in the mere 
“warehousing” of troublesome individuals (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97) or that treatment 
was deployed merely to circumvent the requirements of the ECHR (Eastman 1999a; 
Blackburn 2000). This proposition will be examined further in the next chapter. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The proposals outlined in the 1999 Green Paper, and particularly the idea of creating a 
separate service, were an attempt to break with a history of failures and institutional 
biases and to put forward a radical solution to a problem which had become very high-
profile. In addition to a drive to enhance public safety, a considerable part of the 
motivation behind the proposals was to improve provision for a difficult and neglected 
group. In the compromise formulated by the DSPD proposals, the conclusion that 
treatment could also be used to enhance public protection allowed a balance to be struck 
between the diverging goals of the Department of Health and the Home Office and 
between the competing interests of the public and dangerous individuals. However, in 
the rush to mark a new departure, insufficient attention was paid to the accumulated 
knowledge on the treatment and management of this group. The DSPD programme 
itself, discussed in the next chapter, illustrates the detrimental effects of arguably 
misplaced optimism and unrealistic expectations on the implementation of the policy.  
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As shall become clear in later chapters, therapeutic optimism has been scaled down and 
expectations have narrowed under the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway. 
However, the emphasis on monitoring risk has increased. Coupled with a greater 
reliance on indeterminate sentences, the ability to monitor risk without adequate means 
of reducing it indicates increasingly lengthy prison stays for those in the personality 
disordered group and grounds to fear increasing punishment. There are also grounds for 
questioning whether current rehabilitative interventions can deliver on the promise of 
reducing risk of reoffending and allowing offenders to be re-integrated into society. 
This casts doubt on the ability of the compromise underlying the DSPD proposals to 
strike an adequate balance between competing rights. The clear priority given to the 
protection of the public also indicates that the liberal and progressive appearance of the 
proposals conceals a more coercive reality. This argument will be developed further in 
the second half of this thesis, which will focus on the legal and normative issues arising 
from the treatment, management and detention of the DSPD group in the criminal 
justice and health systems. 
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Chapter 3: The Pilot DSPD Programme 
 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter considered the origins of the policy that led to the establishment of 
the pilot Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (DSPD) programme. This chapter 
turns to consider the whether the DSPD initiative lived up to the lofty expectations of its 
originators and the allied question of whether it could have been expected to do so. Like 
the 1999 proposals, the DSPD programme was predicated on the notion that personality 
disorder and dangerousness were linked and therefore treatments for personality 
disorder could be expected to reduce recidivism risk and allow offenders to progress 
towards release. The programme also sought to improve mental health outcomes for a 
neglected group of offenders and improve their management in institutional settings.  
Early assessments of the DSPD programme’s ability to treat the prisoners and patients 
in its care were disappointing. Inmates received a surprisingly low number of treatment 
hours and their movement through the system was slow. These findings prompted 
psychiatrist Peter Tyrer and others to assert controversially that the DSPD programme 
was engaged in mere “warehousing” and was an attempt to hold back prisoners and 
patients the authorities were too afraid to release (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97). Here it will 
be argued, however, that the DSPD programme was not a cynical exercise in 
containment because treatment was central to the compromise upon which it was based. 
It emerges from the analysis presented here, however, that in attempting to forge a new 
path, the creators of the DSPD programme did not take full account of past experiences 
and the limits of the evidence base for treating personality disordered offenders. As a 
result, the initiative failed in part to live up to the high expectations set for it in its early 
years. Nevertheless, the programme did achieve some successes in improving the 
management of a difficult group of offenders, developing new treatment programmes 
and building knowledge of the characteristics of the DSPD group.  
 
2. The Pilot DSPD Programme 
(a) Reforming mental health law 
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The proposals in the 1999 Green Paper were followed by White Paper entitled 
Reforming the Mental Health Act (Department of Health 2000a; 2000b). Part II of the 
White Paper dealt with “high risk patients”, including those in the DSPD group. A 
rather curt summary of the 290 responses to the 1999 Green Paper was presented, 
downplaying civil liberties concerns in relation to the unconvicted as founded on  
“misplaced fears about the nature of the proposals and their scope” (Department of 
Health 2000b, para. 2.6). While noting that the majority of respondents (with 
reservations) and the Home Affairs Committee preferred the proposals for a “third 
service” for the DSPD group, any decision between policy options was to be delayed 
pending the outcome of a pilot assessment and treatment programme for the DSPD 
group. In the meantime, the government proposed to “bring forward those legislative 
changes that will be required whether Option A or Option B is adopted” (Department of 
Health 2000b, para. 2.12). To this end, the White Paper outlined plans to replace the 
various categories of mental disorder with a single definition and to “move away from 
the narrow concept of ‘treatability’” in the MHA 1983 (Department of Health 2000b, 
para. 3.2).  
Members of both the Fallon Inquiry and Richardson Committee disapproved of 
direction taken by the government on mental health law. Peter Fallon QC was critical of 
what he perceived to be an overly optimistic presentation of current “good practice” in 
relation to the treatment of the DSPD group and urged the government to consider his 
Inquiry’s reviewable sentence proposal (Select Committee on Health 2000b, Appendix 
28). Jill Peay, a member of the Richardson Committee, was critical of an earlier Green 
Paper, entitled Reform of the Mental Health Act 1983 (Department of Health 1999b), 
published at the same time as the DSPD proposals. She described the Green Paper as 
“taking parts of the skeleton of Richardson, but abandoning its ethical heart […] and its 
principled musculature” (Peay 2000, p. 8). The paper had cherry-picked from the 
Richardson Committee’s proposals, adopting the broad definition of mental disorder but 
abandoning the central principles of capacity and non-discrimination. The framework 
proposed in the White Paper followed this approach and revolved around avoiding risk 
of harm to the patient and others. The result, according to the Richardson Committee, 
was “an unfortunate hybrid […] which could significantly extend the use of compulsory 
powers” (Select Committee on Health 2000b, Thursday 6 April 2000).  
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Michael Cavadino saw the “safety-plus” approach of the 2000 White Paper as a serious 
threat to patients’ rights and civil liberties (Cavadino 2002, p. 175). In relation to the 
plans for the DSPD group, he commented that “the prospect for most patients caught up 
in the new legal framework looks less likely to be a wonderful cure effected by 
treatments developed in the shiny new facilities followed by rehabilitation and timely 
release, and more likely to be old-fashioned long-term warehousing because no one 
knows how to treat them, but we are too scared to let them out” (Cavadino 2002, p. 
188). This foreshadowed the later accusation levelled by Peter Tyrer and others 
involved in evaluating the pilot assessment process that the DSPD programme was 
engaged in mere “warehousing” and delaying the release of individuals the government 
was too afraid to release (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97).  
On 14 March 2000, John Heppell MP proposed a Private Members’ Bill intended to 
create a DSPD order based on Option B in the 1999 Green Paper (Home Office and 
Department of Health 1999). The Bill did not advance past its first reading and was 
never raised again. A 2001 Progress Report on the DSPD programme confirmed that 
new legal powers would be created through the reform of the MHA 1983 and there 
would be “no separate powers or provisions for those who are DSPD” (Department of 
Health et al. 2001, p. 1).  
A policymaker who was involved in developing the pilot programme was opposed to 
the idea of a DSPD order and saw it as a “Pandora’s Box” (Civil Servant). Other 
interviewees pointed to a desire to operate within existing legal structures. This desire is 
also reflected in the history of the IPP sentence. According to Annison, in the 
“construction” of the IPP, a concern for compliance with the ECHR “intermingled with 
a more general sense of British fairness” “meshed with the legal official’s natural 
inclination to view ‘the best sort of change [as] the change which maintains continuity 
with what has gone before’” (Annison 2015, p.58, quoting Laws 2013, p. 93). The IPP 
sentence came to be modelled on the existing life sentence rather than on Fallon’s 
reviewable sentence proposal. This move was to place considerable pressure on both the 
prison system and the Parole Board and contributed in part to the eventual downfall of 
the sentence, as considered in Chapter 5.  
Political interest in the third service also began to wane, as ministers were reshuffled 
following the re-election of Labour in 2001 and the officials involved either moved on 
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or left the Civil Service. Debates on a new Mental Health Act continued in Parliament 
in the face of strident opposition from mental health professionals, lawyers and patients’ 
rights groups. Finally, the MHA 2007 was passed, amending the MHA 1983 to broaden 
the definition of mental disorder to include “any disorder or disability of mind” and 
replacing the treatability criterion with the “aspirational” (Peay 2011a, p.238) 
“appropriate medical treatment” test. The pilot DSPD programme in hospitals began to 
operate several years before the changes were introduced, however, demonstrating that 
the existing legal structures were sufficiently flexible to accommodate a new service. 
This prompts the question of whether the removal of the treatability criterion was in fact 
necessary, discussed in Chapter 6. 
(b) Setting up the pilots 
The pilot scheme was intended to be an opportunity “to develop a ‘what works’ 
evidence-base” for the assessment, treatment and management of personality disorder 
and to assuage concerns regarding treatability, diagnosis and risk prediction raised by 
responses to the 1999 Green Paper (Department of Health 2000b, para. 6.23). The pilots 
were to be “rigorously and independently evaluated” and the results would inform 
future decisions about the structure of any new service and the introduction of new legal 
powers (Department of Health 2000b, para. 14). The White Paper acknowledged that 
the strongest study design would involve the “random allocation of subjects” and 
asserted that this would “be considered and chosen if possible (subject to ethical 
considerations)” (Department of Health 2000b, para. 6.53). However, as will be seen 
further below, a randomised controlled trial has not been undertaken and the 
effectiveness of the treatments delivered by the DSPD programme remains unclear.  
The first high secure pilot for men opened in early 2001 in a refurbished prison wing at 
HMP Whitemoor known as D wing and later as the Fens Unit. A pilot DSPD hospital 
ward named Bicester Ward opened in Broadmoor in April 2003 with a small group of 
sexual offenders. The second prison unit for men, the Westgate Unit at HMP Frankland, 
was purpose-built and opened in March 2004. A purpose-built hospital unit, the Peaks 
Unit, opened at Rampton Hospital in March 2004 and in October 2005 Bicester ward at 
Broadmoor was replaced by the purpose-built Paddock Unit. The unit at HMP 
Whitemoor began as an assessment unit and by early 2005 both prison units were fully 
operational (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.22). The Primrose Unit for women at 
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HMP Low Newton opened in December 2006 and provided 12 beds within a prison 
wing also accommodating life sentenced prisoners (Department of Health 2011, p.4; 
Department of Health and NOMS 2011c, p.12). In June 2009, the Fens Unit at HMP 
Whitemoor had a capacity of 70 beds and the Westgate Unit at HMP Frankland had 86. 
However, only 61 and 76 respectively of the places were filled. In the same period, just 
39 of the 48 places at the Broadmoor unit and 50 of the 70 places at the Rampton unit 
were occupied. The women’s unit was at full capacity. In total, there were 238 patients 
and prisoners in DSPD services in June 2009, but 48 were described as “not actively in 
treatment” (Department of Health 2011, p.4). 
It was intended that new specialist high secure services would fit into a “‘whole service’ 
approach” (Department of Health et al. 2001, p.1). Pilot programmes were also 
established in the community and three medium secure hospital units were 
commissioned. From the beginning, however, the bulk of spending went on the high 
end of the service. The reason for this was explained by a policymaker in the following 
terms:   
We would never have got the money from the Treasury to set up the whole end-
to-end service as a single entity from the start from scratch. Never, ever, ever. 
What you had to do was to start focusing on the people who were of the greatest 
public concern, and they’re the people in the high security services, and so you 
try doing something about them and then spread out from that (Civil Servant). 
This top-down approach was later to pose problems for the progression of patients and 
prisoners through the hospital and prison systems. 
Despite resistance to the third service idea on grounds of cost, there was clearly money 
for a pilot service. By June 2009, the total capital investment in the DSPD programme 
came to £128 million, including the three purpose-built high secure prison and hospital 
units, three medium secure hospital units and two NHS hostels. Annual spending was 
estimated at £40 million between 2003 and 2006 and reached £60 million in 2007 (HC 
Deb, 22 June 2009, col. 598-599W). The DSPD programme ran for over a decade and 
has been described as “one of the longest running and most expensive pilot programmes 
in UK history” (Rutherford 2010). 
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According to one civil servant in interview, the motivation of the Home Office in 
setting up the DSPD programme “was entirely public protection” while that of the 
Department of Health “was wellbeing”. Like the DSPD proposals, the narrative that 
developed was a compromise born out of a “need to marry these two objectives 
together” (Civil Servant). Thus, the aim of the DSPD pilot programme was to create: 
[A] flexible service capable of responding to the fact that individuals in various 
combinations came to the system having committed some very serious offences. 
So there’s a track record, if you like. This is not pretend. There’s a genuine risk, 
having done it before there’s a very genuine risk that they will repeat that 
exercise. But at the same time you had to treat them as human beings, in terms 
of providing support and the opportunity to come to terms with what they’ve 
done, understand themselves, because very often people didn’t understand why 
they did it, and really to find coping mechanisms that reduced that risk (Civil 
Servant). 
The civil servants involved in developing the programme were also concerned to allay 
public fears and dispel the myths that had grown up around DSPD, which included the 
notion that anyone with a diagnosis of personality disorder could be labelled as 
dangerous and swept up off the streets. Key to this process was determining the criteria 
for admission to the DSPD programme. The Planning and Delivery Guide for high 
secure services for men specified three criteria for entry onto the programme. First, it 
had to be demonstrated that the candidate was “more likely than not to commit an 
offence that might be expected to lead to serious physical or psychological harm from 
which the victim would find it difficult or impossible to recover” (DSPD Programme et 
al. 2008a, p.8). Second, he or she must be diagnosed with a severe personality disorder 
as defined by one of three sets of diagnostic criteria. The first category required a score 
of 30 or above on Hare’s Psychopathy Checklist Revised (PCL-R) (Hare 1991); the 
second a PCL-R score of between 25 and 29 and at least one personality disorder 
diagnosis other than ASPD in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Organisation 1994); 
and the third required two DSM-IV personality disorder diagnoses (DSPD Programme 
et al. 2008a, p.14-15). Finally, there had to be a link between the disorder and the risk 
of offending (DSPD Programme et al. 2008a, p.8).  
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The criteria stipulated by the Planning and Delivery Guide for women’s high secure 
services also included a likelihood of serious harm and a link between the disorder and 
the risk of offending (DSPD Programme et al. 2006). The diagnostic criteria differed 
from those for men, however, and incorporated women with lower PCL-R scores but 
higher levels of comorbid personality disorders. The three categories were a PCL-R 
score of 25; a PCL-R score of between 18 and 24 and at least two DSM-IV personality 
disorder diagnoses other than ASPD; or a PCL-R score of 17 or less and three or more 
DSM-IV personality disorder diagnoses (DSPD Programme et al. 2006, p.12). The 
reasons for these differences were not given in the documents but may reflect the lower 
levels of psychopathy found in the female population (see Salekin et al. 1998). 
The criteria for both men and women appeared to target a broader group than was 
originally envisaged by the DSPD proposals, which focused on dissocial or antisocial 
personality disorder and psychopathy (Home Office and Department of Health 1999). 
The Planning and Delivery Guides further advised that the diagnostic criteria “should be 
seen as guidelines rather than rigid boundaries for admission” (DSPD Programme et al. 
2008a, p.15; 2006, p.12). As will be seen from the evaluative studies further below, the 
criteria for entry to the DSPD programme were applied flexibly by the units. In 
particular, the third diagnostic category of two or more DSM-IV personality disorders 
would allow individuals without a diagnosis of ASPD or a high psychopathy rating into 
the service. Subsequent evaluations of the DSPD programme found that a large 
proportion of those in the units were diagnosed with BPD, a disorder characterised by 
emotional instability and self-harming behaviour. This is an indication that the units 
were used to house prisoners that were difficult to manage in other parts of the prison 
system as well as those judged to pose a risk to the public. 
(c) Therapeutic optimism and a limited evidence base 
(i) The causal link 
The “target outcomes” of the DSPD programme were “improved public protection”, 
“new treatment services aimed at improving mental health outcomes and reducing risk”, 
and a “better understanding of what works in the treatment and management of those 
who meet the DSPD criteria” (DSPD Programme et al. 2008a, p.6). The “underpinning 
philosophy” of the programme was “that public protection will be best served by 
addressing the mental health needs of a previously neglected group” (DSPD Programme 
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et al. 2008a, p.6). Thus, the “single most important factor” for admission for assessment 
was “the probable impact of the [personality] pathology upon the individual’s offending 
behaviour” (DSPD Programme et al. 2006, p.12; 2008a, p.15).  
At the time the pilot programme was established, however, it was not clear whether 
treatment for personality disorder could be expected to reduce an individual’s risk of 
reoffending. Although there appears to be some association, “any attempt to infer a 
causal relationship between [personality disorder] and violence is fraught with 
difficulties” (Howard 2015, p.1). This is due to confounding factors such as “the 
overwhelming co-occurrence of multiple disorders, particularly in forensic psychiatric 
patients” (Howard 2015, p.1). Conor Duggan and Richard Howard concluded in a 
review that any causal link between violence and personality disorder is “weak” and 
that personality disorder, including ASPD, “probably accounts for only a very small 
proportion of the variance in violent behaviour” (Duggan and Howard 2009, p.29). This 
continues to be the case today (Howard 2015). 
One civil servant involved in setting up the DSPD programme recognised that the idea 
of a “demonstrable link” was “a bit of a fudge in reality” because “how would you 
know, whether something was causative or co-occurring?” Like those who developed 
the DSPD proposals, civil servants involved in the DSPD programme were surprisingly 
aware of the problematic nature of the concepts with which they were dealing and the 
difficulties posed by the solutions that they themselves had a hand in developing. 
Despite this, they were also clearly willing to forge ahead. Part of the explanation may 
be found in how they viewed their role. According to one civil servant, “in a sense, if 
there’s a policy imperative from ministers and they wish to see something happen, then 
the job of the civil service is to find a way of enabling the policy to be put into effect”.  
(ii) Psychological treatments 
As noted in Chapter 2, while there was no consensus amongst mental health experts that 
personality disordered patients were intrinsically “untreatable”, therapeutic pessimism 
seemed to hold sway in the late 1990s. As the Fallon Inquiry concluded, “there have 
always been dedicated enthusiasts convinced that they have the answer within their 
grasp, but there are also the sceptics, probably the majority, who point to the lack of 
credible evidence that treatment works” (Fallon 1999, para. 6.10.1). Despite the 
weakness of the evidence base, the pilots, together with generous research funding, 
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offered a response to the therapeutic nihilism of some psychiatrists. The narrative of the 
programme was “there’s nothing we can do for [the DSPD group] now based on our 
present knowledge, and we need to just keep banging away until we find what that is” 
(Civil Servant). As expressed by another interviewee, “the whole point” “was not to 
give up on treatment” (Politician).  
The use of psychological therapies with personality disordered patients has a relatively 
long history. The Butler Committee noted the 1957 Percy Commission’s observation 
that “various methods of treatment in hospital had been provided for psychopaths, 
ranging from training under conditions of strict security to physical treatment, 
psychotherapy and group therapy” (Butler 1975, para. 5.28). By the time of the Butler 
Committee’s investigation, two forms of intervention were available for those suffering 
from psychopathic disorder: placement in a therapeutic community, such as that at HMP 
Grendon, and psychological behavioural modification treatments, including social skills 
training, aversion therapy and operant conditioning (Butler 1975, para. 5.37). In 1986, 
the DHSS and Home Office commented in relation to psychopathic disorder that there 
were “indications of treatment potential but no valid generalisations about treatability or 
untreatability”. It was also noted that “the most relevant treatment is likely to be social 
and psychological in character rather than drug-based, to include individual and group 
therapies, cognitive therapy, behaviour modification, milieu therapy and planned use of 
educational, occupational and social experiences and social skills training” (DHSS and 
Home Office 1986, para 14).  
Around the time the pilot programme was introduced, evidence was also emerging for 
the effectiveness of some psychological interventions with personality disordered 
individuals.  In randomised controlled trials, dialectical behavioural therapy (DBT) had 
been shown to be more effective than treatment as usual in reducing the severity and 
frequency of self-harming behaviour and improving overall functioning in women 
diagnosed with BPD (Linehan et al. 1991; 1993; Linehan 1993). There were also some 
indications that cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) had positive effects for patients 
diagnosed with ASPD from a case-based study (Davidson and Tyrer 1996). Reported 
benefits included improved interpersonal relationships and decreased irritability. The 
findings were not robust, however, due to the small sample size, absence of a control 
group and short study period.  
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There was less evidence for effective treatments for high risk patients with complex 
problems such as those in the DSPD group. A review commissioned by the Home 
Office found a near-total lack of clinical literature on either “severe” or “dangerous” 
personality disorder (Warren et al. 2003). The review found some studies reporting 
successes in treating personality disordered offenders, but several were 
methodologically flawed and doubts were expressed about the applicability of their 
findings to high-security category prisoners. The authors concluded that the most 
promising intervention was patient participation in a therapeutic community and there 
was also some evidence to support the use of DBT with women with BPD (Warren et 
al. 2003). Nonetheless, using high-security categorisation as a proxy for 
“dangerousness”, they concluded that overall there was “no evidence that “DSPD” can 
or cannot be treated” (Warren et al. 2003, p.120). The review therefore left room for the 
optimistic stance that a lack of robust evidence that the available treatments “worked” 
did not prove that “nothing worked”. This therapeutic optimism also appeared to fuel 
hopes that the service could break with the “the weight of history and accumulated 
failures” of the prison and secure hospitals in dealing with the DSPD group (Fallon 
1999, para. 7.12.4).  
On a more cynical level, the pilots were also a response to a need for the government 
“to be seen to be doing something” about a problem of public concern (Civil Servant). 
As one civil servant commented in interview: “in government often what pilots do is 
provide a vehicle for putting difficult things in a box and saying ‘yes, we’re doing 
something about it but we’ll need to wait to see what the results are’” (Civil Servant). 
They also helped to alleviate some of the pressure: “to some extent the imperatives, the 
immediacy around being seen to be doing something had gone, because you were doing 
something” (Civil Servant). This need “to be seen to be doing something” seems to have 
taken precedence over the need to work out the finer details. As another civil servant 
explained, “inevitably ministers are particularly concerned about public perception. And 
public perception, rightly or wrongly, emphasises concerns about danger presented by 
particular individuals”. This indicates that providing the public with symbolic 
reassurance that “something” was being “done” in response to the fears provoked by 
dangerous offenders was just as important as acting to protect the public from those 
released from determinate sentences. As will be argued below, this allowed the policy to 
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go ahead despite acknowledged difficulties with the evidence base and some of the 
assumptions underlying the initiative.  
 
3. Lessons from the Past 
(a) Treating personality disordered patients in hospital 
Susanne Dell and Graham Robertson’s study Sentenced to Hospital: Offenders in 
Broadmoor, published in 1988, provides insights into the manner in which male patients 
detained under the legal category of psychopathic disorder in the old MHA 1959 were 
managed and treated in the old Special Hospitals. At the time of the study, such patients 
made up about a quarter of Broadmoor hospital’s residential male population (Dell and 
Robertson 1988, p.63). It is striking that many of the issues encountered at Broadmoor 
also arose in the DSPD units. This prompts the question of whether the DSPD initiative, 
in seeking to break with institutional failures, failed to build on lessons from the past.  
In terms of treatment, Dell and Robertson note that individual and group psychotherapy, 
social skills training and behaviour modification programmes were available to male 
patients detained on the grounds of psychopathic disorder. At the time of the study, only 
a small minority of patients were taking part in any therapy, however, and much of the 
care was “custodial” in nature (Dell and Robertson 1988, p.87). According to the 
authors, the patients had spent an average of 8 years in the hospital and for at least two-
thirds of that time “the only treatment they received was that of ‘being there’” (Dell and 
Robertson 1988, p.91). The patients “often expressed unhappiness at the lack of 
programmes directed towards their specific needs, feeling that they had come to 
Broadmoor on a false prospectus – one that promised them treatments that were not 
forthcoming” (Dell and Robertson 1988 p.124). In the view of practitioners at 
Broadmoor, life in a secure hospital setting was a form of therapy in itself, referred to as 
“milieu therapy”, as patients were encouraged to learn acceptable behaviours through 
their interactions with staff and other patients (Dell and Robertson 1988, p.91). Many 
patients disagreed with this, however, and were disappointed with what they perceived 
to be insufficient levels of therapeutic input.  
Maturation was considered a remedy for psychopathy at Broadmoor and was often cited 
by psychiatrists as a reason for discharging patients detained under the category of 
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psychopathic disorder (Dell and Robertson 1988, Chapter 8). There is some evidence 
that the passage of time may succeed where therapeutic intervention does not. 
Criminological research shows that antisocial behaviour peaks in adolescence and 
decreases markedly with age (Moffitt 1993). Furthermore, most antisocial and 
psychopathic personalities go into remission when patients reach their 30s and 40s 
(Martens 2000). The Fallon Inquiry also found that little active treatment was being 
undertaken at Ashworth and an inquiry into Rampton hospital in the 1980s noted a 
focus on containment rather than therapy (Fallon 1999, para. 1.19.1, citing Boynton and 
Department of Health and Social Security 1980). As one interviewee commented: “the 
whole ethos of high security hospitals in relation to personality disorder was not so 
much treating them but just kind of waiting them out and custodial” (Practitioner). As 
discussed later, the theme of “waiting” was to emerge strongly from evaluations of the 
DSPD programme (Tyrer et al. 2007; Burns et al. 2011).  
Nevertheless, many patients at Broadmoor felt that they had gained some benefit from 
specific treatments. Half of those patients who had engaged in individual psychotherapy 
found it “very helpful” and a quarter found it “quite helpful” (Dell and Robertson 1988, 
p.87). Patients commented that they had developed a greater understanding of 
themselves and their problems through therapy and they were better able to 
communicate with others, build relationships and develop trust. The majority of patients 
also found behaviour modification and social skills programmes useful. Group therapy 
was less well-regarded, however, partly due to concerns amongst patients that they 
could not speak freely of their offences with others (Dell and Robertson 1988, p.87).  
Dell and Robertson noted a small number of patients in the hospital had been 
transferred there from prison towards the end of determinate sentences for detention 
rather than treatment. These patients were “hostile, bitter and uncooperative” (Dell and 
Robertson 1988, p.67). Once admitted, however, if their offences were sufficiently 
serious, they were in effect “undischargeable” even though their disorders may not have 
been amenable to treatment (Dell and Robertson 1988, p.78). The Fallon Inquiry also 
highlighted that there had been pressure on Ashworth Hospital to take patients who 
were dangerous but who could no longer be detained in prison. The problem with this 
approach was that it could result in the hospital acquiring “a ward full of […] people for 
whom nothing positive could be done” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.38.2). A further difficulty 
was posed by patients transferred to Ashworth from prison who still had time to run on 
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their prison sentences. These individuals had little incentive to engage with 
rehabilitation programmes preparing them for release when they could be transferred 
back to prison to complete their sentences (Fallon 1999, para. 1.40.1). This inertia, in 
the eyes of the Inquiry, contributed to some of the problems at Ashworth. Fallon 
concluded that “the functions of hospitals and prisons as far as personality disordered 
offenders [were] concerned [were] dreadfully confused” and that secure hospitals were 
in effect “being used as surrogate prisons” because there was no other means of 
detaining this category of dangerous offenders indefinitely (Fallon 1999, para. 1.43.7).  
The problem of “late transfers” continued into the DSPD programme and the 
amendments to the MHA 1983 were in fact aimed at facilitating the detention of those 
nearing the end of their sentences. The attack by Jack Straw on psychiatrists perceived 
to be “cynically hiding behind the ‘treatability’ clause in the Mental Health Act 1983” 
(Maden 2007, s.8) is a further indication that the experiences of Broadmoor, Ashworth 
and other secure hospitals left with disgruntled “untreatable” patients were not taken 
into account in developing the proposals for the DSPD programme. 
(b) Personality disordered offenders in the prison system  
According to John Milton and Gopi Krishnan (2010), a study published in 1998 
showing high levels of personality disorder amongst male and female prisoners in 
England and Wales (Singleton et al. 1998, p. 10) gave rise to a feeling within 
government that greater provision had to be made for this group. Although some special 
units were in operation, the Fallon Inquiry found that the “vast majority of personality 
disordered prisoners” were “dealt with on general location, with no specific provision to 
meet their needs” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.35.6). The most disruptive prisoners were being 
“transferred from segregation unit to segregation unit, often every six weeks [where] 
they would receive […] little or nothing in the way of constructive activity or 
opportunity to address their behaviour” (Fallon 1999, para. 1.35.8).  
Before the DSPD programme was introduced, the very dangerousness of some prisoners 
precluded them from participating in interventions aimed at reducing the risks they 
posed. The Butler Committee (1975) noted that some personality disordered offenders 
were excluded from pre-release home leave and employment schemes as they were 
thought to be too dangerous. This had the paradoxical result that the most dangerous 
offenders on determinate sentences were released without prior socialisation. A similar 
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trend was the exclusion of offenders with high psychopathy scores from treatment 
programmes in prison. Karen D’Silva and colleagues (2004) attributed this to studies 
that purported to show that treatment could actually enhance the risk of recidivism in 
such patients (e.g. Rice et al. 1992). This led to a “Catch 22 situation” in which 
prisoners were told they must complete certain programmes to be considered for parole 
but were then refused entry onto the required programmes due to their high PCL-R 
scores (D’Silva et al. 2004, p.163).  
Disruptive prisoners also caused problems for the administration of the prison system. A 
Home Office working party, the Control Review Committee (CRC), was established in 
1983 in the wake of major prison riots. The Committee advised the establishment of 
special units, positioned “midway between segregation and the ordinary wing, where 
prisoners who have difficulty with normal prison conditions can be helped to find ways 
of coping in smaller, more supportive situations and then guided back into the 
mainstream when they are ready” (Home Office 1984, para. 68). The first CRC unit 
opened at HMP Parkhurst in December 1985 and was followed in May 1987 by a unit at 
HMP Lincoln and in November 1988 by a unit at HMP Hull (Walmsley 1991, p.4). In 
the Parkhurst unit’s first two years, almost half (48%) of the inmates were found to have 
a personality disorder or psychopathic traits, a further 13% were suffering from 
paranoia or psychotic or schizophrenic illness and 13% had both (Walmsley 1991, 
p.15). The bulk of these prisoners were serving long sentences, with 60% serving life 
sentences and between 20% and 25% serving sentences of 10 years or more. The 
majority had been convicted of homicide (40%) or violent offences (35%) (Walmsley 
1991, p.14). 
In February 1998, Close Supervision Centres (CSCs) came to replace the CRCs and had 
a similar purpose (Clare and Bottomley 2001, p.vii). The Intervention Centre at HMP 
Durham, known as I Wing, was intended to offer “psychiatric assessment and specialist 
input to the practical management of prisoners with personality disorders” and “to 
monitor, assess and review individual prisoners’ cases so as to prepare them for a return 
to normal location, progress to an alternative CSC or transfer to a psychiatric hospital as 
appropriate” (Fallon 1999, paras.1.35.10-11). CSCs were small, each holding 10 
prisoners or less at a time (Clare and Bottomley 2001, p.72). A Home Office evaluation 
of the CSC system conducted between 1998 and 2000 was largely unfavourable, finding 
low levels of constructive activity, compromised safety, problems with staff retention 
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and poor outcomes for prisoners in terms of progression, particularly at the HMP 
Woodhill units (Clare and Bottomley 2001). I Wing at HMP Durham fared better, as 
staff-prisoner relations were good, but there were problems with recruiting and retaining 
a psychologist to work in the unit (Clare and Bottomley 2001).  
The CSC system has since evolved, with the Durham unit closing and new units 
opening at HMP Whitemoor and HMP Wakefield (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2006, 
para. 1.7). There are also CSC-designated cells in segregation units in other high 
security prisons to which CSC prisoners may be transferred (HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons 2006, para. 1.11). An inspection by HM Inspectorate of Prisons in 2006 again 
found little meaningful activity was being provided for CSC prisoners in the most 
restrictive wings at HMP Woodhill and lockdown was common (HM Inspectorate of 
Prisons 2006, para 3.7-3.9). The regimes at HMP Whitemoor and HMP Wakefield were 
more positive. A consultant psychiatrist at the time of the 2006 inspection commented 
that two thirds of CSC prisoners had mental health problems that would benefit from 
psychological or pharmacological treatments. The diagnoses of CSC prisoners were 
similar to those on the DSPD programme: “anti-social, borderline and paranoid 
personality disorder, psychopathy, post-traumatic stress disorder, depression and 
anxiety” (HM Inspectorate of Prisons 2006, para. 3.77).  
In lower security conditions, therapeutic communities (TCs) have also been developed 
to treat personality disordered offenders in prisons and secure hospitals. This model 
involves “the creation of an environment in which complex interpersonal and 
community processes become central therapeutic factors and are subject to detailed 
analysis, as well as being considered as a primary medium of treatment” (Warren et al. 
2003, p.14). TCs are characterised by democratic decision-making and mutual respect 
between staff and patients or prisoners. Participants in the community are encouraged to 
take responsibility for their own behaviour and to contribute to the treatment of others 
(Warren et al. 2003, p.14-15). Research on TCs has not been able to establish 
conclusively whether they are effective in reducing reoffending or improving mental 
health outcomes but there have been some encouraging results (Warren et al. 2003).  
Admission to TCs such as that at HMP Grendon is on a voluntary basis and the 
admission processes are selective as not all prisoners are suitable for the democratic 
therapeutic environment. For example, prisoners must be drug free, those with mental 
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illnesses or disabilities are excluded, and the prison will take only Category B or C 
prisoners (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons 2014). These restrictions do not apply to the 
DSPD units in Category A prisons but DSPD patients and prisoners may progress to a 
TC if they fulfil the entry criteria. For practitioners in the prison DSPD units, a move to 
a TC is not necessarily the next step on from a DSPD unit but it can be part of a 
prisoner’s route towards release. According to prison practitioners in interview, referrals 
to the DSPD programme came largely from CSCs, segregation units and normal prison 
wings. Thus, the DSPD units came to occupy a space between the restrictive 
segregation units and CSCs that took the most difficult prisoners and the more liberal 
and selective TCs. 
The experience of the CSCs, much smaller than the DSPD units, illustrate the problems 
associated with holding disruptive prisoners together and the strains that this can put on 
staff. It also illustrates the difficulties with maintaining a constructive therapeutic 
regime for the most difficult and disruptive prisoners. These problems continued into 
the DSPD units, where the levels of therapy were far below those expected of an 
intensive therapeutic programme. Nevertheless, as will be considered later, the DSPD 
units did make progress in the successful management of a difficult group of prisoners, 
and rates of violent disorder were lower than expected given the characteristics of the 
population.   
 
4. Evaluating the “DSPD Experiment” in High Secure Services for Men 
(a) The pilot assessment programme 
An external evaluation of the DSPD assessment programme for men at HMP 
Whitemoor was commissioned by the Home Office and Department of Health and 
carried out between 2001 and 2005 by a group from Imperial College, Arnold Lodge 
and the University of Oxford (IMPALOX) (Tyrer et al. 2007; 2009). The IMPALOX 
study found that the assessment period was unnecessarily long, largely due to staffing 
problems, and levels of therapeutic activity on the wing were low. Therapy groups were 
initially run by psychologists but these were stopped to allow staff to spend more time 
on prisoner assessments and report writing. Prison officers created new groups based on 
discussion and skills teaching to fill the gap left by therapists. In the qualitative 
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component of the study, psychologists on the unit reported that they felt overburdened 
and under-supported while prison officers often felt the work they did was 
underappreciated. On the other hand, several prison officers, many of whom had 
volunteered for or had been approached by the unit, were pleased to have the 
opportunity to interact with prisoners in a more civil and progressive manner (Tyrer et 
al. 2007, p.48). The units tapped into a supply of therapeutically-minded officers who 
felt that this was “the future of the prison service” (Tyrer et al. 2007, p.48). 
Prisoners were generally frustrated with low levels of therapeutic activity, delays in 
completing the assessment and beginning treatment, and the failure to provide the 
assessment reports they had been promised. However, like in Dell and Robertson’s 
(1988) study, just over half of the prisoners interviewed reported gaining benefits from 
the assessment programme (Tyrer et al. 2007). These included greater insight into their 
personalities and offending behaviours and new ways of thinking they believed would 
help them to move forward. None of the prisoners had previously been offered such an 
opportunity, although some reported having participated in the Sex Offenders Treatment 
Programme (SOTP) (Tyrer et al. 2007). This reflects the paucity of treatment provision 
for prisoners with personality disorders prior to the establishment of the DSPD 
programme. However, the IMPALOX study also indicates that prisoners had high 
expectations of treatment and that these were frustrated by relatively low levels of 
therapeutic input.  
Leon McRae’s (2013; 2015) research on prisoners who had sought transfer to a 
specialist personality disorder ward in a medium secure hospital highlights that the 
motivation for many was the hope that engaging in the treatment programme would 
increase their prospects of early release. This motivation may also explain some of the 
frustration of the IMPALOX sample. The programme began with volunteers, and 
prisoners’ motives for agreeing to referral noted by the IMPALOX team “included 
aspirations: to ‘explain’ or ‘excuse’ violent/sex offending by exploring ‘causes’; to 
qualify for treatment; to move towards discharge from prison; [and] to satisfy parole 
and sentence management boards of reduced risk and willingness to work with 
authorities” (Tyrer 2007, p.139).  On the other hand, “in the many cases where prisoners 
did not expect to gain freedom” the main motivation was “to improve their quality of 
life in prison” as many had spent time in segregation units due to their disruptive 
behaviour (Tyrer 2007, p.139). 
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For the first two years, the assessment programme at HMP Whitemoor received only 
volunteers, but after this period it also received prisoners admitted for assessment under 
a degree of coercion. According to the IMPALOX study, “later assessees were more 
likely to have fixed term sentences or be approaching tariff dates, and showed more 
ambivalence toward the assessment, questioning whether it was in their best interests” 
(Tyrer et al. 2007, p.51) Some of the later recruits said they had been “coerced into 
‘volunteering’”, either because the Parole Board demanded they complete assessment 
before it would consider downgrading their security categorisation or because they were 
threatened with losing their enhanced status on the Incentives and Earned Privileges 
scheme (Tyrer et al. 2007, p.52). Perhaps as a result, these prisoners were more 
recalcitrant than the “treatment-seeking” early volunteers (Tyrer et al. 2007, p.51).  
In an article reporting on a randomised controlled trial of the assessment programme 
(Tyrer et al. 2009), the IMPALOX researchers noted that the assessment programme 
was associated with better quality of life in terms of social relationships. However, there 
was an increase in aggression and worse social functioning in those with less severe 
personality disorders. The authors attributed these findings to the “frustration and 
unfulfilled expectations” of the prisoners found by the qualitative component of the 
research (Tyrer et al. 2009, p.132). A linked study of the costs of the DSPD assessment 
programme concluded that over six months, the DSPD group cost an average of £3,500 
more than prisoners with similar characteristics in high secure control prisons and there 
was “a consistent trend for the DSPD assessment group to have worse outcomes than 
controls” (Barrett et al. 2009, p. 127).  
In view of the high costs of the programme and lack of evidence of for its effectiveness, 
the IMPALOX researchers concluded that their “findings, together with concerns about 
treatability, raise[d] more fundamental concerns about whether medical management of 
people with these problems is a justifiable use of resources and ethically appropriate” 
(Tyrer et al. 2009, p. 144). In their view, “the portents for the success of this and similar 
programmes [were] not particularly good” (Tyrer et al. 2009, p. 144). The authors 
suggested that “concentrating the resources on those who are clearly motivated and 
determined to overcome their propensity to re-offend may be one way forward, but it is 
clear that this would only include a minority of those currently in the programme” 
(Tyrer et al. 2009, p. 98).  
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Members of the IMPALOX team and others published a further controversial article in 
2010 entitled “The Successes and Failures of the DSPD Experiment” (Tyrer et al. 
2010). The “successes” included large-scale investment in services for a much-
neglected group of prisoners who would benefit from greater help and support in prison 
and hospital, whether or not the treatment programmes designed for them were proven 
to be effective in reducing recidivism (Tyrer et al. 2010). More generally, the authors 
noted that the interest in personality disorder generated by the DSPD programme had 
driven the development of countrywide personality disorder services and research into 
the treatment and management of the condition that could be expected to benefit 
patients beyond those in the DSPD category (Tyrer et al. 2010, p. 96).  
The programme’s failures appeared to outweigh its successes, however. The authors 
noted that each DSPD unit was administering “substantially different treatments […] 
with no apparent consistency or methodology being applied” (Tyrer et al. 2010, p. 97). 
They also expressed the concern that in the event of conflict it was likely that public 
protection would triumph over treatment (Tyrer et al. 2010, p. 97). Noting that less than 
10% of the time patients and prisoners spent in assessment and treatment could be 
“regarded as direct therapeutic activity”, the authors concluded that the government was 
engaged in the “warehousing” of offenders in a programme that would allow them to 
“be ‘parked’ for long periods thereby preventing them from being released from custody 
and re-offending in society” (Tyrer et al. 2010, p. 97).  
A clear conflict emerged between the IMPALOX group and those working in the DSPD 
programme on what could be accepted as evidence of the “success” or “failure” of the 
programme. Malcolm Ramsay, one of the commissioners of the IMPALOX study at the 
Home Office, wrote an article in collaboration with two practitioners in the HMP 
Whitemoor DSPD unit, Jacqui Saradjian and Naomi Murphy, and head of research at 
the HMP Frankland unit, Mark Freestone, responding to the criticisms made of the 
DSPD programme by the IMPALOX group (Ramsay et al. 2009). The authors argued 
that the conclusion that the “portents” of the DSPD programme were not good (Tyrer et 
al 2009, p.144) appeared to be at odds with the full report of the IMPALOX study 
which found that some prisoners reported having benefitted from the assessment 
process (Ramsay et al. 2009; see Tyrer et al. 2007).  
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Kevin Howells and colleagues (2011) affiliated with the University of Nottingham and 
the DSPD unit at Rampton hospital also wrote a response to Tyrer and colleagues’ 
(2010) “Successes and Failures” article. The authors attributed the low levels of 
therapeutic input recorded to the premature commissioning of the evaluations. Some 
units did not reach full capacity until 2009 while the IMPALOX study began in 2001 
and concluded in 2006 (Tyrer et al. 2007). Much of the work of the units in the early 
stages was with men who had difficulty relating to others and who were “initially 
largely ‘unready’ to undertake intensive therapeutic work” (Howells et al. 2011, p.132). 
The authors contended that “a scientific rather than a scientistic approach” was required 
for the future evaluation of the DSPD programme (Howells et al. 2011, p.132). The 
former “would involve systematically and organically building up knowledge about the 
population, their characteristics and needs, the service itself and the therapies offered 
and their outcomes”. On the other hand, “the latter would jump prematurely and 
exclusively to methods wearing the badge of scientific respectability, such as the 
randomized controlled trial which, of course, certainly has an important, but not 
exclusive, role to play in the longer term” (Howells et al. 2011, p.132).  
In interview, practitioners from the DSPD programme relied on anecdotal evidence of 
prisoner and patient progress to demonstrate the effectiveness of the treatments on offer. 
This contrasts with the prevailing trend for “evidence-based medicine” (see Greenhalgh 
et al. 2014) followed by the IMPALOX team and initially endorsed by the Department 
of Health (2000b). Practitioners often described the treatments delivered by the DSPD 
programme as “evidence-based”. At first, this appeared to be a misleading term in view 
of the conclusions of systematic reviews of the evidence for treating those categorised 
as DSPD (Warren et al. 2003) and those diagnosed with ASPD (Gibbon et al. 2010; 
Khalifa, 2010). Upon further investigation, however, it emerged that the treatment 
programmes developed by the individual DSPD units drew on treatments that had been 
found to be effective with other populations. This included DBT, found to be effective 
for women with BPD, and CBT-based offending behaviour programmes, found to 
reduce reoffending amongst the general prison population. In light of this, Howells and 
colleagues commented that the assertion that “no treatment with a satisfactory evidence 
base could be recommended” (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97) was “overstated” (Howells et al. 
2011, p.131). The authors concluded that “while there are important issues relating to 
how offender programmes need to be modified for a personality disorder population it 
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remains the case that a substantial evidence base as to likely outcomes and principles of 
effective treatment does exist for the DSPD clinician” (Howells et al. 2011, p.131).  
While the contention that the evaluations of the programme were commissioned too 
early seems to be valid, the lack of a control group in studies of treatment outcomes 
remains a problem for assessing the effectiveness of the DSPD programme. Prisoners in 
the IMPALOX study reported subjective benefits but the difficulties associated with 
conducting studies that meet the “gold standard” of the randomised controlled trial in 
forensic settings means that the evidence base for treatment effectiveness remains weak. 
Without a control group it is impossible to separate out the benefits derived from the 
various treatments deployed by the DSPD programme from the effects of maturation 
and placement in a specialist unit with higher staffing levels. The promise of treatment 
and individual attention may also have had a considerable placebo effect for a group 
that had been neglected by mental health practitioners. As will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the effectiveness of the successor of the DSPD programme, the OPDP, is also 
to be evaluated, but the short study period for the evaluation casts doubt on the extent to 
which convincing evidence of success can be produced. 
(b) The pilot treatment programme 
Two large-scale external evaluations of the DSPD pilot treatment programme for men in 
all four high secure units were commissioned by the Home Office and the Department 
of Health. An evaluation of the Primrose Programme for women at HMP Low Newton 
was completed in 2012 but has not been published. Efforts to contact the authors 
received no response. The Inclusion for DSPD: Evaluating Assessment and Treatment 
(IDEA) study examined the referral, assessment, treatment and management processes 
for patients and prisoners (Burns et al. 2011). The two-part Multi-method Evaluation of 
the Management, Organisation and Staffing in High Security Treatment Services for 
People with Dangerous and Severe Personality Disorder (MEMOS) study examined 
the organisation and staffing of the units, the legal status of DSPD patients and 
prisoners, and the impact of DSPD status on Parole Board and Mental Health Review 
Tribunal decision-making (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 2010b; 2012a; 2012b; 
2012c). The findings of these studies seem to show that the DSPD programme did not 
meet the high expectations set for it by policymakers as treatment hours were fewer and 
patient and prisoner stays longer than anticipated. 
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According to the IDEA study, DSPD patients and prisoners had many common 
characteristics. They were overwhelmingly white and UK-born, had long histories of 
mental disorder, custodial care and convictions for serious violent and sexual offences. 
Psychopathy ratings were high, with an average score of 28 on the PCL-R scale and 
40% of participants scoring 30 and above (Burns et al. 2011, p.xi). However, 17.2% of 
patients and prisoners were admitted under the diagnostic category that did not require 
ASPD or a high PCL-R score (Burns et al. 2011, Table 3.8). The lowest recorded PCL-
R scores were 13 in the prisoner group and 18.9 in the hospital patient group, well 
below the cut-off point for psychopathy of 26 for European samples (Burns et al. 2011, 
Table 3.14; p.46). Thus, there was evidence that the DSPD units were admitting a high-
risk group of serious offenders but also that the criteria for entry were being applied 
flexibly. The IDEA researchers noted that a quarter of those on the DSPD programme 
did not meet the criteria and commented that this was “more than one might expect in 
such a controversial (and administratively defined) category” (Burns et al. 2011, p.235-
236). The criterion least likely to be recorded by the units was that of a link between the 
personality disorder and offending, which was noted in 60% of cases (Burns et al. 2011, 
p.36). This may indicate that the units were in practice moving away from the idea that 
personality disorder was causally linked to offending behaviour, as discussed in the next 
chapter. 
The IDEA study found little difference between the prison and hospital units in terms of 
treatment outcomes. There were weak, but statistically significant, reductions in 
Violence Risk Scale (VRS) scores in both prisons and hospitals. This suggested that 
treatment may have been beneficial in the short-term (Ministry of Justice 2011a, p.7). 
Due to the lack of a control group, however, it was not possible to say for certain 
whether these reductions were a result of treatment or other factors affecting the 
participants (Ministry of Justice 2011a, p.7). The management of inmates in prisons 
may have been more effective than in hospitals, with fewer violent incidents being 
reported, although the authors suggested that the hospital units may have had a lower 
threshold for recording incidents (Burns et al. 2011, p.73; p.177). 
There are indications that the units achieved some successes in managing a difficult 
group. A Home Office study (Taylor 2003) found that there were fewer violent 
incidents in the pilot DSPD unit at HMP Whitemoor than anticipated. For the 55 men 
on the unit, 10 violent incidents were recorded over two years, far less than the 37 
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predicted. However, the methods of the study may be questioned. The predicted number 
of incidents was found by calculating the average number of adjudications per prisoner 
over their whole prison careers. These ranged in length from 1.3 to 24 years and no 
account was taken of changes that may have taken place prior to the prisoners’ 
admission to the DSPD unit. Given the relevance of maturation effects for personality 
disordered offenders (Dell and Robertson 1988; Moffitt 1993; Martens 2000), this 
oversight may have skewed the data considerably. Nevertheless, the IDEA study also 
noted that “despite the dangerousness of the sample and the very negative and hostile 
emotions expressed, relatively few security incidents occurred” (Burns et al. 2011, 
p.xvii). The researchers attributed this to factors including “relational and procedural 
security, including the high staff ratio based in relatively small units” (Burns et al. 2011, 
p.xvii).  
While frontline staff working in the DSPD units reported that patients and prisoners 
were less violent and aggressive than they expected, many of those interviewed by the 
MEMOS study were surprised at the high levels of self-harm. Furthermore, most staff, 
including those with previous experience of working with personality disordered 
patients, “admitted to being shocked at the extent of perceived neediness and continual 
demands of the DSPD population” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.80). This may 
indicate that staff members were not sufficiently prepared to work with such a difficult 
group of patients and prisoners. According to MEMOS, “concerns about young and 
inexperienced staff were familiar themes amongst interviewees from the hospital DSPD 
units” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.39).  
The levels of self-harm may also reflect the number of DSPD patients and prisoners 
diagnosed with BPD. A study of 203 male patients and prisoners admitted to high 
secure DSPD services between 2000 and 2007 found that over half were diagnosed with 
BPD and 48.8% were diagnosed with both BPD and ASPD (Kirkpatrick et al. 2010 
p.278; p.270). There were also high rates of psychopathy, with 43.2% scoring over 30 
and 77.8% scoring 25 or greater on the PCL-R (Kirkpatrick et al. 2010 p.269-70). The 
authors explained that prisons and hospitals were “more likely to refer [to the DSPD 
programme] individuals who stand out in terms of their behaviour or who are difficult 
to manage” (Kirkpatrick et al. 2010, p.278). This includes individuals with high PCL-R 
scores and those “characterised by high levels of emotional instability or repeated 
incidents of self-harm indicative of BPD” (Kirkpatrick et al. 2010, p.278). Patients at 
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Rampton hospital most commonly self-harmed to regulate or reduce negative emotions, 
to express aggression in a restrictive environment, and to influence others, for instance 
to gain attention or care (Gallagher and Sheldon 2010). This reflects the levels of 
personal distress of the DSPD patient group and also the traits of manipulativeness and 
aggression associated with antisocial personality disorders. 
The most surprising finding noted by the IDEA study was that formal therapy took up 
an average of less than two hours per week (Burns et al. 2011, p.237). This compared to 
9 hours of structured activities, such as work, education and leisure, in both prison and 
hospital units and 2.7 hours of “milieu therapy” in the hospital units (Burns et al. 2011, 
p.xiv). As may be expected given these figures, DSPD patients and prisoners 
interviewed by the IDEA team reported boredom and frustration with “waiting” for 
treatment and this was the greatest source of dissatisfaction for both samples (Burns et 
al. 2011, p. 205-206). This finding prompts a concern that Peter Tyrer and colleagues’ 
predictions of “warehousing” (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97) may have been made out 
(O’Loughlin 2014). A significant number of patients and prisoners, particularly in the 
hospital units, were unmotivated to engage in therapy or were actively resisting. This 
was seen by those who did engage as having a negative influence on the atmosphere of 
the units and on their own motivation (Burns et al. 2011, p.217-219). There were also 
concerns expressed by patients and prisoners regarding the mixing of predominantly 
sexual and predominantly violent offenders, particularly where therapy groups required 
participants to discuss their offending (Burns et al. 2011, p.220-221). 
Howells and colleagues note, on the other hand, that one of the neglected “successes” of 
the DSPD units was the fact that they had managed to actually deliver therapy to a 
“challenging population” comprised of “individuals who have typically failed to engage 
meaningfully in treatment in previous non-DSPD settings or been denied treatment due 
to their so-called untreatability” (Howells et al. 2011, p.130). The findings are 
nevertheless surprising given the emphasis on therapy in policy documents and 
programme delivery guides and the intention for the programme to be intensive (see 
DSPD Programme et al. 2008a; 2006; Home Office and Department of Health 1999).  
Movement through the DSPD programme also appeared to be slow. At the beginning of 
the MEMOS study in July 2006, the vast majority of those in the prison sample (82%) 
were serving indeterminate sentences, generally life sentences, with just three detained 
  
99 
under IPP sentences. The low numbers of IPP prisoners reflects the fact that the 
dangerous offender provisions of the CJA 2003 came into force in April 2005, a year 
before the MEMOS study began. The mean length of the tariff given to DSPD prisoners 
was 10.7 years and tariffs ranged widely from 2.5 to 30 years (Trebilcock and Weaver 
2010a, p.30–1). Of those prisoners serving indeterminate sentences, 57% were admitted 
to the prison DSPD unit before the expiry of their tariff and the remaining 43% had 
passed their tariff (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.32). The remainder of the sample 
were serving determinate sentences (17%) (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.30–1). The 
mean determinate sentence length was 10.1 years and the range was from 5 to 16 years 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.31). The majority were in the early stages of their 
determinate sentence and 87% had not passed their “non-parole date”: the date at which 
they could expect to be released at the end of their sentence if they had not been granted 
parole at the halfway point. 
By December 2009, nine of the indeterminate sentenced prisoners and six determinate 
sentenced prisoners had left the DSPD prison units. Of the indeterminate sentenced 
group, two men had died and seven had been transferred to other Category A or B 
prisons for reasons including not meeting the DSPD criteria, assault on staff and refusal 
to engage in or co-operate with treatment. This indicates that even though the Planning 
and Delivery Guide explicitly stated that the consent of the prisoner was not required 
for transfer to a high secure DSPD unit (DSPD programme et al. 2008a, p.9), in practice 
uncooperative prisoners could be transferred out. In the determinate sentenced group, 
three prisoners had passed their non-parole date. One of these was released but 
subsequently recalled to prison, a second was transferred to a medium-secure hospital 
unit while a third remained in DSPD services having been resentenced for crimes 
committed while in the unit (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.33–4). Of the remaining 
three prisoners who had not finished their determinate sentences, two had been 
transferred to a Category A or B prison for unclear reasons, and one had been 
transferred to a secure hospital. 
By contrast to the prison sample, 32% of patients in the high secure DSPD hospital 
units were serving indeterminate sentences while the majority (58%) had been given 
determinate sentences. Just 10% of the sample had received hospital orders, indicating 
that the vast majority had been transferred to hospital from prison (Trebilcock and 
Weaver 2010a, p.30–1). Hospital patients were more likely to have passed their tariff 
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expiry date or non-parole date than prisoners. By December 2009, 73% of indeterminate 
sentenced patients had passed their tariff expiration date and 85% of those given a 
determinate sentence had passed their non-parole date (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, 
p.40–1). These findings indicate that the hospital units were being used to detain high-
risk offenders who had completed determinate prison sentences even before the changes 
introduced by the MHA 2007.   
The MEMOS study demonstrates that very few prisoners in the DSPD units had 
progressed onwards from the programme and even fewer saw a reduction in their 
security categorisation. This casts doubt on the programme’s ability to move offenders 
through the system. Nevertheless, the high security categorisation of DSPD prisoners 
should be borne in mind. In reviews of high security prisoners, the Parole Board can 
only recommend release or transfer to an open prison (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a). 
Neither of these options was likely for the DSPD group, many of whom began in 
Category A or B. As a result, the success of the programme cannot be judged solely on 
the release rate. However, the MEMOS study also found that pathways out of the units 
were unclear and there were insufficient step-down services for patients and prisoners 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a). This indicates that the focus on the top end of the 
service blocked prisoner and patient progress.   
More positive findings were reported by clinical staff at the DSPD unit at HMP 
Whitemoor (Saradjian, Murphy and Casey 2010). According to the authors, five of the 
nine Category A prisoners in the first cohort of 18 men to finish treatment had been re-
categorised and one man had been discharged into the community. It seems that the 
remainder were transferred to Category B prisons, but their security categorisation 
before coming to DSPD unit is unclear. Reductions in VRS scores for all but two men 
on the programme were also reported. However, due to the small sample size and the 
rather limited information provided by the article, it is difficult to fully assess the 
findings.  
Similarly to IMPALOX, the MEMOS study noted problems with recruiting and 
retaining good quality and experienced staff to work in the DSPD units and recorded 
high levels of sick leave and burn-out. Over 26% of baseline staff at the units at HMP 
Whitemoor and Broadmoor hospital had left by the end of the 12 month study period. 
Rates of staff turnover were lower at Rampton, with 10.8% of staff leaving by the end 
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(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.34). Staff variously described working in the units as 
“interesting”, “fascinating”, “extremely complex”, “challenging” and “frustrating” 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.79). While acknowledging that working in the DSPD 
unit was a “tough job”, some staff asserted they had worked in more stressful 
environments (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.79). Others “revealed a range of 
negative experiences from being emotionally drained and infuriated through to 
occasional terror” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.79). Each unit had “experienced a 
small number of serious incidents, including a patient being taken hostage, rooms not 
being locked at night, inappropriate staff-patient/prisoner relationships, near riots, and 
the death of a prisoner” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.79). However, staff generally 
identified that it was the “accumulation of minor stresses” that led a feeling of being 
“worn down and emotionally drained” rather than rare but serious incidents (Trebilcock 
and Weaver 2010b, p.79-80).  
The MEMOS study reported that patients spent slightly more time in therapy than the 
IDEA group, at less than 2.7 hours on average per week (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, 
p. 53). Keyworker sessions at the hospital units added another 69 minutes of “milieu 
therapy” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.54). This calculation was based on 
scheduled sessions, however, and did not take into account cancellations. The study 
found that a relatively small proportion of staff time was taken up by face-to-face 
therapy sessions when compared to therapy-related “paperwork”. At Frankland, face-to-
face therapy accounted for 23.9% of staff time while 47.8% was occupied by 
preparation and de-briefing and 28.2% with collateral searches, scoring and report 
writing (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, p.53).  
 
5. Explaining Unfulfilled Expectations 
(a) An experiment 
The findings of the early evaluations indicate that the DSPD programme had trouble 
living up to the lofty aspirations of policymakers. To some extent, as the DSPD 
programme was new it was difficult to foresee how it would turn out in practice. Thus, 
difficulties in getting the programme up and running are likely to have contributed to 
the IDEA study’s conclusion that prisoners and patients were engaged in less than two 
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hours of formal therapy a week (Burns et al. 2011, p.237). As some civil servants 
commented in interview, nothing like the DSPD programme had been tried on such a 
scale before. On the other hand, several of the academics interviewed pointed to lessons 
from previous attempts to deal with this group that had not been learnt.  
Although the DSPD programme seemed to have been influenced by the need to address 
the problems experienced at the Ashworth PDU, one academic commented that the 
programme itself was “surprisingly separate” from the recommendations of the Fallon 
Inquiry. For instance, the Fallon Inquiry had recommended the establishment of small 
specialist units in the prison and hospital systems housing no more than 50 prisoners, in 
contrast to the 70 places at HMP Whitemoor and 86 at HMP Frankland (Trebilcock and 
Weaver 2010b, p.22). The PDU had itself been an experiment, and the approach to the 
DSPD programme appeared to be similar: “it very much seemed to be: right, we're 
going to make a go of this. We're going to give you this money and we're going to find 
out kind of what happens almost again after the fact” (Academic). Furthermore, the 
decision to use the hospital units as places of preventive detention in many ways 
perpetuated the difficulties experienced at Ashworth, including patients resisting 
treatment, frustration with “waiting” and low levels of therapy and a paucity of 
constructive ways to occupy patients’ time. 
One civil servant involved with the pilot programme envisaged an intervention “in the 
pharmacological sense”. In this view, patients and prisoners would receive 2 or 3 years 
of intensive treatment, after which they would be assessed and moved on to allow others 
to participate. This is reflected in the Planning and Delivery Guide for men, which 
specifies that “a clear case, in terms of treatment need, admission priorities and public 
protection, must be made where an individual is to remain on a unit longer than 3 years 
after commencement of treatment” (DSPD Programme et al. 2008a, p.17). The reality 
was much slower movement and longer stays. In the early days, practitioners forecast 
that prisoners would need 7 or 8 years to complete treatment. Although that time has 
since been reduced, at 5 years it remains substantial.  
The comments of one civil servant appear to show that the fears of the early DSPD 
policymakers have been made out, and the enduring culture and traditions of the secure 
hospital and prison estates had a strong influence on what the DSPD programme was 
able to achieve:  
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The prison service model and the health model to a degree colluded […] to put 
the programme in the space of therapeutic environment. So you spend as long as 
you need to before you get the benefit, as opposed to it’s a relatively short 
period of active intervention, you get intensive support, intensive challenge, you 
review, you say yes it’s worked or it hasn’t worked.  
Given the uncertainties regarding effective treatment and the experience of managing 
personality disordered offenders in secure hospitals and prisons in the past, this long-
term approach does not appear surprising. The problem with the pilots, as identified by 
one civil servant, was that “given the nature of the sorts of patients who had been cared 
for in those units, looked after in those units, and the complexity and the lack of 
understanding [of their disorders], the fact that it was a developmental service, almost 
made it inevitable that you weren’t going to see results for 10 or 20 years.” Another 
interviewee expressed this more bluntly: “Nobody in their right mind could believe in a 
million years that personality disorder can be treated within a three year period. It goes 
against all the science” (Academic). A short-term, intense and effective programme may 
therefore have been an unrealistic expectation.  
For some interviewees, the purpose of the evaluations was not necessarily to test what 
was working or what was needed, but rather came down to appearances. “If you’re 
spending a lot of money on something […] you have to be seen to evaluate it” 
(Academic). This brings to mind the initial purpose of the pilot programme, which was 
expressed by one civil servant as “to be seen to be doing something” about the problem 
of dangerous offenders.  
(b) Warehousing? 
As noted previously, Tyrer and colleagues accused the DSPD programme of 
deliberately “warehousing” patients and prisoners in order to delay their release (Tyrer 
et al. 2010, p.97). This theme was explored with interviewees and several revealed 
conflicting views. One academic argued that a therapeutic “gloss” put on the 
programme by practitioners was a cover for the real intention of “holding people in the 
system because they weren’t confident about releasing them”. Nevertheless, the same 
interviewee also acknowledged that the prison officers and therapy staff “included some 
real enthusiasts […] who were actually really enthusiastic about treating prisoners as 
normal human beings, encouraging them to improve their ways, and treating them in a 
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much more respectable, respectful way, and were genuinely enthusiastic about the 
therapeutic potential of the programme” (Academic).  
Another academic who initially believed the DSPD programme “was a slightly 
overinflated and overambitious but fundamentally therapeutic endeavour” later came to 
doubt the motivations of the Home Office. For this interviewee, the low levels of 
therapeutic input reinforced the suspicion that “the DSPD programme was actually a bit 
of a con trick, to find a way around European legislation to just keep locking up people 
for a very long time” (Academic). This reflects the concern expressed by Nigel Eastman 
(1999) that the DSPD proposals were a means of circumventing Article 5 of the ECHR. 
The same interviewee commented that while it seemed that “the practitioners were 
entirely genuine” and that no one had consciously proposed warehousing, as time went 
on it appeared that “locking people up” may have been more important than the 
programme’s evaluators were led to believe. 
A different view of the motivation of the Home Office was put forward by another 
interviewee, who commented that the programme “wasn’t just a cynical exercise in 
containment” and “there was a real ethos of wanting to treat people” (Academic). 
However, problems emerged due to the nature of the patients being cared for, some of 
whom were resisting treatment. The hospital units in particular found themselves 
dealing with a difficult group of patients who had been transferred from prison to 
hospital towards the end of their sentences, essentially for preventive detention under 
the MHA 1983. The problems associated with “late transfers” were highlighted by Dell 
and Robertson in the late 1980s but yet one of the aims of the DSPD programme was to 
facilitate the continued detention of individuals nearing the end of their prison sentence. 
The Planning and Delivery Guides for both men and women’s high secure services 
specified that transfer to a DSPD unit for assessment could take place without the 
candidate’s consent (DSPD Programme et al. 2006; 2008a). However, the Guide for 
men’s high secure services acknowledged the problem of disengagement with treatment 
and emphasised that “work on motivation and engagement [would] form a key part of 
the assessment and treatment process” (DSPD Programme et al. 2008a, p. 2). 
Nevertheless, the Guide also made clear that “considerations of need and public safety” 
rather than motivation to change would “remain primary in considering and prioritising 
admissions” (DSPD Programme et al. 2008a, p. 12). The Ministry of Justice later 
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acknowledged the problems posed by late transfers and now advises that transfer to 
hospital should take place as early in sentence as possible (Ministry of Justice and 
NOMS 2010). Late transfers remain a legal possibility, however, as discussed in 
Chapter 6. 
As all DSPD hospital patients were detained under the MHA 1983, treating patients 
under compulsion was permissible in the hospital units. However, according to 
interviewees, this was not generally helpful in practice. Psychological treatments require 
patient engagement and motivation to change in order to be successful. Therefore 
motivational interventions became a large part of the work of both the prison and 
hospital DSPD units in their early years. Indeed, according to some interviewees, due to 
the small numbers of places on the DSPD units, motivation to engage with the 
programme became an informal criterion for admission.  
In the prison units, on the other hand, compulsory treatment was not permissible. As 
noted previously, some prisoners were moved out of the prison units due to their refusal 
to engage with treatment. However, the IMPALOX study also notes that the Parole 
Board required some prisoners to be assessed for DSPD before being considered for 
downgrading to a lower security status, while others were threatened with the loss of 
enhanced status on the Incentives and Earned Privileges scheme if they did not comply 
(Tyrer et al. 2007, p. 52). Practitioners in the prison DSPD units mentioned in interview 
that once a prisoner had been referred to the DSPD unit, the programme would “remain 
on his sentence plan” and would not be removed until he accessed treatment. This 
meant that prisoners knew they would not have a chance of being released unless they 
complied with the programme. This implies that a level of coercion was present. As 
noted previously, coercion is likely to have a negative impact on the effectiveness of 
psychological treatments for personality disorder that require willing engagement and 
motivation to change on behalf of participants. Thus, the use of coercion may have 
undermined the key aims of reducing risk and reintegrating offenders into society. This 
argument is developed further in Chapter 7. 
Given the operational problems noted by the evaluation studies, rather than an attempt 
at deliberate warehousing it may be more accurate to say that the practical difficulties of 
delivering treatment meant that the DSPD programme appeared to be engaged in mere 
containment despite its therapeutic intentions. The centrality of therapy to the DSPD 
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programme goes against Toby Seddon’s analysis of the initiative as a means of 
excluding dangerous “monsters” (Seddon 2008, p.309). In the DSPD proposals and the 
DSPD programme, personality disorder and dangerousness were purposely conceived 
as potentially mutable qualities and the message was one of therapeutic optimism. As 
outlined in the previous chapter, the ultimate goal of the DSPD proposals was the social 
reintegration of the DSPD group rather than their perpetual exclusion. To some extent, 
therefore, the “monsters” of Seddon’s account were conceived to be redeemable. The 
theme of redemption also underlies historical approaches towards the reform and 
rehabilitation of offenders and is explored further in Chapter 7.  
 
6. The Legacy of the DSPD Programme 
The legacy of the DSPD programme is mixed and its impact on the problems identified 
by the early policymakers is difficult to disentangle from other developments in law, 
culture and practice. As mentioned previously, the programme involved significant 
investment in a neglected population and generated greater interest in research on 
possible treatments for personality disorder. According to Conor Duggan (2011), 
broader developments in policy and “mainstream psychiatry”, including the provision of 
specialist personality disorder training by the Department of Health and the formulation 
of NICE guidelines on BPD (NCCMH et al. 2009) and ASPD (NCCMH et al. 2010), 
would not have taken place without the DSPD initiative. Kevin Howells and colleagues 
(2011) argue that significant learning has emerged from the DSPD experiment in terms 
of treatment innovations, service delivery and the characteristics of the DSPD 
population (see for example Murphy and McVey 2010; Tennant and Howells 2010; 
Tew and Atkinson 2013). More research is needed, however, to confirm whether the 
DSPD programme met the aims of developing effective treatments for its client group 
and reducing the risks they posed so that they could be safely released. In particular, 
long term follow-up of the original DSPD cohort and randomised studies of current 
interventions are necessary to convince sceptics and form a robust evidence base for 
treatment. 
What is clear, however, is that the prison DSPD units managed difficult prisoners 
effectively and at a much lower cost than in other parts of the prison system. According 
to the Impact Assessment for the OPDP (Department of Health 2011), if the DSPD 
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programme were to close, the use of CSCs would significantly increase. This would 
result in much higher costs as a place in a CSC costs £60,000 more per year than a place 
in a DSPD unit (Department of Health 2011, p.6). In addition, managing this group of 
prisoners without providing therapeutic interventions would result in increased levels of 
disruption, put additional pressure on the capacity of prison segregation units and lead 
to more prisoners being transferred from prison to prison (Department of Health 2011, 
p.6). It would also potentially lead to greater use of the Secretary of State’s power to 
transfer prisoners to secure hospitals, where a bed costs around £290,000 per annum 
(Department of Health 2011, p.6). Thus it is clear that the introduction of the DSPD 
units brought significant benefits to the prison system in terms of the effective 
management of difficult and disruptive prisoners at a reduced cost.  
The question of whether the DSPD programme resolved the problem of determinate 
sentenced prisoners being released while still dangerous is less straightforward to 
answer. Following the debate over the DSPD proposals and the introduction of the 
DSPD programme, the numbers of patients admitted to hospital on the grounds of 
psychopathic disorder rose from 40 in 1999 to 51 in 2002 when the first DSPD pilot 
opened, and peaked at 117 in 2007 (Ministry of Justice 2009a, Table 7). This represents 
an increase of 192%. By comparison, the numbers of patients detained on the grounds 
of mental illness in the same period increased by 23% (Ministry of Justice 2009a, Table 
7). The numbers of prisoners transferred to hospital post-sentence under the MHA 1983 
also increased by 82.6% (Ministry of Justice 2010b, Table 2). Statistics are only 
available in this form up to 2007 as the categories of psychopathic disorder and mental 
illness were abolished by the MHA 2007. These statistics may indicate increased 
willingness to admit patients to hospital on the grounds of psychopathic disorder 
following the introduction of the DSPD programme, even prior to the reforms 
introduced by the MHA 2007.  
As noted previously, the reforms to the MHA 1983 introduced by the MHA 2007 made 
little difference to the operation of the DSPD programme. The Paddock Unit at 
Broadmoor began receiving patients as early as April 2003 and the majority of these 
had been transferred from prison (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.30–1). The treatment 
capacity of the DSPD units and the promotion of the idea that personality disorder 
should “no longer [be] a diagnosis of exclusion” (NIMHE 2003) by the government 
may have encouraged psychiatrists to admit greater numbers of personality disordered 
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individuals to hospital. The impact of the MHA 2007 is evaluated further in Chapters 5 
and 6 of this thesis.  
Another important legislative development was the introduction of the IPP sentence, 
which allowed for indeterminate sentences to be passed down on the grounds of future 
risk. Several interviewees were of the opinion that the IPP sentence had largely resolved 
the problem of the premature release of dangerous prisoners. Following the abolition of 
the IPP sentence by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
(LASPO) 2012, the problem of dangerous offenders may be expected to resurface, 
potentially prompting greater reliance on transfers to hospital for personality disordered 
individuals. The impact of changes to the law of sentencing will be explored in greater 
detail in Chapters 5 of this thesis. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to evaluate the extent to which the pilot DSPD programme 
lived up to the expectations set for it in its early years. While the programme appears to 
have had some success in improving the management of a difficult group, it 
encountered difficulties in delivering the intensive levels of therapy that were expected 
and many patients and prisoners were frustrated at the time spent “waiting” for 
treatment (Burns et al. 2011). A combination of unrealistic expectations, practical 
issues, and evaluations that were commissioned too early seem to have contributed to 
this finding. Following on from the analysis of the origins of the DSPD initiative in the 
previous chapter, it has been argued that the centrality of therapeutic intervention to the 
compromise embodied by the DSPD programme casts doubt on the assertion that it was 
engaged in mere “warehousing” (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97). However, the slow progress 
of patients and prisoners through the system indicates that it may have operated as a 
means of holding them back as well as allowing them to progress towards release. Risk 
monitoring was an important function of the DSPD programme and this aim has taken 
on increasing importance in the programme’s successor, discussed in the next chapter. 
The high levels of BPD and self-harming behaviours amongst DSPD patients and 
prisoners indicate that the units were also used to house individuals who were difficult 
to manage on general location. These individuals may also have been more treatment-
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seeking than more purely psychopathic or antisocial patients (Tyrer et al. 2007). In the 
proposals for the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway, the subject of the next 
chapter, expectations for treatment have become narrower and a greater emphasis is 
placed on risk assessment and monitoring. There is also evidence of a move towards 
reserving high secure treatment services on the OPDP for a more treatment-resistant 
group than those admitted to the DSPD programme. As will be argued in the next 
chapter, this casts doubt on the extent to which the DSPD programme’s successor can 
be expected to meet the goal of improving mental health outcomes for this group. It 
further indicates that the DSPD programme has to some extent been co-opted by the 
criminal justice system.  
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Chapter 4: The Offender Personality Disorder Pathway
3
 
 
1. Introduction 
In the first two chapters of this thesis, it was argued that the DSPD proposals emerged 
as a policy response to past failures in the management of difficult personality 
disordered offenders spurred on in part by high profile cases that provoked public fears 
about the release of dangerous individuals. The subsequent pilot DSPD programme was 
an experiment designed to balance the interests of the individual and society by offering 
an intensive course of treatments aimed at improving offenders’ mental health and 
reducing their risk of reoffending while also facilitating their preventive detention in 
prison or hospital. It also aimed to improve the management of a disruptive group of 
patients and prisoners and reduce the costs associated with the use of CSCs and 
segregation units. In its early years, however, the DSPD programme failed in part to live 
up to these expectations and the effectiveness of the treatment interventions in reducing 
risk remains unproven. This chapter addresses the reforms undertaken in the name of 
the Offender Personality Disorder Pathway (OPDP), which has come to replace the 
DSPD programme.  
The OPDP proposals ostensibly build on learning from the DSPD programme and, at 
first glance, appear to be a more concerted effort to follow through on its original aims 
and methods. On closer examination, however, it emerges that the plans uncouple the 
goal of enhancing wellbeing from that of reducing risk. The extent to which the plans 
follow on from the original vision of the early “DSPD programme evangelists” (Peay 
2011a, p.238) may therefore be questioned. Furthermore, the OPDP in high security 
settings focuses on those prisoners who are least likely to be motivated for treatment 
and the more treatment-seeking patients and prisoners who gained access to the DSPD 
programme may find themselves outside of the OPDP. This casts doubt on the capacity 
for the new OPDP to meet its stated aim of reducing health inequalities. The changes 
introduced by the OPDP will be examined here with a view to tracing these shifts and 
drawing out the implications of the policy for personality disordered offenders. The 
discussion in this chapter will set the scene for an in-depth analysis of the interactions 
                                                 
3
 Parts of this chapter have been taken from O’Loughlin, A. (2014) “The Offender Personality Disorder 
Pathway: Expansion in the Face of Failure?”, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 53(2), 173 – 192. 
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between law and policy governing the detention, punishment and treatment of 
personality disordered offenders in the second half of this thesis. 
 
2. Reforming the DSPD Programme 
(a) The Offender Personality Disorder Pathway 
(i) Changing contexts 
The OPDP was devised by civil servants in the Department of Health and the National 
Offender Management Service (NOMS). NOMS was formed in 2004 in response to the 
recommendations of the Carter Review, which called for a move away from 
incapacitating offenders and towards rehabilitating them in the fight against reoffending 
(Carter 2003, p.15-16). In 2007, it became an executive agency of the Ministry of 
Justice, which took over responsibility for prisons and probation from the Home Office. 
The aim of NOMS was to develop “a system focused on the end-to-end management of 
offenders throughout their sentence” that has “a clear responsibility for reducing re-
offending” (Carter 2003, p.34). Its operating principles include the “risk-assessed use of 
scarce resources, through the use of a system based on improved information” and 
“more effective service delivery […] through greater contestability, using providers of 
prison and probation from across the public, private and voluntary sectors” (Carter 
2003). In a parallel development, the NHS took over responsibility for prisoner 
healthcare from the Prison Service with the aim of giving prisoners “equivalence of 
care”, defined as “access to the same quality and range of health care services as the 
general public receives” (NHS Executive and HM Prison Service 1999, para. 9). 
Together, these structural changes paved the way for a reconsideration of how offenders 
with mental health problems were dealt with by the criminal justice and health systems.    
By 2006, the NHS had taken over responsibility for prisoner healthcare in the bulk of 
the prison estate. This brought about some improvements but concerns regarding the 
inadequacy of prison mental health in-reach services, the detrimental effects of 
imprisonment on mental health and the high prevalence of mental disorders amongst 
prisoners persisted. In 2007, the Secretary of State for Justice commissioned a review 
by Lord Keith Bradley to examine the extent to which offenders with mental health 
problems or learning disabilities could be diverted from the criminal justice system and 
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to make recommendations to the government on how to improve mental healthcare 
provision (Bradley 2009). The subsequent Bradley Report noted that personality 
disorder was particularly prevalent amongst prisoners, affecting around 63% of the 
prison population compared to between 10% and 13% of the general population. Rates 
were particularly high amongst violent and sexual offenders (Bradley 2009, p. 108). For 
Lord Bradley, this suggested “that in the spirit of ‘equivalence of services’ some 
development of personality disorder-specific services would play a significant role in 
improving prison mental health services” (Bradley 2009, p.108).  
The Bradley Report noted the work done by the DSPD programme “at the severe end of 
the spectrum” but found there was no “coherent and agreed inter-departmental approach 
to the management of personality disorder within the criminal justice and health 
systems” (Bradley 2009, p. 109). Consequently, the Report called for an evaluation of 
the DSPD programme “to ensure that it is able to address the level of need” (Bradley 
2009, p. 109). In addition, it recommended that the Department of Health, NOMS and 
the NHS “develop an inter-departmental strategy for the management of all levels of 
personality disorder within both the health service and the criminal justice system, 
covering the management of individuals with personality disorder into and through 
custody, and also their management in the community” (Bradley 2009, p. 109).  
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government elected in May 2010 
responded to the recommendations of the Bradley Report in a criminal justice 
consultation paper entitled Breaking the Cycle, published in December 2010 (Ministry 
of Justice 2010a). In acknowledgement of their “joint responsibility” for personality 
disordered offenders, the NHS and NOMS were to “reconfigure existing services in 
secure and community settings to manage and reduce risk of reoffending” (Ministry of 
Justice 2010a, para. 126). Notably, and in contrast to the Bradley Report, there was no 
reference in Breaking the Cycle to plans to improve health outcomes. In February 2011, 
the Coalition followed up on its commitment with a joint Department of Health and 
NOMS (2011a) consultation paper putting forward plans for the OPDP.  
(ii) Continuity? 
Under the plans for the OPDP, the high and medium secure hospital DSPD units were 
to be decommissioned and treatments for personality disorder on the new pathway 
would in principle be delivered in the criminal justice system. Resources recouped from 
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the hospital units would be funnelled into 570 new treatment places and 820 progression 
places (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 33). There would also be a 
programme for identifying prisoners with personality disorder early in their sentences 
and greater supervision on release. New personality disorder intervention and treatment 
services were to be established in Category B and C prisons for men, in closed prisons 
for women and in the community (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a). Onward 
progression pathways for patients and prisoners from personality disorder treatment 
units were to be clarified and transfer from treatment units into other parts of the prison 
and secure hospital estate would be via specialist progression units called 
“psychologically informed planned environments” (PIPEs) (Department of Health and 
NOMS 2011a, para. 47). There were also plans for workforce development and a 
Knowledge and Understanding Framework (KUF) to enhance staff training in 
personality disorder (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 41).  
In contrast to the pilot DSPD programme, which benefitted from the availability of 
large sums of money at a time of economic prosperity, the OPDP reforms were 
undertaken at a time of severe budget cuts. By October 2010, the deficit of Britain’s 
public sector budget stood at £7.1 billion (Office for National Statistics 2010) and a 
Spending Review announced public sector spending cuts of £81 billion over four years 
(HM Treasury 2010, p.16). Under the plans, the Ministry of Justice was to lose 23% of 
its budget (HM Treasury 2010, p.56). Overall, the OPDP strategy was intended to 
provide interventions for a greater number of offenders using the same resources as the 
DSPD programme (see Department of Health 2011).   
The DSPD programme was originally intended to “develop care pathways to allow a 
continuum of care across all levels of security” (Department of Health et al. 2003) and 
staff training and development were always part of the plans (see Home Office and 
Department of Health 1999). In many respects, the OPDP therefore represents a more 
concerted effort to follow through on the original aims and methods of the DSPD 
programme. Like its predecessor, the OPDP also seems to be predicated on the 
assumption that personality disorder and offending are linked and treatment can 
therefore be expected to reduce risk of reoffending. The “main objective” of the OPDP 
is “to improve public protection” but it is also expected to contribute to other “strategic 
objectives” of the Ministry of Justice and the Department of Health. These include 
“reducing reoffending, improving psychological health and well-being and tackling 
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health inequality” (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 36). However, the 
questionable continuity between the DSPD programme and the OPDP calls into 
question the extent to which the OPDP proposals follow on from the high aspirations of 
the DSPD programme’s initiators. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Jack Straw’s public attack on psychiatrists and the 
misinformation surrounding the Michael Stone case contributed to a sense that 
“untreatable” dangerous psychopaths were left free to kill in legal limbo. Perhaps 
surprisingly, many of the myths and misinformation that were rife at the time the 
proposals were being discussed live on in the minds of those involved in the OPDP. 
Despite the findings of the inquiry into his care and treatment (Francis et al. 2006), the 
claim that Stone was “a diagnosed psychopath who did not satisfy the treatability 
criteria of the 1983 Mental Health Act and who could not therefore be detained 
indefinitely, constituting an unacceptable risk to the public” was cited recently as one of 
the reasons for the establishment of the DSPD programme (Lloyd and Bell 2015, p.2).  
The introduction to a Special Edition of the Prison Service Journal entitled Working 
with People with Severe Personality Disorder published in March 2015 states that in the 
late 1990s “personality disorder was ‘a diagnosis of exclusion’ across the NHS” , “there 
were no services in place and personality disordered patients were largely deemed to be 
untreatable” (Lloyd and Bell 2015, p.2). Similarly, in the same issue, the officials 
responsible for designing and commissioning the OPDP claim that, before the DSPD 
programme, “many offenders perpetrating serious violence and sexual crimes were said 
to be untreatable” (Benefield et al. 2015, p.4). As these individuals’ problems were 
largely “due to behavioural difficulties and/or psychopathy and personality disorder” 
there was “no place for them in a hospital” (Benefield et al. 2015, p.4). It is further 
claimed that this was the case “for anyone showing signs of personality disturbance 
whether they were an offender or not” and “left mental health services almost 
exclusively for those deemed mentally ill” (Benefield et al. 2015, p.4).  
These blanket statements appear inaccurate given evidence that patients detained on the 
grounds of psychopathic disorder had long been cared for by the special hospitals 
(Butler 1975; Dell and Robertson 1988; Fallon 1999). It also disregards the history of 
the use of psychological interventions with personality disordered patients and the range 
of opinions amongst psychiatrists and other mental health practitioners as to whether or 
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not personality disorder or psychopathy could or should be treated in hospital (Butler 
1975; Fallon 1999). As Tony Maden commented in his account of the “antecedents and 
origins” of the programme, “the DSPD diagnosis and service appeared suddenly but not 
from nowhere” (Maden 2007, s.8).  As the key players behind the original DSPD 
proposals moved on, however, their narrative appears to have become lost in the midst 
of media and political presentations of the initiative.  
(b) The “Rehabilitation Revolution” 
In addition to introducing plans to reform the DSPD programme, Breaking the Cycle 
outlined the Conservative-led Coalition’s plans to reduce costs and reoffending in a 
climate of economic austerity. In a speech in June 2010, then Lord Chancellor Ken 
Clarke broke with the previous Conservative government’s claim that “prison works” 
(Howard 1993) and set a new tone by roundly criticising prison as a “costly and 
ineffectual approach that fails to turn criminals into law-abiding citizens” (Clarke 2010). 
Backtracking on the Conservatives’ election pledge to top Labour’s prison-building 
scheme by 5,000 new places (Conservative Party 2008, p.16), Clarke vowed instead to 
close several prisons and reduce prisoner numbers by 3,000 over four years (Clarke 
2010). He also foreshadowed plans for a “radical new approach to rehabilitation” that 
would make prisons not only “places of punishment, but also of education, hard work 
and change” (Clarke 2010). The Coalition’s “rehabilitation revolution” (Ministry of 
Justice 2010a, p.1) was not as radical as it was portrayed to be, however, as the plans in 
many ways followed on from the Carter Review (2003) commissioned by its 
predecessor.  
As outlined in Chapter 2, Minister Paul Boateng claimed that society had “both a right 
and a need to protect itself from the actions of [the DSPD group] who, because of their 
disordered personality, pose[d] an unacceptable level of risk of causing serious harm to 
others” (Boateng and Sharland 1999, p.6). In Breaking the Cycle, the Coalition made a 
similar claim in relation to all offenders, asserting that “law abiding citizen[s]” had a 
“right” “to feel safe in their home and in their community” (Ministry of Justice 2010a, 
p. 1). Those who threatened that safety would “face a swift and effective response” from 
a criminal justice system responsible for “punishing offenders, protecting the public and 
reducing reoffending” (Ministry of Justice 2010a, p. 1). This indicates that the 
Coalition’s approach to rehabilitation is based on similar premises to the DSPD 
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programme and also assumes a “right” on behalf of a vulnerable public to a subjective 
sense of security (Ramsay 2012a; 2012d; see also Zedner 2003).  
The plans in Breaking the Cycle are couched in notably more coercive and punitive 
language than the DSPD proposals. In the 1999 Green Paper, individuals assessed as 
DSPD were to be “helped and encouraged to co-operate in therapeutic and other activity 
designed to help them return safely to the community” (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p.9). However, it was clear that if treatment did not succeed in reducing 
the risks they presented, there would be “no alternative but to continue to detain them 
indefinitely if the public is to be properly protected” (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p.9). While not expressed in these terms, the figurative bargain struck 
between the government and the DSPD group appeared to give rise to a duty for the 
latter to take up the opportunities offered to them in the form of treatment and, through 
these means, prove their safety for release. In Breaking the Cycle, the Coalition 
government asserted more explicitly that “offenders who commit to reforming 
themselves will have a greater chance of returning to society as law abiding citizens” 
(Ministry of Justice 2010a, para. 29). For the Coalition, “managing offenders” meant 
“striking the right balance between controlling them to protect communities and 
requiring them to take the action needed to change their criminal lifestyle” (Ministry of 
Justice 2010a, para. 84). The nature of the offender’s duty to engage in rehabilitation 
and the coercion that underlies it is analysed in further detail in the next chapter of this 
thesis. 
In Breaking the Cycle, punishment was also conceived of as a means of reducing 
reoffending, as exemplified by the claim that the government’s plans were “about 
finding out what works – the methods of punishment and rehabilitation [that] actually 
reduce crime by reducing the number of criminals” (Ministry of Justice 2010a, p.2). The 
Ministerial forward to the OPDP consultation also stated that “having a personality 
disorder does not absolve responsibility for criminal behaviour, and all offenders will be 
held accountable for their actions” (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, p.5). This 
reflects the legal view of personality disordered offenders as criminally responsible and 
deserving of punishment despite their limited volitional and rational capacities (see 
Chapters 5 and 6).  
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As noted previously, one of the aims of NOMS was to increase efficiency in the 
management of offenders by opening the provision of prison and probation services up 
to competition. In Breaking the Cycle, the Coalition declared its intention to pursue the 
marketization of criminal justice services. This drive has continued in the more recent 
Transforming Rehabilitation agenda (Ministry of Justice 2013a). The government is 
concerned not to “take any risks in protecting the public”, however, and the public 
sector National Probation Service (NPS) is to “retain ultimate responsibility for public 
protection and […] manage directly those offenders who pose the highest risk of serious 
harm to the public” (Ministry of Justice 2013a, p. 6). The reformed NPS was established 
on 1
st
 June 2014 along with 21 Community Rehabilitation Companies managing low to 
medium risk offenders (National Probation Service 2015). As will be seen further 
below, part of the criteria for admission to the OPDP requires offenders to be managed 
by the NPS.  
Despite some similarities, the OPDP departs from the original approach of the DSPD 
programme in a number of important ways. The most surprising element of the plans is 
that the selection of prisoners for the OPDP will no longer require a “formal” diagnosis 
of personality disorder (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para.17). The new 
scheme will be located predominantly within the criminal justice system and aims not 
only to facilitate the progression of prisoners onwards from high security settings but 
will also incorporate prisoners from lower security categories. The OPDP also 
represents a lowering of expectations for treatment and an increased focus on 
identifying and monitoring the risks presented by offenders. Nevertheless, the treatment 
programmes on offer incorporate more holistic understandings of personality disorder 
that imply that enhancing the wellbeing of offenders continues to be an aim of the 
OPDP. The remainder of this chapter will consider each of these changes in turn and 
highlight their implications for personality disordered offenders and the prospects for 
the OPDP to succeed in meeting its aims.   
 
3. A Criminal Justice Pathway 
(a) Are prisons “more effective”? 
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Under the OPDP, treatment for personality disorder will primarily take place in prisons 
but transfer to hospital will be available in certain circumstances. The Coalition’s 
strategy ostensibly aims to improve services for personality disordered offenders by 
diverting resources away from the hospital system and investing them in prisons, where 
“treatments can be provided more effectively and at much lower cost” (Department of 
Health and NOMS 2011a, para.2). As noted in the previous chapter, however, the IDEA 
study reported little difference between the DSPD hospital and prison units in terms of 
treatment effectiveness (Burns et al. 2011). Both patients and prisoners experienced 
weak but statistically significant reductions in VRS scores (Burns et al. 2011). The 
claim that treatments can be provided “more effectively” in prison may therefore be 
questioned. 
At first glance, the prison DSPD units appeared to outperform the hospital units in terms 
of patient satisfaction. While both groups were dissatisfied with the time spent 
“waiting” for treatment, those in the hospital units expressed the greatest discontent 
(Burns et al. 2011). There were also fewer violent incidents recorded in prisons than in 
hospitals, indicating that the DSPD group may have been managed more smoothly by 
the prisons. On closer examination, however, a significant number of patients were 
being preventatively detained in the hospital DSPD units following the expiry of their 
determinate prison sentences. The corollary of this was that a greater proportion of 
DSPD patients than prisoners felt that they had little say in their admission to the 
programme and patients reported a higher level of perceived coercion than prisoners 
(Burns et al. 2011, p.225; p.58). This is significant, particularly given the IDEA study’s 
finding that unwillingly-admitted patients were less motivated to participate in 
treatment (Burns et al. 2011). The hospital patients may therefore have been more 
difficult to manage and work with than the prisoners. On the other hand, the IDEA 
study reported that some hospital patients seemed to adopt a “sick” role with a sense of 
entitlement to treatment (Burns et al. 2011, p.231). The disappointment that such 
patients felt at the low number of treatment hours may also have contributed to their 
dissatisfaction. As will be seen below, the latest criteria for entry onto the OPDP appear 
to exclude more treatment-seeking prisoners, casting doubt on the extent to which the 
programme can be expected to tackle health inequalities in the spirit of the Bradley 
Report (2009). 
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While the claim that the prison units were “more effective” than the hospital units is not 
supported by the IDEA findings, what is clear is that the prisons were providing similar 
treatments to the DSPD group at a much lower cost than the hospitals. The annual 
operating costs of the DSPD programme were huge, estimated at £69 million per 
annum. At approximately £300,000 per year, a place in a secure psychiatric DSPD unit 
cost over three times as much as a place in a prison DSPD unit, at £85,000 per year 
(Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para.24). From the available data it appears 
that the extra cost did not equate to better results. At a time of severe budget cuts, it 
seems that concern with cost, rather than effectiveness or appropriateness, may have 
been the determining factor in the decision to focus on a prison pathway.  
Secure hospitals will, however, continue to play a role on the OPDP. The former DSPD 
units are to become hospital PD units funded through NHS England Specialised 
Commissioning, and high and medium secure personality disorder treatment services in 
hospitals will be part of the pathway approach (Department of Health and NOMS 
2011a). Placement in hospital will “be reserved for offenders who can only be managed 
in a hospital setting” (NOMS and NHS England 2015, p.17). Broad criteria for entry 
onto the hospital pathway include uncertain, changing or disputed diagnosis or risk 
levels, a need for interventions not readily available in prison, deliberate self-harm, co-
morbid mental illnesses requiring stabilisation in hospital, and complexity compounded 
by borderline intellectual functioning or neurological impairment. Also mentioned are 
“repeated failure in a prison setting”, “irretrievable breakdown of relationships in 
custody” and “therapy-interfering behaviours” such as “litigiousness, breaches of 
boundaries [and] pathological attachments” (NOMS and NHS England 2015, p.17). 
Finally, there are “notional 37s” – patients who were transferred to hospital under s.47 
of the MHA 1983 but whose prison sentences have since expired (NOMS and NHS 
England 2015, p.17).  
The criteria indicate that secure hospitals will continue to be used to preventively detain 
individuals at the end of determinate prison sentences and that they are to take on the 
more challenging and complex cases that cannot be dealt with by the prison service. 
Following decommissioning, they will be expected to do this without the additional 
staffing and resources of the DSPD units. The DSPD unit at Broadmoor closed in April 
2012 and 78 staff were made redundant (Nursing Standard, April 2012). The Peaks unit 
at Rampton hospital remained open and operational for a time and accepted patients 
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from areas in the south of England in order to compensate for the closure of the 
Broadmoor unit (Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust 2011). In July 2014, the Peaks 
ceased to accept DSPD referrals and all subsequent referrals would be categorised as 
general personality disorder (PD) patients (Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust and 
NHS England 2015). The purpose-built Peaks unit is now to become part of the general 
PD service at Rampton. Of the original cohort of 63 DSPD patients present at 
decommissioning, 47 remain at Rampton while the others have been moved to other 
prison or secure hospital accommodation (Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS Trust and 
NHS England 2015).  Patients who would otherwise have been referred to the Peaks are 
now to be referred to the prison pathway or to one of three PD wards at Rampton, 
Broadmoor and Ashworth (DH/NOMS Offender Personality Disorder Programme 
2014).  
The OPDP is to be evaluated over a period of 4 years in a project led by Paul Moran of 
King’s College London. The first phase, a feasibility study, started in August 2014. This 
will be followed by a process study, impact evaluation and economic evaluation. The 
whole study is expected to be completed in 2018. The impact evaluation will measure 
the effectiveness of the pathway in “reducing reoffending and improving psychological 
health” (NOMS and NHS England 2015, p.18-19). Given the large and diffuse nature of 
the pathway, however, it is likely to prove challenging to evaluate. Furthermore, at four 
years, the timeframe for the study is very short and it is unlikely that it will be possible 
to draw robust conclusions on treatment effectiveness. It has also been commissioned 
very early given that the plans for the OPDP were first announced in 2011. Thus, the 
evaluation may suffer from the same difficulties as those that faced the IMPALOX and 
IDEA studies considered in the previous chapter. A follow-up study of the progress of 
the DSPD cohorts may provide more convincing conclusions on effectiveness but there 
are no plans to do so at present. This raises the concern that the evaluation of the OPDP 
may not bring us much closer to determining “what works” in reducing risk of 
reoffending amongst personality disordered offenders.  
(b) Can prisons be therapeutic? 
As noted in previous chapters, the question of where dangerous offenders with 
personality disorder or psychopathy should be detained, treated and managed has been a 
significant point of debate (see Butler 1975; Fallon 1999; Reed 1994). This debate is 
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on-going and has not been resolved by the decision by those behind the OPDP to opt for 
a system focused on prison and probation seemingly on grounds of cost. A group of 
psychiatrists at Broadmoor hospital have argued that the diagnostic expertise of doctors 
is needed to assess a group of patients who often present with complex 
psychopathologies and mental illnesses in addition to personality disorder so that they 
may be directed towards suitable treatment (Witharana et al. 2011). In a similar vein, 
Howells and colleagues refer to the “untold story” of the benefits of psychotropic 
medications which help to “stabilize individuals so that they can then engage in 
psychological and lifestyle-focused interventions” (Howells et al. 2011, p.130). More 
radically, Lawrence Jones, a psychologist and former clinical lead of the Rampton 
DSPD unit, proposes that severe personality disorder may be better conceptualised as 
chronic trauma given the histories of abuse and victimisation common to those in the 
DSPD group. Intervening with some patients in a prison setting may be inappropriate or 
even unethical due to the potential for patients to be re-traumatised (Jones 2015).  
The above raises the broader question of whether prisons can act as therapeutic 
environments. There is evidence from the broader sociological literature that the 
demands of prison are not compatible with the goal of rehabilitation, and particularly 
with holistic rehabilitation programmes, such as the DSPD programme, that require 
changes in the prison environment and culture. For example, Elaine Genders and Elaine 
Player (1995; 2010) found in their study of the TC at HMP Grendon that where a 
conflict arose between the interests of the mainstream prison and the TC, penal power 
tended to prevail. Richard Sparks’ (2002) experience of the Barlinnie Special Unit in 
Scotland also yields evidence of conflict between the agenda of the wider prison and 
that of the “experimental” Special Unit with its permissive TC, which was eventually 
closed. The OPDP documentation implicitly recognises this conflict, particularly in its 
plans for PIPEs. These units are intended to provide “a safe and facilitating environment 
that can retain the benefits gained from treatment, test offenders to see whether 
behavioural changes are retained and support offenders to progress through the system” 
(Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para.59). This implies that a return to 
mainstream location risks undoing the progress made in therapy and, by extension, that 
the prison environment, at least in its current form, is not supportive of lasting change.  
Evaluations of both the DSPD units (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b) and a PIPE pilot 
(Turley et al. 2013) give indications of conflict between experimental treatment and 
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progression units and the culture and priorities of security staff. According to the PIPE 
evaluation, while relationships between staff and prisoners were generally described as 
positive, some prison officers found it difficult to adjust to the ethos of the PIPE as they 
were required to address inmates by their first names and to participate in therapeutic 
and leisure activities alongside them (Turley et al. 2013). Similarly, prison officers at 
the DSPD unit at HMP Whitemoor were wary of the therapeutic model at first as they 
felt it threatened the smooth management of the prisoners and generated risks to the 
safety and security of staff (Fox 2010). This tension was eventually resolved as officers 
came to see that, by challenging the prisoners, the programme was working towards 
reductions in risks to the public in the long-term. In this context, they became more 
tolerant of the short-term risks to safety and good order provoked by treatment (Fox 
2010). The need for officers to “emotionally engage” (Fox 2010, p.230) with prisoners 
as part of the therapeutic model was also problematic, as officers in training are 
“informally encouraged to ‘develop a suspicious mindset’” and never to trust or become 
friends with prisoners (Fox 2010, p.229, citing Crawley 2004). Prison officers who 
embraced their new role were treated with suspicion by colleagues both within and 
beyond the DSPD unit who disapproved of “caring” for prisoners (Fox 2010).  
Conflicts between the units and their host institutions were also apparent. The schedule 
of the PIPE often conflicted with that of its host prison and there was evidence that the 
PIPE became insular and residents tended to stick together when out in the main prison. 
Similar problems were experienced by the DSPD units. Prisoners and patients 
interviewed by the IDEA team commented that security procedures interfered with the 
therapeutic aims of the DSPD units (Burns et al. 2011, p.215-217) and staff interviewed 
by MEMOS spoke of conflicts between the units and their host institutions. Sources of 
tension included the greater resources and higher staffing levels of the DSPD units, their 
relative isolation, the security policies of the wider institution restricting the extent to 
which the DSPD units could operate in line with their clinical models, and 
misunderstandings in the wider institution about the work of the DSPD unit (Trebilcock 
and Weaver 2010b). These tensions eased over time through efforts on behalf of 
management to improve the integration of DSPD units with their host institutions, to 
raise awareness of the work of the DSPD units within the institution and to encourage 
the sharing of best practices (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b). However, practitioners in 
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the former DSPD prison units revealed in interview that while there had been some 
improvement, tensions with their host prisons required on-going negotiation.  
These tensions and role conflicts indicate that broader cultural changes will be required 
before prisons can become more therapeutic places. One of NOMS’s six 
“commissioning intentions” from 2014 is to “enhance public protection and ensure a 
safe, decent environment and rehabilitative culture” in prisons (NOMS 2013 p.9). 
According to a recently released Rehabilitation Services Specification, the “right prison 
culture” is one in which “prisoners feel safe and hopeful and where constructive staff 
prisoner relationships promote desistance, recovery, rehabilitation and change” (NOMS 
2015, para. 4.3). While these changes sound positive, it is questionable whether they 
can be achieved in the current climate. Prisons will be “expected to provide” therapeutic 
environments “using their own staff resources” (NOMS 2015, para. 1.4). In other 
words, no additional funding will be available. Reports of increased incidences of 
suicide, self-harm and assault in prisons demonstrate that the system is already 
struggling to cope with cuts to staff and chronic overcrowding (see Howard League for 
Penal Reform 2014; HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales 2014). 
Furthermore, the delivery of therapeutic interventions in the coercive prison 
environment may be expected to undermine their effectiveness and lead to greater 
punishment for personality disordered prisoners. These tensions will be explored further 
in Chapter 7 of this thesis.  
 
4. Progression and Expansion 
As illustrated in previous chapters, the DSPD proposals were a compromise between the 
interests of the Department of Health and the Home Office. In the OPDP proposals, on 
the other hand, the concerns of the Ministry of Justice are much more prominent and 
health considerations appear to be marginalised. This is evident from the expansion of 
the OPDP into lower security categories and the lowering of expectations for treatment, 
discussed below.  
(a) Progression 
The OPDP places particular emphasis on prisoner progression and proposes a “whole 
systems approach”, incorporating “the various stages of an offender’s journey, from 
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charge, conviction, prison, [to] post release supervision and resettlement” (Department 
of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 38). The pathway will also integrate outcomes from 
“related programmes for young people and families […] to contribute to breaking the 
intergenerational crime cycle” (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 38). In 
this sense, the OPDP seems closer to the original plans for the third service, which, 
according to one early policymaker, would have been “end-to-end” or “cradle to the 
grave” (Civil Servant). Rather than establishing a separate service, however, the OPDP 
operates within existing legal and institutional structures.  
As seen from earlier chapters, the DSPD programme was originally intended to 
incorporate “step-down” for patients and prisoners from high secure services. Treatment 
interventions were also intended to be short term and intensive so that they could reach 
a larger number of offenders. The reality was much slower movement and longer stays. 
Due to an initial focus on the “high end” of the system, the options for onward 
progression were limited and uncertainties regarding pathways out of the units also had 
a detrimental effect on prisoner and patient engagement with therapy (Trebilcock and 
Weaver 2010a; 2010b; Burns et al. 2011). The OPDP aims to resolve these issues by 
developing new treatment units in Category B and C prisons for men and closed prisons 
for women and establishing a number of PIPEs in prisons and the community.  
(b) Expansion at the bottom 
The 2011 consultation document on the OPDP proposed the following inclusion criteria 
for the pathway: 
The pathway is intended to meet the needs of all offenders […] who have a 
severe personality disorder; and  
 are assessed as presenting a high likelihood of violent or sexual offence 
repetition;  
 present a high or very high risk of serious harm to others;  
 and where there is a clinically justifiable link between their 
psychological disorder and the risks they pose (Department of Health 
and NOMS 2011a, para. 16. Original emphasis). 
By replicating the DSPD criteria almost exactly, the OPDP initiative at first appears to 
be based on the same assumptions as its predecessor: that personality disorder causes 
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offending and that treatment for personality disorder will therefore reduce risk of 
recidivism. Upon further examination, however, it emerges that the OPDP criteria are 
more flexible than the original DSPD criteria and may be applied less strictly. 
Startlingly, despite the inclusion of “severe personality disorder” in the criteria, the 
OPDP consultation document notes that the “focus of work, in most cases, will be in 
relation to offenders who do not have a formal personality disorder diagnosis” 
(Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 17). These individuals “will have 
complex needs consisting of emotional and interpersonal difficulties, and display 
challenging behaviour of a degree that causes concern in relation to their effective 
management” (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 17). A formal diagnosis 
will be required for “some forms of treatment” on the OPDP, but it is not specified what 
these might be (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 17).   
More recently published criteria for entry onto the OPDP for men are even broader. The 
pathway will be open to men: 
1. At any point during their sentence, assessed as presenting a high 
likelihood of violent or sexual offence repetition and as presenting a high 
or very high risk of serious harm to others; and  
2. Likely to have a severe personality disorder; and  
3. A clinically justifiable link between the personality disorder and the risk; 
and  
4. The case is managed by [the National Probation Service] (Benefield et 
al. 2015, p.6). 
“Severe personality disorder” is also characterised as: 
Persistent and complex needs with regard to interpersonal functioning; emotion 
regulation; arousal; impulse control and ways of thinking and perceiving. It is 
associated with considerable personal and social disruption. The disorder is 
likely to appear in late childhood or early adolescence and is enduring (d’Cruz 
2015, p.49). 
This definition does not adhere to any particular type of personality disorder recognised 
in current clinical classifications such as the DSM-V and ICD-10 and therefore appears 
to have even less scientific validity than the original DSPD criteria. The reference to a 
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“psychological disorder” rather than a “personality disorder” indicates the potential 
breadth of application of the OPDP criteria beyond the small group targeted by the early 
DSPD policymakers. Given the uproar over the controversial DSPD “diagnosis” noted 
in Chapter 2 it is perhaps surprising that the criteria for the OPDP have received such 
little attention. Given the substantial overlap between the diagnostic criteria for 
psychopathy, ASPD and BPD and offending behaviour and the high rates of ASPD and 
BPD reported in the prison population, the generality of the OPDP criteria also raises 
the question of what exactly distinguishes severely personality disordered individuals 
from other high risk offenders who pose management problems in prisons.  
As highlighted in previous chapters, the developers of the DSPD programme sought to 
alleviate public fears and dispel the “myth” that anyone with a personality disorder 
could be swept up off the streets and detained against their will. One of their first tasks 
was therefore to make clear that the programme would be reserved for a small number 
of serious offenders. Initial estimates of numbers eligible for the DSPD programme 
were accordingly very low, at around 2,000 (Home Office and Department of Health 
1999; Boateng and Sharland 1999). At around 20,000, the number of men expected to 
be eligible for the OPDP is ten times higher (Benefield et al. 2015, p.4). The total 
NOMS caseload figure from which this calculation derives is not given. Based on 
NOMS statistics, the total male prison and probation caseload was 276,532 men on 31 
December 2014 (Ministry of Justice 2015a, Table A4.13; Ministry of Justice 2015b, 
Table 1.1). The estimated male OPDP population is therefore approximately 7.2% of 
the total NOMS caseload.  
There are a number of possible explanations for the significant upsurge in numbers. As 
the pathway will include offenders who have been assessed as high risk “at any point 
during their sentence” (Benefield et al. 2015 p.6) it may be expected to draw many 
more individuals into the net. The inclusion of prisoners “likely” to suffer from a 
personality disorder also accounts for part of the increase. Another possible area for 
slippage is the third criterion of a “link” between the personality disorder and risk of 
reoffending. This is now described as a “clinically justifiable link” (Benefield et al. 
2015 p.6). However, no further information is available on how this link is to be 
evaluated or justified in light of the fact that a “formal” diagnosis of personality 
disorder will not be necessary.  
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As noted in the previous chapters, the idea of a “link” between personality disorder and 
risk of offending in the original DSPD criteria was controversial and it was not clear 
whether this criterion required causation or merely co-occurrence. Given the small 
numbers estimated to be eligible for the DSPD programme, Conor Duggan and Richard 
Howard (2009) concluded that the narrower causal interpretation must have been 
intended. In light of the vast increase in numbers eligible for the OPDP, it may be that 
the “link” now merely requires co-occurrence. This criterion may no longer operate to 
exclude prisoners from the pathway, which may simply incorporate any serious 
offenders who are difficult to manage in prison.  
A seemingly progressive move under the OPDP is the removal of the stigmatising 
“dangerous and severe” label. However, stigma also attaches to the personality disorder 
label itself (Tyrer et al. 2011). A group of psychiatrists at Broadmoor have expressed 
concern that diagnosis and case formulation under the OPDP will be left to offender 
managers with the assistance of forensic and clinical psychologists with no medical 
input, and assessment may be based on filling out a form rather than a comprehensive 
clinical assessment (Witharana et al. 2011). This, in their opinion, could lead to an over-
diagnosis of personality disorder and the attachment of a stigmatising label that can 
affect a patient’s care pathway and subsequent sentencing and custody decisions. On the 
flipside, it may also result in under-diagnosis, with some personality disordered 
individuals slipping through the net and being left out of services that could be of 
benefit to them.  
The incorporation of individuals who have not been formally diagnosed with 
personality disorder into a “personality disorder pathway” explicitly linked with high 
risk of serious harm is problematic. The continuing uncertainty about treatment may 
mean that a stigmatising label will be attached to prisoners without giving them 
effective means to later remove it. Furthermore, inclusion on a pathway for high risk 
offenders may potentially be a retrograde step for prisoners whose security 
categorisation has been downgraded due to reduced risks over the course of their 
sentence. The expansion of the OPDP to prisoners in lower security categories thus 
risks impeding the progress of ever greater numbers of prisoners and may subject them 
to increased punishment, as considered further below.  
(c) Narrowing at the top 
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The 2011 consultation document specifies additional criteria for entry into personality 
disorder units in Category A prisons, “most” of which should be met before admission 
(Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 49). These include offence and risk-
related criteria such as posing “an imminent risk of serious harm to others if released” 
and “a history of serious violent and/or sexual offences” which “may have excessively 
violent or sadistic aspects” (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 49). Other 
criteria relate to offenders’ personality traits or behaviour. These include failing to 
acknowledge the harms they have caused, tending to minimise the impact of their 
offending on others, blaming others for their problems or circumstances, exploiting 
others and abusing trust or friendships, and a history of breaching parole, bail conditions 
or community sentences (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 49). Further 
criteria relate to their motivation or amenability to treatment, including being “unlikely 
to make progress in other interventions”, requiring “more intense intervention from 
psychologically trained staff” and being “unlikely to be very motivated, but likely to 
benefit from work to increase […] motivation and engagement” (Department of Health 
and NOMS 2011a, para. 49). Prisoners must have a minimum of three years to serve on 
their sentence and priority will be given to those who have spent time in segregation or 
who are ready to leave a CSC (Department of Health and NOMS 2011a, para. 49).  
The new criteria may be expected to yield a more concentrated population of prisoners 
exhibiting antisocial or psychopathic personality traits and behaviours than those 
admitted to the high secure DSPD units. These prisoners are likely to prove 
exceptionally difficult to work with given that they will be selected explicitly on the 
grounds of their low motivation to engage with treatment. It is not clear how their 
likelihood of responding to interventions to increase motivation will be determined 
before entry to the programme. The concentration of treatment resistant prisoners makes 
it likely that these units will be particularly difficult to manage and may struggle with 
staff retention and motivation. This indicates that some important lessons from the 
DSPD programme may not have been learned and that the OPDP may therefore be 
expanding “in the face of failure” (O’Loughlin 2014). 
The changes are problematic on another level, as entry to the high security units will not 
require the consent of the prisoner and an element of implicit coercion will therefore be 
present. This may jeopardise the effectiveness of psychological treatments. The decision 
to focus on the antisocial type in high secure services also presents difficulties in terms 
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of “equivalence of services” for all prisoners with personality disorder (Bradley 2009, 
p.108). As outlined in the previous chapter, some patients and prisoners on the DSPD 
programme had PCL-R scores under the threshold for psychopathy and over half had 
been diagnosed with BPD. These patients may have been more treatment-seeking and 
possibly more amenable to treatment given the more encouraging evidence base for 
treating BPD (NCCMH et al. 2009). Such prisoners may now be excluded from high 
secure units focusing on those with a more antisocial profile. The aim of “reducing 
health inequalities” is also problematic in relation to offenders diagnosed with ASPD, as 
success in treating this population is often calculated in terms of reduced risks to others 
rather than benefit to patients (NCCMH et al. 2010). Prisoners with low motivation for 
treatment may be even less likely to engage with treatments primarily aimed at reducing 
risk to the public. Again, the extent to which the OPDP builds on learning from the 
DSPD programme may be questioned given the disruption caused to the work of the 
units by patients who were resisting treatment.  
(d) Women’s services 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the assessment criteria for entry onto the DSPD 
programme for women were identical to those for men except for the diagnostic criteria, 
which required lower PCL-R scores and higher levels of comorbidity (see DSPD 
Programme et al. 2006, p. 8). At around 50, the number of women expected to meet the 
DSPD criteria was very low and just 12 treatment places for women were established at 
the Primrose Unit at HMP Low Newton (DSPD Programme et al. 2006, p.8). For the 
OPDP strategists, applying the same criteria to women as to men would have yielded a 
group too small for a viable pathway and would have failed “to fill the yawning gap 
between the level of need and the availability of interventions for women who do not 
necessarily present a risk of harm to others, but who have significant personality 
difficulties linked to their offending” (d’Cruz 2015, p. 48). Separate criteria were 
therefore devised for the OPDP “to ensure equality of access to services for women” by 
reflecting “the much lower numbers of women who are a high risk of harm to the 
general public, and the proportionately higher numbers of women offenders with mental 
health problems and self-harming behaviours” (Benefield et al. 2015, p.6. Emphasis in 
original).  
The new criteria are much broader than the original DSPD criteria for women: 
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1. Current offence of violence against the person, criminal damage, sexual (not 
economically motivated) and/or against children; and 
2. Assessed as presenting a high risk of committing an offence from the above 
categories OR managed by the NPS; and 
3. Likely to have a severe form of personality disorder; and 
4. A clinically justifiable link between the above (d’Cruz 2015, p.49). 
The first criterion requires women to have an index offence from a specific range of 
offences that may fall below the threshold of “serious harm” set by the OPDP criteria 
for men. The inclusion of the offence of criminal damage without any additional 
requirement of harm to others may be expected to widen the net considerably. No 
further explanation is given for the inclusion of this offence or for the reference to 
offences against children. Another difference is the requirement that the woman should 
present a high risk of committing a further specified offence or be managed by the NPS, 
implying that women who do not reach the risk threshold required for management by 
the NPS may nevertheless enter onto the OPDP.  
As may be expected, estimates of the number of women eligible for the OPDP are 
significantly higher than under the DSPD programme and stand at between 1,000 and 
1,500 (d’Cruz 2015, p.48). The upper estimate is 30 times the original figure estimated 
to be eligible for the DSPD programme for women. According to the latest offender 
management statistics, the total female probation and prison caseload was 25,518 on 31 
December 2014 (Ministry of Justice 2015a, Table A4.13; Ministry of Justice 2015b, 
Table 1.1.). The upper estimate is therefore approximately 5.9% of the current NOMS 
female caseload, somewhat lower than the 7.2% figure for men.   
Services for women on the OPDP are more explicitly aimed at enhancing wellbeing 
than those for men. Thus, the aim of the high secure Primrose Service at HMP Low 
Newton is to “reduce risk to self and others, and to provide women with pro-social life 
skills which enhance their physical, emotional, spiritual and mental wellbeing” (d’Cruz 
2015, p.51). The Corston Report (2007) on women in the criminal justice system called 
for services to adopt a “woman-centred”, holistic approach and the OPDP strategy for 
women claims to pursue this. However, despite the identification of a “gap” between 
those presenting the highest risks and those with the greatest needs, the women’s 
strategy still focuses on women assessed as presenting a high risk of relatively serious 
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reoffending. Lower risk but perhaps more needy personality disordered women may 
therefore be left out. 
(e) Progress? 
Julie Trebilcock and Tim Weaver (2010a; 2012a) found in their study of Parole Board 
decision-making in relation to DSPD prisoners that Parole Board members attached 
more weight to the high security categorisation of the prisoners than to the DSPD label. 
Almost by definition, Category A prisoners were unlikely to be recommended for 
release or transfer to open prison conditions, which were the only options open to the 
Board in their cases. On the other hand, Parole Board members were concerned by the 
stigma attaching to the DSPD label, and the DSPD programme was seen to be a 
disruption to prisoners’ expected journeys as it “introduced unknown, unaccredited and 
individualised treatment interventions into a highly structured system” (Trebilcock and 
Weaver 2012a, p.148). The implications for assessing risk on such a programme were 
therefore unclear. The OPDP introduces further unknowns, such as the new PIPEs and 
treatment units in Category B and C prisons. Like the DSPD programme, these units 
will have to develop their own treatment programmes and ways of working.  
Completing an intervention such as the DSPD programme can be a condition for 
progressing through prison. One prison practitioner asserted in interview that once 
prisoners were assessed to be suitable, the DSPD programme would “remain on their 
sentence plan […] until they access treatment” (Practitioner). DSPD practitioners also 
made clear in interview that therapy also performs a risk-monitoring function. 
Information from therapy sessions and informal interactions between inmates and staff 
are constantly fed into individual prisoner risk profiles maintained by the 
multidisciplinary team on the units. Similarly, the PIPEs have an explicit risk 
monitoring function and staff continually test and assess prisoners by observing their 
interactions (Turley et al. 2013). It may be, therefore, that both refusal to engage and 
participation in therapy feed into judgments on risk and may hinder offenders in their 
progress towards release. The next chapter will examine further the impact of selection 
for a treatment programme such as the OPDP on categorisation and release decisions. 
Given that participation in the OPDP may impede their progress, prisoners may have 
rational reasons to refuse to engage with treatment. If they agree to participate, on the 
other hand, they may find themselves in a Catch-22 as their compliance may be 
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interpreted as an attempt at manipulation and a manifestation of their disorders (see 
Lacombe 2007). Viewing prisoners’ acts of resistance and compliance with prison 
regimes through the lens of their disorders draws attention away from the coercive 
environment in which they find themselves. In this context, a treatment programme that 
encourages offenders to take responsibility for themselves and make “pro-social 
choices” (Hannah-Moffat 2005) disguises the ultimately coercive nature of the 
“bargain” underlying the DSPD programme that is perpetuated by the OPDP. This 
theme will be returned to in Chapter 7. 
 
5. Expectations for Treatment 
(a) Narrower horizons 
As noted previously, the OPDP appears to set lower expectations for treatment than the 
DSPD programme. The promise of the OPDP, according to one interviewee involved in 
its development, was that it “could make things more effective in terms of output, 
although not necessarily in terms of outcome” (Civil Servant). This distinction is 
important, as it shows that aspirations have become narrower. Indeed, as the same 
interviewee told me, “treatment is the smallest part of our programme”. The rationale 
for this was that around 90% of the typically “treatment resistant” DSPD population 
would never access treatment but yet would “still present a high risk of harm to others” 
(Civil Servant). Therefore it made more sense to focus resources on the 90% who were 
out of treatment rather than on the 10% who were in treatment. It is clear from this that 
the OPDP will focus more on identifying, monitoring and managing the risks posed by 
these prisoners than on delivering treatments for the few that engage.  
According to the interviewee, by defining people as either in or out of treatment, the 
OPDP would risk missing “the people with the greatest level of need […] [and] the 
greatest complexity” and also “the public protection responsibility” (Civil Servant). The 
latter, the interviewee remarked, was “what Jack Straw’s main concern was in the early 
days. So in some ways perhaps we’re closer to meeting those original objectives now 
than we were 10 years ago” (Civil Servant). This statement stands in contrast to the 
original aim of the programme as defined by the early DSPD policymakers, which was 
not only to ensure public protection but also to meet the mental health needs of 
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individual offenders in exchange for their preventive detention. For one early 
policymaker, the focus of the OPDP on a criminal justice pathway was disappointing, as 
“the whole point” of the DSPD proposals “was not to give up on treatment” (Politician). 
For another, the move indicated that the present policy team are “focusing on narrower 
horizons [and] redefining what is success, frankly” (Civil Servant). 
Part of the reason for the narrower focus of the policy may be that the evidence base for 
treating personality disorders, particularly ASPD, remains limited (Gibbon et al. 2010; 
Khalifa et al. 2010; Stoffers et al. 2010; 2012). A review of the evidence base for 
interventions geared towards reducing reoffending conducted by the Ministry of Justice 
(2014) as part of the Transforming Rehabilitation initiative found that “while mental 
health problems may be linked to offending behaviour, and there is evidence of a 
specific link between psychopathy and violent reoffending, any such relationship is 
likely to be complex and mediated by other factors, such as poverty, poor social 
environments and difficult family and interpersonal relationships” (Ministry of Justice 
2014, p.21). The review noted that there was “limited evidence on interventions targeted 
specifically at offenders with mental health needs, and it is often inconclusive regarding 
criminal justice outcomes” (Ministry of Justice 2014, p.21). On the other hand, the 
review noted there was “good” evidence to support the use of cognitive skills 
programmes and violence reduction programmes using the risk-need-responsivity 
model to reduce reoffending amongst violent offenders (Ministry of Justice 2014, p. 22-
23). For sexual offenders, however, the evidence remained “mixed”, with some reviews 
unable to draw conclusions on reoffending (Ministry of Justice 2014, p.23-24).  
In a context of little robust research, the NICE guidelines on both BPD and ASPD 
suggest clinicians consider using those interventions that have shown some promise in 
treating these disorders (NCCMH et al. 2009; 2010). While changing personality traits 
themselves appears to be a difficult task, there is some evidence to support the use of 
behavioural interventions with offenders. NICE advises practitioners treating offenders 
with ASPD in institutional and community settings to “consider offering group-based 
cognitive and behavioural interventions […] focused on reducing offending and other 
antisocial behaviour” (NCCMH et al. 2010, para. 7.2.18.2). In separate guidance for 
BPD, NICE recommends that clinicians consider “a comprehensive dialectical 
behaviour therapy programme” where the priority is to reduce self-harming behaviour 
in women (NCCMH et al. 2009, para. 5.12.1.3).  
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The ASPD guideline also recommends challenging therapeutic pessimism and negative 
attitudes towards ASPD patients and to encourage staff to develop “a stronger belief in 
the effectiveness of their own personal skills” (NCCMH et al. 2010, para. 4.3.1). For 
patients with BPD, NICE recommends exploring treatment options “in an atmosphere 
of hope and optimism, explaining that recovery is possible and attainable” and building 
a trusting relationship between therapist and patient (NCCMH et al. 2009, para. 
4.6.2.1). The message in relation to both disorders is therefore one of therapeutic 
optimism despite a limited evidence base.  
The focus on reducing reoffending rather than meeting mental health needs in policy 
documents seems to indicate that the priorities of the criminal justice system have won 
out, and those of the health system have retreated. Aspirations for the DSPD initiative 
seem to have progressively narrowed, from the grand vision for a radical “third 
service”, to an experiment operating as a compromise between the health and criminal 
justice systems, to what now appears to be an extension of existing prison and probation 
arrangements. The DSPD story is therefore one of revised expectations, as grand 
aspirations about treatment have given way to a more narrow pragmatism and concern 
with protecting the public. A counter-trend may, however, be discerned in the 
continuing place of holistic and welfare-oriented treatment approaches on the pathway, 
outlined below. 
(b) Treatments on the OPDP 
It was noted in the previous chapter that, due to a lack of robust evidence on effective 
treatments for personality disorder, the DSPD units were encouraged to develop their 
own treatment models and therapeutic environments. Peter Tyrer and colleagues are 
critical of this approach and argue that “the programme cannot continue to use what are 
essentially cottage garden modifications of treatments developed elsewhere, which have 
not yet demonstrated efficacy in this population” (Tyrer et al. 2015, p.102). While the 
plans for OPDP appear to be moving towards a greater concern with offending 
behaviour, treatments aimed at altering problematic personality traits themselves retain 
a place. This indicates that the original ideas of the DSPD “evangelists” (Peay 2011a, 
p.238) and the (perhaps misguided) notion of a causal link between personality disorder 
and offending (Duggan and Howard 2009) have not been entirely forgotten.  
  
135 
It is beyond the scope of this thesis to survey the complex array of approaches taken to 
treating personality disorder on the OPDP, or to examine any one treatment programme 
in detail. Brief comment is, however, offered here on the approach taken by two 
treatment programmes: the Chromis programme at HMP Frankland and the cognitive 
interpersonal model at HMP Whitemoor.  
(i) The Chromis Programme at HMP Frankland 
The Chromis programme at HMP Frankland draws explicitly on the “risk-need-
responsivity” (RNR) model developed by James Bonta and D.A. Andrews (2007). The 
RNR model is a product of the “what works” movement which advocates the use of 
“evidence-based” interventions with offenders that have been shown to reduce 
reoffending (Cullen and Gendreau 2001). Three principles govern the RNR model. 
First, interventions should target those offenders at highest risk of reoffending (the risk 
principle). Second, they should focus on criminogenic risk factors or “needs” linked to 
reoffending (the need principle). Finally, they should be adapted to the learning styles 
and abilities of individual offenders (the responsivity principle) (Bonta and Andrews 
2007). “Criminogenic needs” are risk factors for offending and include antisocial or 
criminal beliefs or attitudes, poor problem-solving skills, criminal associates, substance 
abuse, unemployment and poor family relationships. In the RNR model, antisocial 
personality traits may be conceptualised as criminogenic needs or as “responsivity 
factors” that interfere with treatment and reduce its effectiveness (Bonta and Andrews 
2007, p.13).   
In the Chromis model, which draws on RNR principles, personality traits are regarded 
as responsivity factors rather than as treatment “needs”. Thus, the programme “does not 
aim to change personality traits but to work with these to reduce individuals’ risk of 
violent offending” (Tew and Atkinson 2013, p.417). The underlying philosophy of this 
approach sees personality disordered offenders as affected by the same criminogenic 
risk factors as ordinary offenders but regards them as more challenging to engage in 
treatment. This indicates a movement towards assimilating personality disordered 
offenders into the mainstream and away from treating them as a case apart.  
The aim of the creators of the Chromis programme was to adapt cognitive behavioural 
interventions to the characteristics of the DSPD group in order to increase their 
effectiveness. For example, the programme takes a “transparent” and “collaborative” 
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approach in order to engage a group that tends to be mistrustful. It also makes use of 
short session lengths and “novel and stimulating material” to keep the attention of 
participants who have a low tolerance for boredom (Tew and Atkinson 2013, p.420). 
The programme also harnesses personality characteristics that may assist the treatment 
process, such as a desire for choice and control (see further Tew and Atkinson 2013).  
As mentioned previously, given the vast increase in numbers estimated to be eligible, 
the OPDP seems to be moving away from the requirement for a causal link between 
personality disorder and offending. The dilution of the entry criteria further blurs the 
distinction between severely personality disordered prisoners and other high risk and 
difficult to manage groups. Treatment programmes such as Chromis are compatible 
with this change and with the move towards a criminal justice pathway and away from a 
health model. The Chromis programme is only one of the interventions delivered at the 
treatment unit at HMP Frankland, however, which incorporates a range of other 
interventions, including some that have more in common with psychotherapy (see 
Burns et al. 2011). According to practitioners in interview, however, the Frankland 
programme remains more narrowly focused on reducing risk than its more holistic 
counterpart at HMP Whitemoor, described below. 
(ii) The cognitive interpersonal model at HMP Whitemoor 
The first DSPD prison unit at HMP Whitemoor is now a high security intervention unit 
on the OPDP. Its treatment programme is based on a cognitive interpersonal model that 
specifically targets trauma, a common aetiological factor in the development of 
personality disorders, and seeks to modify personality traits themselves (see further 
Saradjian, Murphy and McVey 2010). For example, one component of the programme 
encourages participants to connect with themselves as victims of their own traumatic 
backgrounds in order to develop empathy with their past and potential victims 
(Saradjian, Murphy and McVey 2010). The developers of the programme argue that 
such interventions can be expected to lead to more fundamental and long-lasting change 
than those focused more narrowly on behaviours (Saradjian, Murphy and McVey 2010).  
As all participants in the programme undertake work relating to trauma, the approach is 
more holistic than risk-centred, and may also generate benefits to wellbeing as prisoners 
come to understand themselves better. According to one prison practitioner in interview, 
the programme at HMP Frankland is more focused on reducing risk, and explorations of 
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past trauma would only be undertaken if related to current risky behaviours. However, 
offending behaviour interventions are also undertaken at HMP Whitemoor in the later 
stages of treatment. Trauma-focused therapy therefore plays a role in stabilising 
prisoners so that they can then engage with behavioural interventions geared more 
explicitly towards reducing risk. 
(c) Leaving room for welfare 
In The Culture of Control, David Garland argues that “the practice of rehabilitation is 
increasingly inscribed in a framework of risk rather than a framework of welfare” and is 
“viewed as a means of managing risk, not a welfarist end in itself” (Garland 2001, 
p.176). Contemporary rehabilitation as described by Garland, is “a targeted 
intervention” aimed at “inculcating self-controls, reducing danger, enhancing the 
security of the public” (Garland 2001, p.176). Following on from this, Gwen Robinson 
argues that “late-modern” rehabilitative programmes “have secured legitimacy via a (re-
) marketing campaign” that emphasises the “utilitarian” credentials of rehabilitation as a 
means of benefitting society and downplays its welfarist justifications (Robinson 2008, 
p.432. Emphasis in original). As the Victorian concept of “less eligibility” has been 
revived, “it is no longer offenders themselves who are seen as the main beneficiaries of 
rehabilitative interventions, but rather communities and potential victims” (Robinson 
2008, p.432).  
Treatments on the DSPD programme and the OPDP cannot be straightforwardly said to 
be aimed at protecting future victims rather than enhancing the welfare of the offender, 
however. Psychotherapeutic approaches, such as those employed on the OPDP, seek to 
help “patients understand and resolve their problems by increasing awareness of their 
inner world and its influence over relationships both past and present” (British 
Psychoanalytic Council 2016). These interventions aim for “deep seated change in 
personality and emotional development” by targeting the source of the patient’s distress 
and enhancing his self-understanding (British Psychoanalytic Council 2016). CBT, on 
the other hand, focuses on managing symptoms and changing thought patterns, feelings 
and behaviours rather than targeting the source of the patient’s problems (BABCP 
2005). Nevertheless, it can also be used to enhance wellbeing, as demonstrated by the 
use of a variant, DBT, to reduce the frequency and severity of self-harming behaviour in 
individuals diagnosed with BPD (Linehan 1993). The subjective benefits and insights 
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into their own problems patients and prisoners reported having gained from the 
assessment and treatment processes (Tyrer et al. 2007; Burns et al. 2011) reflect the fact 
that behavioural and psychotherapeutic interventions can be employed to enhance 
wellbeing as well as to reduce the risk of violent or sexual offending. 
For Robinson, “the disjunction of rehabilitation from welfarism is quite clearly evident 
in the new distinction between ‘criminogenic’ and ‘non-criminogenic’ offender needs, 
which essentially de-legitimates attention to problems or needs which cannot be shown 
to be directly linked with the individual’s propensity to re-offend” (Robinson 2008, 
p.432). In Robinson’s account, as rehabilitation has become separated from welfarism, 
the needs targeted for intervention reflect recidivism risk rather than traditional social 
work concerns as offenders’ needs and the concept of rehabilitation are “‘re-inscribed’ 
in a risk management regime” (Robinson 1999, p.429). The place of more holistic 
treatments for personality disorder on the DSPD programme and the OPDP appears to 
contradict these trends, however, and suggests that the approach taken towards 
personality disordered offenders is welfarist as well as “utilitarian”.  
Holistic therapeutic interventions are “utilitarian” in the sense that they help to stabilise 
a disruptive group of patients and prisoners so that they can engage with more targeted 
offending behaviour programmes. They are also intended to improve the management 
of prisoners and patients and to reduce the costs associated with mental health crises, 
violence and self-harm. The DSPD offender presents a myriad of other risks in addition 
to risks to the public. In particular, the DSPD group posed risks to themselves, to staff 
and other prisoners and patients, and ultimately to the integrity and functioning of the 
institutions that housed them. These risks were also targeted by the DSPD proposals and 
the DSPD programme.  
For Kelly Hannah-Moffat, the focus on “criminogenic needs” in Canadian risk/need 
offender behaviour programming “leaves intact the presumption that crime is the 
outcome of poor choices or decisions, and not the outcome of structural inequalities or 
pathology” (Hannah-Moffat 2005, p.41-2). The psychotherapeutic trauma-focused 
programme at HMP Whitemoor targets sources of distress that include histories of 
neglect and abuse common to personality disordered offenders (Saradjian, Murphy and 
McVey 2010). Arguably, this brings the social or “structural” causes of crime back into 
the equation.  
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The enduring relevance of more holistic interventions on the OPDP may be related to 
the background of forensic psychologists as mental health professionals. Despite the 
“instrumental” language of official government policy on rehabilitation, empirical 
studies of criminal justice practices demonstrate that the shift towards risk has been 
inconsistently implemented on the ground. Criminal justice workers have responded 
with forms of resistance and adaptation to current trends and there is evidence of a 
continuing commitment to welfarism in professions influenced by social work, such as 
probation (Robinson 1999; 2002; McNeill et al. 2009). The stated aim of reducing 
health inequalities on the OPDP also points in a welfarist direction, and interventions 
aim to stabilise offenders so that they can engage in more offending-focused 
rehabilitative work. Thus, there are similarities with the “penal welfare” era described 
by Garland (1985; 2001) in which both instrumental and welfarist arguments were put 
forward to justify interventions with offenders in the name of cutting crime or 
enhancing individual prospects. 
 
6. Conclusion  
It has been argued in this chapter that while the stated aims of the OPDP appear to be 
the same as those motivating the DSPD programme, improving wellbeing seems to take 
second place to the goal of protecting the public in policy plans. This indicates that the 
DSPD programme has been co-opted by a criminal justice system geared towards 
protecting the public from crime and monitoring and managing the risks posed by 
offenders rather than meeting their mental health needs. There are also indications of a 
movement away from treating the DSPD group as a case apart and towards assimilating 
them into the mainstream prison population. This position is congruent with treatment 
approaches on the OPDP that do not see personality disorder as causally linked to 
offending but rather as a hindrance to the engagement of certain offenders in 
mainstream behavioural interventions. On the other hand, these trends could be 
construed as the beginning of a movement towards interpreting the behaviour of all high 
risk and disruptive prisoners through the lens of personality disorder and the 
medicalization of offending.  
Nevertheless, the OPDP continues to accommodate more holistic treatment approaches 
that target the causes of personality disorder and welfarist interventions retain a place on 
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the OPDP. However, the focus of the new pathway on high risk offenders and on those 
who are least likely to be motivated to engage with treatment indicates that the goal of 
reducing health inequalities is pursued inconsistently by the OPDP. Preventive 
detention on the grounds of risk to others also presents particular threats to the rights 
and interests of personality disordered offenders that may not be adequately addressed 
by the provision of rehabilitative treatments in prisons. This issue will be considered in 
greater depth in the second half of this thesis, beginning with the next chapter.  
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Part II: Dangerous Offenders with Severe Personality 
Disorders and the Legal Framework 
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Chapter 5: Dangerous Personality Disordered Offenders in the 
Criminal Justice System 
 
1. Introduction 
In the first part of this thesis, the origins of the DSPD proposals and the subsequent 
development of the DSPD programme and the OPDP were explored. It emerged from 
the analysis presented that the DSPD proposals and the subsequent DSPD programme 
were intended to strike a compromise between the concerns of the Department of Health 
to improve the management of a difficult patient group and the aim of the Home Office 
to protect the public from dangerous offenders. It was also argued that there was a 
degree of overlap between the interests of the two departments and that the proposals 
were interdepartmental. The offer of rehabilitation and a route towards release in 
exchange for preventive detention was also intended to strike a “balance” between the 
purported right of the public to be protected and the civil liberties of the offender. This 
translated across to the pilot DSPD programme, which was intended to improve public 
protection and mental health outcomes. The controversial DSPD proposals were never 
implemented in full and little attention has since been paid to the complex web of legal 
provisions that currently govern the DSPD group. The second part of this thesis, 
beginning with this chapter, aims to fill that gap by examining the legal framework 
governing the detention and treatment of offenders in the DSPD category and those 
subject to the OPDP in the criminal justice and mental health systems. 
Like in the plans for the OPDP, the legal framework has shifted towards managing the 
DSPD group in the criminal justice system and away from the health system. 
Furthermore, the increasing use of indeterminate and lengthy determinate sentences, 
supervision requirements and civil preventive orders with dangerous offenders points 
towards a revival of liability for defective criminal character. In this process, liberal 
criminal law principles have been side-lined and the protection of the public takes 
priority over the individual rights of offenders. Concomitant with this trend is an 
increased reliance on both risk monitoring and rehabilitation as a means of preventing 
reoffending. In this context, selection for the DSPD programme or OPDP can operate to 
hold back personality disordered offenders who may find it particularly difficult to 
prove their suitability for release.   
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The analysis of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) jurisprudence on whole 
life tariffs, IPP sentences and preventive detention presented in this chapter reveals that 
the Court also tries to strike a “balance” between the competing rights of the offender 
and those of the public. It will be argued, however, that in both the domestic and 
European legal regimes, the public’s “right to security” (Lazarus 2007; 2012; Ramsay 
2012a; 2012b; 2012c) takes precedence over the offender’s “right to rehabilitation” 
(Van Zyl Smit et al. 2014). Rather than having a “right” to rehabilitation, therefore, 
offenders who are labelled as dangerous have a “duty” to engage in rehabilitation. This 
gives the “balance” struck between competing rights a progressive appearance that 
conceals its fundamental coerciveness. This coercion may jeopardise the effectiveness 
of treatment efforts with personality disordered individuals. 
 
2. The DSPD Proposals: Legal Gaps and Options for Policy Development 
The 1999 consultation paper Managing Dangerous People with Severe Personality 
Disorder (Home Office and Department of Health 1999) outlined gaps in the legal 
framework governing those in the DSPD group. In essence, the majority of those in the 
DSPD group were expected to have been “convicted of crimes that potentially carry life 
sentences, but many [had] not receive[d] life sentences”. As a result, some presented “a 
grave danger when […] released from prison at the end of a determinate sentence” 
(Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p. 7). Furthermore, the “treatability” 
clause in the MHA 1983 was presented as a barrier to the detention of this group in 
secure hospitals. 
In formulating the DSPD proposals, the Department of Health and Home Office were 
concerned to ensure that any proposals to change the law would be compliant with the 
ECHR. The aim was “to get the right balance between the human rights of individuals 
and the right of the public to be protected from these very dangerous people” (Boateng 
and Sharland 1999, p.7). Another expression of this “balance” was “between the civil 
liberties of those who may be detained and those who might otherwise become victims” 
(Boateng and Sharland 1999, p.5). The terms of the proposed bargain meant that, in 
exchange for their detention to protect the public, dangerous offenders with personality 
disorder would be offered tailored treatments aimed both at alleviating their personal 
distress and reducing the risks they posed so that they could eventually be released. 
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Tellingly, however, where such interventions were found not to reduce the risks posed 
by the DSPD group, there would be “no alternative but to continue to detain them 
indefinitely if the public is to be properly protected” (Home Office and Department of 
Health 1999, p.9). Two options for policy development were put forward: Option A and 
Option B.  
(a) Option A 
Under Option A, DSPD offenders were to be given prison sentences rather than hospital 
disposals at sentencing and the detention and supervision of those not subject to a prison 
or community sentence would be pursued through mental health law. Rather than taking 
up the recommendation of the Butler (1975) and Fallon (1999) reports to introduce a 
reviewable sentence for psychopathic offenders, Option A proposed to extend the 
discretionary life sentence to a broader range of crimes and to encourage the judiciary to 
make greater use of this sentence with the DSPD group (Home Office and Department 
of Health 1999, p.21). In contrast to the eventual IPP sentence, there were no proposals 
in Option A to fetter the discretion of judges or to force them to hand down 
indeterminate sentences on the grounds of risk. Option A also contained proposals to 
establish centrally funded and commissioned specialist DSPD services within the prison 
and hospital systems. This would have fallen short of establishing a “whole system” for 
DSPD offenders, however, and any new services would risk becoming subject to the 
internal pressures and cultures of the institutions that housed them. Option B presented 
a more appealing solution for the government and was initially favoured by politicians 
and policymakers. 
(b) Option B: The Third Service 
Under Option B, a new service separate from the prison and health services would be 
established for the DSPD group, and individuals could be detained there on the basis of 
a “DSPD direction” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.24). DSPD 
directions could be attached to any prison sentence, except the mandatory life sentence 
for murder, or made in civil proceedings “on the basis of evidence that the offender was 
suffering from a severe personality disorder and as a consequence of the disorder 
presented a serious risk to the public” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, 
p.24). The effect of a DSPD order would be to detain the offender in a specialist facility 
“until such time as [he was] no longer considered to present a serious risk on the 
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grounds of [his] disorder” (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, p.24). Those 
released from the third service would also be monitored in the community and subject 
to recall. The order would be “subject to appeal and periodic review” but the details of 
this procedure had yet to be developed (Home Office and Department of Health 1999, 
p.24). 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the proposals were met with strong opposition from 
lawyers and mental health practitioners and neither option came to fruition. Instead, a 
pilot service for the DSPD group was established in prisons, hospitals and in the 
community to develop and test potential treatment and management techniques for 
personality disorder within existing legal frameworks. Nevertheless, as will be argued in 
this chapter, control has incrementally been extended over a much larger group than 
envisaged under the DSPD proposals through developments in criminal and civil law 
that have taken place since 1999. Like the OPDP, these developments indicate that the 
dangerous personality disordered offender is increasingly coming within the purview of 
the criminal justice system. Legal developments also reflect a similar “balance” is being 
struck between the rights and interests of personality disordered offenders and the 
public, but the basis for this balance may be questioned as it is not clear that the 
provision of rehabilitation is an adequate brake on punishment. 
 
3. Legal Developments Following the 1999 Green Paper 
The DSPD group has come to be governed by a complex web of sentencing provisions 
and civil orders with criminal penalties for breach. These changes have largely been 
achieved within the framework of the existing law. It will be argued that this seems to 
run contrary to the “counter-law” thesis of Bill Hebenton and Toby Seddon, who argue 
that the DSPD proposals represented “the deployment of law against law in order to 
erode, eliminate or circumvent laws or legal procedures that are perceived to get in the 
way of the pre-emption of harms” (Hebenton and Seddon 2009, p.346). This claim will 
be examined further in this section. 
(a) Indeterminate sentences 
Recent years have seen an increase in the number of prisoners serving life or IPP 
sentences. The jurisdiction of England and Wales now has the highest number of 
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prisoners serving indeterminate sentences in Europe and the total is more than three 
times higher than the figures for France, Germany and Italy combined (Prison Reform 
Trust 2015, p.3). Indeterminate sentences account for 18% of the sentenced prison 
population, up from 9% in 1993 (Prison Reform Trust 2015, p.2). Tariff length has also 
increased over time, and a growing number of prisoners are now subject to a “whole life 
tariff”. On 31 March 2016, there were 54 prisoners serving whole life tariffs, 12 more 
than on the same date in 2013 (Ministry of Justice 2016b, Table 1.9; Ministry of Justice 
2013b, Table 1.4). The expanding use of these sentences seems to have negated the 
need for reviewable sentences for the DSPD group, as discussed below. 
(i) Discretionary life sentences 
As noted above, Option A proposed expanding the use of the discretionary life sentence 
in order to tackle the problem of dangerous offenders released from determinate prison 
sentences. This is not surprising in light of the history of this sentence, which evolved 
“as a measure of preventive detention for mentally unstable and dangerous offenders as 
a result of judicial innovation from the 1950s onwards” (Cullen and Newell 1999, p. 
109).  According to the MEMOS study, the majority (82%) of those in the prison DSPD 
units were serving indeterminate sentences, and the remaining 17% were serving 
determinate sentences (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.30–1). Most of the 
indeterminate sentenced group were serving life sentences, with just three inmates on 
IPP sentences (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.30–1).  
The history of the sentence reflects that it has long been used to manage the risks posed 
by dangerous or mentally unstable offenders similar to those in the DSPD group. An 
early authoritative statement of the circumstances in which such a sentence was 
warranted was given by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Hodgson (1967) 52 Cr App R113:  
(1) Where the offence or offences are in themselves grave enough to require a 
very long sentence; (2) where it appears from the nature of the offences or from 
the defendant's history that he is a person of unstable character likely to commit 
such offences in the future; and (3) where if the offences are committed the 
consequences to others may be specially injurious, as in the case of sexual 
offences or crimes of violence.  
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These criteria were further elaborated upon by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Wilkinson 
(1983) 5 Cr App R (S) 105, in which it stated that such sentences “must only be passed 
in the most exceptional circumstances” and should generally be reserved “for offenders 
who for one reason or another cannot be dealt with under the Mental Health Act, yet are 
in a mental state which makes them dangerous to the life or limb of the public” 
(Wilkinson, p.108-9).  
Subsequently, the reach of the discretionary life sentence was extended beyond the 
mentally unstable offender to rational but dangerous individuals. In the case of R. v. 
McNee, Gunn and Russell [2008] 1 Cr App R (S) 108, the Court of Appeal accepted 
that evidence “suggesting irrationality, or instability of the personality” was not 
necessary in all cases. Indeed, where there was evidence that the offender “represented a 
continuing risk for the indefinite future […] the danger could be represented by a 
wholly rational individual” (McNee, para. 34). In the case of R. v. Kehoe [2009] 1 Cr. 
App. R. (S.) 9, the Court of Appeal reiterated, however, that discretionary life sentences 
should continue to “be reserved for those cases where the culpability of the offender is 
particularly high or the offence itself particularly grave” (Kehoe, para. 17).  
The reference to “unstable character” in Hodgson indicates that the discretionary life 
sentence is a form of liability for defective criminal character, which dates back to 
Victorian times. Nicola Lacey defines character responsibility as “a pattern or practice 
of responsibility-attribution which is premised in whole or in part on an evaluation or 
estimation of the quality of the defendant's (manifested or assumed) disposition as 
distinct from his or her conduct” (2011, p.153). The discretionary life sentence also 
creates a form of quasi-criminal status based on criminal character, as the breach of 
licence conditions following release can result in recall to prison, even where no new 
crime has been committed (Lacey 2011).  
(ii) IPP sentences
4
 
The IPP sentence was introduced by s.225 of the CJA 2003 along with a number of 
other provisions for dangerous offenders and eroded the place of the discretionary life 
sentence as a risk-based sentence. Like a life sentence, the IPP sentence is a hybrid of a 
determinate punitive “tariff” and an indeterminate period of preventive detention which 
                                                 
4
 Parts of this section have been taken from O’Loughlin, A. (2014) “The Offender Personality Disorder 
Pathway: Expansion in the Face of Failure?”, Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 53(2), 173 – 192. 
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begins after tariff expiry and lasts until the Parole Board decides that the prisoner’s 
detention is no longer necessary for the protection of the public (Crime (Sentences) Act 
1997, s.28). The IPP may also be conceptualised as a form of character liability based 
on a statutory presumption of dangerousness arising from a previous conviction for 
certain offences specified under Schedule 15 to the 2003 Act. Jessica Jacobson and 
Mike Hough assert that both the dangerousness provisions of the CJA 2003 and the 
DSPD programme were “manifestations of an emerging culture of risk aversion across 
the criminal justice system, mental health services and, indeed, wider society” 
(Jacobson and Hough 2010, p.5). As the authors point out, in the case of the IPP and the 
DSPD proposals, “the person’s likely future behaviour, and not just the gravity of past 
behaviour, guides the choice of sentence” (Jacobson and Hough 2010, p.5). 
By contrast to a life sentence, after 10 years of release on licence, an individual may 
apply to the Parole Board to have his IPP licence cancelled. This establishes somewhat 
of a hierarchy of seriousness between IPP and discretionary life sentences. Similarly to 
the discretionary life sentence, the rationale behind the IPP sentence was to prevent the 
premature release of offenders who were still thought to be dangerous at the end of a 
determinate prison sentence (Annison 2015). The reach of the IPP extended well 
beyond the group to whom the discretionary life sentence was intended to apply after 
Wilkinson, however, and the provisions of the CJA 2003 significantly curbed judicial 
discretion.  
The IPP sentence was initially criticised for its harshness and the broad scope of the 
specified offences under Schedule 15 to CJA 2003, which triggered a presumption of 
dangerousness (Prison Reform Trust 2007; Harrison 2010). The original provisions 
were highly prescriptive, preventing judges from exercising their discretion in cases in 
which all the conditions for imposing an IPP sentence were met, even where the 
circumstances of the case did not otherwise warrant an indeterminate sentence. The 
impact of the IPP on the prison system was underestimated by the Home Office, which 
predicted that the prison population would increase by just 3,500 following its 
introduction and that the effect would level off by 2012 (de Silva et al. 2006, p.8). In the 
three years following their introduction, the number of prisoners on IPP sentences 
increased more than fivefold from 1,100 in 2006 to 5,600 in 2009 (HC Deb, 16 January 
2008, col. 1337W; HL Deb, 28 October 2009, col. 1254). By June 2012, numbers had 
reached 6,020 (Ministry of Justice 2012a, p.7). In the same period, the prison population 
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increased by more than 8,500, from 78,127 in 2006 to 86,634 in 2012 (Ministry of 
Justice 2015c, Table A1.2). 
The prison system was ill-prepared to deal with the influx of IPP prisoners, resulting in 
overcrowding and stretched resources. The sentence was challenged in the domestic 
courts and in the ECtHR (see below) and it was eventually abolished by the Legal Aid, 
Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders (LASPO) Act 2012 introduced by the 
Coalition government. As abolition did not have retrospective effect, however, large 
numbers of IPP prisoners remain incarcerated. As of 31 March 2016, 4,133 prisoners 
are still serving IPP sentences and more than three quarters (3,330) have passed their 
tariff expiry dates (Ministry of Justice 2016b, Table 1.9). Many of those still detained 
are serving sentences with short punitive tariffs: 693 continue to be detained following 
the expiry of tariffs of less than two years and 1,787 have passed tariffs of between two 
and four years (Ministry of Justice 2016b, Table 1.9). In light of the decision of the 
ECtHR in James, discussed further below, all post-tariff IPP prisoners may be in a 
position to seek release, damages or both (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p. 160).  
Prisoners sentenced to IPP are disproportionately affected by mental health problems 
when compared to both life sentenced prisoners and the general prison population 
(Sainsbury Centre 2008, p.39). This disparity prompted Max Rutherford (2009) to dub 
the IPP sentence an example of the “reverse diversion” of mentally disordered offenders 
from the mental health system into the criminal justice system. In a search of OASys 
data, 59% of IPP prisoners were found to require a clinical assessment for DSPD 
programme entry, compared to 34% of life-sentenced prisoners and 29% of the general 
prison population (Rutherford 2009, p.S53). In 2007, just three of the MEMOS sample 
of 174 patients and prisoners were serving IPP (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p. 31), 
but by 31
st
 December 2011, numbers had increased to just over 13% (HC Deb, 17 
September 2012, col. 473W).  
Prisoners on IPP sentences are also disproportionately likely to be selected for the 
OPDP. In June 2012, it was estimated that 21% of the male IPP prison population met 
the screening criteria for the OPDP (Skett and Goode 2015). This was compared to 10% 
of male prisoners on life and determinate sentences of more than one year and 11% of 
those on determinate sentences of less than one year. The estimate for recalled male 
prisoners was higher, at 27%. The numbers are even higher for the female prison 
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population, bearing in mind that the OPDP criteria for women are much broader than 
for men. 80% of the female prison population serving IPP sentences were estimated to 
meet the screening criteria, compared to 48% of those serving determinate sentences of 
less than a year, 46% of those serving determinate sentences of less than a year, 55% of 
those serving life sentences, and 74% of the female recall population (Skett and Goode 
2015).   
(b) Dangerous offenders under the Coalition 
(i) Extending detention 
Following its abolition by LASPO 2012, the IPP has been replaced with the life 
sentence for a second serious offence (also known as the “two strikes life sentence”). 
This sentence applies to offenders with a previous conviction for a serious violent or 
sexual offence listed in Schedule 15B to the CJA 2003 who are being sentenced for a 
second such offence. The legislation contains a saving provision in s.224A that allows 
the judge to decline to pass such a sentence if to do so would be unjust. Thus, the 
provisions portray the message of “toughness” desired by the government, while not 
fettering judicial discretion entirely and repeating the mistakes of the IPP sentence. 
According to Martin Wasik, the use of the two strikes sentence may be expected to be 
rare due to the numerous conditions contained in s.224A. He further argues that many 
offenders who would qualify for this sentence would most likely have been subject to a 
discretionary life sentence in any case and therefore the new provisions may not have a 
significant impact (Wasik 2014, p. 478). 
LASPO 2012 also abolished the extended sentence for public protection (EPP) 
introduced by s.227 CJA 2003. The aim of this sentence was to allow judges to pass a 
determinate sentence with an extra measure of protection for the public where the 
maximum penalty for an offence was less than 10 years (Home Office 2006, p. 39).  It 
is composed of a determinate custodial term plus an extended licence period of up to 5 
years for a specified violent offence and 8 years for a specified sexual offence and, 
together, the custodial and licence periods cannot exceed the maximum penalty for the 
offence (s.227(4) and (5), former CJA 2003). The EPP has been replaced with the new 
extended determinate sentence (EDS). The same maximum licence periods are available 
under an EDS as under an EPP but prisoners serving an EDS will not be released until 
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they have served two-thirds of their custodial term, rather than at the half-way point as 
under an EPP.  
The recent Criminal Justice and Courts Act (CJCA) 2015 ended automatic release for 
those sentenced to an EDS on or after 13 April 2015 at the two-thirds point. These 
prisoners will instead have to apply to the Parole Board for early release. Recent 
changes have also extended licence supervision over determinate sentenced prisoners. 
Under the original CJA 2003, prisoners serving determinate sentences of less than 12 
months were released at the half-way point unconditionally (CJA 2003, s.243A). The 
Offender Rehabilitation Act (ORA) 2014 extended licence conditions and parole 
supervision to prisoners sentenced to more than one day but less than two years 
imprisonment in respect of crimes committed on or before 1 February 2015. Those 
serving 12 months or more continue to be released subject to a conditional licence 
which lasts until the end of the sentence (CJA 2003, s.244). While on licence, offenders 
are subject to probation supervision and must comply with conditions or else be recalled 
to prison. This extends control over an even greater number of prisoners than ever 
before, and may also be expected to contribute to further prison overcrowding as 
prisoners caught up in the system struggle to prove their suitability for release. The EDS 
may therefore become the IPP of the future. 
According to Leon McRae, “SPD [severely personality disordered] offenders will ally 
with medical practitioners in the pursuit of pro-social behaviour (rehabilitation) if it 
serves ulterior gain” (McRae 2015, p.8; see also McRae 2013). For McRae, offenders 
on IPP sentences therefore had an incentive to engage with treatment as this could be 
expected to expedite their release by the Parole Board. In his view, the “absence of 
coercion” resulting from the removal of the IPP sentence and its replacement with the 
EDS “may undermine efforts to identify and encourage SPD offenders to take 
responsibility for their criminogenic risk” (McRae 2015, p.8). This is because offenders 
serving an EDS of less than 10 years will be “unlikely to be motivated to seek, and 
engage in, treatment” because they will benefit from automatic release in any case 
(McRae 2015, p.13).  
McRae argues that this oversight is due to the Coalition government’s “failure […] to 
identify the link between indeterminate sentences (punitiveness) and treatment 
engagement (qua rehabilitation)”. In his view, “external motivation (legal coercion) is 
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an important pre-requisite to exposing the patient to what might be an effective 
‘treatment dose’ over time” (McRae 2013, p.66). According to McRae, while a patient 
may begin by engaging in treatment in the hope of progressing towards release, “upon 
reaching a notional ‘treatment dose’”, this may give way to “pro-social behaviour” that 
is “self-regulating” (McRae 2013, p.67). The applicability of McRae’s findings to the 
DSPD context may be questioned, however. As noted previously, the IMPALOX (Tyrer 
et al. 2007), IDEA (Burns et al. 2011) and MEMOS (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 
2010b) studies indicate that patients and prisoners participated in the DSPD programme 
for a range of reasons. Some pursued treatment in the hope that this would expedite 
their release from prison while others sought to better understand themselves and their 
reasons for offending and to enhance their quality of life.  
Furthermore, McRae underplays the negative effects coercion can have on treatment 
engagement in the personality disorder group. The clearest example of this was the 
disruption to the work of the hospital units caused by the presence of a group of 
disgruntled patients who had been transferred to hospital late in sentence. Even the more 
subtle forms of legal coercion referred to by McRae may undermine treatment efforts. 
The effectiveness of the treatments deployed on the DSPD programme and its successor 
depends on the patient’s willingness to engage and his motivation to change. McRae 
acknowledges the warning contained in the NICE guidelines on ASPD (NCCMH et al. 
2010), that “it is very unlikely that all antisocial patients can be coerced into pro-social 
thinking or behaviour” (McRae 2013, p. 51). There is also a substantial literature that 
contends that punishment and rehabilitation are not compatible with each other, and that 
tying prisoners’ release dates to their successful rehabilitation jeopardises the success of 
rehabilitation and risks disproportionate punishment (Hudson 1987; Rotman 1990; 
Lewis 2005; Moore and Hannah-Moffat 2005). In the final chapter of this thesis, the 
relationship between coercion, punishment and rehabilitation will be explored further. It 
will be argued that tying release to progress in rehabilitation may in fact undermine 
efforts to treat personality disordered offenders and is likely to lead to greater use of 
preventive detention and punishment. In addition, the use of psychological interventions 
geared towards reducing offending behaviour in the prison setting may expose prisoners 
to greater harsh treatment and increase their subjective experience of punishment. 
The removal of the IPP sentence has partially re-opened the gap identified by the 1999 
consultation paper in cases in which the two strikes life sentence does not apply but the 
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EDS is not sufficient to protect the public from a dangerous offender. In the recent case 
of R. v. Saunders [2014] 1 Cr. App. R. (S.) 45, the CA recommended that judges pass a 
discretionary life sentence where the EDS will not ensure sufficient protection for the 
public. The CA in Saunders also removed the “denunciatory value” requirement 
established in Wilkinson, stating that it was no longer necessary to distinguish between 
serious cases deserving of the public abhorrence conveyed by a discretionary life 
sentence and lesser cases attracting an IPP sentence. The use of discretionary life 
sentences may be expected to increase following this guidance. Nevertheless, the Court 
in Saunders went on to emphasise that the discretionary life sentence should remain a 
last resort.  
It remains to be seen, therefore, whether the discretionary life sentence will be applied 
to offenders whose records show a pattern of growing seriousness but where the current 
offence is not of the particular gravity required by Wilkinson and Kehoe. On one hand, 
judges may now be more conscious of the risks presented by offenders and may be 
more inclined to use the discretionary life sentence in a climate of risk aversion. On the 
other hand, having seen the problems the IPP sentence created in the prison system and 
the numbers that are still currently serving such sentences, they may be more inclined to 
pass a long determinate sentence. The insistence in Saunders that the discretionary life 
sentence continue to be a measure of last resort also tends in this direction. 
(ii) Extending supervision  
Recent years have also seen the expansion of civil orders with criminal penalties for 
breach, which may also be described as a form of status or character liability aimed at 
controlling dangerous offenders. Option A of the DSPD proposals envisaged the 
creation of new civil law powers of supervision over individuals in the DSPD group 
upon their release from hospital. The introduction of civil orders with criminal 
consequences for breach was also a feature of the Labour government’s reshaping of 
criminal justice. Coupled with the increasing use of indeterminate sentences and the 
extension of release on licence to determinate sentenced prisoners, the coercive reach of 
the criminal and civil law has been considerably extended since 1999.  
The Sexual Offences Prevention Order (SOPO) was introduced by s.104 of the Sexual 
Offences Act 2003 and the Violent Offender Order (VOO) was introduced by s.98 of 
the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008. A SOPO may be handed down to 
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offenders who have been convicted or cautioned of particular sexual offences. A VOO, 
on the other hand, is only available where the individual has been convicted of a 
particular violent offence. The purpose of both orders is to protect potential victims 
from “serious” harm at the hands of the offender. Convicted sexual offenders are made 
subject to notification requirements irrespective of whether or not a SOPO has been 
made, whereas notification requirements only apply to violent offenders subject to a 
VOO. It may therefore be seen that sexual offenders are subject to a much more 
restrictive regime than violent offenders, reflecting a public and policy concern for 
preventing sexual offending. The penalty for breach of a SOPO or VOO or notification 
requirements is up to 5 years’ imprisonment upon conviction. Such orders may be used 
in respect of prisoners released at the end of a determinate prison sentence, or in respect 
of offenders who have been found not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead but 
to have done the act in question. Thus, an individual may find himself in court again for 
breach of an order and again pleading unfitness or insanity, in a cycle that could prove 
never-ending. 
The recent changes to sentencing demonstrate that recent Conservative-led governments 
have pursued the agenda of ensuring that greater numbers of offenders spend 
increasingly longer periods in prison and under supervision in the community. Thus, the 
IPP sentence has been replaced with ever-lengthening custodial and licence periods that 
attempt to close the gap with life sentences. Together, these developments indicate that 
the preventive arm of the criminal justice system is growing to close the gap with the 
mental health system in the case of personality disordered offenders. Nevertheless, 
where prison sentences end, offenders with personality disorder may still be made 
subject to detention in hospital under the MHA 1983, as discussed in the next chapter. 
(c) Counter-law? 
Bill Hebenton and Toby Seddon argue that the DSPD proposals were form of “counter-
law” as described by Richard V. Ericson (2007), who drew on the use of the term by 
Michel Foucault (1977). “Counter-law I”, in Ericson’s terms, “takes the form of laws 
against law” as “new laws are enacted and new uses of existing law are invented to 
erode or eliminate traditional principles, standards and procedures of criminal law that 
get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of harm” (Ericson 2007, p. 24). 
“Counter-law II” on the other hand, “takes the form of surveillant assemblages”. Here, 
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“new surveillance infrastructures are developed and new uses of existing surveillance 
networks are extended that also erode or eliminate traditional standards, principles and 
procedures of criminal law that get in the way of pre-empting imagined sources of 
harm” (Ericson 2007, p. 24). According to Hebenton and Seddon, the proposal to create 
a DSPD direction, that would allow individuals to be detained regardless of whether or 
not they had been convicted of any crime, deployed the first form of counter-law “with 
the primary aim of getting around the legal barriers to the use of coercive institutional 
confinement (in both prisons and secure psychiatric facilities) as a preventive strategy” 
(Hebenton and Seddon 2009, p.347). In the event, however, the plans for civil detention 
did not materialise. Instead, the dangerous offender provisions in the CJA 2003 came to 
close the gap identified in the DSPD proposals and mental health law was altered, as 
considered in the next chapter. 
The discretionary life sentence and the IPP sentence may be described as a form of 
“counter-law” as they bring a measure of administrative discretion into the quantum of 
punishment decided by the court at sentencing. The role of “surveillance” in this context 
is to monitor the risks posed by the individual and allow for the continuation of his 
detention where those risks remain. The individual is also monitored in the community 
and his detention may be resumed if he fails to adhere to the conditions governing his 
release. Thus, surveillance appears to operate on the “underside of the law” and 
“supports, reinforces, multiplies the asymmetry of power” between the individual 
offender and the state (Foucault 1977, p.22-23, quoted by Ericson 2007, p.30).  
However, it might be questioned whether it also serves to “[undermine] the limits that 
are traced around the law” (Foucault 1977). This is because the law itself leaves room 
for “counter-law” by allowing for preventive sentencing and preventive detention in 
hospital on the grounds of risk to the public. The “limits” traced around the law in 
Ericson’s account are the limits of liberal criminal law with its attendant “traditional” 
“high standards of due process, evidence, proof and culpability” (Ericson 2007, p. 24). 
This is not the only form taken by criminal law, however, as forms of character liability 
like the discretionary life sentence compete with the model of subjective capacity-based 
responsibility that has come to dominate the criminal law and criminal law theory 
(Lacey 2011).  
  
156 
Both the SOPO and VOO create a form of status liability based on offending and a risk 
of serious harm to the public. The effect is to extend preventive control over sexual and 
violent offenders in the community on the grounds of a future, and therefore uncertain, 
risk of serious harm. For Lacey “status offences or semi-status offences […] as well as 
regular recreations of ‘dangerousness’ categories, show that the impulse to organize 
responsibility-attribution along status lines is a pervasive one in the history of criminal 
law” (Lacey 2011, p.160). She argues that the creation of “a quasi-criminal status” or 
“prima facie judgment of criminal propensity” which “sits unhappily with the idea of 
punishment as commensurate to crime” (Lacey 2011, p.168-169).  
Status criminalisation is indeed at odds with the “modern” criminal law principles that 
“defendants are punished not for who or what they are, but simply for what they have 
done” and that “criminal responsibility pertains only to voluntary acts” (Lacey 2011, 
p.160-1). Lacey further argues, however, that forms of liability for criminal character 
should not be dismissed as anomalies but rather reflect fundamental disagreements on 
what the purpose of the criminal law should be: to punish culpable acts (retributivism) 
or to reduce or prevent crime (consequentialism) (Lacey 1987).  
The counter-law thesis is, however, useful in highlighting how far control can be 
extended through administrative means and the potential for measures designated as 
“preventive” to also be punitive. The key aim of the discretionary life and IPP sentences 
is to manage risk rather than to punish. However, in the execution of these sentences, 
the consequentialist and retributivist aims of the law are confused, as both the punitive 
and preventive periods are served in the same prison environment. Thus, once his 
punitive tariff elapses, the prisoner continues to be punished by being deprived of his 
liberty in prison until he can show a reduction in risk. In this sense, the prisoner is 
punished for “who” or “what” he is (a dangerous person) in addition to what he has 
done.  
The reliance on rehabilitation as a limit on disproportionate punishment in the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR discussed further below also seems to confuse retributivism 
and consequentialism, and the risk aversion underlying the Court’s approach 
undermines its commitment to rehabilitation as a “right” of those subject to detention on 
the grounds of risk (Van Zyl Smit et al. 2014). Selection for the DSPD programme or 
OPDP can also operate to hold prisoners back as the completion of these programmes 
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has become an administrative requirement for release despite continuing doubts 
surrounding their effectiveness in reducing risk. 
 
4. The Journey to Release 
(a) Participation as an administrative requirement 
A large proportion of prisoners on the OPDP may be expected to be serving 
indeterminate sentences or extended determinate sentences and their release will be at 
the discretion of the Parole Board. The Parole Board has the power to direct the release 
of prisoners on licence where it “is satisfied that it is no longer necessary for the 
protection of the public that the prisoner should be confined” (Crime (Sentences) Act 
1997, s28(6)(b)). It can also recommend that a prisoner be transferred to an open prison 
(Category D) but it cannot otherwise make recommendations regarding his security 
categorisation. More pertinent for high security prisoners are the recommendations of 
the Category A Review Teams (CART) and the decisions of the Deputy Director of 
Custody High Security (DDC-HS) in NOMS who is responsible for the re-
categorisation of Category A prisoners. In this section, the impact of selection for the 
DSPD programme or OPDP for prisoner progress will be examined. 
Julie Trebilcock and Tim Weaver (2010a; 2012a) studied the influence of DSPD status 
on Parole Board decision-making as part of the MEMOS study. Upon entry to the 
DSPD programme, the majority (63%) of the MEMOS prison sample were in Category 
B, 34% were in Category A, and 2% in Category C (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, 
p.32). The majority (77%) had been transferred from high security prisons, 20% had 
come from Category B prisons, and the remainder from Category C prisons (Trebilcock 
and Weaver 2010a, p.32). As DSPD prisoners were generally high security prisoners 
serving long sentences they had to “undergo a journey through different levels of 
security to enable their risk to be tested at different stages of their sentence” (Trebilcock 
and Weaver 2010a, p.45). Prisoners’ “journeys” are influenced by selection for 
treatment programmes such as the DSPD programme and the OPDP, which serve to 
impede or facilitate their progress through the system. 
As was the case under the DSPD programme, admission to the OPDP is an 
administrative decision taken by the prison or hospital authorities. As mentioned in the 
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previous chapter, practitioners in interview asserted that if a prisoner was assessed to be 
suitable for the DSPD programme, it would remain on his sentence plan, and he would 
not make progress until he completed treatment. This is also reflected in the case law on 
categorisation decisions. In the case of R. (S) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2009] 
EWHC 2168 (Admin), the DDC-HS decided not to downgrade a prisoner to Category B 
on the grounds, inter alia, that he was “not satisfied that he [could] make the judgment 
on risk which he is required to make without the whole six years of the Fens Unit 
[DSPD] programme being completed”. The decision was upheld by the High Court on 
judicial review. Similarly, in R. (Guntrip) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2010] 
EWHC 3188, the applicant’s refusal to engage in offending behaviour work or with 
treatment in a DSPD unit or TC as recommended by the Parole Board and Secretary of 
State meant that his Offender Supervisor could not recommend any further progression.  
In R. (Falconer) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 2341 (Admin), the 
CART declined to recommend the applicant for downgrading to Category B on the 
grounds that, although his behaviour in prison had been good and he had participated in 
some programmes, he had not addressed his violent offending. His participation in the 
five-year DSPD programme, or an alternative programme if he did not meet the DSPD 
criteria, would be required to demonstrate a reduction in risk. The High Court held that 
it was “in the prisoner's own interests that he undertakes the work required by the DSPD 
programme, onerous as it is, so as to establish the grounds for a finding that the risk he 
presents is substantially reduced” (Falconer, p.7). In the absence of participation in the 
programme he was unlikely to make further progress towards release. 
Participation in the DSPD programme has thus become an administrative requirement 
for prisoners identified as suitable for it to demonstrate their suitability for release to the 
Parole Board. This is despite the doubts expressed by Parole Board members in the 
MEMOS study on whether treatment for personality disorder is effective in reducing 
risk (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 2012a). As Kelly Hannah-Moffat (2015) argues, 
unmet treatment needs are easily elided with risk in the risk/need paradigm. Thus, 
suitability for the DSPD programme or the OPDP may have the effect of placing a 
further hurdle in front of prisoners serving indeterminate sentences on their journey 
towards release.  
(b) Evaluating risk 
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More recent information is now available on prisoners who have completed the DSPD 
programme. By January 2014, 25 prisoners had completed treatment in HMP 
Frankland’s Westgate unit, and reductions in actuarial risk scores were observed in all 
but 5 completers (Bennett 2014, p.21). However, only 8 treatment completers were re-
categorised to a lower security category and none of these were originally in Category 
A. The Category A completers were, however, able to make progressive moves to 
mainstream prisons or PIPEs (Bennett 2014, p.21). The numbers completing the 
treatment programme seem rather low considering the Westgate unit opened in March 
2004 and there were 75 prisoners in the unit by 2007 (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, 
p.23). While the data indicates that some reductions in risk have been achieved, onward 
progression continues to be slow and very few prisoners experienced a change in 
security category after completing the programme.  
Practitioners in the DSPD unit at HMP Whitemoor reported in 2010 that five of the nine 
Category A prisoners in the first cohort of 18 men to finish treatment at the unit had 
been re-categorised and one man had been safely discharged into the community 
(Saradjian, Murphy and Casey 2010). It seems that the remainder were transferred to 
Category B prisons, but their initial security categorisation is unclear. Reductions in 
VRS scores for all but two men on the programme were also reported. Again, however, 
these numbers appear small when we consider that the HMP Whitemoor unit opened in 
2002 and there were 64 prisoners in the unit by 2007 (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b, 
p.23). Thus, treatment completion rates at the units appear to be low, and those who 
have completed treatment are not necessarily assessed to be suitable for a reduction in 
security category.  
As elaborated further below, the presumption of risk attaching to offenders in the 
DSPD/OPDP group also gives rise to a duty to prove, through participation in 
rehabilitation, that they no longer pose a threat to vulnerable members of the public. In a 
climate of risk-aversion that prioritises the protection of the public over the 
rehabilitation of offenders it may prove difficult for offenders selected for the OPDP to 
prove their suitability for release from indeterminate sentences. This is particularly the 
case in the face of a continuing lack of evidence for effective treatments for antisocial 
forms of personality disorder. The effect of this may be to subject this group to 
increasing punishment, as they are given a label associated with a high risk of 
reoffending and resistance to treatment without an effective means for removing it.  
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5. Preventive Detention in Human Rights Law 
It has been argued in the first part of this chapter that the criminal law has gradually 
extended its coercive reach over a larger range of dangerous offenders than the original 
DSPD group. This reflects the revival of liability for criminal character and results in 
the punishment of offenders for who they are rather than what they have done. In this 
context, the revival of rehabilitation as an aim of the criminal justice system is not 
surprising, as forms of character liability and the Victorian notion of “reform” through 
punishment have historically been intertwined (Lacey 2001a; 2011; Garland 1985; see 
further Chapter 7). As will be seen through the discussion of ECtHR case law presented 
in this section, the legitimacy of preventive detention on the grounds of dangerousness 
is dependent on the provision of rehabilitation and a route towards release. However, 
the ECtHR also recognises a “right” of the public to be protected from dangerous 
offenders that has the potential to conflict with the offender’s “right” to rehabilitation 
and reintegration into society. In the final analysis, as in the DSPD proposals, the right 
of the public to protection trumps the offender’s right to rehabilitation. This raises the 
question of whether the current system is intended to achieve a “balance” between 
competing rights or is simply a means of pursuing the protection of the public. 
(a) Preventive detention and liberty 
Originally, the indeterminate character of the discretionary life sentence discussed 
previously was intended to guard not only against the release of dangerous prisoners but 
also against the disproportionate punishment that might be imposed by a lengthy 
determinate sentence as the possibility of early release remained open (Appleton 2010, 
p.13). This argument was accepted by the ECtHR in Weeks v. UK. In that case, the 
ECtHR approved a discretionary life sentence for armed robbery that had been handed 
down to the applicant when he was aged just 17. During the course of the offence, the 
applicant had threatened the owner of a pet shop with a starting pistol loaded with 
blanks and stole 35 pence, which was later found on the shop floor. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the Court held that concern for public safety, the applicant’s rehabilitation 
and the fact that the sentencing court hoped for an early release justified the imposition 
of an indeterminate prison sentence on a minor, which would otherwise have constituted 
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disproportionate punishment contravening the prohibition on inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in Article 3 of the ECHR. 
In Weeks, the ECtHR further considered whether the applicant’s recall to prison for 
breach of his life licence was justified under Article 5.1(a), which permits lawful 
detention following conviction by a competent court. The Court held that for the 
purposes of Article 5.1(a), “there must be a sufficient causal connection between the 
conviction and the deprivation of liberty at issue” (Weeks, para. 42). In Weeks it was 
held that the link between the appellant’s original conviction and his subsequent recall 
to prison had not been broken because the life sentence had originally been passed in 
order to subject him, “a dangerous young man”, to a continuing security measure in the 
interests of public safety and to rehabilitate him (Weeks, para. 46). The Court held that 
“in view of [his] unstable, disturbed and aggressive behaviour, there were grounds for 
the Home Secretary to have considered that the applicant’s continued liberty would 
constitute a danger to the public and to himself” (Weeks, para. 51). 
As mentioned previously, the IPP sentence came under attack in both domestic courts 
and before the ECtHR. The prison system was ill-prepared to deal with the influx of IPP 
prisoners, resulting in overcrowding and stretched resources. In R. (on the application of 
Wells) v. Parole Board [2010] 1 AC 553, three IPP prisoners challenged their detention 
on the grounds that the failure of the Secretary of State to provide them with the courses 
they needed to prove their suitability for release to the Parole Board violated their right 
not to be subjected to arbitrary detention under Article 5.1. The House of Lords found 
that although the Secretary of State had failed in his public law duties to the prisoners, 
their post-tariff detention had not breached Article 5.1 because the purpose of the IPP 
sentence was not to rehabilitate offenders but to punish them and to protect the public.  
The prisoners in Wells subsequently brought their case before the ECtHR and, on 18 
September 2012, judgment was delivered in James, Wells and Lee v. UK. Contradicting 
the ruling of the House of Lords in Wells, the ECtHR found that the grounds for the 
applicants’ detention for the purposes of Article 5.1(a) included both public protection 
and rehabilitation. The Court therefore concluded that until steps were taken to progress 
the applicants through the prison system by providing them with access to rehabilitative 
courses their detention would be arbitrary under Article 5.1(a). The effect of the 
judgment in James is that detention after conviction based on public protection alone is 
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not permissible under Article 5.1 unless prisoners are also given access to rehabilitative 
treatments and a route towards release.  
The Court in James also saw rehabilitation as a means of ensuring that measures of 
preventive detention are proportional to the need to protect the public from a particular 
offender. This proportionality requirement was derived from its decision in M v. 
Germany [2009] ECHR 2071. In that case, the Court established the principle that 
where prisoners have served the punitive element of their sentences and are detained 
solely on the basis of the risk they pose to the public, there may be a violation of Article 
5.1(a) “if there are no special measures, instruments or institutions in place, other than 
those available to ordinary long-term prisoners, aimed at reducing the danger they 
present and at limiting the duration of their detention to what is strictly necessary in 
order to prevent them from committing further offences” (James, para. 194).  
In the M case, the European Court also emphasised the need for a difference between 
the ordinary prison regime and that applying to preventatively detained prisoners. This 
principle was not taken up in James. This is despite the fact that there is very little 
difference in practice between the punitive and preventative elements of IPP and life 
sentences. Each is served in the coercive prison environment, and prisoners may have 
access to rehabilitative treatments both prior to and following the expiry of their 
punitive tariffs. The distinction between the punitive element of an IPP sentence and the 
preventative period, while clear in the court room at sentencing, tends to become 
blurred once the offender reaches prison. Furthermore, the Court in James and M did 
not address the proportionality of the punishment imposed by an indeterminate 
sentence, choosing to focus instead on the proportionality of indeterminate sentences to 
the need for prevention. Nevertheless, the judgment in M indicates that, following the 
expiry of the punitive tariff, IPP and life sentenced prisoners continue to be punished on 
the grounds of their criminal propensities rather than their original crimes. This raises a 
risk of disproportionate punishment that is not adequately addressed by the Court in 
James, which focused instead on the failure to provide rehabilitative interventions. This 
issue is addressed in the next section. 
(b) Whole life tariffs and punishment 
In the case of Vinter and Others v. UK [2012] ECHR 61 (C); [2013] ECHR 645 (GC), 
three prisoners subject to whole life tariffs challenged their detention on the grounds 
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that their sentences where irreducible and that this constituted inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment under Article 3 by depriving them of any hope of release. This 
decision further illustrates the Court’s approach to “balancing” the offender’s right to 
protection against disproportionate punishment against the public’s right to be protected 
from harm.  
In the English and Welsh system, a prisoner subject to a whole life tariff can only be 
released at the discretion of the Secretary of State if the latter “is satisfied that 
exceptional circumstances exist which justify the prisoner’s release on compassionate 
grounds” (s.30(1) Crime (Sentences) Act 1997). Previously, the Secretary of State had 
the power to review whole life tariffs after 25 years but this mechanism was removed by 
the CJA 2003. Under the terms of Prison Service Order (PSO) 4700, the Secretary of 
State may exercise his power of compassionate release where “the prisoner is suffering 
from a terminal illness and death is likely to occur very shortly” or where he “is 
bedridden or similarly incapacitated, for example, those paralysed or suffering from a 
severe stroke”. 
In an initial Chamber judgment in Vinter [2012] ECHR 61 (C), the Court held that, 
while in principle questions of appropriate sentencing fell outside the scope of the 
ECHR, following Weeks, grossly disproportionate sentences could violate Article 3. The 
test of “gross disproportionality” was a strict one, however, likely to be met only on 
“rare and unique occasions” (Vinter (C), para. 89). While detaining a prisoner for his or 
her natural life would not automatically violate Article 3, the Court held that such a 
sentence could be grossly disproportionate where the prisoners’ detention did not serve 
any legitimate penological purpose, which included punishment, deterrence, crime 
prevention and rehabilitation, and where the sentence was irreducible de facto and de 
iure (Vinter (C), para. 92). The Chamber noted the narrowness of the Secretary of 
State’s policy of compassionate release and found that it “could conceivably mean that a 
prisoner will remain in prison even if his continued imprisonment cannot be justified on 
any legitimate penological grounds, as long as he does not become terminally ill or 
physically incapacitated” (Vinter (C), para. 94). However, the Chamber further held that 
no Article 3 issue had arisen in the applicants’ cases as the High Court had found it 
necessary in view of the seriousness of their crimes to detain them for their whole lives 
in the interests of punishment and deterrence. 
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On appeal, however, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR discerned “clear support in 
European and international law for the principle that all prisoners, including those 
serving life sentences, be offered the possibility of rehabilitation and the prospect of 
release if that rehabilitation is achieved” (Vinter [2013] ECHR 645 (GC), para. 114). 
Furthermore, whole life orders could be inconsistent with the aim of pure punishment 
because “even when a whole life sentence is condign punishment at the time of its 
imposition, with the passage of time it becomes […] a poor guarantee of just and 
proportionate punishment” (Vinter (GC), para. 112). This was because if “a prisoner is 
incarcerated without any prospect of release and without the possibility of having his 
life sentence reviewed, there is the risk that he can never atone for his offence: whatever 
the prisoner does in prison, however exceptional his progress towards rehabilitation, his 
punishment remains fixed and unreviewable” (Vinter (GC), para. 112). Henceforth, 
Article 3 was to “be interpreted as requiring reducibility of the sentence, in the sense of 
a review which allows the domestic authorities to consider whether any changes in the 
life prisoner are so significant, and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made 
in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued detention can no longer be 
justified on legitimate penological grounds” (Vinter (GC), para. 199).  
As Natasa Mavronicola argues, the decision of the Grand Chamber in Vinter “is a clear 
indication that the [European] Court, in contrast with the UK government, does not 
accept that the retributive (and deterrent) purpose of imprisonment can in itself justify 
whole life imprisonment” (Mavronicola 2014, p. 303). Purely retributive whole life 
sentences justified by the seriousness of the offence which, as the government argued in 
Vinter, does not diminish over time, would eliminate the need for rehabilitation and be 
incompatible with the principle of human dignity underpinning Article 3 (Mavronicola 
2014). This is reflected in the statement of Judge Power-Forde in her separate opinion in 
Vinter that even “those who commit the most abhorrent and egregious of acts […] retain 
the right to hope that, someday, they may have atoned for the wrongs which they have 
committed” (Vinter (GC), p.53).  
The analysis offered by Mavronicola (2014) may be extended to the decisions in James 
and M in which the Court also seemed to reject “pure” public protection as a 
justification for preventive detention without recourse to rehabilitation. In M, 
rehabilitation was also conceived as a means of ensuring the length of detention was 
proportionate to the need to protect the public. The Grand Chamber in Vinter also relies 
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on the provision of opportunities for rehabilitation and a review mechanism as a means 
of avoiding disproportionate punishment under Article 3. In this sense, rehabilitation is 
expected to ensure the proportionality of punishment by allowing an offender who has 
“atoned” for his wrongs through rehabilitation to be released. Rehabilitation in this 
sense may therefore be seen as a means for a dangerous offender to redeem himself in 
the eyes of the law (see further Chapter 7). Dirk Van Zyl Smit and colleagues (2014, 
p.59) argue that “implicit in the right to a prospect of release is a right to an opportunity 
to rehabilitate oneself” and that this runs through a line of ECtHR case law, including 
James and Vinter. They further argue that the right to rehabilitation should be enshrined 
in the law of England and Wales in order to comply with the ECHR and that this should 
be achieved through the inclusion of due process guarantees in Parole Board decisions. 
The status of Vinter is unclear, however, following the more recent Chamber judgment 
in Hutchinson v. UK [2015] ECHR 111. In that case, the ECtHR appeared to retreat 
from its previous position on the English and Welsh system while not explicitly 
overturning the principles set down by the Grand Chamber in Vinter. In R. v. 
McLoughlin and Newell [2014] EWCA Crim 188, a specially constituted Court of 
Appeal (CA) seemingly contradicted the European Court by holding that whole life 
tariffs were compatible with the ECHR. The CA held that the Secretary of State’s 
discretion was not bound by the terms of PSO 4700 and that his power of 
compassionate release had to be exercised in conformity with Article 3. It further held 
that the term “exceptional circumstances” was sufficiently certain and that 
“compassionate grounds” was “a term with a wide meaning that can be elucidated, as is 
the way the common law develops, on a case by case basis” (McLoughlin, para. 33). In 
the Court’s judgment, “the law of England and Wales therefore does provide to an 
offender ‘hope’ or the ‘possibility’ of release in exceptional circumstances which render 
the just punishment originally imposed no longer justifiable” (McLoughlin, para. 35). 
The decision set the CA in direct opposition with the Grand Chamber, which rejected 
similar arguments put forward by the British government in Vinter.  
In Hutchinson, the ECtHR surprisingly held that the Court of Appeal in McLoughlin 
had “specifically addressed” the doubts expressed by the Grand Chamber in Vinter and 
had “set out an unequivocal statement of the legal position” (Hutchinson, para. 25). The 
Court also held that it “must accept the national court’s interpretation of domestic law” 
and that the power of release under s.30 of the CJA 2003, “exercised in the manner 
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delineated in […] [McLoughlin], [was] sufficient to comply with the requirements of 
Article 3” (Hutchinson, para. 25). This was despite the fact that the Grand Chamber had 
stated categorically in Vinter that the clarification of the legal position by way of 
judicial review, including the quashing of PSO 4700 by the courts, would not be 
“sufficient to remedy the lack of clarity that exists at present as to the state of the 
applicable domestic law governing possible exceptional release of whole life prisoners” 
(Vinter (GC), para. 46). More fundamentally, it is unclear how the terms “exceptional 
circumstances” and “compassionate grounds” may be interpreted to include 
consideration of progress in rehabilitation, which was central to the Grand Chamber’s 
reasoning in Vinter. Although the Court in Hutchinson declared itself satisfied with a 
review mechanism that seemed not to meet the standards set by the Grand Chamber in 
Vinter, it did not explicitly overturn them. The decision in Hutchinson does, however, 
represent a significantly watered-down application of the Vinter principles and it is 
difficult to predict how these will be followed by the ECtHR in future.  
(c) Protecting the public  
In Weeks, the ECtHR accepted that the protection of the public was a “legitimate aim” 
of the preventive detention of dangerous offenders but it did not articulate this in terms 
of a “right” of the public to protection (Weeks para. 47). In Vinter, on the other hand, the 
Grand Chamber held that “States have a duty under the Convention to take measures for 
the protection of the public from violent crime” (para. 108. Emphasis added). The Court 
further claimed that states may fulfil their obligation to protect the public “by 
continuing to detain […] life sentenced prisoners for as long as they remain dangerous” 
(Vinter (GC) para. 108). As authority for this proposition, the Court referred to two 
cases: Mastromatteo v. Italy [2002] ECHR 694 (GC), and Maiorano and Others v. Italy 
ECHR 15 Dec 2009. These cases have received little attention in the literature. They do, 
however, give a sharp illustration of the limitations of the Court’s commitment to the 
rehabilitation of offenders expounded in Vinter, James and M. 
Mastromatteo and Maiorano follow on from the earlier case of Osman v. UK [1998] 
ECHR 101 in which the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR held that a positive obligation to 
protect life arises where it is established that “the authorities knew or ought to have 
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an 
identified individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they 
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failed to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, 
might have been expected to avoid that risk” (Osman, para. 116. Emphasis added). The 
duty of the state to protect its citizens from harm reflected in Osman may be 
conceptualised as the converse of a “right to security” claimed on behalf of the public. 
Liora Lazarus argues that “the right to security is inherently ambiguous. It encapsulates 
on one hand a commitment to rights, which we commonly associate with absence from 
coercion, but on the other hand a commitment to coercion in the name of individual and 
collective security” (Lazarus 2012, p.89). She notes that the political rhetoric of 
“rebalancing” in this context “commonly poses the rights to security of the majority 
against the rights of minorities which might be infringed” (Lazarus 2012, p.97). Such a 
balancing metaphor was seen in the DSPD proposals between the right of the public to 
protection from dangerous offenders and the right of offenders to liberty (see Boateng 
and Sharland 1999).  
For Lazarus, the “key question” that arises in relation to the “right to security” “is 
whether security is a basic right; or a specific right derived from broader grounding 
rights or principles; or a meta-right, in other words a right which grounds other rights” 
(Lazarus 2012, p.97). Lazarus is wary of claims that the “right to security” is a “meta-
right” as this tends towards the “usurpation and erosion of existing fundamental rights” 
in favour of a right to security (Lazarus 2007, p. 344). On the other hand, she is 
supportive of a “delineated, transparent and narrower notion of the ‘right to security’ 
that respects and is grounded in other fundamental rights” (Lazarus 2007, p. 344). She 
advocates limiting the duty of states to protect the public’s right to security to “the 
development of structures and institutions capable of responding to and minimising 
‘critical and pervasive threats’ to human safety, namely absence from harm in the most 
central, physical sense of harm to person” (Lazarus 2012, p. 106). For Lazarus, the 
principle in Osman is an example of the narrower type of right to security as it is 
founded on the right to life recognised by the ECHR. It also appears to meet the “critical 
and pervasive threat” threshold as it requires a “real” and “immediate” risk to the lives 
of identified individuals.  
Lazarus’s discussion is missing the full implications of the State’s positive duty to 
protect individuals from dangerous offenders, however, as she neglects to address the 
more expansive principle in Mastromatteo that has grown out of Osman. This principle 
demonstrates the tendency of the right to security claimed on behalf of “the law’s 
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‘innocent’ but abstract subjects” to trump the competing rights of the law’s “dangerous’ 
but concrete subjects” (Ramsay 2012b, p. 206). The case of Maiorano, which followed 
Mastromatteo, is a further demonstration of the weakness of the Court’s attachment to 
the “right to rehabilitation” established in James and Vinter (Van Zyl Smit et al. 2014) 
in the face of serious re-offending by released prisoners. 
In Mastromatteo, the applicant’s son had been killed in the course of a bank robbery by 
two prisoners who had absconded while on leave from prison. The applicant argued that 
the Italian State, by releasing the prisoners, had failed in its duty to protect the life of his 
son under Article 2. As there was no way of identifying the applicant’s son as the likely 
victim of the released prisoners, the Court held that the State’s positive duty to protect 
life established in Osman could also embrace an “obligation to afford general 
protection to society against the potential acts of one or of several persons serving a 
prison sentence for a violent crime” (Mastromatteo, para. 69. Emphasis added).  
The Court in Mastromatteo went substantially further than Osman by removing the 
need for an identifiable victim and extending the positive duty to protect life to the 
public at large. The Court in Mastromatteo retained the requirement in Osman for a 
“real and immediate risk” to life and clarified that the state’s positive duty did not 
extend to an “obligation to prevent every possibility of violence” (Mastromatteo, para. 
68). Rather, the duty “must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an 
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities, bearing in mind the difficulties 
involved in policing modern societies, the unpredictability of human conduct and the 
operational choices which must be made in terms of priorities and resources” 
(Mastromatteo, para. 68). On the facts in Mastromatteo, the Court found that the Italian 
system of prison leave provided sufficient protection for society and that there had been 
no failings in the decision to release the prisoners.   
By contrast, in the Chamber decision of Maiorano, the ECtHR found the Italian 
authorities had failed in their duty to protect life under Article 2 by granting prison 
leave to a “dangerous” “repeat offender” convicted of “exceptionally brutal crimes” 
who went on to murder two women. Thirty years previously, the prisoner had been 
convicted of kidnapping, rape, murder and attempted murder in similar circumstances. 
The Italian government argued before the ECtHR that while the prisoner in question had 
breached the conditions of his release by associating with other offenders there was no 
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indication of his murderous intentions. The murders of the victims were unconnected 
with the drug trafficking activities the prisoner seemed to have resumed upon his 
release. The Italian government further argued that the crimes were not foreseeable 
under the principles in Osman, as the prisoner explained they had been committed for 
pleasure and to re-create the offences he had committed thirty years previously. In 
addition, the government argued that, by their nature, measures aimed at the gradual 
social reintegration of offenders involved a risk of recidivism. The system could reduce 
that risk but it could not be completely eliminated. Following Mastromatteo, the 
government contended that “the mere possibility that a person who had killed once 
could kill again” could not constitute a “real, foreseeable and concrete” risk to life. “To 
conclude otherwise would be to rule out in advance any measure of social reintegration 
for killers” (Maiorano, para. 89, my translation).   
The Court in Maiorano found the Italian government’s arguments unconvincing. It 
noted that the case fell under the broader principle in Mastromatteo as there was no way 
of identifying the two victims in advance. Despite showing some improvement in 
prison, the Court noted that the prisoner had committed further crimes, including 
obtaining weapons and holding a prison guard hostage in an escape attempt. 
Furthermore, he had demonstrated “a tendency to disrespect the law and authority” 
(Registrar of the ECtHR 2009). The Court held that by granting the prisoner day release 
“despite his criminal record and behaviour in prison” and failing to act on information 
that he had resumed his criminal activities, the Italian authorities had breached their 
duty of care under Article 2 of the Convention (Registrar of the ECtHR 2009). While 
the Court approved of Italy’s measures of social reintegration and safeguards in general, 
it held that they had not been adequately followed on this occasion. 
The Court’s decision in Maiorano represents a watering down of the requirement that 
the individual pose a “real and immediate risk” to life and demonstrates the potential for 
the positive duty doctrine to undermine the Court’s own commitment to the 
rehabilitation of offenders. Furthermore, it shows that the Court is not immune to the 
“hindsight bias” commonly found in inquiries following homicides by released patients 
(Szmukler 2000, p.8). As Szmukler argues, “with hindsight an outcome begins to look 
inevitable; a plausible chain of causes can be easily traced backwards through time” and 
awareness of the “multitude of possibilities that present themselves in ‘real’, forward-
moving time” is easily lost (Szmukler 2000, p.8). The similarity of the 2005 murders to 
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the crimes committed by the prisoner in 1975, coupled with the failure to recall the 
prisoner for breaching his release conditions by associating with other criminals, may 
have given the impression that the offences were foreseeable and therefore preventable. 
In Maiorano, the Court thus appeared to disregard the constraints laid down in 
Mastromatteo including the “unpredictability of human conduct” and the difficulties in 
policing modern societies. 
The Court’s focus in Maiorano on the gravity of the prisoner’s previous offences also 
appears to be at odds with the principle in Vinter that even those convicted of the most 
heinous crimes should not be deprived of the hope that they will one day have “atoned” 
for their wrongs. The risk-averse stance of the Court in Maiorano also casts doubt on 
the claim in Vinter that rehabilitation can provide a means of avoiding grossly 
disproportionate punishment and the claim in James and M that it can be expected to 
render length of detention proportionate to the risk the individual poses to the public. 
Coupled with the low predictive accuracy of current risk assessment instruments, the 
paradoxes associated with assessing progress in personality disordered offenders and 
the weak evidence base for the effectiveness of rehabilitative interventions in reducing 
risk, these principles appear to present little resistance to the excessive use of preventive 
detention with personality disordered offenders. 
 
6. A Right to Security and a Duty to Engage in Rehabilitation? 
(a) A duty to reassure a vulnerable public 
At the time the DSPD proposals were developed, the general duty to protect life in 
Mastromatteo had not yet been articulated by the ECtHR. Nevertheless, the narrower 
principle in Osman gave Mike Boyle of the Home Office grounds to assert that the 
ECHR “impose[d] upon states an obligation to protect the public from predictable 
dangers that individuals may cause” (Select Committee on Health 2000b, 18 May 2000, 
para. 636). On the other hand, John Wadham, Director of Liberty, stated that the rule in 
Osman did not force government to take the steps outlined in the DSPD proposals 
because it required “a situation where the authorities know that there is an individual 
who is going to take a specific action, not that an individual might, in two years’ time, 
or three years’ time, take a certain action” (Home Affairs Committee 2000b, Minutes of 
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Evidence, 23 November, para. 7). The now more expansive principle in Mastromatteo 
seems to support former Minister Paul Boateng’s claim that society had a more general 
“right” to protection from dangerous personality disordered individuals and that the 
government had a duty to provide that protection (Boateng and Sharland 1999, p.6). In 
Maiorano, as in the DSPD proposals, the right of the public to protection also takes 
clear priority over the right of the offender to rehabilitation and social integration.  
Peter Ramsay argues that it is the vulnerability of potential victims of crime, “the law’s 
‘innocent’ but abstract subjects”, that underlies official justifications for the 
prioritisation of their interests over those of potential offenders, the law’s “dangerous’ 
but concrete subjects” (Ramsay 2012b, p. 206). This gives rise to an “obligation” on 
behalf of dangerous offenders “to reassure the authorities that they are not a significant 
risk” (Ramsay 2012c, p.134). In the context of the public’s right to security and the 
government’s “duty” to protect life, therefore, instead of having a “right” of access to 
rehabilitation, offenders have a duty to engage in rehabilitation in order to demonstrate 
their suitability for release.  
According to Ramsay, the duty to reassure arises from the “ideology of vulnerable 
autonomy” (Ramsay 2012a, p.84). This ideology was the confluence of three theories 
that strongly influenced the New Labour programme: Anthony Giddens’ Third Way, 
communitarianism and neoliberalism. All three theories “assume that the autonomy of 
citizens is vulnerable to insecurity caused by others' hostility and indifference” (Ramsay 
2012a, p.84). The “ideology of vulnerable autonomy” imposes “obligations to be aware 
of others’ vulnerability” in the face of uncertainties generated by life in modern society 
in the hope that “the lack of social cohesion engendered by the atomistic neoliberal 
economic and social order might be ameliorated” (Ramsay 2012a, p.111).  
According to Giddens, as tradition and custom have gone into decline, they have been 
replaced by “a new individualism” (Giddens 1991, p.40). In this context, “ontological 
security” operates as a “protective cocoon” and is essential to allow individuals to 
develop a stable sense of self and to pursue self-actualisation free from existential 
anxiety (Giddens 1991, p.40). This “cocoon” is threatened by the selfish actions of 
others and individual autonomy is therefore dependent on the choices of those around 
us. In Giddens’ theory, the role of the new welfare state is “not in essence an economic 
concept, but a psychic one” in which the state seeks to ensure security as an aspect of 
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psychological wellbeing (Giddens 1998, p.117). Fear of crime in Giddens’ theory 
presented a particular threat to autonomy and “freedom from the fear of crime” was 
therefore conceived as “a major citizenship right” (Giddens 2002, p.17).  
Through claiming to pursue the protection of the public through preventive detention of 
the dangerous, the DSPD proposals sought to protect the “right” of the public not only 
to actual protection by the state but also to freedom from fear of crime. One civil 
servant in interview stressed that “ministers are particularly concerned about public 
perception. And public perception, rightly or wrongly, emphasises concerns about 
danger presented by particular individuals”. This gave rise to the “atmosphere of 
needing to demonstrate that the government was doing something” about an issue of 
concern that was “exacerbated by concerns about the Michael Stone case” (Civil 
Servant). Those in the DSPD group would also have to live up to their duties as citizens 
by reassuring others that they no longer posed a threat by actively participating in the 
rehabilitative interventions that aimed to reduce their risk to the public. 
The duty to engage in rehabilitation was given the status of an administrative 
requirement in Guntrip and Falconer. It also appears in the rhetoric surrounding the 
revival of rehabilitation as an aim of the criminal justice system in recent years. For 
Elaine Genders and Elaine Player, the low priority of prisoners’ rights in Britain is the 
result of their status of “‘less eligibility’, whereby the notion of universality of rights is 
replaced by a concept of desert that links access to the assessment of personal virtue” 
(Genders and Player 2014, p.451). As the authors point out, in the Coalition 
government’s “Rehabilitation Revolution” (Ministry of Justice 2010a) “prisoners’ 
access to services is framed within a discourse of obligation rather than one of 
entitlement” (Genders and Player 2014, p.451).  
Meeting the “duty” to engage in rehabilitation may also be characterised as a condition 
of citizenship. Zedner argues that the “recasting of citizenship as a status that has to be 
earned” in immigration law can also be seen in domestic criminal law (Zedner 2010, 
p.389). “Irregular citizens”, including sexual and violent offenders, are “consigned to a 
probationary or provisional status” as “citizenship rights of participation and protection 
are made conditional upon compliance with prescribed norms and upon conformity with 
specified requirements” (Zedner 2010, p.389). Those who fail to comply are “barred 
temporarily or indefinitely from full citizenship” through exclusionary measures 
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(Zedner 2010, p.390). Appeals to rehabilitation as a means of avoiding disproportionate 
punishment conceal the unequal and coercive nature of the “balance” being struck 
between the “law-abiding” citizen and the “irregular” or non-citizen.  
(b) Liberalism, security and “balance” 
The ECtHR case law implies that, in preventive detention, the right to life of one 
individual is pitted against the right of another not to be arbitrarily deprived of his 
liberty. In its judgments in M, James and Vinter, the Court was willing to permit 
preventive detention so long as rehabilitative interventions were made available to 
mitigate the effects of long-term incarceration and to ensure that the length of detention 
served was not disproportionate to the risk prevented by the individual. However, the 
expansive duty of the state to protect the general public from released prisoners 
established in Mastromatteo and the risk-averse judgment in Maiorano demonstrate the 
weakness of the ECtHR’s commitment to the rehabilitation of offenders in the face of 
threats to the security of the public. The Maiorano case also implies that, like in the 
DSPD proposals, the “balance” between competing rights is tipped in favour of the 
public. 
Mark Neocleous argues that the idea of a “balance” between security and liberty “is 
essentially a liberal myth […] that in turn masks the fact that liberalism’s key category 
is not liberty, but security” (Neocleous 2007, p.131). He argues that liberal theories of 
government, beginning with John Locke, left room for the exercise of prerogative power 
and that this allowed the earlier tradition of “reason of state” to enter into liberal 
governance. According to Neocleous, “reason of state treats the sovereign as 
autonomous from morality; the state can engage in whatever actions it thinks right, so 
long as they are done according to ‘necessity’ and/or ‘the public good’” and, ultimately, 
to protect the state itself (Neocleous 2007, p.137). By the late 18
th
 century, “liberty” and 
“security” became synonymous with each other and there was therefore no need to 
strike a “balance” between them (Neocleous 2007, p.141). For Neocleous, “security 
became the cornerstone of the liberal mind, which came to identify security with the 
freedom and liberty to pursue one’s individual self-interest” (Neocleous 2007, p.142). 
Problematically, however, the liberal “commitment to security leaves liberalism with no 
defence against authoritarian or absolutist encroachments on liberty, so long as these 
are conducted in the name of security” (Neocleous 2007, p.143, emphasis in original).  
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According to Neocleous, for liberal politicians today, rather than being expressed in 
“reason of state” terms, “any attempt to limit liberty on the grounds of security has to be 
couched in terms of the rule of law and basic rights” (Neocleous 2007, p.143). Appeals 
to the public’s “right” to security, in the subjective and objective senses, may be seen in 
this light. The case law of the ECtHR goes further in Vinter by presenting rehabilitation 
and periodic review of detention as a means of avoiding the disproportionate 
punishment that would otherwise be imposed by indefinite detention under a whole life 
tariff. However, in the framework of the ECHR, both the right to life, enshrined in 
Article 2, and the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, enshrined in Article 3, are unqualified rights. This implies that there should 
be no trade-off between the two. In Maiorano, however, security may be seen to take 
priority over the right of the offender to social reintegration and states are permitted to 
detain indefinitely those who are deemed to pose too high a risk.  
Ramsay argues that the emergence of preventive measures against those who fail to 
reassure others of their harmlessness indicates that “the criminal law's threats are 
premised on their own inadequacy” (Ramsay 2012a, p.212). Contrary to Garland’s 
“limits of the sovereign state” thesis, Ramsay argues that “the problem of the expansion 
of penal control is the result of the actual decline of sovereign authority rather than of 
the political pursuit of its myth” (Ramsay 2012a, p.212). The dangerous personality 
disordered offender may be understood as a particular threat to the authority of the 
criminal law, as he appears to be undeterred by the prospect of punishment and 
unpersuaded by the law’s normative force. The historical use of preventive detention to 
govern dangerous offenders is not surprising, therefore, as the presence of such 
individuals undermines the state’s authority to control crime through the 
pronouncement of norms and penalties.  
Rather than a balance between conflicting rights, therefore, the prioritisation of public 
protection may be better understood a means of protecting the authority of the state, 
which takes precedence over individual rights. Rather than a question of balancing 
“rights”, “the public good” trumps the rights of the offender. This public good is found 
not only in objective security, or freedom from actual harms, but also in subjective 
security, or freedom from the fear of harm (Ramsay 2012d). As in the welfare state, in 
respect of dangerous offenders, the “new” state retains the “responsibility of being both 
the ultimate and the proximate guarantor of security” (Rose 2000, p.327). However, by 
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assuming responsibility for protecting the public from dangerous offenders and seeking 
to eliminate risk, the government sets itself up for failure as atrocities inevitably occur.  
If liberalism really does prioritise security over liberty, a question arises as to why the 
provision of rehabilitative interventions is required at all. Particularly informative here 
is Ian Loader’s (2006) study of the “platonic guardians” who were responsible for 
criminal justice policy in the middle decades of the 20
th
 century. According to Loader, 
these “liberal elites” were “wedded to the belief that government ought to respond to 
crime (and public anger and anxiety about crime) in ways that, above all, seek to 
preserve “civilized values” (Loader 2006, p.563). In Loader’s account, rather than being 
the “organizing principle” of “penal-welfarism”, the commitment to rehabilitation 
evinced at this time was “contingently attached” to the broader “project of being 
civilized” (Loader 2006, p.564-565). The appeal of rehabilitation was two-fold. First, it 
“gave a humanizing rationale to the otherwise troubling and distasteful practice of penal 
detention” and, second, it “offer[ed] a scientifically grounded and effective means of 
helping offenders return to the fold of citizenship” (Loader 2006, p.565).  
The fact that the DSPD initiative was intended to promote offender re-integration seems 
to reflect the “civilizing” purpose described by Loader (2006). As argued in Chapter 2, 
the DSPD initiative was sparked off by a group of civil servants in the Home Office and 
Department of Health and led by a politician, Paul Boateng, who was concerned with 
civil liberties and human rights. Through the compromise at the centre of the 1999 
proposals, the “wasteful” “damaging” or “distasteful” (Loader 2006, p.565) practice of 
imprisonment was made more palatable by the prospect of tailored treatments that 
would alleviate the distress of those in the DSPD group and allow them to progress 
towards freedom. Policymakers were concerned not to “write off” the DSPD group, 
implying that the dangerous were potentially redeemable by reformative means. 
Nevertheless, where the reduction of risk through treatment was found to be impossible, 
the safety of the public would prevail. In the final chapter of this thesis, the assumptions 
underlying the framework governing dangerous personality disordered offenders will be 
interrogated further and it will be argued that rehabilitation and preventive detention 
may be seen as responses to the redeemable and irredeemable offender.  
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7. Conclusion 
The extensive coercive powers outlined in this chapter may be seen to exploit the 
mobile boundaries of a legal framework that prioritises the rights of a nebulous “public” 
to protection from uncertain harms over the rights of concrete offenders to liberty and 
freedom from disproportionate punishment. At first glance, the Grand Chamber’s stance 
in Vinter appears to be progressive and protective of individual prisoners’ rights and to 
establish a right of access to rehabilitation. The Mastromatteo and Maiorano cases 
demonstrate, however, that the European Court, like the British government, is also 
willing to sacrifice the right of offenders to social re-integration to the pursuit of public 
protection. This indicates the weakness of liberal human rights principles in the face of 
serious offending by released prisoners.  
The case law suggests that the ECtHR prioritises the public’s right to security, grounded 
in the right to life under Article 2, over the offender’s right not to be subjected to 
disproportionate punishment under Article 3. The priority placed on the protection of 
the public over the rehabilitation of the offender suggests that, rather than striking a 
balance between competing individual rights, the “bargain” in fact trades individual 
liberty and the right not to be subjected to grossly disproportionate punishment for 
collective security. The low priority given to the rights of offenders is a theme that 
continues through the body of mental health law considered in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6: Dangerous Personality Disordered Offenders in the Mental 
Health System 
 
1. Introduction 
As argued in earlier chapters, the reforms to the MHA 1983 brought by the MHA 2007 
were in many respects motivated by a concern to facilitate the detention and treatment 
of the DSPD group in secure hospital. However, the effects of the MHA 2007 have 
reached far beyond this small group to subject a large range of mentally disordered 
individuals to compulsory powers. Furthermore, access to defences and pleas on the 
grounds of mental disorder, including unfitness to plead, insanity and diminished 
responsibility, is particularly limited for personality disordered offenders, and reform 
proposals tend to further entrench this pattern. Thus there is a tendency for courts to 
view personality disordered offenders as at least partially culpable for their disorders 
and therefore deserving of punishment. This is despite empirical evidence indicating 
that the volitional deficits of personality disordered offenders may prevent them from 
acting towards others “in the spirit of brotherhood” (Peay 2011a, p.232). 
The limited nature of defences relating to mental disorder has been partially alleviated 
by the greater availability of hospital disposals as sentencing options. Despite the 
reforms introduced by the MHA 1983, however, personality disordered offenders are 
judged to be unsuitable for hospital disposals due to the doubtful “treatability” of their 
disorders and the risks they pose to the public. The greater availability of treatment for 
personality disorder in prisons following the introduction of the DSPD programme 
seems to have contributed to the view of the CA in the recent decision of Vowles that a 
prison sentence is the correct response to personality disordered offenders who pose a 
risk to the public.  On the other hand, “appropriate medical treatment” is interpreted 
broadly when it comes to detaining personality disordered offenders in hospital on the 
grounds of risk. The result for individuals in the personality disorder category is that 
their mental disorders, while insufficient to exculpate them, allow them to be detained 
and treated in the hospital system for the protection of society. It is argued that this risk 
averse and punitive stance towards personality disordered offenders fails to take into 
account the particularities of their disorders and jeopardises their wellbeing. 
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2. Defences and Pleas Relating to Mental Disorder 
Rates of mental disorder are high amongst prisoners. In a study of 1,435 newly 
sentenced prisoners commissioned by the Ministry of Justice, 10% were identified as 
“likely to have a psychotic disorder”, 61% a personality disorder and over one third 
reported “significant symptoms of anxiety or depression” (Stewart 2008, p.iii). From the 
same sample, 57% of female and 48% of male prisoners reported that they had accessed 
mental health treatment in the year prior to conviction and 49% of women and 18% of 
men said they needed help for mental health problems in prison (Light et al. 2013, 
p.20). These figures indicate that mentally disordered offenders are not being 
adequately filtered out of the prison system at sentencing.  
As will be seen below, the access of personality disordered offenders to defences based 
on mental disorder is severely limited, and reform proposals tend to further entrench 
this pattern. This indicates that personality disordered offenders tend to be found by 
courts to be criminally responsible despite the volitional deficits and emotional 
problems linked to their disorders. Drawing on the doctrine of diminished 
responsibility, personality disordered offenders are sometimes considered by the courts 
to be “partially culpable” for their crimes. However, this finding tends to result in a 
punitive rather than a therapeutic disposal.  
(a) Unfitness to plead 
Under s.4 of the Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, the question of fitness to plead 
is to be determined as soon as it arises by the judge without a jury on the written 
evidence of two or more medical practitioners. If the defendant is found unfit to plead 
the trial may not proceed, and under s.4A of the 1964 Act the jury must determine 
whether the accused did the act or made the omission with which he is charged. 
According to the House of Lords, the purpose of the proceedings under s.4A is “to 
strike a fair balance between the need to protect a defendant who has, in fact, done 
nothing wrong and is unfit to plead at his trial and the need to protect the public from a 
defendant who has committed an injurious act which would constitute a crime if done 
with the requisite mens rea” (R. v. Antoine [2000] UKHL 20, [2001] 1 AC 340, at 375).  
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Prior to the reforms introduced by the Criminal Procedure (Insanity and Unfitness to 
Plead) Act 1991, a finding of unfitness to plead was followed by confinement in 
psychiatric hospital until release was granted by the Home Secretary. Now, a range of 
disposals are available, including absolute discharge, supervision orders and hospital 
orders with or without restrictions (s.5 and 5A Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964). 
The number of findings of unfitness have increased year-on-year since the 1991 reforms 
came into force, rising from 13 in 1993 to 31 in 1994 and reaching a high of 118 in 
2008 (Mackay 2016, p.3-4). Between 2002 and 2014, the annual average was 100.6 
findings (Mackay 2016, p.4). Numbers remain relatively low, however, given the rates 
of mental disorder amongst the prison population mentioned previously. 
The test for unfitness is found in the common law and derives from the case of R. v. 
Pritchard (1836) 7 C & P 303. A defendant may be found unfit where he lacks any of 
the following: “the ability to plead to the indictment, to understand the course of the 
proceedings, to instruct a lawyer, to challenge a juror and to understand the evidence” 
(Law Commission 2010, para. 2.46). The Law Commission is highly critical of the 
Pritchard test as it “places a disproportionate emphasis on cognitive ability” and fails to 
“take any or sufficient account of factors such as emotion or volition” or “of the 
capacity of the accused to make decisions relating to his or her trial” (Law Commission 
2010, para. 3.23).  
In its recent report to the government, the Law Commission advocated that there should 
be “a full trial wherever fair and practicable” and that removal from the trial process as 
a result of unfitness should take place “as a last resort” (Law Commission 2016, para. 
1.11-1.12). In the Commission’s view, defendants should be supported to participate in 
their trials as fully as possible as the trial process ensures the protection of due process 
rights and allows for the full range of sentencing disposals (Law Commission 2016). 
Given the deficiencies of the Prichard test, the Law Commission proposes a substitute 
modelled on the Mental Capacity Act (MCA) 2005. The aim of the MCA 2005 is to 
allow decisions to be made on behalf and in the best interest of individuals who lack 
capacity to make them.  
The proposed new test for unfitness to plead is very similar to the test of capacity 
contained in the MCA 2005 but specifically focuses on the accused person’s 
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understanding of the charge and trial process and his or her ability to make decisions 
during the course of the trial. Under the proposed test: 
A defendant is to be regarded as lacking the capacity to participate effectively in 
a trial if the defendant’s relevant abilities are not, taken together, sufficient to 
enable the defendant to participate effectively in the proceedings on the offence 
or offences charged. 
An accused should be found to lack capacity if he or she is unable: 
(1) to understand the information relevant to the decisions that he or she will 
have to make in the course of his or her trial,  
(2) to retain that information,  
(3) to use or weigh that information as part of decision making process, or 
(4) to communicate his or her decisions 
(Criminal Procedure (Lack of Capacity) Bill, s.3(2); s.3(5)). 
While the Commission did not analyse the issue of psychopathy or personality disorder 
in detail, it acknowledged that the volitional or emotional deficits associated with the 
disorders could affect a defendant’s decision-making capacity (Law Commission 2010, 
para. 3.38-39).  
Characteristics of ASPD and psychopathy include impulsivity, grandiosity, a lack of 
remorse, failure to learn from experience, manipulativeness and failure to accept 
responsibility for one’s actions (American Psychiatric Association 2013; Hare 1991). 
Individuals affected by these disorders may have a good cognitive understanding of the 
trial process but their capacity to make rational decisions about the conduct of their 
defence may be impaired by their personality traits. In the case of R. v. Diamond [2008] 
EWCA Crim 923, for example, the defendant, who had previously been diagnosed with 
a personality disorder, pleaded not guilty to murder instead of pleading guilty to 
manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility, seemingly in the belief he 
would be acquitted.  
Paranoid personality traits may also cause a defendant to distrust his legal team and the 
impartiality of the court and lead to inappropriate pleading. In R. v. Moyle [2008] 
EWCA Crim 3059, there was fresh psychiatric evidence that the appellant was suffering 
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from paranoid schizophrenia and delusions of persecution at the time of the trial that 
influenced his decision not to raise the defence of diminished responsibility.  
Borderline personality disorder, also prevalent amongst DSPD patients and prisoners 
(Burns et al. 2011), is characterised by depressiveness, impulsivity, self-harming 
behaviour and emotional lability (American Psychiatric Association 2013). These 
symptoms may cause defendants to plead guilty in the belief that they deserve 
punishment. In the case of R. v. Murray [2008] EWCA Crim 1792, a woman suffering 
from paranoid schizophrenia pleaded guilty to murder, even though a plea of diminished 
responsibility would have been available, as she felt overwhelming guilt at having killed 
her young daughter and wished to be punished for her crime.  
According to the Law Commission, if the test it proposes were adopted, “paradigmatic 
cases such as Moyle, Diamond and Murray would presumably result in a finding that 
the accused lacks decision-making capacity” (Law Commission 2010, para. 3.37). 
However, some unresolved issues remain regarding how a capacity-based test would 
apply to defendants with personality disorder. When the Richardson Committee 
proposed a new capacity-based framework for a new MHA it foresaw that compulsory 
powers would be unlikely to apply to personality disordered patients because “many 
[…] may be found to have the necessary capacity to choose for themselves whether to 
accept care and treatment” (Department of Health 1999a, para. 4.15). This is confirmed 
by the data in the IDEA study, which found that 94% of patients and prisoners on the 
DSPD programme had the capacity to consent to treatment based on a standardised 
testing instrument entitled Thinking Rationally about Treatment (TRAT) (Grisso and 
Appelbaum 1993, see Burns et al. 2011, p. 93). Although this instrument is not based on 
the criteria of the MCA 2005, it does include analogous concepts such as consequential 
thinking, complex thinking, generating consequences, weighing consequences, and 
expressing a choice (Burns et al. 2011, Table 3.13). A capacity-based test of unfitness 
to plead may therefore find that offenders with personality disorder have the capacity to 
make decisions about their trial even though their choices may be influenced by their 
disorders. While the Law Commission does refer in its consultation paper to the impact 
of emotions and volition on the capacity of defendants to make decisions, the test does 
not explicitly incorporate those factors. The result may therefore be another test of 
cognitive function that does not adequately take into account the impairments of 
personality disordered offenders, who may be left outside its protection. 
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(b)  Insanity  
Where a defendant is found fit to plead at trial (or the issue was not raised) but he was 
mentally disordered at the time of the offence, he may plead not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGRI). Under the M’Naghten rules, the burden rests upon the accused to 
prove on the balance of probabilities that at the time of the offence, he was “labouring 
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he was doing 
what was wrong” (Queen v. M'Naghten, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 [1843]). As was the case with 
unfitness to plead, prior to the 1991 Act, the only disposal available to the court upon a 
finding of insanity was indefinite detention in psychiatric hospital until release was 
ordered by the Home Secretary. Now a range of disposals is available. However, where 
the charge is murder and the defendant is found NGRI, the court is bound to impose a 
hospital order with restrictions under s.37 and s.41 of the MHA 1983.  
A personality disorder is a “disease of the mind” falling within the M’Naghten rules. 
The first part of the test, whether the defendant did not “know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing”, has been very narrowly defined and is rarely used in practice 
(Law Commission 2013, para. 1.48). In the case of R. v. Codère (1917) 12 Cr App Rep 
21, it was held that “nature and quality” meant that a defendant could not plead insanity 
if he was aware of the physical aspects of his act, regardless of whether or not he was 
aware of its moral aspects. The second part of the test, whether the defendant knew that 
what he was doing was “wrong”, is more frequently used. However, wrongfulness has 
been interpreted in the narrow sense of legally rather than morally wrong (R. v. Windle 
[1952] 2 QB 826). This definition may pose a particular barrier to personality 
disordered defendants who may have a good cognitive understanding of what legal rules 
state but who may not respond to moral reasons for restraint (see Morse 2008; Peay 
2011a).  
Since the introduction of the 1991 reforms, the annual average number of findings of 
NGRI has been steadily increasing, rising from an average of 8.8 per year between 1987 
and 1991 to 24.4 between 2007 and 2011 (Law Commission 2012, para. E.5). The 
numbers of defendants found NGRI nevertheless appear low when we consider the rates 
of mental illness and mental disorder amongst the prison population. The rate of 
successful pleas of NGRI amongst personality disordered defendants is even lower, as 
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between 1975 and 1988 there were just three findings of NGRI where the diagnosis was 
personality disorder and, in later research, there were no successful pleas with this 
diagnosis (Law Commission 2012, para. 3.38). 
In their responses to the Law Commission’s consultation paper on insanity, legal and 
medical practitioners acknowledged that while “academic criticisms of the defences are 
justified”, in practice they “work round the problems” (Law Commission 2013, para. 
1.10). Thus, “practitioners take a pragmatic approach, and achieve the ‘correct’ 
outcome, in the view of the practitioner and/or the accused, without having to consider 
the insanity defence” (Law Commission 2013, para. 1.82). In light of this, the 
Commission concluded that “while there are a great many people convicted of offences 
who have mental health problems and/or learning difficulties, the number who 
completely lack criminal responsibility as a result is small […] and it may be that this 
would remain the case even if the defences were brought up to date” (Law Commission 
2013, para. 1.83). The proportion of prisoners affected by mental disorder casts doubt 
on the Commission’s assertion that the narrowness of the insanity defence causes few 
problems in practice. 
The Commission’s proposals for a new defence of “not criminally responsible by reason 
of recognised medical condition” (Law Commission 2013, para. 3.16) tend to exclude 
personality disordered offenders further from the defence. The proposed new defence is 
based on the existing defence of diminished responsibility. It would require the 
defendant to demonstrate that, at the time of the offence, he was affected by “a total 
lack” of capacity to do one or more of the following: “rationally to form a judgment 
about the relevant conduct or circumstances; to understand the wrongfulness of what he 
or she is charged with having done; or to control his or her physical acts in relation to 
the relevant conduct or circumstances” (Law Commission 2013, para. 4.126-7). This 
lack of capacity must arise from “a qualifying recognised medical condition” (Law 
Commission 2013, para. 4.126).  
As it covers volitional as well as cognitive capacities, the test may be expected to draw 
more mentally disordered offenders into the defence of insanity. However, the Law 
Commission deliberately excludes from the definition of “recognised medical 
condition” disorders, such as ASPD, that are “characterised solely or principally by 
abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible behaviour” where “the evidence for the 
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condition is simply evidence of what might broadly be called criminal behaviour” (Law 
Commission 2013, para. 1.90). It is notable that the Law Commission purports to use 
the same definition that was formerly used to bring certain personality disordered 
individuals within the ambit of the old MHA 1983 to exclude them from a new insanity 
defence. Part of the formula for the new test derives from the former s.1(2) of the MHA 
1983, which defined “psychopathic disorder” as “a persistent disorder or disability of 
mind […] which results in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct on 
the part of the person concerned”.  
Following the amendments to the MHA 1983, all personality disordered individuals are 
encompassed by the definition of “mental disorder” and potentially subject to 
compulsory powers. Yet, many of those with personality disorder or psychopathy would 
remain outside the protection that would be afforded by the proposed new insanity 
defence. Thus it appears that personality disordered offenders are doubly disadvantaged 
by the nature of their disorders. This theme recurs later in the choice between hospital 
disposals and punitive prison sentences discussed later in this chapter. 
(c) Diminished responsibility 
Diminished responsibility is a partial defence to murder first introduced by s.2 of the 
Homicide Act 1957. The doctrine was adopted from Scottish law and was intended to 
“[inject] flexibility” into the law of insanity and “counter the effects of the narrow, 
cognitive M’Naghten test” (Loughnan 2012, p.234). The defence was reformulated in 
s.52(1) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Under the reformed defence, a defendant 
charged with murder will see his charge reduced to one of manslaughter if he can show 
that, at the time of the killing, he was “suffering from an abnormality of mental 
functioning” that “arose from a recognised medical condition” and that this 
“substantially impaired [his] ability to […] understand the nature of [his] conduct; to 
form a rational judgment [or] to exercise self-control” and “provides an explanation for 
[his] acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing” (s.52(1) CJA 2009). 
When accepted, the defence results in conviction for manslaughter, thus avoiding the 
mandatory life sentence for murder and leaving the choice of sentence to the judge’s 
discretion. The maximum sentence for manslaughter is life imprisonment and hospital 
disposals are also available.  
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A defence of diminished responsibility was accepted under the previous law in the case 
of R. v. Byrne [1960] 2 Q.B. 396. In that case, the appellant, who had killed a young 
woman, was found to be a “sexual psychopath” suffering from an abnormality of the 
mind such that he was unable to resist his impulses. The CCA reduced Byrne’s murder 
conviction to one of manslaughter but left in place his life sentence as this was “the only 
possible sentence given [his] tendencies” (Byrne, p.405). Although the reformed 
defence of diminished responsibility was partly modelled on the directions of the court 
in Byrne, according to Ronnie Mackay, personality disorder “is now unlikely to fall 
within the new plea unless the defendant's ability to exercise self-control can be proved 
to have been substantially impaired” (Mackay 2010, p.297). Claims on this ground are 
subject to the requirement that the defendant’s conduct be fully or partially caused by 
his mental abnormality, which may constitute a further hurdle for personality disordered 
defendants to overcome. 
As indicated in the introduction to this thesis, the nature of the association between 
offending and personality disorder is unclear and the multiplicity of confounding factors 
makes any causal relationship difficult to determine (Duggan and Howard 2009; 
Howard 2015). Furthermore, as Jill Peay argues, it is not easy to “draw a bright dividing 
line between those who do not and those who cannot control their behaviour” (Peay 
2011a, p.234). For Peay, “factors such as a low tolerance for frustration and impulsivity, 
combined with substance misuse facilitated by impaired moral reasoning, can make for 
a murky picture” (Peay 2011a, p.234). However, these “maladaptive traits will be 
placed into a context where, because those with personality disorder remain capable of 
instrumental reasoning to achieve their goals, the capacity to respond to moral reasoning 
will remain, at least in part” (Peay 2011a, p.234; see also Glannon 2008). It may 
therefore prove difficult for offenders in the personality disorder category to prove a 
sufficient causal connection between their disorders and their offending for a plea of 
diminished responsibility to succeed. Furthermore, as diminished responsibility is only 
available as a partial defence to murder its practical effect is limited.  
Prior to the 2009 reforms, the numbers of successful pleas of diminished responsibility 
on the grounds of personality disorder were relatively low, at 10% in 2005, compared to 
28% for paranoid schizophrenia (Ministry of Justice 2009b, p. 15). No more recent 
statistics could be found on the rates in respect of personality disordered offenders, but 
Mackay (2010) argues that they may be expected to be as low if not lower following the 
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reforms. Again, the effect of reform may be to exclude more personality disordered 
offenders from defences based on mental disorder. Nevertheless, the numbers indicate 
that personality disordered offenders may be more successful in raising diminished 
responsibility than insanity or unfitness to plead. Courts have derived a concept of 
“partial responsibility” from the doctrine of diminished responsibility and this has been 
used by in determining sentence even in non-murder cases, as discussed below. 
 
3. The Impact of the MHA 2007: From “Treatability” to “Appropriate” Treatment  
(a) Treatability: A question of culture or law? 
Under the old MHA 1983, patients suffering from “psychopathic disorder” could only 
be detained in hospital where treatment was “likely to alleviate or prevent a 
deterioration of [their] condition”. This became known as the “treatability” test and was 
targeted for abolition by the DSPD proposals as it was regarded as a barrier to the 
detention of dangerous personality disordered offenders in hospital to protect the public. 
Rather than removing the test completely, however, the MHA 2007 substituted the 
requirement that “appropriate medical treatment” be “available” to the patient in 
hospital and that its “purpose” be “to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder 
or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations” (s.145(4) MHA 1983). This is 
similar to the old test but sets a lower standard as “purpose is not the same as 
likelihood” (Department of Health 2008, para. 6.4). To satisfy the availability 
requirement, “treatment must actually be available to the patient [and it] is not sufficient 
that appropriate treatment could theoretically be provided” (Department of Health 2008, 
para. 6.13). “Medical treatment” is defined broadly and includes “nursing, 
psychological intervention and specialist mental health habilitation, rehabilitation and 
care” (s.145(1) MHA 1983).   
Under the former MHA 1983, the courts already took a broad view of what constituted 
“treatment” for personality disorder. In Hutchison Reid v. Secretary of State for 
Scotland [1999] 2 A.C. 512, which concerned Scottish legislation similar to the MHA 
1983, the House of Lords (HL) held that even though the patient was not receiving 
treatment for his personality disorder, his detention in a secure hospital “was preventing 
a deterioration of his condition because his abnormally aggressive or seriously 
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irresponsible behaviour was being controlled or at least being modified” (Hutchison 
Reid, p. 531). Furthermore, it held that the definition of “medical treatment” was “wide 
enough to include treatment which alleviates or prevents a deterioration of the 
symptoms of the mental disorder, not the disorder itself which gives rise to them”. The 
fact that the patient’s anger management showed improvement in the structured and 
medically supervised environment of the hospital was enough to satisfy this test 
(Hutchison Reid, p. 531).   
This position was approved by the ECtHR in the subsequent case of Hutchison Reid v. 
UK, in which it was held that “compulsory confinement” “may be necessary not only 
where a person needs therapy, medication or other clinical treatment to cure or alleviate 
his condition, but also where the person needs control and supervision to prevent him, 
for example, causing harm to himself or other persons” (Hutchison Reid v. UK, para. 
52). In principle, however, detention under Article 5.1(e) will only be lawful “if effected 
in a hospital, clinic or other appropriate institution” (Aerts v. Belgium, [1998] ECHR 64, 
para. 46).  
As noted previously, the vast majority of hospital patients in the MEMOS study had 
been transferred to hospital from prison under s.47 MHA 1983 (Trebilcock and Weaver 
2010a). Just 10% of the patients had been given a hospital order at sentencing 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.31). This reflects the fact that personality disordered 
offenders are often found criminally responsible by the courts and are rarely found not 
guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI) or unfit to plead. By the end of the MEMOS study 
period, 73% of the indeterminate sentenced patients had passed their tariff expiration 
date and 85% of those given a determinate sentence had passed their non-parole date 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.40-41). This indicates that the hospital units were 
being used to detain high-risk offenders who were eligible for release after completing 
their prison sentences even before the implementation of the MHA 2007.  
Highlighting that the hotly contested changes to the MHA 1983 brought by the MHA 
2007 were not necessary to the operation of the DSPD units, several MHRT members 
“identified that through case law the issue of treatability had become largely redundant” 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.72). One member further observed that “MHRTs 
would always take risk into consideration before treatability” (Trebilcock and Weaver 
2010a, p.72). For example, one MHRT member observed that it was often easy to 
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satisfy the test of whether treatment was likely to “prevent deterioration” in the patient’s 
condition, as the fact the patient was in hospital meant that re-offending could be 
prevented. Thus, the test was malleable enough to allow public protection to be 
prioritised over the offender’s claim to liberty. This, in combination with the Hutchison 
Reid cases, begs the question of whether the much-debated changes to the MHA 1983 
were in fact necessary.   
The Law Society suggested that the “problem” targeted by the DSPD proposals may not 
have been a legal problem but rather a problem with the “culture” that determined “the 
care, treatment and management of people with severe personality disorder” (Law 
Society 2000). The Society questioned whether changes in the law could be expected to 
“enforce the required changes in ‘culture’” (Law Society 2000).  In the event, a 
combination of political and clinical therapeutic optimism, the development of a range 
of treatments and greater treatment capacity, and a more flexible approach to the 
concept of “treatability” by the courts may have contributed to resolving the DSPD 
problem without the need for legislative intervention. Martyn Pickersgill argues that, 
over time, personality disorder has come to be seen as “treatable” through “a […] 
complex series of reciprocal interactions and mutually constitutive processes between 
clinical knowledge, law and policy” (Pickersgill 2012, p.32). These include the 
promotion of the notion that personality disorder was treatable by the Department of 
Health and Home Office and the flowering of a clinical literature on effective treatment 
approaches. In Pickersgill’s view, the DSPD programme also played a role in this 
process. As clinicians were largely free to develop their own treatment approaches 
based on a range of different theoretical models, “the DSPD units acted as laboratories 
within which framings of personality disorder could be experimented with” and “played 
a salient role in the constitution of the conception that personality disorder was 
treatable” (Pickersgill 2012, p.42). More concretely, as argued by one interviewee, the 
DSPD units provided some of the treatment capacity needed to accommodate those in 
the DSPD category within the hospital system. The achievements of these on-going 
processes may therefore have been cemented and legitimised by eventual legislative 
changes rather than prompted by them. However, as argued below, the new test of 
appropriate treatment leaves room for argument on whether personality disorder is now 
regarded as “treatable” by the law.  
(b) Appropriate medical treatment 
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A permissive view has been taken in some cases as to what constitutes “appropriate 
medical treatment” for personality disorder. In MD v. Nottinghamshire Healthcare NHS 
Trust [2010] UKUT 59 (AAC), the Upper Tribunal held that although the applicant, 
who suffered from psychopathic disorder, was not psychologically able to engage with 
treatment at the time of the decision, he had “the potential to benefit from the milieu of 
the ward both for its short term effects and for the possibility that it would break 
through the defence mechanisms and allow him later to engage in therapy” (MD, para. 
39). Thus, the Court held that appropriate treatment was available to him. As Bartlett 
and Sandland (2014) note, this “comes perilously close to finding that detention is, 
itself, appropriate treatment [and] undercut[s] the therapeutic image which the 
appropriate treatment test was meant to foster” (Bartlett and Sandland 2014, p. 255).  
A more cautious approach was, however, taken in the subsequent case of DL-H v. 
Devon Partnership NHS Trust and Secretary of State for Justice [2010] UKUT 102 
(AAC), decided by the same Upper Tribunal judge, Judge Jacobs. The Tribunal was 
concerned that the definition of “medical treatment” given in s.145 was so broad that 
there was a “danger that a patient for whom no appropriate treatment is available may 
be contained for public safety rather than detained for treatment” (DL-H, para. 33). In 
order to avoid this, the judge advised that:  
The tribunal must investigate behind assertions, generalisations and standard 
phrases. By focusing on specific questions, it will ensure that it makes an 
individualised assessment for the particular patient. What precisely is the 
treatment that can be provided? What discernible benefit may it have on this 
patient? Is that benefit related to the patient's mental disorder or to some 
unrelated problem? Is the patient truly resistant to engagement? (para. 33). 
In the case of R (SP) v. Secretary of State for Justice [2010] EWCA Civ 1590, Lady 
Justice Arden commented that it was not the case that “a person's known rejection of all 
treatment could never be relevant to the formation by a medical practitioner of his 
opinion as to the appropriateness of treatment”. The implication is that appropriate 
treatment may be held not to be “available” where the patient is actively resisting all 
treatment. This indicates that the old problem of patients resisting treatment in the hope 
of being discharged could resurface under the new test.  
  
190 
The dicta of the Court in DL-H and SP appear to set a higher standard than that 
established in MD and Hutchison Reid and suggest that debate on what constitutes 
appropriate treatment in the case of personality disorder is on-going. While Pickersgill 
highlights that the claim that “personality disorder is treatable” has increasingly been 
made he also notes that not all mental health practitioners are convinced and some 
scepticism remains (Pickersgill 2012, p.44). The continuing paucity of robust evidence 
for the clinical effectiveness of treatments, particularly for ASPD, may leave room for 
argument over whether appropriate treatment is “available” for these patients (see 
Gibbon et al. 2010; Khalifa et al. 2010; Stoffers et al. 2010; 2012). Furthermore, as 
discussed in the next section, the issue of “treatability” has crept back into the case law 
on the choice between a prison sentence and a hospital order for mentally disordered 
offenders. In this context, it operates as a means of excluding difficult personality 
disordered offenders from hospitals and pushing them into the criminal justice system.  
 
4. The Choice between Punitive and Therapeutic Disposals    
As noted earlier, it is difficult for personality disordered offenders to succeed in raising 
defences based on mental disorder. This suggests a tendency for the law to treat 
personality disordered offenders as criminally responsible despite the volitional and 
emotional deficits associated with their disorders. Prior to the recent case of Vowles, a 
line of case law was developing that took into account various factors in determining 
the choice between a prison sentence and a hospital disposal for mentally disordered 
offenders. These included the causal connection between the offender’s mental disorder 
and his offence, the presence of independent factors contributing to offending, and the 
offender’s level of culpability. Following Vowles the distinction between offenders with 
low and high culpability is less important as the CA now prioritises prison disposals and 
seeks to punish mentally disordered offenders for “any element or particle of 
responsibility” they have for their offences (Ashworth and Mackay 2015). Nevertheless, 
the Court’s reasoning in the individual appeals grouped within Vowles reveals 
differences between the Court’s view of personality disordered offenders and those with 
mental illnesses alone. Concern for reflecting the culpability of the individual offender 
and protecting the public continue to influence judicial reasoning and considerations of 
offender wellbeing come second, if they feature at all.  
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(a) Sentencing mentally disordered offenders before Vowles 
(i) Risk and welfare 
In R. v. Birch (1989) 11 Cr. App. R. (S.) 202, the CA held that:  
The choice of prison as an alternative to hospital may arise in two quite different 
ways: (1) If the offender is dangerous and no suitable secure hospital 
accommodation is available […] [and] (2) Where the sentencer considers that 
notwithstanding the offender’s mental disorder there was an element of 
culpability in the offence which merits punishment (Birch, p.215). 
The Court commented that the latter scenario includes “where there is no connection 
between the mental disorder and the offence, or where the defendant's responsibility for 
the offence is ‘diminished’ but not wholly extinguished” (Birch, p.215). The dual 
factors of public protection and punishment highlighted in Birch continue to structure 
the Courts’ reasoning in relation to mentally disordered offenders. 
The early preference of the CA in sentencing mentally disordered offenders was to 
impose a hospital order with restrictions under s.37 and s.41 of the MHA 1983. The CA 
in Birch noted that “a hospital order is not a punishment” and therefore considerations 
of “retribution and deterrence, whether personal or general, are immaterial”. Rather, the 
“sole purpose of the order is to ensure that the offender receives the medical care and 
attention which he needs in the hope and expectation of course that the result will be to 
avoid the commission by the offender of further criminal acts.” This implies that the 
presence of a causal connection between the disorder and the offending behaviour 
counts in favour of a hospital order. 
A hospital order may only be made by a Court under s.37 of the MHA 1983 where it is 
satisfied that “the offender is suffering from mental disorder [...] of a nature or degree 
which makes it appropriate for him to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment 
and appropriate medical treatment is available for him” (s.37.2(a) MHA 1983). The 
Court may make the hospital order subject to restrictions under s.41 if this is “necessary 
for the protection of the public from serious harm”.  
The Mental Health Tribunal has a duty to discharge a patient detained under a hospital 
order: 
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if it is not satisfied: (i) that he is then suffering from mental disorder or from 
mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be 
liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; or (ii) that it is 
necessary for the health and safety of the patient or for the protection of other 
persons that he should receive such treatment; or (iia) that appropriate medical 
treatment is available for him (s.72(1)(b) MHA 1983. Emphasis added).  
When a restriction order has been imposed under s.41 MHA 1983, the patient may not 
take leave of absence, be transferred to another hospital without the assent of the 
Secretary of State and may not be discharged from hospital except by the Secretary of 
State or a Tribunal. When considering discharging a restricted patient, the Tribunal 
must have regard to the same criteria as for unrestricted patients with the proviso that “if 
the tribunal is satisfied that it is not appropriate for the patient to remain liable to be 
recalled to hospital for further treatment, they must direct an absolute discharge” 
(s.73(1)(b) MHA 1983. Emphasis added).  
In Birch, following the case of R. v. Howell (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S.) 360, the CA held 
that “in the absence of any question of culpability and punishment, the judge should not 
impose a sentence of imprisonment simply to ensure that if the [Mental Health] Review 
Tribunal […] is […] constrained to order a discharge, the offender will return to prison 
rather than be set free” (Birch, p.215). Thus, the Court did not support the use of prison 
sentences as a means of managing the risks presented by mentally disordered offenders. 
It also held, following R. v. Mbatha (1985) 7 Cr. App. R. (S) 373, that “even where 
there is culpability, the right way to deal with a dangerous and disordered person is to 
make an order under section 37 and 41”. This indicates that the Court prioritised the 
medical management of mentally disordered offenders over their punishment. 
The decision of the House of Lords (HL) in R. v. Drew [2003] 1 W.L.R. 1213 seemed to 
deviate from the therapeutic approach taken in Birch and moved towards a more risk-
averse stance. The HL noted that “defendants made subject to hospital orders, whether 
restricted or not, are entitled to release when the medical conditions justifying their 
original admission cease to be met” and, thereafter, “are liable to recall only on medical 
grounds”. The Court remarked that such defendants may, however, “be a source of 
danger to the public even though these medical conditions are not met” (Drew, para. 
21). A defendant sentenced to life imprisonment, on the other hand, could not be 
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released unless the Parole Board was satisfied that it was safe to do so and he could be 
recalled to prison if “he appear[ed] to present a danger to the public” (Drew, para. 21). 
“In short”, the court concluded, “an automatic life sentence affords a measure of control 
not available under the other available orders” (Drew, para. 21). 
The HL noted the suggestion made on behalf of the Home Secretary that cases 
including Howell and Mbatha, “gave less than adequate weight to the differing 
conditions governing the release and recall of restricted patients as opposed to life 
sentence prisoners”. It went on to hold that these were “a matter to which sentencing 
judges and appellate courts should try to give appropriate weight”. However, the 
“notorious” “difficulties caused to prison managements by the presence and behaviour 
of those who are subject to serious mental disorder” meant that the Court “would need 
to be persuaded that any significant change in the prevailing practice was desirable” 
(Drew, para. 22). The HL in Drew regretted, however, that the s.45A hospital and 
limitation direction was only available at the time for offenders suffering from 
psychopathic disorder. In the Court’s view, such an order would have provided a useful 
means for ensuring an offender received treatment for his mental disorder in hospital. 
Hospital and limitation directions were introduced by the Crime (Sentences) Act 1997. 
A hospital direction, placing the offender in a specific hospital, and a limitation 
direction, subjecting him to restrictions, may be attached by the Crown Court to a 
custodial sentence and the criteria are the same as for a hospital order. Originally, s.45A 
orders were available only for offenders in the psychopathic disorder category. 
Following the introduction of the MHA 2007 they are now available for convicted 
offenders with any mental disorder. The measure originated in the “hybrid order” 
originally recommended for psychopaths of uncertain treatability by the Reed (1994) 
working group. In 1996, a different version of the Reed proposal appeared in a joint 
discussion paper issued by the Home Office and Department of Health (1996). This 
dropped the emphasis on “uncertain treatability” and instead “stressed that the existing 
hospital and restriction orders were ‘insufficiently flexible’ where the courts were not 
certain that ‘treatment will sufficiently address the risk to the public’ or where they 
believed that ‘a punitive element in the disposal is required to reflect the offender's 
whole or partial responsibility’” (Eastman and Peay 1998, p. 96, citing Home Office 
and Department of Health 1996, para. 1.4). By 1997, the emphasis had shifted, moving 
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away from the idea of partial responsibility and again stressing public protection (Home 
Office 1997, cited in Eastman and Peay 1998, p. 97).  
A patient subject to a hospital and limitation direction may only be discharged from 
hospital before the end of his prison sentence by the Secretary of State, who may order 
his transfer to prison. The patient’s Responsible Clinician can propose to the Secretary 
of State that the patient be transferred to prison at any point before the expiry of his 
sentence if “no further treatment is necessary or likely to be effective” (MHA 1983 
Code of Practice, para. 33.23). The limitation direction ceases to have effect upon the 
expiry of the offender’s prison sentence, but the hospital order continues in force so that 
he may be detained in hospital as if on a non-restricted hospital order (Rutherford 2010, 
p. 33). If the prisoner has been given an indeterminate sentence his release will be at the 
discretion of the Parole Board, who will decide on public protection rather than medical 
grounds.  
The judicial preference for public protection over the therapeutic needs of the offender 
was made more explicit in the case of R. v. Staines [2006] EWCA Crim 15. In that case, 
the defendant appealed against a discretionary life sentence and s.45A order imposed 
after she pleaded guilty to manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. The 
sentencing judge had held that this disposal was appropriate on the grounds of the 
seriousness of the appellant’s offence, her record of previous violence and the 
“considerable risk of serious danger” she posed to the public. Psychiatrists at Staines’s 
sentencing hearing had argued against a hospital order with restrictions because her 
diagnosis was primarily one of BPD or psychopathy and there was a danger she would 
be released by a Tribunal if she resisted treatment or was found to be “untreatable” 
under the former MHA 1983. One psychiatrist argued that a prison sentence plus a 
s.45A order “would carry with it the safety net that [Staines] could be returned to prison 
should she refuse to engage in treatment or should the treatment be unsuccessful, 
thereby ensuring the protection of the public whilst at the same time giving the 
opportunity for treatment to be attempted” (Staines, para. 8).  
Three and a half years later, Staines appealed against her sentence. Her counsel argued 
that, in the interim, she had proven treatable and was suffering from mental illness in 
addition to psychopathic disorder. A restricted hospital order was therefore the 
appropriate sentence. Her counsel further argued that the s.45A would encourage 
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Staines to resist treatment in hospital when engagement with therapy became too 
difficult in order to engineer a transfer to prison. Such a transfer would have been 
detrimental to her mental state. Counsel for the appellant also suggested that a Mental 
Health Review Tribunal would be better placed than the Parole Board to “impose more 
pertinent conditions” on her release from custody and to “ensure a more relevant 
support and monitoring regime” (Staines, para. 26).  
The CA rejected these arguments in a judgment that prioritised the protection of the 
public over the therapeutic needs of the appellant. The Court concluded that there was 
no “realistic possibility” that Staines would be returned to prison “at the conclusion of 
successful treatment” (Staines, para. 28). Rather, it found that her treating team would 
have a choice between recommending to the Parole Board that she be returned to prison 
or discharged from hospital into the community “through the usual range of medium 
secure and then less secure accommodation” (Staines, para. 29). Following this, the 
Court could “see no reason” why the Parole Board could not make “appropriate 
arrangements” for the appellant’s release. It therefore found no reason to disturb her 
sentence.  
In the subsequent case of R. v. Cooper [2010] EWCA Crim 2335, the CA not only 
prioritised the protection of the public over the wellbeing of the offender but also over that 
of prison staff and other prisoners. In Cooper, counsel for the appellant argued that the 
“pitfall” of a life sentence and hybrid order was that once a Mental Health Tribunal found 
the appellant no longer suffered from mental illness, his rehabilitation could be “thwarted” 
by the Parole Board’s concern for public protection. The result, “in all probability, would 
be a transfer back to a prison and a heightened risk of relapse with a significant danger to 
staff and prisoners within the prison setting, before a transfer back to hospital might be 
[effected]” (Cooper, para. 18). The CA dismissed this point on the basis that “if the 
appellant's therapeutic rehabilitation were to be so fragile that a prison setting, however 
structured to deal with one who had suffered serious mental disorder, might cause it to re-
emerge […] [it] would be very concerned about the potential pitfalls he would face if he 
had been discharged back immediately into the community” (Cooper, para. 18).  
Perhaps disingenuously, the CA in both Cooper and Staines argued that the Parole Board 
could negotiate a package of social and psychiatric support for the respective appellants’ 
release. By this, the decisions imply that the Parole Board could act like a Tribunal in 
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ensuring an individual’s mental health needs were met but that a Tribunal could not be 
trusted to protect the public as effectively as the Parole Board. The Court also appears to 
expect the hospital system to act like the prison system and continue to detain patients 
whose disorders have been successfully treated and allow them to progress downwards 
through security categories towards release. The judgments are dismissive of the prospect 
that the appellants would be transferred to prison once they recovered or where all 
treatment options had been exhausted. As noted previously, this was the original purpose 
of the hybrid order. The judgments also dismiss the point that the prison environment can 
be highly stressful and prisons are poorly equipped to care for vulnerable individuals 
whose mental conditions may deteriorate following transfer. In Cooper, the Court seems to 
expect the Tribunal and Parole Board to work together to make special provisions for the 
appellant without citing any evidence that this is possible or making any arrangements to 
ensure it has been done. The judgments therefore leave a great deal to administrative 
discretion in ensuring appropriate care is given to mentally disordered prisoners. 
The CA in R. v. Welsh [2011] 2 Cr. App. R. (S.) 68 continued this trend towards 
prioritising public protection. The CA held it was “bound to take into account” the 
question of “public confidence […] when choosing between a hospital order with 
restriction and life imprisonment” and that this could “only be satisfied by ensuring that 
the issue is resolved in a way which best protects the public and reflects the gravity of 
the offence” (Welsh, para. 14). In that case, given the appellant’s “propensity for 
violence”, which pre-dated his paranoid schizophrenia and the seriousness of his 
offending, the CA did not accept that a hospital order with restrictions would maintain 
public confidence. Furthermore, the Court considered that “there [was] a risk he [would] 
remain a source of danger even if his condition substantially improves once he has 
received treatment and medication” (Welsh, para. 17). The Court left the appellant’s 
discretionary life sentence in place so that he could not be released unless the Parole 
Board was satisfied “that it was no longer necessary for the protection of the public that 
the prisoner should be confined” (Welsh, para. 15, citing s.28(6)(b) (Crime (Sentences) 
Act 1997).  
Welsh illustrates the difficulties facing courts responsible for sentencing a mentally 
disordered offender who is in need of hospitalisation but who is also likely to continue 
to pose a risk to the public even after his mental disorder has successfully been treated. 
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The test followed in subsequent cases of this nature was laid down in in Attorney 
General's Reference No 54 of 2011 [2011] EWCA Crim 2276. The CA noted in that 
case that the defendant’s risk of reoffending arose partly from the criminal lifestyle he 
was leading prior to the emergence of schizophrenia. Consequently, it was concerned 
that he could be released from hospital by a Tribunal once his mental disorder had been 
treated even if he remained a danger to the public. While the CA acknowledged it “was 
not in the defendant's interests but much more importantly it was not in the public's 
interest that his apparent recovery [in hospital] should be put in jeopardy” it felt that a 
hospital order had been the incorrect choice (AG’s Reference, para. 16). The Court 
recognised there was a “tension” between the risk raised in psychiatric evidence that a 
transfer to prison would foster the applicant’s incipient antisocial personality traits on 
the one hand and “a complete absence of control on licence on the other”. In the 
circumstances, however, it felt that “the risk [had] to be taken” (AG’s Reference, para. 
19). The Court achieved the desired effect by passing an order of Detention for Public 
Protection (DPP) and making arrangements for the appellant to be transferred directly 
from court to hospital under s.47.   
The case of R. v. Fort [2013] EWCA Crim 2332 is in many ways the converse of AG’s 
Reference. The appellant had no previous convictions, his crime (killing his mother) 
appeared senseless and there was psychiatric evidence that his actions were caused by a 
dissociative state provoked by possible schizophrenia. The CA, applying the test in 
AG’s Reference, found that the appellant’s risk of further serious offending would no 
longer be significant once his mental disorder had been treated. The Court therefore 
quashed his life sentence and the s.45A order and substituted a hospital order with 
restrictions. Similarly, in R. v. Ruby [2013] EWCA Crim 1653, the CA found that 
“although the applicant was dangerous, his explosion of violence was the product of his 
mental disorder, which was susceptible to treatment” and he had no previous 
convictions (Ruby, para. 35). The CA therefore chose to substitute a hospital order with 
restrictions.  
In Ruby and Fort, the psychiatric evidence raised concerns that the appellants’ treatment 
would be jeopardised by a transfer to prison but these arguments were not directly 
addressed by the CA. Instead, the Court decided both cases on the grounds the 
appellants would not pose a serious risk to the public if discharged by a Tribunal. As Jill 
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Peay (2015) points out, the comment of one psychiatrist at Ruby’s trial that the Parole 
Board would have difficulty in assessing the risks posed by a prisoner with Asperger’s 
syndrome and personality disorder may also have influenced the CA’s decision to make 
the appellant subject to monitoring by the Tribunal and Secretary of State. This would 
be in line with the Court’s concern for managing risk.  
A clear trend towards prison disposals for offenders who present a risk of reoffending 
independent from their disorders may be discerned from the cases discussed here. This 
is the case even where the wellbeing of the individual, and of those around him, is 
clearly jeopardized by the prospect of a transfer to prison. The case law thus 
demonstrates that a concern for protecting the public takes priority over attending to the 
welfare of the offender. The reference in Welsh to the need to ensure “public 
confidence” in sentencing is telling, as the symbolic nature of efforts to reassure the 
public may be just as important as avoiding actual harm. Preventive measures may be 
motivated by a pragmatic effort on behalf of the state to avert future moral outrages and 
avoid blame (see Wolff 2006). This may be seen in the CA’s concern in Welsh to ensure 
“public confidence” in the sentencing of serious offenders and in the emphasis in 
Vowles on punishing culpable mentally disordered offenders, considered later. The 
perceived causal connection between the disorder and risk of offending also influences 
the court’s view of the culpability of the offender, considered in the next section. 
(ii) Culpability 
As noted in Birch, the decision to impose a prison sentence on a mentally disordered 
offender (with or without an order under s.45A) is also intended to reflect his 
culpability. Several cases involving appeals against hybrid orders refer to the concept of 
“partial culpability” which originally derived from the defence of diminished 
responsibility. Curiously, this concept has been transposed into non-homicide cases in 
which a plea of diminished responsibility is not available. According to Peay, the 
“fluid[ity]” of the concept of partial culpability has generated “some incoherence” in the 
case law as “some offenders with partial culpability are sent direct to hospital; and 
others given the perceived safety-net of the s.45A” (Peay 2015, p. 39).  
The defendants in Fort and Ruby, considered previously, had not been found insane or 
unfit to plead and, therefore, must have borne some responsibility for their offences. 
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Restricted hospital orders were nonetheless judged to be a suitable disposal. The issue 
of Ruby’s culpability was not discussed at all, whereas the Court in Fort found the 
appellant “did not have much, if any, mental responsibility for his actions” (Fort, para. 
54). A plea of insanity was not open to Fort despite his almost total lack of 
responsibility. However, a non-punitive hospital order with restrictions allowed the 
Court to do justice in his case. This may be seen as an example of how courts “work 
round” the problems presented by the narrowness of the insanity defence (Law 
Commission 2013, para. 1.10). Thus, in the earlier case law, a hospital order with 
restrictions emerged as a solution for defendants whose culpability was very low or 
absent but who did not satisfy the narrow criteria for unfitness to plead or insanity.  
By contrast, in Drew, while the HL accepted it was “wrong in principle” to punish 
defendants who are unfit to plead or insane, it noted that the appellant had “pleaded 
guilty to an offence of which an essential ingredient was an intention to cause [GBH] to 
another” (Drew, para. 16). The Court concluded that “the appellant's mental illness 
could properly be relied on as mitigating the criminality of his conduct but not as 
absolving him from all responsibility for it” (Drew, para. 16). Similarly, in Staines, the 
judge stated that, while the appellant’s plea of diminished responsibility had been 
accepted, her responsibility for the killing was reduced but not extinguished. Like the 
appellant in Drew, Staines had not been found unfit to plead or insane at her trial and 
the judge concluded that she bore “a considerable degree of responsibility” for the 
“savage killing” she had carried out (Staines, para. 9).  
In Cooper there was psychiatric evidence that the offences would not have occurred but 
for the appellant’s mental illness and the link between his disorder and offending was 
therefore strong. However, there was also evidence of “aggressive and abusive” 
elements to his personality and that he would continue to present a risk after treatment. 
Furthermore, taking into account psychiatric evidence that it was likely the appellant’s 
drug abuse had contributed to his psychosis, the CA approved the trial judge’s finding that 
he had “voluntarily embarked upon the course of events which led to his illness” and 
therefore “must bear some responsibility” for his offence. As Peay suggests, it seems here 
that the Court was “casting around for a basis to attribute responsibility in the context of 
what was clearly an acute psychotic episode, however brought about” (Peay 2015, p.25). 
By attributing blame to the defendant for triggering the psychiatric symptoms that 
prevented him from exercising his will, the Court found a basis for punishing a defendant 
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whose culpability was otherwise low but who presented an independent risk of re-
offending.  
Similarly, in R. v. Fox [2011] EWCA Crim 3299, the trial judge considered that while the 
appellant’s culpability was “reduced” by his mental disorder it was “not wholly excluded”. 
In support of this finding, the judge relied on the fact that the jury had found Fox guilty of 
a crime that required a mens rea of intention, that the alcohol he had voluntarily consumed 
meant his ability to resist a voice that had told him to hurt the victim was reduced, and that 
he had been able “to take deliberate measures” to escape the scene of the crime. The CA 
approved this reasoning and concluded that the appellant’s “will was not entirely 
overborne by the voices in his mind”. There was also evidence that the appellant had a 
tendency to react impulsively and violently to feelings of anger and jealousy and had 
difficulties controlling his anger likely to be exacerbated when in a psychotic state. The 
CA left in place the two IPP sentences with eight year tariffs set by the judge who, in the 
Court’s view, had taken into account the mitigating circumstances of the defendant’s 
mental disorder and had “rightly” determined that such a minimum term would ensure an 
“appropriate degree of punishment”.  
The derivation of culpability from a guilty plea to an offence requiring a mens rea of 
intent is problematic. As noted previously, the deficiencies of the current test for 
unfitness to plead raise the possibility that the pleas of personality disordered offenders 
may in some cases be attributable to their disorders. As Peay argues, in cases such as 
Fox and Cooper, the fact that the offenders were acutely psychotic at the time their 
offences “brings into question the extent to which [they] truly appreciated the 
consequences of their pleas” (Peay 2015, p.39). Furthermore, the fact that a defendant 
pleads guilty to an offence does not mean that intent has been proven, particularly given 
that defendants have an incentive to plead guilty in order to receive mitigation of 
sentence. The narrowness of the insanity defence and its focus on cognitive rather than 
volitional, moral or emotional capacities also casts doubt on the finding that defendants 
retained culpability for their offences simply because they did not raise or were unable 
to prove insanity.  
Although AG’s Reference had not yet been decided, the fact that the appellants in Cooper 
and Fox had previously demonstrated aggressive and violent or abusive tendencies before 
the onset of their illnesses is likely to have been a factor in the Courts’ decisions to impose 
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a prison sentence in order to ensure public protection. The combination of the two 
elements in Birch coupled with the limited availability of the insanity defence may thus 
explain some of the “incoherence” noted by Peay (2015). In cases such as Cooper and 
Fox in which the causal connection between the mental disorder and offending was 
strong but the defendant posed a risk of reoffending independent of his mental disorder, 
a prison sentence was passed to ensure risk was adequately managed and to reflect the 
offender’s residual culpability. In cases such as Fort and Ruby, on the other hand, the 
causal connection was strong and culpability was low but the defendant did not pose a 
risk independent of his mental disorder. A hospital order was therefore the correct 
choice.  
A punitive sentence may also have some symbolic importance. In the case of R. v. Poole 
[2014] EWCA Crim 1641, the CA left in place the appellant’s determinate sentence as 
this was intended by the sentencing judge to reflect Poole’s “culpability”. This was 
despite the fact that Poole was likely to spend the whole of his determinate prison 
sentence in hospital and a transfer to prison was judged not to be appropriate. There 
must therefore have been something symbolic in the handing down of a prison sentence 
to a “partially culpable” defendant that would not be achieved by a non-punitive 
hospital order with restrictions. The defendant in Poole was convicted of offences of 
dishonesty, demonstrating that the notion of “partial culpability” has been extended to 
cases in which diminished responsibility was not an available defence. The concept of 
partial culpability continues to be relevant following the recent decision of the CA in 
Vowles, considered below. 
(b) Sentencing Mentally Disordered Offenders after Vowles 
(i) New guidelines 
The recent case of Vowles consummates the CA’s retreat from the more therapeutic 
position it adopted in the earlier cases of Birch, Mbatha and Howell. The judgment is 
intended to provide definitive guidance to courts sentencing mentally disordered 
offenders. The CA in Vowles distinguished the HL’s reluctance in Drew to recommend 
a change in sentencing practice and asserted that “the release regime that will apply to 
the offender” is now of “primary importance” in the choice between a restricted hospital 
order and an indeterminate sentence (Vowles, para. 12; para. 52). 
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As Andrew Ashworth and Ronnie Mackay (2015) observe, two principle themes 
emerge from Vowles. First, courts “should ensure that a mentally disordered offender is 
punished for any element or particle of responsibility for her or his wrongdoing”. 
Second, they should “focus on finding the sentence or disposal with the most suitable 
release provisions, taking account of the risk presented by [the defendant]” (Ashworth 
and Mackay 2015, p. 545). Thus, in line with the trend noted in earlier cases, sentencing 
decisions following Vowles are to be structured by considerations of public protection 
and punishment rather than by the prospect of therapeutic benefit to the patient.  
In seeming deviation from the earlier cases, however, the judgment also makes clear 
that a prison sentence, with or without an order under s.45A, is now the default option 
for all mentally disordered offenders. Judges are now required to give “sound reasons 
for departing from the usual course” (Vowles, para. 51). Nevertheless, the decisions of 
the CA in the individual appeal cases it considered seem to show that the nature of the 
defendant’s mental disorder, the causal connection between the disorder and the 
offending, and the “treatability” of the disorder will continue to be relevant to the choice 
between a prison sentence and a hospital order. 
According to the Court in Vowles, in cases in which the criteria for a hospital order in 
s.37(2)(a) are met, judges must “carefully consider all the evidence in each case and not, 
as some of the early cases have suggested, feel circumscribed by the psychiatric 
opinions”. This seems to indicate that the Court has become sceptical of psychiatric 
evidence and places greater emphasis on judicial expertise. This marks a further 
departure from the therapeutic approach of earlier cases such as Birch and increasing 
concern for ensuring public protection and punishment. Thus, in considering the 
appropriate disposal, “the matters to which a judge will invariably have to have regard” 
include: 
(1) the extent to which the offender needs treatment for [mental disorder] […]; 
(2) the extent to which the offending is attributable to the mental disorder; (3) 
the extent to which punishment is required; and (4) the protection of the public 
including the regime for deciding release and the regime after release. (Vowles, 
para. 51) 
Reflecting the case law outlined previously, the CA noted that a hospital order with 
restrictions “is likely to be the correct disposal” “if: (1) the mental disorder is treatable; 
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(2) once treated there is no evidence [the offender] would be in any way dangerous; and 
(3) the offending is entirely due to that mental disorder” (Vowles, para. 54 (iii)). The 
court “must”, however, “also have regard to the question of whether other methods of 
dealing with [the offender] are available” and this includes whether transfer to hospital 
under s.47 would “taking into account all the other circumstances, be appropriate” 
(Vowles, para. 54 (iv)).  
There appears to be a conflict between these directions and the order in which the CA 
now advises sentencing courts to approach the choice between a prison sentence and a 
hospital order. The guidance states:  
A court should, in a cases where: (1) the evidence of medical practitioners 
suggests that the offender is suffering from a mental disorder; (2) that the 
offending is wholly or in significant part attributable to that disorder; and (3) 
treatment is available, and it considers in the light of all the circumstances, that a 
hospital order (with or without a restriction) may be an appropriate way of 
dealing with the case, […] [first] consider whether the mental disorder can 
appropriately be dealt with by a hospital and limitation direction under s.45A 
(Vowles, para. 54).  
As mentioned previously, the criteria for the imposition of a hospital order and a 
hospital and limitation direction under the MHA 1983 are the same. Consequently, if a 
sentencing court first considers imposing a prison sentence and a hospital and limitation 
direction and finds the relevant criteria are fulfilled it is likely to choose this option, 
negating the need to then consider making a hospital order. Furthermore, the CA’s 
guidance seems to run counter to s.45(1) of the MHA 1983, which states that a hospital 
and limitation direction applies where the criteria for its imposition are fulfilled, and 
where “the court considers making a hospital order in respect of [the defendant] before 
deciding to impose a sentence of imprisonment” (emphasis added). This implies that 
sentencing judges should first consider making a hospital order before passing a prison 
sentence coupled with a hospital and limitation direction under s.45A.  
As Ashworth and Mackay (2015, p.547-8) argue, the Court in Vowles clearly “ignores 
s.45A(1)(b), reverses the statutory priority of the order and fails to insist that hospital 
and limitation directions should be received for offenders who pose a serious risk to the 
public and merit punishment as a result of a high degree of culpability”. The CA in 
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Vowles also appears to recommend a prison sentence and s.45A order in cases in which 
the offending is wholly attributable to mental disorder and culpability is therefore low 
or absent. On this interpretation, “the traditional notion of the s.45A order as providing 
an option for treatment in cases of high culpability and high risk would be all but 
extinguished” (Peay 2016, p.159). However, it will be argued below that the court’s 
reasoning in the six separate appeals it considered implies that a hospital order with 
restrictions is the correct choice where the casual connection between the appellant’s 
disorder and his offending is strong and the disorder is treatable. 
(ii) The individual appeals in Vowles 
All six appellants in Vowles were serving discretionary life or IPP sentences and had 
been transferred from prison to hospital by the Secretary of State exercising his power 
under s.47 MHA 1983. All sought to have their sentences quashed and substituted for 
hospital orders with restrictions. The Court did so in three cases but left the sentences in 
place for the other three. Following its own guidance, however, the Court may have 
been expected to hand down prison sentences with hospital and limitation directions 
attached in all six cases, or to leave the prison sentences in place as the appellants were 
already detained in hospital under s.47. 
Although therapeutic considerations were raised in argument, public protection and the 
question of culpability appeared to be the determining factors in the three successful 
appeals. At the time the appellants in Coleman, Odiowei and McDougall were 
sentenced they were thought to be suffering from personality disorders and were sent to 
prison. Following their transfer to hospital, however, they were each eventually 
diagnosed with schizophrenia and were responding to treatment. In Coleman, the Court 
quashed the appellant’s sentence on the grounds of “the nature of her mental disorder” 
(schizophrenia), “its causal connection with [her index offence], its treatability and the 
clear evidence that her condition will be better managed on release under the MHA 
regime and the public better protected” (Vowles, para. 133). Similar reasoning applied 
in the other two cases. The Court also commented that a hospital order with restrictions 
under s.37 and s.41 was more likely to be appropriate for defendants primarily 
diagnosed with “severe mental illness” than for those with personality disorder. The 
Court explained this distinction on the grounds that it was “more likely” that severe 
mental illness would “have a direct bearing on the offender's culpability” and that it was 
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“likely to be more responsive to treatment in a hospital”. The decisions indicate that a 
strong causal connection between the individual’s disorder and his offending implies 
low culpability and militates in favour of a hospital disposal. Where the causal 
connection is strong and the disorder is treatable in hospital this also weighs in favour of 
release by the Tribunal rather than by the Parole Board.  
The decision in the three successful appeals may be contrasted with the Court’s decision 
in the leading case of Vowles. In that case, the Court focused on the culpability of the 
appellant, who was diagnosed with BPD. The Court held that it was appropriate to leave 
her IPP sentence in place, “taking into account the nature of her mental disorder”, “her 
culpability for the offence, the need for punishment and the risk to the public” (Vowles 
para. 98). In the case of Barnes, on the other hand, the Court focused on the causal 
connection between the appellant’s mental disorder and his offending rather than on his 
culpability. The Court found that it was “evident that Barnes had a serious criminal 
record; he was a heroin addict and this played a significant part in his offending”. 
Furthermore, the Court was of the view that it “[could not] be said that the [appellant’s] 
personality disorder and his learning disability as distinct from his drug addiction were 
the driving factors at the time [of the offence]”. Given the lack of a clear causal 
connection between the appellant’s mental disorder and his offending, therefore, the 
Court considered that a hospital order would not have been appropriate and left his 
prison sentence in place.  
In the final appeal of Irving, the Court concluded that while there was “no doubt” the 
appellant was “rightly placed […] within the hospital system rather than in a prison 
environment” this did not mean that a prison sentence had been the wrong choice. In 
seeming criticism of the psychiatric experts in the case, the Court stated that “the fact of 
mental illness […] is not a passport to a medical disposal as many of the psychiatric 
opinions we have considered […] appear to presume” (Vowles, para.196). Rather than 
merely following the recommendations of psychiatric experts, the Court held that “the 
sentencing judge must have regard to ‘all the circumstances, including nature of 
offence, character and antecedents and the other available means of dealing with [a 
defendant]’ and thereafter only make a hospital order if it is the ‘most suitable method 
of disposal’” (Irving para. 196, quoting s.37(2) MHA 1983). While “a causal link 
between a defendant's mental disorder and the offences” was not necessary for a s.37 
hospital order or s.45A hybrid order to be made, “it remain[ed] a legitimate factor to 
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weigh in the balance of the circumstances as a whole” (Vowles, para.197). The Court 
concluded that fresh psychiatric evidence that the appellant’s learning disability had 
been underestimated in pre-sentence reports had not “established any sufficient causal 
link which would tend to support the argument that the first instance judge was wrong 
in principle to impose a prison sentence rather than a hospital order”. This implies that 
where the causal link is strong enough, this would militate in favour of a hospital order 
rather than a prison sentence. 
Despite the Court’s reasoning in the three successful appeals, the CA’s guidance in 
Vowles may be predicted to result in prison sentences being handed down to offenders 
not otherwise deserving of punishment. Such individuals may be expected to spend 
most, if not all, of their prison sentences in hospital. However, if their disorders are 
successfully treated or prove untreatable they may be transferred to prison to finish out 
their sentences if the criteria for their detention in hospital are no longer fulfilled. As 
highlighted by Jill Peay, this may be expected to give rise to “the difficulties caused to 
prison managements by the presence and behaviour of those who are subject to serious 
mental disorder” the HL warned against in Drew (para. 22) “albeit not immediately” 
(Peay 2016, p.159). It should also be noted that the Court in the successful appeal cases 
also found that the mental health route would be a better means of ensuring the public 
was protected from offenders whose mental illnesses were causally connected to their 
disorders. The Court’s own guidance would appear to thwart this rationale, however, as 
the Parole Board is responsible for release decisions in relation to offenders serving 
indeterminate sentences. 
According to Peay (2016), following its own guidance, the CA in Vowles may well have 
imposed prison sentences in the three unsuccessful appeals, leaving the Secretary of 
State to exercise his power under s.47. However, as the Court used Vowles as the 
leading case, it must have considered that particular appellant to be a suitable candidate 
for an order under s.45A had one been available at the time she was sentenced (Peay 
2016). The choice between s.45A and s.47 in the case of defendants such as Vowles, 
who retain a greater measure of culpability, and defendants such as Irving and Barnes, 
whose disorders are not causally connected to their offending, may be structured by 
practical considerations rather than by any clear principles. Hospital and limitation 
directions may be used for those who require immediate transfer to hospital. For those 
less clearly in need of treatment in hospital, a prison sentence may be passed, leaving 
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the Secretary of State to exercise his power under s.47 to direct transfer to hospital. 
Perhaps by reversing the statutory order, the Court merely intended to prompt 
sentencing courts to make greater use of s.45A. The CA noted, perhaps with some 
frustration, that s.45A continued to be underused despite the Court’s previous guidance 
on when such orders were appropriate. The CA may not have fully appreciated the 
effect of its own guidance, however, given that it decided the appeals before it using the 
principles of causality, culpability and treatability employed in previous cases. 
A further question arises as to how cases like the appeals in Vowles will be decided 
following the abolition of the IPP sentence. Four of the appellants in Vowles had been 
given IPP sentences with tariffs of between 18 and 28 months under the former CJA 
2003 while two, Odiowei and Irving, had been given discretionary life sentences with 
tariffs of four and six years respectively. Where a mentally disordered defendant falls 
into the “gap” left by LASPO 2012, courts may choose to expand the use of the 
discretionary life sentence or pass an extended determinate sentence, leaving the 
Secretary of State to exercise his power under s.47 should the defendant require 
treatment in hospital. In the latter case, increased use of the s.47 power to transfer 
prisoners to hospital for preventive detention may also be expected as offenders 
approach the end of determinate prison sentences. The question of late transfers is 
discussed below. 
(c) Sentencing personality disordered offenders after Vowles 
(i) Punishment and culpability 
The early admission criteria for the DSPD programme called for a “link” between the 
individual’s disorder and his risk of serious offending (DSPD Programme et al. 2008a, 
p.2). Duggan and Howard (2009) concluded that this link was intended to be causal. 
Early on, the causal link was intended to be a means of selecting out those personality 
disordered offenders whose offending was attributable to their mental disorders and 
who could therefore be treated and released when they no longer presented a danger. In 
reality, however, the causal relationship between personality disorder and offending is 
unclear and subject to confounding factors. Consequently, the treatment of personality 
disorder may not lead straightforwardly to a reduction in offending (Duggan and 
Howard 2009). Furthermore, as the diagnoses of ASPD and psychopathy are 
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notoriously circular it is difficult to distinguish disordered offending from more normal 
criminality. 
As courts are reliant on psychiatric evidence to demonstrate a causal link between the 
defendant’s mental disorder and his risk of reoffending, the uncertainty of the 
relationship between personality disorder and serious offending and the paucity of 
evidence for effective treatment may encourage judges to impose a prison sentence to 
ensure the public is adequately protected and the defendant is punished. Relying on the 
psychiatric evidence before it, the CA in Vowles expressly stated that while mental 
illness may be expected to “have a direct bearing on the offender’s culpability” it is 
“more difficult to attribute a reduction in culpability to a personality disorder” (Vowles, 
para. 50 (iii)). Thus, the personality disordered offender is deprived of the benefit of the 
doubt surrounding the causal connection and more likely to be regarded as deserving of 
a punitive response. In this context, the “partial” culpability of a defendant who is not 
able to resist his impulses is a reason to punish him rather than a plea in mitigation of 
sentence. 
The prioritisation of prison sentences with s.45A orders attached has the clear potential 
to be anti-therapeutic in the case of personality disordered offenders and may be 
expected to have an adverse impact on their wellbeing. In particular, it runs the risk 
highlighted in Staines that patients who lack motivation to change may resist treatment 
in the hope of securing a transfer to prison in order to escape the demands of treatment 
in hospital. This is a possibility that is left open following the interpretation of the 
“appropriate medical treatment” test in SP and DL-H in which it was suggested that 
treatment may not be “available” to a patient who was resisting all treatment. On the 
other hand, the background threat of imprisonment may jeopardise treatment 
effectiveness where the patient knows they are likely to be transferred to prison once 
their mental disorder improves to the extent that their detention in hospital is no longer 
warranted. There may therefore be a perverse incentive for patients to disengage with 
treatment in order to remain in hospital rather than face the harsher conditions of prison.  
The threat of coercion hanging over patients with prison sentences left to serve may also 
jeopardise the effectiveness of psychological treatments that require voluntary 
engagement and motivation to change. The CA in Vowles and the judgments in 
preceding cases pay insufficient attention to the risks posed to mentally disordered 
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offenders by imprisonment. Furthermore, in a coercive context in which offenders feel 
pressured into accepting treatment, such interventions may have punitive rather than 
therapeutic effects. This argument will be developed further in the final substantive 
chapter of this thesis. 
(ii) “Treatability” and risk aversion  
The uncertain treatability of personality disorder also prompted a risk-averse response 
from the CA in Vowles.  Echoing the long-standing problems noted in Chapter 2 of this 
thesis, the Court in Vowles noted evidence that psychiatrists were concerned they would 
become “stuck” with personality disordered patients who had proven untreatable but 
who nevertheless could not be released from hospital due to the risks they posed to the 
public (Vowles, para. 50 (v)). The Court also noted that “at present individuals with 
severe personality disorders are less likely to benefit from hospitalisation” but that 
treatment was available “in a range of specialist prisons” (Vowles, para. 50 (iii) and (v)). 
Now there is a greater availability of treatment options in prisons following the DSPD 
experiment, the CA clearly favours prison disposals for personality disordered 
offenders. This is despite the similarities between the treatments offered by prison and 
hospital DSPD units and the continuing debate surrounding whether prison or hospital 
is the right place for personality disordered offenders reflected in Chapter 3.  
The distrust of Mental Health Tribunals evinced in Vowles and previous cases may also 
be misplaced. In the case of restricted patients, absolute discharges without prior 
conditional discharge are rare – ranging between 15 in 2011 and 5 in 2014 (Ministry of 
Justice 2016a, Table 8). At between 7% and 9.5%, the percentage of restricted patients 
discharged conditionally into the community by tribunals has remained low and 
relatively stable since the mid-1990s (Boyd-Caine 2010, Table 6.2; Ministry of Justice 
2016a, Table 8). The MEMOS study demonstrates that risk aversion also influences 
decisions pertaining to the release of patients in the DSPD category. MHRT members 
reported that they “were concerned not only about the risks of DSPD patients to 
themselves or others, but also sensitive of the risks to the credibility of MHRT decision-
making” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.70). Several members also noted that “the 
MHRT (and other key decision-makers in the mental health system […]) had become 
increasingly risk averse” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.70).  
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By contrast to Parole Board members, who described DSPD prisoners “as little different 
to other high security prisoners”, MHRT members saw DSPD patients and others 
detained under the category of psychopathic disorder as “fundamentally different to 
other patients in the mental health system” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.66). 
Several MHRT members “appeared to associate personality disorder primarily with 
offending rather than illness” and one suggested that prison was the appropriate place 
for these patients (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.66-7). Strikingly, some members 
“appeared to regard the likelihood of reoffending by DSPD patients to be high, almost 
inevitable” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.67). While others were more optimistic 
about the potential for change, several of those interviewed as part of the MEMOS 
study were “concerned about the lack of evidence base” and “sceptical about the likely 
benefits of DSPD treatment” (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.68). Despite these 
reservations, some “suggested that until patients had engaged with and completed 
treatment, they were unlikely to be considered by the MHRT for a progressive move” 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.76). Similarly to high security prisoners, discharge 
directly into the community from a secure hospital was rare and patients were expected 
“to undertake a journey through the different levels of security” (Trebilcock and Weaver 
2010a, p.65). As in the criminal justice system, personality disordered patients in the 
mental health system are expected to engage with treatment before they will be allowed 
to progress. This is despite MHRT members themselves entertaining doubts about the 
effectiveness of interventions with personality disordered patients. 
The personality disorder Catch-22 identified in the previous chapter was also a 
complicating factor in decision-making for the MHRT. Patients with personality 
disorder were considered “to be particularly manipulative and skilled at convincing 
professionals that they are ready for discharge” only to reoffend upon release 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.70). Like Parole Board members, MHRT members 
were concerned that the high security, surveillance and staffing levels of the DSPD 
units meant that the patients’ progress in treatment was not being adequately tested. 
They were also concerned that improvements in patients’ behaviour could be attributed 
to the tightly controlled environment of the DSPD units rather than to changes in the 
patient (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a, p.71). As noted in the previous chapter, a level 
of risk is inherent in the rehabilitation and re-socialisation of offenders as their ability to 
cope in lower levels of security needs to be tested out. The reluctance of the prisons and 
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hospitals to take such risks also demonstrates that public protection ultimately takes 
priority over the rehabilitation of the offender.  
Notably, the rules articulated in Vowles appear to allow offenders with personality 
disorder to be excluded from hospital disposals on the basis of a narrow conception of 
their “treatability” despite the reforms introduced by the MHA 2007. However, as will 
be considered in the next section, when personality disordered prisoners who are 
considered to be dangerous can no longer be detained in prison, their “treatability” is 
construed more broadly in order to facilitate their transfer to and detention in hospital. 
In this sense, the notion of “untreatability” is used to deny offenders with personality 
disorder entry to hospital through the front door, even where detention in prison carries 
the risk of relapse, goes against the individual’s therapeutic interests and increases the 
risk of violence towards staff and other prisoners. On the other hand, the availability of 
“appropriate medical treatment” is construed widely when public protection is being 
pursued and personality disordered offenders are brought into hospital through the back 
door when they can no longer be detained in prison.  
 
5. Detention in Hospital at End of Sentence 
(a) Late transfers 
As noted in Chapter 3, the practice of “ghosting” meant that the hospital DSPD units 
had to deal with a significant group of disgruntled and uncooperative patients 
transferred from prison close to their release dates. This had a negative impact on the 
work of the DSPD hospital units and on the treatment of patients who were cooperating 
(see Burns et al. 2011; Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b and Chapter 3). Such late 
transfers were criticised by the CA in the case of R. (TF) v. SS for Justice [2008] EWCA 
Civ 1457. This case appears to have prompted a change in policy at the Ministry of 
Justice. Nevertheless, late transfers continue to be a legal possibility. 
In TF, the appellant had reached the reception area of the prison wearing his civilian 
clothes in anticipation of release when he was served with an order of transfer to 
hospital. The order was made on the grounds he was suffering from psychopathic 
disorder under the old MHA 1983 and that treatment was “likely to alleviate or prevent 
deterioration” in his condition. The CA held that as the decision to transfer TF to 
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hospital had been “taken right at the end of [his] sentence” it “involved depriving him of 
his liberty” (TF, para. 13). This, according to the Court, “heighten[ed] the scrutiny” the 
Secretary of State and the lower court reviewing his decision ought to have applied to 
the evidence in support of transfer. The Court “suggest[ed]” that where the decision to 
transfer was taken at such a late stage, it “[could not] simply be taken on the grounds 
that a convicted person will be a danger to the public if released (as understandable as 
that concern must be) but [could] only be taken on the grounds that his medical 
condition and its treatability (to use a shorthand) justify the decision” (TF, para. 18). 
The Court also stated that s.47 would “hopefully” only be used at the end of sentence 
“in very exceptional cases”. In the event, the Court found that the reports supporting the 
decision to transfer were out of date and did not show that the doctors who had assessed 
TF had “applied their minds to treatability” (TF, para. 28). 
In R. (SP) v. Secretary of State for Justice, the CA dealt with the issue of late transfers 
following the implementation of the MHA 2007. Close to his release date, the appellant, 
SP, had been transferred from the DSPD unit at HMP Frankland to the DSPD unit at 
Rampton hospital under s.47. The transfer direction relied on the reports of two 
psychiatrists and a letter from the clinical director of the Rampton unit offering SP a 
place. One of the psychiatrists had used an old form and had recommended the transfer 
on the basis that SP required placement in a high secure DSPD setting and that 
treatment there was “likely to alleviate or prevent a deterioration” in his condition. In 
her judgment, Lady Justice Arden noted that “SP was about to be released from prison 
when the transfer direction was made” and “the transfer direction therefore constituted a 
severe restriction on his personal liberty”. Consequently, the transfer direction had to be 
“considered carefully” and could not be acted on unless the provisions of s.47 had been 
“scrupulously satisfied” (SP, para. 11). In the event, however, the judge considered that 
the Secretary of State was “entitled to give the reports a sensible meaning” and that “by 
necessary implication” the psychiatrist’s report, even couched in the terms of the old 
MHA 1983, demonstrated that “appropriate treatment” was “available”.  
Leon McRae finds the decision in SP “particularly disappointing because it failed to 
develop the view taken […] in the earlier case of [TF] that late transfers […] should 
take place only in ‘very exceptional cases’” (McRae 2015, p.67). He further states that 
in the view of the Court in TF, “a late transfer would be impeachable under domestic 
law and Article 5 of the Convention if taken solely on the grounds that ‘a convicted 
  
213 
person will be a danger to the public if released (as understandable as that concern must 
be)’”. It is argued, however, that McRae attributes too much importance to these 
statements of the Court. As noted above, the CA in TF was merely “hopeful” that late 
transfers would only take place in exceptional circumstances and sought to “suggest” 
decisions should not be taken on the grounds of public protection alone. In SP, Article 5 
was recognised as the basis for the individual right to liberty of the person but the Court 
further recognised this was subject to the exception of detention on the grounds of 
“unsound mind”.  
The CA’s comments in TF imply a concern that the new “appropriate medical 
treatment” test leaves room for transfer decisions motivated purely by public protection 
rather than by therapeutic considerations. This concern may also have prompted the 
Court in DL-H, discussed previously, to require Tribunals to consider what “discernible 
benefit” treatment may have on the patient. However, treatment “benefit” is not required 
by the MHA 1983 and the decision in DL-H implies a higher standard even than that set 
by the HL in Hutchison Reid under the earlier “treatability” test. As noted previously, 
the ECtHR held that the criteria for detention on the grounds of unsound mind under 
Article 5.1(e) do not require an individual’s mental disorder to be amenable to treatment 
(Hutchison Reid v. UK). Taken together, these judgments may present no barrier to late 
transfers if the correct procedures in the MHA 1983 have been followed. However, TF 
and SP suggest that the Courts will take a dim view of such decisions and scrutinise 
them closely.  
The Court’s dicta in TF sent a message of judicial disapproval of the practice of late 
transfers and, according to interviewees, helped prompt a change in policy at the 
Ministry of Justice. The Ministry and NOMS now instruct that “prisoners should not be 
transferred to hospital at the end of sentence unless there is clear evidence that hospital 
admission is necessary on clinical grounds” (Ministry of Justice and NOMS 2010, para. 
5.6 and 5.8). They also direct that “sentenced prisoners who may need transfer to 
hospital for treatment must be assessed for transfer at the earliest possible point in their 
sentence”. Practical reasons for avoiding late transfers are acknowledged in the policy, 
indicating that some lessons have been learned from the experience of the DSPD units: 
The notional section 37 [hospital order] is not a suitable power for managing the 
risk posed by a prisoner after his release date. Hospitals may not readily accept a 
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dangerous offender where restrictions do not apply. The prisoner will have been 
anticipating release and is likely to be angry if his liberty is further curtailed. He 
is unlikely to co-operate with medical treatment, and he may pose a risk of 
serious harm to other vulnerable people in the hospital (Ministry of Justice and 
NOMS 2010, para. 5.7).  
Where hospital admission is necessary, the policy states that admission for assessment 
or treatment under the civil powers in s.2 and s.3 of the MHA 1983 is to be preferred. 
This is on the grounds that this procedure “demonstrates that the decision is clinically-
led, and is not a misuse of the powers of the Mental Health Act to extend the sentence 
of the Court” (Ministry of Justice and NOMS 2010, para. 5.8).  
The fact that the decision to detain in hospital under s.2 or s.3 is made by the hospital 
authorities and not by the Secretary of State may help to create the impression that the 
decision is “clinically-led”. McRae suggests that the fact that “only medical 
practitioners preparing reports in respect of civil admissions are required to visit the 
proposed transferee within the 14-day period before submission” may also make a 
difference (McRae 2015, p.68). These subtleties may, however, be lost on an individual 
who finds himself detained in hospital shortly following his release from prison. Such a 
patient is likely to be just as, if not more, disgruntled than if he had been transferred 
towards the end of his prison sentence. He will also be in a similar legal position, as 
restrictions no longer apply to transferred prisoners once their release dates have passed. 
Thus, despite the change in policy, similar problems to those experienced by the DSPD 
units may be expected to continue in the future.  
(b) Preventive detention as punishment 
Detention in hospital on public protection grounds after sentence expiry may also be 
experienced as punitive by the patient. John Stanton-Ife (2012) recognises that detention 
in hospital necessarily involves some of the material deprivations that characterise 
imprisonment. These include limitations on freedom of movement, impaired comfort 
and amenity, isolation from friends, family and the community, reduced autonomy and 
loss of privacy. What seem to be missing are the “symbolic” aspects of punishment, 
which Stanton-Ife characterises as the communication of censure and blame and the 
intention to punish (Stanton-Ife 2012). While he acknowledges that detention under the 
MHA 1983 may be psychologically stigmatising for the individual, Stanton-Ife argues 
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that, unlike a criminal conviction, it is not intended to be so. Nevertheless, he concedes 
that “if a detainee is insensitive to the symbolic features of situations, the detainee may 
see little or no difference between civil detention and imprisonment” (Stanton-Ife 2012, 
p.153).  
As Lucia Zedner comments, the “privileging of purpose” in distinguishing between 
penal and non-penal forms of state power “does not mitigate the pains imposed by 
coercive measures” (Zedner 2016, p.4). The transfer of an offender to hospital at the end 
of a determinate prison sentence, while not intended to punish, is a deprivation of 
liberty and may be experienced as an extension of the punitive sentence of the court. 
Furthermore, the types of treatments developed for the DSPD group in hospitals do not 
differ much from those deployed in prisons and include offence-focused interventions 
(see Burns et al 2011). Bill Glaser distinguishes sex offender treatment from 
involuntary committal for psychiatric treatment. The latter, he argues, “is not related to 
any offending behaviour displayed by the patient (except if such behaviour is 
symptomatic of a disorder), is not intended to be harmful per se (i.e. it must be 
ultimately beneficial for the patient), and does not (or at least should not) imply any 
moral disapproval of the patient’s behaviour” (Glaser 2010, p.266). In sex offender 
treatment, on the other hand, traditional principles of mental health ethics such as 
putting the interests of the client first, beneficence and non-maleficence, respecting 
patient-therapist confidentiality, refraining from coercive treatment and offering a 
choice of therapies are brushed aside in the interests of protecting victims and the public 
(Glaser 2010). In light of this, Stanton-Ife’s argument that detention in hospital is not 
punitive appears less convincing.  
(c) Preventive detention as discrimination  
The current legal framework is also in conflict with the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) of which the UK is a signatory. This 
document draws on a social model of disability, “articulated not in terms of limitations 
or impairments of disabled people, but as flowing from inadequate social responses to 
the particular needs of individuals in society” (Bartlett 2012, p. 753). Tensions may be 
seen between Article 5.1(e) ECHR, which allows the detention of “persons of unsound 
mind”, and Article 14.1(b) of the CRPD, which states that “the existence of a disability 
shall in no case justify a deprivation of liberty”. According to the UN High 
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Commissioner for Human Rights, the CRPD forbids “deprivation of liberty based on the 
existence of any disability, including mental or intellectual, as discriminatory” including 
in combination with “other elements such as dangerousness, or care and treatment” (UN 
High Commissioner 2009, para. 48).  
The MHA 1983 and the Winterwerp criteria certainly fall foul of the standards of the 
CRPD and there are therefore grounds for doubting the British government’s assurances 
that the MHA 1983 is CRPD compliant (Office for Disability Issues 2011; see also 
Bartlett 2012). The Mental Capacity Act 2005, often promoted as a more “progressive” 
instrument, may also be non-compliant as the concept of capacity is based on 
impairments arising from mental disability and may therefore be discriminatory 
(Bartlett 2012, p. 762). Coercive treatment for mental disorder may also fall foul of 
Article 17 CRPD, which asserts that “every person with disabilities has a right to 
respect for his or her physical and mental integrity on an equal basis with others”. This 
sets a higher standard of respect for rights than Article 3 ECHR, which permits coercive 
treatment where this is justified by medical necessity (Herczegfalvy v. Austria [1992] 
ECHR 58). 
In the view of the UN High Commissioner, while Article 14 CRPD precludes 
preventive detention on the grounds of disability, even in combination with other 
grounds, it does not prohibit preventive detention completely. This may be permitted 
where the legal grounds for detention are “de-linked from the disability and neutrally 
defined so as to apply to all persons on an equal basis” (UN High Commissioner 2009, 
para. 48). Peter Bartlett argues that this would permit the possibility of “a general law of 
preventive detention” which could, for instance, “be introduced to detain people who 
are perceived as dangerous, irrespective of disability” (Bartlett 2012, p.773).  This 
possibility is discussed in the next chapter. 
 
6. Conclusion  
It has been argued in this chapter that personality disordered offenders are often 
excluded from the benefit of therapeutic disposals due to doubts surrounding the 
amenability of their disorders to treatment and the uncertain relationship between their 
disorders, their previous offending and their future risk of recidivism. The analysis of 
the case law presented here shows that a selective interpretation is given to the issue of 
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“appropriate medical treatment” depending on which outcome is being pursued – the 
punishment of personality disordered offenders in prison or their preventive detention in 
hospital. The case law also reveals a worrying trend towards the prioritisation of risk 
management and punishment over the welfare of all mentally disordered offenders. This 
may be expected to lead to greater numbers of mentally disordered offenders being 
inappropriately placed in the prison system. It has also been argued that preventive 
detention at end of sentence continues to be a legal possibility and that this may be 
experienced as punitive by the individual.    
It has been argued in this chapter that the law tends to regard personality disordered 
offenders as at least partially culpable for their crimes and, following the decision in 
Vowles, this is likely to lead to a punitive outcome. These defendants are also 
progressively being excluded from the scope of defences and pleas based on mental 
disorder due to the reliance of efforts to reform the law on cognitive tests of mental 
capacity. The current legal framework thus leaves unresolved the question of how far 
personality disordered offenders may be regarded to be responsible for their actions 
given that deficits in their capacity to control their impulses may prevent them from 
acting towards others “in the spirit of brotherhood” (Peay 2011a, p.232). On the other 
hand, the risk-averse treatment of these offenders by the mental health system, in which 
their reoffending may be regarded as “almost inevitable” (Trebilcock and Weaver 
2010a, p.67), indicates a recognition that they lack voluntary control over their actions. 
In the next chapter, the differing conceptions of the personality disordered offender 
deployed by the law will be examined further. In addition, some suggestions as to how a 
normative framework that is more responsive to the needs of offenders with personality 
disorder may be constructed will be presented. 
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Chapter 7: The Role of Rehabilitation in the Management of 
Dangerous Personality Disordered Offenders 
 
1. Introduction 
Building on the analysis presented in both halves of this thesis, this chapter addresses 
two questions that are central to the argument. First, it seeks to unearth and examine the 
particular conceptions of the personality disordered offender that structure legal and 
policy responses to personality disordered offenders. Second, it questions whether the 
current framework provides an adequate response to the particularities of personality 
disordered offenders and whether a better way of resolving the dilemmas they present 
could be developed.  
It will be suggested that the concept of responsibility for defective criminal character 
traced by Nicola Lacey (2001a; 2001b; 2011; 2016) may provide a means of reconciling 
the judgment that personality disordered offenders are responsible for their actions with 
the denial of autonomy implicit in the use of preventive detention. It will be argued that 
Nikolas Rose presents the most accurate characterisation of the DSPD offender as not 
“the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the bio-psychological social subject 
of positivist criminology, but of the responsible subject of moral community guided – or 
misguided – by ethical self-steering mechanisms” (Rose 2000, p.321). This concept also 
provides an explanation for why personality disordered offenders must engage in 
rehabilitation in order to secure release or face further detention and punishment.  
Furthermore, it will be argued that the offender’s “duty” to engage in rehabilitation in 
order to prove his suitability for release may in fact subject him to further punishment 
and, ironically, jeopardise his chances of progress. Effecting preventive detention in 
non-punitive conditions and de-linking progress in rehabilitation from release decisions 
may provide a better means of safeguarding the rights and interests of personality 
disordered individuals thought to be “dangerous”.  However, any suggestions for 
reforming the current framework will have to take into account the symbolic nature of 
efforts to reassure a vulnerable public that the government is “doing something” to 
protect them from a group that provokes fear.  
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2. The Dangerous Personality Disordered Subject 
(a) Positivism and Monsters 
In Toby Seddon’s view, despite the modern language of “risk” permeating the DSPD 
proposals, the initiative was “hybrid” in nature and combined “a novel focus on risk 
with a more archaic concern about dangerous subjects” (Seddon 2008, p. 309). Drawing 
on Jonathan Simon’s (1998) analysis of American sexually violent predator laws, 
Seddon reasons that because DSPD “is essentially an unchanging characteristic” “the 
perceived causal link between their personality traits (which […] are the person) and 
their potential for serious violence [marked the DSPD group] out as ‘monsters’ 
requiring an exclusionary response” (Seddon 2008, p.309). Andrew Rutherford, on the 
other hand, links the DSPD proposals to “the warm embrace of risk and a vigorous 
renaissance of positivism towards offenders” that he argues were “underlying themes of 
New Labour's emerging criminal policy” (Rutherford 2006, p.51). Both accounts imply 
a deterministic view of the DSPD offender driven by internal or external forces beyond 
his control (Garland 1985, p.85). 
The early DSPD proposals may have given the impression that a “revival” of positivism 
was underway as they implied a causal link between offending and severe personality 
disorder and assumed that treatment could therefore be expected to reduce risk of 
reoffending. It was argued in Chapters 3 and 4, however, that the programme soon 
retreated from the idea that personality and offending were causally linked and the entry 
criteria were applied flexibly (Burns et al. 2011). The OPDP has moved even further 
away from the idea of a causal link and has gone so far as to remove the need for a 
formal personality disorder diagnosis altogether. Furthermore, the focus of treatment 
has shifted away from the personality disorder itself towards behavioural interventions 
that are used to target risk factors for offending in mainstream prisoners (see Chapter 4).  
Jonathan Simon sees civil commitment and registration laws as a punitive form of a 
“new penology” that seeks not to transform abnormal individuals but merely to 
incapacitate and exclude them (Feeley and Simon 1992). In the DSPD scheme, 
however, treatment and transformation were central to the bargain deployed to justify 
preventive detention. The types of intervention deployed on the DSPD programme and 
its successor, the OPDP, are further evidence that the DSPD initiative does not conceive 
of the offender as a “monster” subject to internal and external forces beyond his control. 
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Treatments on the DSPD programme seek to equip offenders with the skills they require 
to lead a law-abiding life, implying that the dangerous personality disordered offender is 
capable of learning to exercise control over his baser instincts. More holistic 
interventions also retain a place, implying that welfarism has not been wholly displaced 
by risk management. If the offender fails to participate or demonstrate change, however, 
he will face continued detention in prison or transfer to hospital on the grounds of the 
risk he poses to the public.  
It was argued in Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis that the law generally regards 
personality disordered offenders to be at least partially criminally responsible for their 
own actions. This implies that they are in control of their criminal behaviour and can 
exercise free will, in line with classical conceptions of the offender as a rational moral 
actor reflected in classical utilitarian and retributive theories of punishment. On the 
other hand, the use of preventive detention on the grounds of dangerousness, whether on 
an indeterminate sentence or under the MHA 1983, implies that those in the DSPD 
group cannot be expected to exercise their capacity for rational control to restrain 
themselves from offending. Here it will be argued that the concept of responsibility for 
defective criminal character provides a better explanation for these diverging 
conceptions of the offender than accounts based on positivism and classicism.  
The figures of the redeemable and irredeemable offender seen in the Victorian notion of 
“reform” and in more modern forms of risk-based governance also provide an 
explanation for the hybrid inclusive and exclusionary control strategies deployed by the 
DSPD programme and the OPDP. Drawing on this analysis, it will be argued that the 
duty to engage in rehabilitation may be characterised as a moral duty and serves as an 
underlying justification for the punishment of personality disordered offenders who fail 
to reassure the public that they do not pose a threat. This preliminary step seeks to 
expose the assumptions underlying current approaches to personality disordered 
offenders so that they can be made subject to critique later in this chapter. 
(b) Redeemable and irredeemable characters 
Nicola Lacey’s socio-historical account of the evolution of criminal responsibility 
shows that the Victorian concept of responsibility for defective criminal character pre-
dates the modern subjective capacity-based responsibility that now dominates the 
criminal law and criminal law theory (Lacey 2001a). Furthermore, she argues that forms 
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of liability for defective criminal character continue to exist alongside modern capacity-
based forms of criminal responsibility and are reflected in preventive measures taken 
against the dangerous (Lacey 2011). The concept of liability for criminal character is 
closely aligned with the penal strategies of reform and rehabilitation and provides a 
means of reconciling the seeming contradiction between the finding that the DSPD 
group are criminally responsible and the denial of responsibility implicit in the use of 
preventive detention.  
According to Lacey, in the early 19th century and in opposition to the brutal and 
arbitrary system of early retributive punishment, “there emerged both a democratic 
concern for uniformity in the administration of criminal law and a powerful discourse of 
individual responsibility based on defective character” (Lacey 2001a, p.364). At this 
time, “it was not the capacity for understanding or opportunity for direct control of the 
criminal act itself but rather the capacity to work on one’s character which was the 
important thing: defective, criminal character was understood as the failure to exercise 
general self-government or self-discipline” (Lacey 2001a, p.364). In character 
responsibility, “criminal behaviour was seen as proceeding from uncivilised, savage 
human nature; but through the announcement of a clear set of norms and threats, and 
through the intervention of the modern prison, proper habits of self-governance could be 
instilled into a deviant but potentially malleable population” (Lacey 2001a, p.364).  
Rather than betraying “a belief in ‘actual’ responsibility in the sense of free will”, 
character responsibility reflected “a governmental belief that the best way to get people 
to conform was to treat them as if they were fully responsible in the sense of having the 
capacity to work on their characters” (Lacey 2001a, p.364). Thus, individuals could be 
held responsible for their failure to exercise self-control and for reforming the defective 
criminal characters that allowed their baser instincts to prevail and led them to offend. 
According to Lacey, notions of character and capacity “coincided within two strikingly 
different social philosophies” in early Victorian criminal justice:  
First, a moralised version of utilitarianism, in which the contemplation of 
consequences was expected to lead to more considered, rational (and, in this 
context, law-abiding) behaviour; second, Evangelicism, in which the 
contemplation of a future life was meant to have an improving effect upon self-
discipline and hence character in the present one (Lacey 2001a, p.364).  
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The Victorian concept of “reform” was “a process of moral atonement […] to be 
brought about through moral exhortation and the grace of God” (Garland 1985, p.127). 
It was central to the 19th century “penitentiary” model that was intended to reform 
criminals through a combination of hard work, contemplation, and solitary reflection 
similar to monastic discipline (see Rotman 1990, Chapter 1; Hudson 2003, p. 27-8). 
Thus, reform and punishment were closely intertwined in Victorian times. In this sense, 
the offender was viewed as both morally responsible for his defective criminal character 
and potentially redeemable through the process of punishment and reform. 
Some offenders were unmoved by the threat or experience of imprisonment, however, 
and appeared to be incorrigible by reformatory means. These “habitual criminals” 
presented a particular problem for a penal system founded on the principles of less 
eligibility and deterrence. Habitual offender legislation targeted persistent offenders, 
largely convicted of acquisitive crimes, subjecting them to increasing punishment by 
imposing progressively longer prison sentences for recidivism and heightened 
surveillance measures in the community through a system of release on licence 
(Godfrey et al. 2010). Those of defective character were thus divided into two groups: 
the corrigible, who were redeemable through reform, and the incorrigible or 
irredeemable who had to be confined to preserve the Victorian moral order. The 
measures were largely a failure and caught petty offenders rather than the truly 
dangerous.  
(c) Penal welfarism and the survival of character 
In the latter part of the 19th century, the “odd equilibrium of utilitarianism and 
Victorian moralism” began to break down, partly due to “a shift in world-view 
occasioned by the growing influence of the social and natural sciences, which gradually 
undermined confidence in individual responsibility for crime” (Lacey 2001a, p.365). In 
Garland’s (1985) account, in the mid-to-late 19th century, economic decline was 
attended by high unemployment and a housing shortage led to increasing numbers 
living in poverty and unsanitary conditions. This gave rise to a social crisis that 
threatened the stability of the highly stratified Victorian society. In combination with 
scientific developments, this led to “a series of transformations that reconstituted the 
penal complex in a form designed to repair its disciplinary deficiencies and to re-
establish legitimacy and public support” (Garland 1985 p.65).  
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For Garland, “the realm of penality became the chosen site for an extension of control, 
for a new mode of social administration which was underpinned and sanctioned by law 
but whose effects were not limited by it” (Garland 1981, p.39). The new system 
operated primarily through the “welfare sanction […] which takes as its object not a 
citizen but a client, activated not by guilt but by abnormality, establishing a relation 
which is not punitive but normalising” (Garland 1981, p.40). However, as Lucia Zedner 
comments, despite the dominance of welfarism in penal discourse, the courts continued 
their commitment to “classical legalism” and the fine was the most frequently imposed 
sanction (Zedner 2002, p.344). This casts doubt on the dominance of the “welfare 
sanction” in the penal welfare era and indicates that the criminal law continued to be 
“retributivist in its orientation” (Zedner 2002, p.345).  
Lacey argues that while the “eclectic ‘penal welfarist’ settlement” described by Garland 
(1985) was being assembled and “the penal system was being reconstructed on more 
inclusionary lines” that saw “human character as shapeable by reformist interventions”, 
“capacity-based and subjective principles of responsibility were continuing their steady 
progress in the courts” (Lacey 2011, p.172). A “strong conception of individual 
(mental) responsibility” reflected in the “doctrine of mens rea” began to develop (Lacey 
1998, p.32). A capacity-based and subjective concept of mens rea could respond to the 
emergence of scientific evidence that not everyone was capable of fulfilling the ideal of 
the free and rational man, and concessions were made in the defences of insanity, 
infancy and diminished responsibility (see Loughnan 2012). This “protected criminal 
law’s autonomy in the face of the multiplication of rehabilitative and other welfare-
oriented discourses which impinged on the same terrain and which legitimised 
regulatory responses to human behaviour irrespective of individual responsibility or 
desert” (Lacey 1998, p.32). Thus, the criminal trial came to be dominated by classical 
conceptions of the offender as a rational actor. 
As positivists largely failed to find new scientific interventions that went beyond 
existing measures aimed at reforming offenders (Garland 1985), the tenets of positivism 
were “gradually consigned to the academy rather than the prison or reformatory” (Lacey 
2011, p.172). Thus, the post-conviction stages came to be dominated by the Victorian 
notion of “reform” rather than by the positivist concept of “rehabilitation”.  
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Nevertheless, the division between the trial and post-conviction stages is not as clear-cut 
as it may seem. Forms of character liability persist in the criminal law and are difficult 
to reconcile with liberal criminal law theory’s emphasis on capacity and moral 
culpability (Lacey 1987). For Lacey, “status offences or semi-status offences […] as 
well as regular recreations of ‘dangerousness’ categories, show that the impulse to 
organize responsibility-attribution along status lines is a pervasive one in the history of 
criminal law” (Lacey 2011, p.160).  
The division between corrigible and incorrigible offenders also survived into penal 
modernism, indicating the longevity of the notion of criminal character. Measures for 
preventive detention of habitual offenders were re-introduced by the Prevention of 
Crime Act 1908. By 1932, owing to the objections of judges and liberal politicians, the 
regime had, however, become a “dead letter” (Home Office 1963, p.2). The use of 
preventive detention with persistent offenders was revived again in post-war Britain 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1948 and was also aimed at those who were thought to 
be beyond reform (Home Office 1963, p.9). The conditions of detention were to be “as 
little oppressive and as much superior to the conditions of ordinary imprisonment as 
might be compatible with safe custody and good order” (Home Office 1963, p.10). By 
July 1962, 1,171 men and 30 women were detained in prisons set aside for this purpose 
(Home Office 1963, v). The majority had been convicted of offences against property, 
with just 10% convicted of a violent or sexual offence, indicating that the measures 
were being used for those who were a mere nuisance rather than the truly dangerous 
(Home Office 1963, p.7-8). The damning conclusion of the Report of the Advisory 
Council on the Treatment of Offenders commissioned by the Home Office was that, 
although the public were protected for as long as preventive detention lasted, preventive 
detention was: 
Demoralising and embittering and does little, or nothing, to prepare most of [the 
detainees] for life in the outside world on their release; thus at the end of the 
sentence they are usually no more able to keep out of crime than they were 
before they began it (Home Office 1963, p.19). 
The report concluded that the system of preventive detention should therefore be 
abolished and replaced by longer prison sentences available on the grounds of previous 
offending. The measures were formally abolished by the CJA 1967. 
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Lacey argues that a “resurgence” of character responsibility may be seen in the raft of 
preventive measures aimed at violent or sexual offenders. In her view, “risk of sexual 
harm or violent crime orders” impose forms of “(highly targeted) status liability” and 
sex offender registration statutes create “a quasi-criminal status” or “prima facie 
judgment of criminal propensity” which “sits unhappily with the idea of punishment as 
commensurate to crime” (Lacey 2011, p.168-9). As Lacey notes, “a criminal conviction 
resulting from the breach of any of these orders is a form of criminalization which 
applies specifically to a group identified in terms of its subjection to the relevant order” 
(Lacey 2011, p.168-9). Rather than targeting petty property offenders, these measures 
target serious sexual or violent offenders who threaten the security of the public. 
As forms of character liability have gained increasing importance, the growing 
emphasis on reform and rehabilitation under the recent Coalition and Conservative 
governments may not come as a surprise. As penal policy prioritises the prevention of 
crime the purpose of the prison shifts towards preventive detention and reform. 
However, as the system continues to be influenced by retributivism, prison sentences 
are also conceived as a punishment. In character responsibility, these two elements are 
combined, as punishment is seen as a means of improving those with defective criminal 
characters who cannot be trusted not to reoffend.  
(d) Character and risk-based governance 
Andrew Rutherford (2006) saw the DSPD initiative as an example of Nikolas Rose’s 
(2000) “risk thinking” in which the “excluded are not merely cast out but become 
subject to strategies of control”. Measures are taken to “neutralise” those who for whom 
“social inclusion” is “impossible” (Rutherford 2006, p.82). Within these “exclusionary 
circuits” “a whole variety of paralegal forms of confinement” are devised for those who 
appear “intractably risky” and “may require waiving the rule of law” (Rutherford 2006, 
p.82, quoting Rose 2000). Rutherford’s account neglects the other “circuit of exclusion” 
identified by Rose, however. By contrast to the new penology thesis, Rose argues that 
“whilst confinement without the aspiration of reformation is certainly on the increase in 
[…] new control practices, it would be a mistake to think that the logics of control pay 
no attention to the transformation of the excluded individual” (Rose 2000, p.334). This 
is reflected in the circuit of exclusion that seeks “to reaffiliate the excluded […] and to 
reattach them to the circuits of civility” (Rose 2000, p.330).  
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Rose identifies three groups subject to circuits of exclusion: those who “have refused 
the bonds of civility and self-responsibility”, those who are “unable to assume them for 
constitutional reasons” and those who “aspire to them but have not been given the skills, 
capacities and means” (Rose 2000, p.331). His model leaves open the possibility for the 
excluded to move into the circuits of inclusion and to become self-regulating, 
responsible moral citizens. These “circuits of security” are made up of “disciplinary 
institution[s]” that seek to “mould conduct by inscribing enduring corporeal and 
behavioural competences, and persisting practices of self-scrutiny and self-constraint 
into the soul” (Rose 2000, p.325). Through the process of normalisation, the individual 
internalises norms and comes to govern himself, meaning that the state can govern its 
citizens “at a distance” (Rose 2000, p.337).  
On the other hand, “for those who cannot or will not be included, and who are too risky 
to be managed in open circuits – the repeat offender, the irredeemably anti-social, the 
irretrievably monstrous, the paedophile, the psychopath – control will take the form of 
more or less permanent sequestration” (Rose 2002, p.335). Such “harsh measures” 
against these individuals are justified as they have “refused the offer to become 
members of [the] moral community” (Rose 2002, p.335). In this system, “citizenship 
becomes conditional upon conduct” (Rose 2002, p.335). This implies that refusal to 
engage with the circuits of inclusion is met with a punitive and exclusionary response. 
Rose’s positioning of “the psychopath” in the category of the permanently excluded is 
likely to have led Rutherford to characterise the DSPD initiative as an exclusionary 
tactic. However, the DSPD programme was predicated on the notion that the dangerous 
personality disordered offender could be imbued with the skills needed to exercise the 
“responsible and prudent self-management” Rose argues is required for membership of 
a modern, civilised society (Rose 2010, p.96-7). These interventions focus on 
encouraging the offender to take responsibility for his own offending and criminogenic 
risk factors and to equip him with the skills he needs to make pro-social choices (see 
Ministry of Justice et al. 2011). Following Rose, therefore, the “pervasive image” of the 
DSPD offender is not “the juridical subject of the rule of law, nor that of the bio-
psychological social subject of positivist criminology, but of the responsible subject of 
moral community guided – or misguided – by ethical self-steering mechanisms” (Rose 
2000, p.321). 
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Erin Donohue and Dawn Moore’s discussion of the “client” and “the offender” also 
offers an explanation for the alternating discourses of exclusion and inclusion that 
appear in discussions on the DSPD group. According to Donohue and Moore, “the 
client” is “a choice-making, engaged and participatory subject” and is used to recruit 
offenders and criminal justice workers into the contemporary penal project. “Clients” 
are “individuals whose illnesses and lack of skills, rather than inherently evil or 
opportunistic tendencies, lead them into crime and thus they are the individuals who 
will be led back out of criminality with the help of psy expertise and actors” (Donohue 
and Moore 2009, p.323). The language of the client is one of self-determination, choice, 
“consumer empowerment” as well as entitlement and rights to services (Donohue and 
Moore 2009, p. 327).  
The authors contrast “the client” with the figure of “the offender”, who can be seen on 
the “public face” of punishment and is the subject of “punitive rhetoric” (Donohue and 
Moore 2009, p.321). “Villainous, irredeemable and objectified, the offender does 
nothing once caught up in the [criminal justice system], she simply is the target of 
intervention” (Donohue and Moore 2009, p.321). Allusions by Jack Straw and Paul 
Boateng in parliament to dangerous psychopathic or sexually deviant offenders who had 
to be detained to protect the public may be seen to draw on the discourse of the 
“offender”. On the other hand, in the balancing metaphor, the DSPD group was 
presented as having an entitlement or “right” to treatment that would help them back 
into the fold of responsible citizenship.  
Rose characterises both inclusive and exclusionary practices as a means of controlling 
the population but his account lacks an explanation for why inclusive strategies are used 
where exclusionary ones would achieve the same effect. Kelly Hannah-Moffat provides 
one in her discussion of the “transformative risk subject” she argues is the target of 
current rehabilitative interventions with offenders. According to Hannah-Moffat, the 
“fixed or static risk subject” (Hannah-Moffat 2005, p.34) of “actuarial justice” (Feeley 
and Simon 1992) leaves no room for change and threatens the legitimacy of 
interventions with offenders (Hannah-Moffat 2005, p.40). “Transformative risk 
subject[s]”, on the other hand, can be taught “how to manage their criminogenic needs 
and reduce their risk of recidivism by acquiring the requisite skills, abilities, and 
attitudes needed to lead a pro-social life” and to become “prudent and rational risk 
managing subject[s]” (Hannah-Moffat 2005, p.42; p.40).  
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The transformative risk subject fits well with “political and humanistic commitment[s] 
[…] to ‘do something’ that will facilitate reintegration and rehabilitation” (Hannah-
Moffat 2005, p.29; p.34). This can be seen in the concern of DSPD policymakers not to 
simply “write off” dangerous offenders but to offer them the means for re-integration. 
The goal was not just to reduce risk to the public but also to work towards re-integrating 
those with the potential to become functioning citizens. Interviewees described the 
DSPD group as “damaged” and the role of government was to “do what we should to 
try to help them to fit into society a bit more” (Civil Servant). The ultimate aim of the 
system was to reintegrate the individual back into society, “to their benefit as well as 
society’s”, and to enable them “to live more fulfilling lives for themselves” (Civil 
Servant).  
Rose’s excluded individuals and Donohue and Moore’s “client” and “offender” seem to 
echo the redeemable and irredeemable subjects seen in the Victorian period of “reform” 
and the penal welfare era. Robinson argues, however, that while current strategies 
“reprise [the] themes of personal responsibility, choice and recognition of the moral 
implications of those choices” they do not “re-invent the sinner of pre-modern 
reformative efforts” (Robinson 2008, p.438). Rather than a process of “moral 
atonement” coming about through the “grace of God” (Garland 1985, p.127) as in 
Victorian times, the DSPD programme and its successor seek to redeem the personality 
disordered offender through psychological interventions. For Rose, through the 
techniques of “remoraliz[ation]” and “responsibilization”, re-inclusion strategies seek 
“to reconstruct self-reliance in those who are excluded” (Rose 2000, p.334). A 
“language of empowerment” is employed and exclusion is reformulated as “lack of self-
esteem, self-worth and the skills of self-management necessary to steer oneself as an 
active individual in the empire of choice” (Rose 2000, p.334).  
Rather than blaming others for their problems, individuals are encouraged to identify 
their own “collusion” in their difficulties and to overcome them (Rose 2000, p.334). 
Thus, “autonomy” is “represented in terms of personal power and the capacity to accept 
responsibility”. Empowered subjects are expected to “work on themselves, not in the 
name of conformity, but to make them free” (Rose 2000, p.334). The use of 
psychotherapeutic approaches with the DSPD group implies that the aim of the system 
is to prompt them to engage in the process of self-discovery and self-actualisation that 
Giddens (1991) identifies as “the new individualism”. In order to be able to engage with 
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the world again, however, offenders will not only have to come to understand 
themselves better but also respect the “vulnerable autonomy” of others (Ramsay 2012a).    
The distinction between redeemable and irredeemable offenders may therefore provide 
a further means of understanding the “hybrid” nature of the DSPD initiative. 
Rehabilitation and eventual release may be conceived as a response to the redeemable 
subject whilst indefinite preventive detention is a response to the irredeemable – those 
who are unable or who refuse to engage with treatment and cannot therefore be re-
integrated into the circuits of inclusion (Rose 2000).  
 
3. Criminal Responsibility and Punishing the Personality Disordered Offender 
(a) Character and capacity 
Accounts of the criminal responsibility of the DSPD group have also drawn on the 
notion of positivism. According to Rutherford, the promotion by forensic psychologists 
of the notion that personality disordered offenders were treatable was a “revival of 
criminological positivism and its message of optimism” (Rutherford 2006, p.72). 
Rutherford argues that, in the DSPD scheme, “ultimately an agenda of public protection 
places issues of risk to the fore of those of individual rights and the accent becomes pre-
emptive rather than reactive” (Rutherford 2006, p.83). Positivism, according to 
Rutherford, is focused on the prevention of crime and was “untrammelled by the so-
often tortuous process of harmonising the legal definition of responsibility with the 
mental state of a particular offender, disregard[ed] the traditional concepts of moral 
guilt, expiation or retribution [and] reject[ed] the insistence upon proportionality 
between crime and punishment” (Radzinowicz 1999, p.16, quoted in Rutherford 2006, 
p.84).  
In the “third service” model, there would have been no need for a conviction before an 
individual meeting the DSPD criteria could be made subject to preventive detention in a 
specialist unit. This seems to accord with positivism’s disregard for concepts such as 
“‘free will, ‘responsibility’, ‘guilt’ and ‘punishment’” which were seen by its 
proponents as “not just fictions out of favour with science, but metaphysical concepts 
which posed a danger to society’s security” (Garland 1985, p.85). However, the “third 
service” idea never came to pass and the majority of those in the DSPD units were 
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given prison sentences (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 2012a). Personality disordered 
offenders are also generally regarded by the Courts and the Law Commission to be at 
least partially responsible for their offending and therefore deserving of punitive prison 
sentences rather than therapeutic hospital disposals (see Chapter 6). Yet, those in the 
DSPD group and on the OPDP are also judged to be too risky to release and are 
preventively detained in prison on indeterminate sentences or in hospital under the 
provisions of the MHA 1983. 
Ashworth and Zedner (2014) express the problem posed by the preventive detention of 
the “dangerous” as “how to square the tacit denial of responsibility entailed in saying 
that an individual is incapable of restraining their dangerous violent or sexual impulses 
with the judgement that the same individual can justly be held responsible for past 
criminal conduct” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.149). Anthony Bottoms has sought to 
explain this tension by highlighting the dominance of “classical” and “positivist” 
conceptions of the offender at different stages in the criminal justice system: 
Western legal systems typically treat offenders as freewill rational beings in the 
early stages of police processing and the determination of guilt by the court 
(classicism). In later stages, notably in prison and probation treatments, the 
emphasis typically shifts to pathology and psychic disturbance (positivism) 
(Bottoms 1977, p.92, n.8).   
Harry Annison argues that the IPP sentence “goes with the grain” identified by Bottoms 
(1977) because it does not affect the determination of guilt by the court but merely 
provides it with “an additional sentencing option that is preventive in its outlook and 
positivist in its underlying assumptions” (Annison 2015, p.62). However, like the view 
of the DSPD offender as a “monster” (Seddon 2008, p.309), the conceptualisation of 
criminality as “pathology” in Bottom’s account leaves little to individual agency. It also 
fails to account for the finding that the personality disordered offender is both 
responsible for his offending and has a duty to reform himself in order to progress 
towards release.  
The concept of responsibility for defective criminal character may provide a better 
explanation for seemingly alternating conceptions of the “dangerous” offender at 
different stages of the criminal justice system. As argued in Chapter 6, reform proposals 
for defences based on mental disorder tend to focus on individuals’ cognitive rather than 
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volitional capacities and do not take full account of the deficits of personality disordered 
offenders. The concept of partial responsibility is also used to justify punishing 
personality disordered offenders for any particle of responsibility they bear for their 
offending (Ashworth and Macakay 2015). Similarly, the concept of responsibility for 
defective character underlying preventive sentencing does not require answers to the 
difficult question of whether personality disordered individuals can justly be said to be 
in control of their actions. This is because it treats the offender “as if” he is “fully 
responsible” on the grounds that he has the capacity to “work on” his character (Lacey 
2001a, p.364).  
(b) Breaching the duty to engage in rehabilitation 
David Garland (1996) and Pat O’Malley (1999) characterise recent trends in criminal 
justice as “volatile and contradictory” and tend to place rehabilitation and preventive 
detention in opposition to each other. O’Malley describes trends in criminal justice 
policy as “inconsistent and sometimes contradictory couples” that include 
“incapacitation and warehousing versus correctional reform, punishment and 
stigmatization versus reintegration” (O’Malley 1999, p.176). He attributes this 
“incoherence” to the contradictory elements of “New Right politics” which “extends the 
repertory of penality simultaneously in ‘nostalgic’ (neo-conservative) and ‘innovative’ 
(neo-liberal) directions” (1999, p.175). Toby Seddon also saw “inconsistencies” 
between the “apparent disregard for civil liberties” in the DSPD proposals and the 
“therapeutic innovations” that developed within the DSPD units (Seddon 2008, p.310).  
Garland, on the other hand, attempts to explain the “volatile”, “contradictory” and 
“ambivalent” nature of penal policy in terms of the limits on the power of the sovereign 
state to control crime (Garland 1996). In his view, governments vacillate between 
rational “adaptive strategies”, in which they accept such limitations, and punitive 
“strategies of denial”, through which they hysterically attempt to re-assert their power 
(Garland 1996, p.445). According to Garland, “adaptive strategies” can be seen in 
relation to rehabilitation, as prison authorities no longer make ambitious claims about 
their ability to rehabilitate individuals but focus more narrowly on incapacitation while 
shifting responsibility onto prisoners to make use of those opportunities for reform that 
are offered to them (Garland 1996, p.458). On the other hand, punitive “strategies of 
denial”, including measures of “custodial incapacitation” and “powers to pass very long 
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sentences on certain offenders”, “express popular feelings of rage and frustration in the 
wake of particularly disturbing crimes” and also claim to pursue the instrumental 
purpose of controlling crime (Garland 1996, p.460).  
The characterisation of rehabilitation as “progressive” and lengthy or indeterminate 
prison sentences as “punitive”, “populist” and “emotive” overstates the differences 
between these approaches, however. Garland’s focus on the claim that rehabilitative 
efforts are “instrumental”, in the sense that they are intended to reduce risk of 
reoffending, may have led him to disregard the more punitive elements of such 
interventions. In Garland’s earlier work, he argues that notions of “reform” rooted in 
Victorian evangelical utilitarianism and the positivist notion of rehabilitation coexisted 
into the early 20
th
 century in a “penal welfare settlement” (Garland 1985). Despite the 
confidence of positivists that criminal behaviour was caused by scientifically 
discoverable internal or external factors, new scientific interventions going beyond 
traditional reformative methods were lacking. Therefore, the practice of rehabilitation 
came to rely on the interventions deployed in the name of reform. Interventionist penal 
measures that “clearly flouted the traditions of liberalism” were made palatable for a 
Liberal government through appeals to “the ‘moral duty’ of a charitable state to extend 
its ‘care’ and ‘protection’ to those in need of ‘rescue’” (Garland 1985, p.209). This 
“‘evangelised’ version of criminology” dissolved political issues into “questions of care 
and benevolence” (Garland 1985, p.209). Coercion was never far from the surface, 
however. “The rewards, provisions and benefits” of the social sphere were “conditional 
upon certain norms of conduct” and these “terms” were “negatively reinforce[d]” by the 
penal system, which “threaten[ed] to deal coercively with those who refuse them” 
(Garland 1985, p.233).  
Punitive and coercive language may be seen in relation to the recent revival of 
rehabilitation, which seems to hark back to the Victorian notion of reform, which took 
place through punishment and the intervention of the modern prison. In the 2010 Green 
Paper Breaking the Cycle, the Coalition government asserted that criminals would be 
met with “more effective, tough punishments” and that prisons would become “places 
to learn the link between hard work and reward” (Ministry of Justice 2010a, p. 9). The 
plans also asserted that offenders had a responsibility to reform themselves and this was 
backed up with a threat of punishment. Thus, they would be required “to take the action 
needed to change their criminal lifestyle” and “swiftly caught and punished if they [did] 
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not accept the opportunities offered to them and instead return to a life of crime” 
(Ministry of Justice 2010a, p. 25).   
A recent speech by Minister for Justice Michael Gove indicates that the Evangelical 
notion of “reform” and Victorian moralism continue to be intertwined with 
rehabilitation in the Conservative government’s policies. The Minister spoke of the 
need for “a new and unremitting emphasis in our prisons on reform, rehabilitation and 
redemption” (Gove 2015). He stressed that offenders “have to be punished because no 
society can protect the weak and uphold virtue unless there is a clear bright line between 
civilised behaviour and criminality” (Gove 2015). He also called for prisons to be 
places in which “offenders whose irresponsibility has caused pain and grief can learn 
the importance of taking responsibility for their lives, becoming moral actors and better 
citizens” (Gove 2015).  
For Ashworth and Zedner, preventive detention is a denial of autonomy as it removes 
“the moral opportunity to exercise choice to reflect, repent, and to resist temptations to 
engage in wrongdoing in the wider world” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.150). 
“Whereas conviction for a crime past rests upon the claim that the individual acted 
culpably at a particular point in time, the decision to detain preventively […] relies upon 
the assertion that the character traits of the detainee are enduring and predictable” 
(Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.150). They argue that “the judgement that an individual 
poses a significant risk of serious harm” implies that “he does not have the capacity to 
choose to do right” or, “at the very least”, that “he will not in fact exercise that capacity 
to restrain himself” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.150). Ashworth and Zedner’s two 
categories echo Nikolas Rose’s distinction between excluded individuals who lack the 
ability to conform and those who refuse the bonds of civility. The underlying 
justification for the continued detention of those of incorrigible bad character is their 
refusal of the moral order and their continuing dangerousness. Punishment is more 
difficult to justify as response to the irredeemable offender who cannot conform. 
Instead, preventive detention may be seen as a response to his dangerousness. 
Preventive detention may be seen to be a punitive response to individuals who have 
breached the moral order by offending. The exclusion of volitional capacities from 
subjective capacity-based responsibility allows personality disordered offenders to be 
punished for transgressions they may not have been able to restrain themselves from. 
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The concept of responsibility for criminal character also sees them as responsible for 
reforming their defective criminal characters. Furthermore, the DSPD initiative has 
important symbolic value as a response to public fears of dangerous mentally disordered 
offenders that go beyond its “instrumental” promises to protect the public. Drawing on 
Ramsay’s theory of the ideology of vulnerable autonomy, the failure to reassure others 
of one’s safety is constructed as a wrong to be punished. Those who refuse to engage 
are also to be punished for their refusal to become moral citizens of the modern world 
and pursue their own self-actualisation while maintaining a regard for the protective 
cocoon of others (Rose 2000; Giddens 1991). The promise of rehabilitation is that it 
allows for a distinction to be drawn between those who are redeemable and 
irredeemable.  
This framework breaks down in practice, however, as the DSPD programme and the 
OPDP have not yet found a means of differentiating between the redeemable offender, 
those who are unable to conform and those who refuse to do so. Neither has it shown 
convincingly that it can mould redeemable personality disordered offenders into 
responsible citizens. This difficulty stems in part from the characteristics of personality 
disordered offenders, who do not straightforwardly divide into those who cannot 
conform and those who choose not to do so. According to Hanna Pickard, insofar “as 
violent behaviour (in those with or without PD) is responsive to incentives, it appears to 
be subject to choice and a degree of control” (Pickard 2015, p.20). The reduction in 
violence seen in the tightly controlled DSPD units implies that personality disordered 
offenders do have the capacity to control, or at least re-direct, their violent impulses 
when they are under close observation. Nevertheless, such individuals may experience 
great difficulty in exercising control over their behaviour, particularly given that 
violence is often a habitual or learned response to emotional distress (Pickard 2015, 
p.20).  
The failure of the DSPD programme to separate out the redeemable and irredeemable 
has resulted in the expectations for the programme being scaled down. The programme 
now focuses more closely on “the generation of ‘knowledge that allows selection of 
thresholds that define acceptable risks’” that inform the practices of inclusion and 
exclusion (Rose 2000, p.333). Nevertheless, the possibility of redemption through 
psychological intervention is left open. It will be argued in the next section that the 
assumptions underlying the current framework present particular threats to personality 
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disordered offenders. Furthermore, it undermines the goals of social reintegration and 
public protection and the possibility for the promise of rehabilitation to act as a brake on 
disproportionate punishment. 
 
4. The Risks of the Current Framework 
(a) The risk of harsh treatment 
As argued previously, rehabilitation has been historically intertwined with punishment 
as a response to both redeemable and irredeemable offenders. Robinson (2008) argues 
that current efforts at the rehabilitation of offenders may be characterised as “punitive” 
or “expressive” as they involve “the communication of censure” (Robinson 2008, 
p.438). Interventions are “offence focused” and emphasise that the offender has “done 
wrong” (Robinson 2008, p.438). They also encourage offenders to “think ethically” and 
“develop a capacity for ‘victim empathy’ which, it is hoped, will serve to dissuade them 
from future offending” (Robinson 2008, p.438). The clinical concept of “responsibility 
without blame” described by Nicola Lacey and Hanna Pickard may offer a means of 
avoiding the punitive effects of rehabilitative interventions with offenders.  
Lacey and Pickard define “affective blame” as “the range of hostile, negative attitudes 
and emotions that are typical human responses to blameworthiness” (Lacey and Pickard 
2013, p.3). They argue that the retributive “justice model” “forges a strong association 
between the justification of punishment, the attribution of responsible agency in relation 
to the offence, and the appropriateness of [affective] blame” as “deserved” by the 
offender (Lacey and Pickard 2013, p.2). In the clinical model of “responsibility without 
blame”, patients are also judged to be “responsible and indeed accountable for wrongful 
or harmful conduct to the extent that they possess the relevant cognitive and volitional 
capacities in relation to it” (Lacey and Pickard 2013, p.2). In contrast to the justice 
model, however, responsibility without blame “resists any corresponding tendency 
towards affective blame” (Lacey and Pickard 2013, p.2). Lacey and Pickard argue that, 
if the model of responsibility without blame were brought into the legal realm, 
“rehabilitation need not entail the effacement of moral responsibility, and justice need 
not entail the hard treatment and stigma that is typical of affective blame, even when 
negative consequences are justified and imposed” (Lacey and Pickard 2013, p.3). In this 
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sense, the concept of “responsibility without blame” used in clinical psychology could 
provide a means of reconciling retributive punishment with the rehabilitative ideal 
(Lacey and Pickard 2013, p.3).  
Nevertheless, the use of psychotherapeutic approaches with personality disordered 
offenders involving the exploration of difficult traumatic experiences in a coercive 
prison or secure hospital setting raises the prospect that therapy itself will be 
experienced as harsh treatment. This may be the case even where therapists aim to avoid 
“affective blame” as suggested by Lacey and Pickard (2013). Dawn Moore and Kelly 
Hannah-Moffat (2005) contend that the use of offending behaviour programmes based 
on cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) in the prison context is essentially punitive. 
They see a continuation of the oppressive practices of the penal welfare era operating 
under the “liberal veil of the free subject who makes his or her own choices” (Moore 
and Hannah-Moffat 2005, p.86). Therapeutic interventions in the prison setting may be 
experienced as punitive because the prisoner is forced to face traumatic past 
experiences, come face-to-face with his or her problems or inadequacies, has no right to 
choose a therapist and is separated from family and friends (Moore and Hannah-Moffat 
2005). In their view, the use of interventions that emphasise freedom of choice serves to 
mask the underlying punitiveness of rehabilitative interventions and seems cruelly 
ironic in a context in which prisoners have little control over their own circumstances 
(Moore and Hannah-Moffat 2005). 
Furthermore, rehabilitative interventions can pose risks to the wellbeing of prisoners. 
Elaine Genders and Elaine Player argue that current criminal justice policy “supports 
rehabilitative opportunities that address the risks offenders pose to the public, yet 
remains inattentive to the risk of harm that rehabilitative programmes can pose to 
offenders” (Genders and Player 2014, p.434). The authors note that the target 
populations for the “Rehabilitation Revolution” in the UK are typically composed of 
individuals “serving long sentences for serious offences, who have personal histories 
shaped by physical and sexual abuse and other risk factors associated with social 
disadvantage and exclusion” (Genders and Player 2014, p.451). Therapeutic 
interventions with such individuals “break down barriers between their public and 
private self” to expose “levels of trauma that reflect the adversity of the social worlds 
they have inhabited, as well as the complexity of their psychological needs” (Genders 
and Player 2014, p.451). Furthermore, the discussion of offence histories in group 
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therapy can expose prisoners to victimisation from other inmates, particularly where 
sexual offenders are mixed in with those who have been victims of sexual abuse 
(Genders and Player 2014). According to Genders and Player, the vulnerability this 
produces “demands professional skill and expertise and lies at the heart of the duty of 
care that is owed to these prisoners” (Genders and Player 2014, p.451). The authors note 
that the plans for the OPDP seem to indicate that such skills and expertise are not 
already in place, casting doubt on the programme’s ability to care adequately for these 
individuals and protect them from harm.  
The prison environment may also be re-traumatising (Jones 2015). The harmful social 
and psychological effects of imprisonment have been well documented and include 
separation from family, friends and social networks, loss of employment and housing, 
threats to physical safety and risks to physical and mental health (Liebling and Maruna 
2005, Chapter 1). For those suffering from mental illness, prison can also “exacerbate 
mental ill health, heighten vulnerability and increase the risk of self-harm and suicide” 
(Bradley 2009, p.7). Those diagnosed with BPD are particularly at risk, with between 
60 and 70% having attempted suicide during their lifetime (Oldham, 2006). There is 
also evidence of a heightened risk of self-harm, suicide and suicide attempts amongst 
those diagnosed with ASPD (Verona et al. 2001). Frontline staff in the DSPD units 
were reportedly shocked at the levels of self-harm amongst patients and prisoners and 
the constant demands placed on them (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010b). There are 
indications, therefore, that personality disordered patients and prisoners may be at a 
heightened risk of self-harm and suicide which may be exacerbated by the experience of 
imprisonment.  
Psychological assessment and intervention may also serve to exacerbate the pains of 
imprisonment and the hard treatment imposed by imprisonment. Ben Crewe’s (2011) 
work on the modern “pains of imprisonment” describes the “pains of psychological 
assessment” and “the pains of self-government” that have emerged as “psychological 
power” has replaced more overt forms of physical power in the prison (Crewe 2011). 
The “pains of self-government” stem from the use of responsibilization strategies with 
prisoners. Here, “the prisoner is given greater autonomy – in a limited and localized 
way – but is enlisted in the process of self-government and held responsible for an 
increasing range of decisions” (Crewe 2011, p.519). This limited freedom is described 
by one prisoner as being given “enough rope to hang yourself” (Crewe 2011, p.519; 
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p.509). According to Crewe, “prisoners are on edge less because they are fearful of staff 
than because they themselves might ‘cock up’ their situation” (Crewe 2011, p. 519).  
Prisoners experience psychological assessment as dehumanising as it deprives them of 
control over their own identities by casting aside any interpretations that do not fit into 
psychological discourse (Crewe 2011). The “pains of psychological assessment” also 
give prisoners a sense that psychological interpretations of their behaviour are 
“inescapably negative” (Crewe 2011, p.517). The feeling that “any comment can be 
used against [them]” in psychological risk assessments is experienced as “both dizzying 
and suffocating” by prisoners (Crewe 2011, p.517). In contrast to physical power, which 
takes a more brutal and overt form, “psychological power suspends itself perpetually, 
never quite revealing when it might take effect” (Crewe 2011, p.518). This leaves 
prisoners with a sense of “ontological insecurity” (Crewe 2011, p.513, citing Giddens 
1991).  
The use of psychological assessment and intervention in prisons may be said to 
compromise the “ontological security” of prisoners in order to protect the subjective 
security of the public. The sense of insecurity experienced by prisoners may further 
jeopardise efforts to encourage them to pursue self-actualisation through psychotherapy. 
The experience of prison may be more punitive for those who are subject to greater 
psychological monitoring and input, such as those serving indeterminate sentences and 
those who have been selected for the DSPD programme and the OPDP. The linking of 
participation in rehabilitative interventions and risk assessments to release decisions 
also implies that prisoners are to some extent coerced into participation, and this may 
further undermine the effectiveness of psychological interventions that require willing 
participation and motivation to change. 
(b) The risk of excessive detention 
It may be questioned whether punishment and preventive detention coupled with the 
promise of rehabilitation is the correct response to personality disordered offenders 
given their particular characteristics. Some of the traits of the psychopath include lack 
of remorse and a failure to learn from experience - both qualities that may make them 
less likely to be deterred by the prospect or experience of punishment. Individuals with 
psychopathic or antisocial traits may also be expected to encounter difficulty in 
responding to treatment programmes that require them to take responsibility for their 
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offending or to show remorse or empathy for their victims (Peay 2011a, p.233). 
Treatment programmes designed for mainstream offenders, even when adapted to 
personality traits such as proneness to boredom, may therefore struggle to elicit the 
expected responses from personality disordered offenders, who may then find it difficult 
to make progress or to demonstrate a reduction in risk.  
Proving a reduction in risk through treatment is likely to be a slow process for offenders 
in the former DSPD units and on the OPDP. It is difficult for prisoners to demonstrate 
reductions in risk when they are in a high security setting but concerns regarding their 
dangerousness and high risk status seem to preclude more realistic tests of risk 
reduction in lower security settings (Trebilcock and Weaver 2012a; 2012b). 
Furthermore, as manipulativeness is a key feature of psychopathy and ASPD, seeming 
cooperation with treatment can be construed as an attempt to subvert the process. Dany 
Lacombe (2007) in her ethnography of a sex offender treatment programme in prison 
amply illustrates this problem. Worryingly, participants found themselves in a 
paradoxical situation.  In order to show progress, they had to internalise the teachings of 
the programme and confess to having deviant sexual fantasies, leading some to invent 
such fantasies. If they complied too well with the programme’s teachings, however, 
they opened themselves up to accusations of manipulation and psychopathy.  
This Catch-22 is also reflected in the IMPALOX study. It was found that participants 
“were discouraged by the interpretation of their behaviour by psychologists: 
cooperation, for example, could be interpreted as manipulation, and there was 
disillusion and confusion about the attribution of labels (such as psychopath), and the 
ability of individuals to demonstrate change (diminished risk)” (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.98). 
The interpretation of “treatment interfering behaviours” as manifestations of personality 
disorder (Saradjian, Murphy and McVey 2010) is likely to contribute to the 
maintenance of this Catch-22 for those selected for the OPDP. The application of a 
personality disorder label to individuals not clinically diagnosed with personality 
disorder is particularly problematic as the personality disorder label is very difficult to 
remove once applied. 
In the literature on both the Chromis and HMP Whitemoor programmes, “treatment 
interfering behaviours” are explicitly understood as manifestations of the individual’s 
personality disorder. These include refusal to engage in treatment and excessive 
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recourse to complaints procedures, lawyers and litigation (Murphy and McVey 2010, 
p.136). This leaves little room for consideration of the effects of the coercive prison 
environment and the consequences of participation and non-participation in treatment 
for prisoners. As personality disordered offenders generally retain mental capacity 
(Peay 2011a) they may be very well aware of how the system works and the constraints 
operating on their choices. In some circumstances, their responses may therefore be 
better understood as a rational or normal response to the problematic situation in which 
they find themselves than as a symptom of disorder. As Leon McRae comments, the 
strategy of seeking treatment in a medium secure unit in order to expedite release “was 
generally taken as evidence of the very behaviour justifying the diagnosis of [severe 
personality disorder], rather than a form of amoral currency spent to avoid the threat of 
preventive detention. Yet, presumably most, if not all, of us would take remedial action 
to avoid such a threat” (McRae 2015, p.331). 
Personality disordered offenders also pose particular problems when it comes to 
treatment engagement. While individuals diagnosed with BPD tend to be treatment-
seeking and demanding of services, those diagnosed with ASPD are less likely to 
perceive themselves to be in need of treatment and tend actively to resist it (NCCMH et 
al. 2009; 2010). As noted in previous chapters, much of the work of the DSPD units 
involved motivating prisoners and patients to engage with treatment. As the types of 
treatment deployed generally require the active participation of the patient and 
motivation to change, coercive approaches are unlikely to be successful. Implicit 
coercion may be present in the prison environment in which prisoners are expected to 
comply with rehabilitative programmes or face sanctions or be denied the possibility of 
parole and this may jeopardize the effectiveness of treatment with this group.  
Those patients and prisoners who consented to treatment on the DSPD programme 
reported lower levels of perceived coercion than those who did not consent (Zlodre et 
al. 2015; Burns et al. 2011). Furthermore, those who did not consent to treatment had 
lower levels of competence to consent to treatment (Zlodre et al. 2015). Decreasing 
perceived coercion and enhancing competence to consent to treatment may therefore be 
expected to enhance voluntarism and lead to improved clinical outcomes for personality 
disordered patients (Zlodre et al. 2015, p.2). This echoes Tyrer and colleagues’ 
suggestion that “concentrating the resources on those who are clearly motivated and 
determined to overcome their propensity to re-offend may be one way forward” for the 
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DSPD programme (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.98). This route has not been adopted by the 
OPDP, however, which continues to prioritise those who are “high harm” rather than 
those who are motivated for treatment. This implies that the focus of the OPDP on those 
who present the highest risk to the public may further jeopardise the success of efforts at 
rehabilitation. This again casts doubt on the potential for rehabilitation to act as a 
safeguard against disproportionate preventive detention, particularly where participation 
is tied to release.  
 
5. The Third Service Revisited 
Andrew Ashworth and Lucia Zedner (2014) recognise that legitimate limits can be 
placed on certain individuals’ autonomy to protect that of others, such as potential 
victims. However, in line with Peter Ramsay, they argue that this seems to prioritise the 
rights of unknown potential victims over concrete offenders (Ramsay 2012b, p. 206 
Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.150). The cases of Mastromatteo and Maiorano appear to 
do just that and indicate that the security of the public takes precedence over the right of 
the offender to rehabilitation and social reintegration. In this section some suggestions 
will be put forward as to how a new legal framework could respond to the problem of 
dangerous offenders while taking into account the risks posed by reliance on 
rehabilitation as a curb on preventive detention. The suggestions draw on the proposals 
for a “third service” and the limits traced around the use of preventive action by 
Ashworth and Zedner (2014). Any proposals to reform the current system will, 
however, also have to take account of the symbolic nature of efforts to reassure the 
public that something is being “done” to protect them from dangerous offenders. 
(a) Preventive detention in prison 
It has been argued in this thesis that reliance on rehabilitative interventions as a means 
of rendering preventive detention proportionate to the need to protect the public is 
problematic. Preventive detention in prison presents particular problems. Ashworth and 
Zedner (2014) argue that preventive detention is a violation of the presumption of 
innocence, as it punishes the offender for what he “might” do rather than what he has 
done, and it also violates the principle of retributive punishment. Furthermore, the 
statement of penal reformer Alexander Paterson that “men are sent to prison as 
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punishment, not for punishment” (Ruck 1951, p.13) implies that deprivation of liberty is 
punishment and therefore the longer the offender is preventively detained, the more he 
is being punished. This is exacerbated by the fact that the preventive and punitive 
portions of indeterminate and extended determinate sentences are currently served in the 
prison environment.  
Ashworth and Zedner (2014) are critical of the use of risk-based indeterminate 
sentences where these violate the principle of proportionate punishment. The authors 
propose that everyone should have a right to be presumed harmless and that preventive 
action should only be taken by the state to protect individuals from “a significant risk of 
serious harm” where someone has lost that right through violent offending. 
Furthermore, they suggest that the burden of proving an individual presents a risk of 
violence should be placed on the state; judgments of dangerousness should be based on 
an individual assessment; decision-makers should be mindful of the contestability of 
such judgments; and the decision to detain should be open to appeal (Ashworth and 
Zedner 2014, p.169-170). Given the limitations of risk assessment, however, the 
“significant risk of serious harm” threshold recommended by Ashworth and Zedner may 
be more likely to relate to levels of public tolerance for risk or attitudes towards 
particular groups than to any objectively measurable “need” to protect the public.  
Ashworth and Zedner further propose that those detained should also have access to 
“adequately resourced risk-reductive rehabilitative treatment and training courses” and 
preventive detention should take place in “non-punitive conditions with restraints no 
greater than those required by the imperatives of security” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, 
p.169). Where possible, this should be in a facility separate from the prison system. 
These proposals are strikingly similar to the “third service” idea in the DSPD proposals 
(see Chapter 2). This is not surprising as both sets of proposals draw on the use of 
preventive detention in other European countries reflected in the case law of the ECtHR.  
Ashworth and Zedner also propose setting a high threshold of harm and recommended 
an individualised approach to assessment, regular reviews of detention and the 
provision of risk-reducing treatment interventions in non-punitive conditions. These 
suggestions continue to rely on the provision of risk-reductive treatments to offenders in 
order to allow them to progress towards release. As argued previously, the use of such 
treatments under conditions of coercion may also expose the personality disordered 
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offender to excessive punishment and jeopardise the effectiveness of any treatment 
intervention in reducing risks to the public. The continuing lack of evidence for 
effective treatments for offenders with personality disorder, and particularly ASPD, 
casts particular doubt on the prospects for rehabilitative intervention to allow this group 
to progress towards release. The requirement of parsimony in Ashworth and Zedner’s 
recommendations is, however, preferable to the ECtHR’s broader brush approach of 
approving detention insofar as it is “proportionate” to the risks presented to the public. 
Nevertheless, the slippage between actual and symbolic protection mentioned 
previously may call into question what “necessary” or “proportionate” means in this 
context. 
Demands for punishment are influenced by public appetites, which may be excessive or 
overindulgent (Loader 2009) and the public appetite for security and protection may be 
described as “insatiable” (Loader 1997, p.151). Lucia Zedner observes that “absolute 
security (objective or subjective) is a chimera, perpetually beyond reach” (Zedner 2003, 
p.157). New threats uncover “unknown vulnerabilities” and the pursuit of security 
consequently “requires continuing vigilance” (Zedner 2003, p.157). A parsimonious 
approach towards the problem of dangerous offenders risks provoking public fears if 
measures are perceived to be insufficient to ensure the safety of the public from those 
who threaten.  
(b) Preventive detention in hospital  
As argued in Chapter 6, preventive detention of personality disordered offenders in 
hospital also presents difficulties as this may be experienced as punishment by the 
individual even where this is not the intention. Ashworth and Zedner (2014) are critical 
of the lack of references in the MHA 1983 to the fact that detention in hospital 
constitutes a deprivation of liberty. Similarly to detention on the grounds of 
dangerousness, the authors are, however, willing to accept preventive detention in 
hospital on the grounds of “a significant risk of serious harm” to others as “a last 
resort”, “for as short a time as possible, and in conditions as normal as feasible” 
(Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.217). The use of compulsory powers in this context 
“should always be kept in proportion to the gravity of the prospective harm and the 
probability of it occurring” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.219). In their view, detention 
in hospital after a criminal offence should only occur where the court finds treatment to 
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be necessary, that nothing less would be effective in protecting the public, and where 
the individual has been convicted of a serious offence carrying a sentence of at least 
seven years imprisonment. Furthermore, the individual should have a right to challenge 
decisions to detain him and to regular review of his detention, which should end as soon 
as it is no longer necessary to protect the public from “a significant risk of serious 
harm” (Ashworth and Zedner 2014, p.219). Whether detention takes place in hospital or 
prison, risk reductive treatments should also be available to enable the individual to 
work towards release. 
These proposals are also similar to the “third service” idea. The requirement that 
treatment be “necessary” may not be adequate to avoid the misuse of hospital as a venue 
for the preventive detention of the dangerous given the broad interpretation given to 
“treatment” in the case law discussed in Chapter 6. The model proposed by the 
Richardson Committee, which would permit compulsion only in relation to those who 
lacked capacity and could be expected to benefit from treatment, was likely to leave out 
personality disordered offenders (Department of Health 1999a). This may, however, be 
a more honest way forward than the use of hospital as a venue for preventive detention 
where little treatment benefit could be expected. In the next section, it will be suggested 
that a form of non-punitive preventive detention similar to that permitted in Germany 
could go some way towards addressing the risks posed by the current system. These 
suggestions could form the basis for a future project on the normative limits to be 
placed on measures to address the dangers posed by particular personality disordered 
offenders. 
(c) Non-punitive detention 
In line with current judicial policy and the principles of desert, it is argued that life 
sentences should be reserved for murder, very serious offences and repeated serious 
offending. In order to comply better with the rules laid down in M, the punitive period 
of the sentence would be served in the prison and followed by indeterminate detention 
in a non-punitive environment. For those convicted of less serious offences who appear 
to present a risk of serious offending, a determinate prison sentence could be followed 
by an additional determinate period of preventive detention in a non-punitive 
environment. Provision could be made for the possibility of early release if reduced risk 
could be shown. Automatic release at the end of the determinate preventive period 
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would nevertheless follow. The indeterminate nature of the life sentence for the most 
serious offenders would also allow for eventual release, but this would not be automatic. 
This would help to counteract the disillusionment and hopelessness of whole life tariffs 
highlighted in Vinter while avoiding the additional punishment that comes with 
preventive detention served in a prison setting.   
These forms of detention would have to be imposed after conviction to comply with 
Article 5 of the ECHR and retrospective preventive detention would not be permissible 
under Article 7. The result could be a system similar to that of Germany or the 
Netherlands, where an order of preventive detention can be imposed at conviction and 
served in a separate environment after the expiry of a period of punitive detention. In 
contrast to the “third service”, such a system would not permit detention without a 
crime and would therefore avoid one of the fatal criticisms of Option B in the DSPD 
proposals. It would also avoid the use of hospitals as a venue for preventive detention in 
the absence of expected treatment benefit. Such a system would have the advantage of 
making the management of offenders deemed to be dangerous more visible and would 
permit the public to scrutinise the preventive measures taken in their name. 
As discussed previously, the maturation process appears to be the most effective means 
of reducing re-offending in personality disordered and non-disordered offenders. There 
is an argument, therefore, for de-linking progress towards release from the provision of 
treatment, particularly in the case of personality disorder where evidence for the 
effectiveness of risk-reducing treatments continues to prove elusive. In order to reduce 
levels of coercion that may jeopardise treatment or lead to further punishment, one way 
forward could be to provide rehabilitation on a voluntary basis rather than as a means of 
demonstrating suitability for release. Egardo Rotman (1990) and Sam Lewis (2005) 
argue that rehabilitation can have a place within a system largely based on retributive 
punishment, as it can have a humanising influence and mitigate some of the damaging 
effects of incarceration on prisoners, and even improve their prospects of a crime-free 
and productive life post-release. These authors promote the idea of a right to 
rehabilitation and a reciprocal duty incumbent on the authorities to provide 
rehabilitative interventions to prisoners who wish to avail of them. On the other hand, 
they argue that the authorities should abstain from forcing unwilling prisoners to 
participate, including by making participation a condition of release. 
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In order to move towards a humanising model, interventions aimed at reducing risk to 
the public would be optional and deployed alongside interventions oriented towards 
enhancing wellbeing and countering the negative effects of detention. The German 
Constitutional Court has made recommendations along these lines for the German 
system of preventive detention (see Drenkhahn et al. 2012). It further stipulates that the 
regime of preventive detention should be oriented towards release and provide a means 
of re-socialising and re-integrating offenders through day release. Such an approach 
may better prepare detainees for life on the outside than risk reduction programmes 
conducted within the prison walls with few opportunities for testing out new skills.  
Such a system would, however, demand greater tolerance of the risks posed by the 
release and re-integration of personality disordered offenders. It may also provide less 
symbolic reassurance than indeterminate periods of detention for those deemed to pose 
a risk. A rational expert-led system of preventive detention may risk backlash from the 
“redemptive” side of democracy described by Margaret Canovan (1999). She argues 
that populism should not be dismissed as “a symptom of backwardness that might be 
outgrown” but may be perceived as “a shadow cast by democracy itself” (Canovan 
1999, p.3). In this view, populism is produced by a fundamental conflict between the 
two faces of democracy: the pragmatic and the redemptive. The pragmatic face 
conceives democracy as a system of governance capable of resolving conflicts and 
moderating passions, whereas the redemptive face promises “salvation” and “power to 
the people” (Canovan 1999, p.2; p.8). Instrumental or “rational” responses to objective 
levels of risk may therefore not be enough to provide symbolic reassurance that 
“something” is being “done” in response to public fears.  
Proposals to open up criminal justice policymaking to “deliberative” (Green 2006) or 
“participatory” (Johnstone 2000) democracy may go some way to alleviate the struggles 
of government to appease the public desire for direct power and the expression of their 
will (Canovan 1999) and allow more rational decision-making. The issue of dangerous 
personality disordered offenders appears already to have lost some of its political 
“heat”. Harry Annison notes that former Chancellor Ken Clarke was able to abolish the 
IPP sentence and replace it with the more limited LASPO 2012 regime due to his 
“characteristic resistance to media criticism” (Annison 2015, p.169). He may have been 
helped by the fact the steps were taken early on in the term of a Conservative-led 
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Coalition government wishing to distinguish itself from the previous Labour 
administration and not yet subject to the pressures of seeking re-election.  
On the other hand, the increase in preventive measures against terrorists in the years 
after the attacks on 11
th
 September 2001 indicate that public and governmental attention 
may have simply shifted to focus on a different type of dangerous offender, one who 
threatens the safety of the public and the security of the state more directly. Recent calls 
from Prime Minister David Cameron (2016) to introduce mandatory “de-radicalisation 
programmes” for those convicted of terrorist offences indicate that this group has also 
been selected for coercive rehabilitative interventions aimed at moulding those who 
pose a threat to society into responsible citizens. This implies that dangerous individuals 
and public fears they provoke will continue to present a challenge and indicates the 
enduring appeal of inclusive and exclusionary approaches to offenders judged to be 
dangerous but potentially redeemable. 
 
8. Conclusion 
In this chapter it has been argued that punishment, rehabilitation and incapacitation all 
form part of a response to the dangers posed to the public by dangerous personality 
disordered offenders. Law and policy in this area seeks to protect and reassure a 
vulnerable public while also attempting to separate out redeemable individuals and 
mould them into responsible citizens. Despite the more modern focus on risk factors, it 
is clear that a concern for enhancing individual welfare through rehabilitative efforts has 
survived the demise of the “penal welfare” era. As in those times, the rehabilitation of 
offenders continues to be influenced by notions of “reform” through punishment and 
justified on the grounds that it will reduce crime and promote wellbeing. In light of the 
particularities of the personality disordered offender, however, this may not be an 
adequate response as coercive interventions are less likely to succeed and may in fact 
subject the offender to further harsh treatment.  
Given the clear priority accorded to security over individual liberty in the “balance” 
struck by the DSPD proposals it has also been argued that rehabilitation may merely be 
an effort to render coercive preventive measures taken in the pursuit of security more 
palatable for liberal governments. Furthermore, reliance on rehabilitative interventions 
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as a means of “balancing” competing rights in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR may not 
be an adequate safeguard against disproportionate punishment. A system of non-
punitive preventive detention that de-links progress from participation in rehabilitative 
interventions could be one way forward. Any proposals to reform the system would, 
however, have to take into account the symbolic nature of efforts to reassure the public 
that they are protected against those who provoke fear.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
1. Proactive Policymaking 
The aim of the first half of this thesis was to investigate where the DSPD initiative came 
from and why it came about when it did. It has been argued that, rather than a “populist 
law and order reaction” (Mullen 2007, s.3) to public fears provoked by a handful of 
high profile cases, the DSPD initiative was an attempt to respond to long-standing 
problems. The plans were, however, given greater impetus by public concerns 
surrounding high profile cases of crimes committed by mentally disordered individuals 
and the release of notorious offenders from prison. This led to a sense that the 
government had to be “seen to be doing something” about an issue of public concern.  
As Rutherford suggests, the 1999 DSPD proposals “are more appropriately located 
within a proactive rather than a reactive scheme” (Rutherford 2006, p.79-80). A small 
group of civil servants drawn from the Home Office and Department of Health came 
together in 1997 to continue work on the issue of dangerous individuals being released 
from determinate prison sentences that had begun as far back as 1975 (Butler 1975). 
They also sought to strike a balance between the need to protect the public and the need 
to attend to the welfare of a damaged population. Inspired by systems in place in the 
Netherlands, Germany, Canada and the USA, they sought to create a British solution to 
respond to the range of problems the DSPD group posed for public protection, the 
reputation of the government, and the work of the prison and secure hospital systems.  
While well-intentioned, their radical proposals for civil detention were met with staunch 
opposition from psychiatrists, patient groups and legal experts. The proposals were 
characterised as the creation of a dubious psychiatric diagnosis rather than as an attempt 
to define a group who posed longstanding problems. The eventual DSPD programme 
was later accused of pursuing the mere “warehousing” of individuals who provoke 
public fears (Tyrer et al. 2010, p.97). Contrary to this account, it has been argued here 
that therapy was an integral part of the programme stemming from the ambitions of the 
early policymakers. An impression of mere containment was, however, created by a 
combination of unrealistic expectations of what could be achieved in a short period of 
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time with a very difficult group of patients and evaluations that were commissioned too 
early. 
A further aim of this thesis was to develop a critical account of the more inclusive or 
“progressive” elements of the DSPD initiative that have been neglected in previous 
criminological analyses. In particular, the research sought to explain the dual “tough” 
and “progressive” appearance of the DSPD programme identified by Toby Seddon 
(2008). The history of the proposals indicates that their “hybrid” nature may be 
attributable in part to the diverging interests of the Home Office and Department of 
Health. These were respectively characterised by interviewees as “public protection” 
and “wellbeing”. The division was not as clear-cut as it may seem, however, as 
ministers and officials from both the Department of Health and Home Office voiced 
their support for both strands. Furthermore, concerns with public protection and the 
wellbeing of prisoners and patients crossed the divide between the mental health and 
criminal justice systems. The history of efforts to deal with the problems presented by 
personality disordered patients in the secure hospitals reflected a concern with 
protecting the public, or at least avoiding attracting blame for patients who reoffended 
(see; Butler 1975; Dell and Robertson 1988; Fallon 1999). The government was also 
concerned to address the poor quality of mental health care within prisons (Reed 1992; 
1994) and to improve prison conditions following episodes of prisoner unrest and 
rioting in the 1980s (Walmsley 1991).  
 
2. Learning Lessons? 
Building on the analysis of the origins of the DSPD concept in Chapter 2, it has been 
argued that the DSPD initiative and the subsequent DSPD programme were based on a 
compromise that was heavily reliant on the discovery of new and effective treatments 
for personality disorder. These treatments were needed to strike a “balance” between the 
rights and interests of the public and those of dangerous individuals (Boateng and 
Sharland 1999). The DSPD programme continued in the spirit of the DSPD 
“evangelists” (Peay 2011a, p.238) and sought to marry together the interests of the 
Home Office and the Department of Health by improving treatment provision for a 
difficult and neglected group. In the rush to “be seen to be doing something” about a 
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high profile issue of public concern and to take a therapeutically optimistic stance, 
however, those behind the DSPD programme seemed to disregard some important 
lessons from past experience. Furthermore, by aligning itself with pre-existing legal and 
institutional structures, the DSPD programme in many ways perpetuated the difficulties 
experienced by the prison and secure hospital systems. This included a number of 
disgruntled patients and prisoners resisting treatment impeding the work of the unit, 
participants spending long periods of time “waiting” in “custodial” care, high rates of 
staff burn-out and turnover, and conflicts between the therapeutic ethos of the units and 
the entrenched cultures and concerns of the prisons and hospitals that housed them.  
The story presented in the first two chapters of this thesis highlights the pitfalls of 
optimism coupled with short-termism and a failure to take full account of past 
experience. It also indicates the importance of continuity in the implementation of grand 
policies. The vision of the early DSPD “evangelists” (Peay 2011a, p.238) for an 
integrated “end-to-end” system for those with personality disorder was neglected as the 
pilots got underway and key actors moved on. The survival of the “myth” that Michael 
Stone was an “untreatable” psychopath in the minds of those involved with the latest 
attempt to deal with the DSPD group also indicates that the narrative of the original 
working group has been lost amidst media and political constructions of the problem of 
dangerous offenders and the measures taken to address it. Thus, the radical plans of the 
early policymakers eventually escaped their creators. 
The developers of the OPDP have learned some lessons from the DSPD programme, 
however, and it in many ways represents a more concerted effort to follow through on 
the plans for the construction of an integrated system with adequate progression for 
prisoners. By deciding not to undertake a randomised controlled trial or to conduct a 
long term follow-up of the DSPD cohort, however, those responsible for the OPDP have 
missed another promising chance to improve the evidence base for the treatment of 
personality disorder. As the OPDP is still in its early stages and the study period for the 
recently commissioned evaluation is short, its potential to produce robust evidence of 
effectiveness is likely to be limited. The decision to expand the capacity of the treatment 
and progression units under the OPDP appears ill-advised given the continuing 
uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of treatments with the DSPD group in 
reducing their risk of reoffending and allowing them to progress towards release. 
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Expansion may, however, reflect the importance of the DSPD programme as a cost 
effective means of managing difficult prisoners and continuously monitoring their risk 
levels. These aims may be just as important as the aim of effecting long-term reductions 
in their risk of recidivism and facilitating their social reintegration.  
 
3. Risk Management and the Medicalisation of Offending 
A further aim of the first part of this thesis was to examine whether the OPDP was a 
better response to the problems posed by the DSPD group than the original DSPD 
programme. It has been argued that a movement towards risk management and away 
from health outcomes is reflected in the less optimistic and perhaps more realistic stance 
of the OPDP towards treatment. The initiative is also to increasingly target high risk 
offenders and those who are less likely to be motivated to engage with treatment. This 
indicates that the programme is “focusing on narrower horizons” (Civil Servant) and 
that the programme has been co-opted into the pursuit of managing prisoners and 
reducing reoffending rates. In light of this, the extent to which the OPDP will be able to 
achieve the stated goal of “reducing health inequalities” (Bradley 2009) is in doubt. The 
focus on reducing reoffending and managing risk efficiently appears to leave less room 
for welfare-enhancing interventions. Nevertheless, the OPDP continues to incorporate 
more holistic treatment approaches, such as the trauma focused programme at HMP 
Whitemoor (Saradjian, Murphy and McVey 2010) and treatments such as DBT aimed at 
reducing self-harming behaviours and improving overall functioning (Linehan 1993).  
The OPDP may therefore be distinguished from the Canadian “risk/need” offending 
behaviour programmes described by Kelly Hannah-Moffat (2005) and indicates that the 
motivations of the early DSPD policymakers have not been completely forgotten. It also 
demonstrates the survival of health concerns, which may be linked to the background of 
forensic psychologists as mental health practitioners.  
The inclusion of prisoners who have not been diagnosed with a personality disorder on 
a “personality disorder pathway” is surprising, however, and seems to suggest that the 
OPDP may come to encompass any prisoner judged to be at high risk of reoffending 
who poses management difficulties in prisons. The generality of the definition of 
“severe personality disorder” used by the OPDP indicates that any disruptive or 
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disturbing behaviour is now to be viewed through the lens of personality disorder. A 
movement towards the medicalization of offending may also be discerned in the use of 
psychological offending behaviour programmes with mainstream offenders.  
Viewing prisoners’ acts of resistance through the lens of personality disorder shifts 
attention away from the coercion that acts on prisoners and the struggles they 
experience in maintaining a sense of self and agency within the prison (Crewe 2011). 
This may increase the “pains of imprisonment” for prisoners with personality disorder 
and thus the hard treatment and punishment they receive for their offending. The use of 
psychological therapies within the prison setting also exposes the vulnerabilities of a 
group with a common history of trauma (Jones 2015) and generates risks for 
participants that must be carefully managed (Genders and Player 2014). The “punitive” 
nature of “post-modern” rehabilitation and offending behaviour programmes further 
indicates that individuals selected for the DSPD programme or OPDP may be punished 
disproportionately to their crimes. 
 
4. Jeopardising Treatment and Progress 
It has been argued here that placement on the OPDP may also slow prisoners’ progress 
through the prison and secure hospital systems. Viewing the behaviour of prisoners and 
patients through the lens of personality disorder poses difficulties for assessing 
reductions in risk of reoffending, as acts of both compliance with and resistance to 
treatment may be interpreted as a product of personality disorder in a troubling Catch-
22 (see Lacombe 2007). The coercive nature of the prison environment may also 
jeopardise the effectiveness of interventions that require motivation to change on behalf 
of the patient. On the other hand, individuals such as those in Leon McRae’s (2013) 
study who sought entry onto treatment programmes in the hope of progressing towards 
release may be disappointed as the effectiveness of the interventions provided in 
reducing risk remains in doubt and rehabilitation is not a clear route towards release. 
As reflected in the cases of Guntrip and Falconer, participation in the DSPD 
programme or OPDP has become an administrative requirement for prisoners assessed 
to be suitable. This is despite the misgivings expressed by Parole Board members in the 
MEMOS study regarding the effectiveness of personality disorder treatment, the ability 
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of the DSPD programme to adequately test out prisoners’ risk of reoffending, and the 
“unknowns” introduced by a new treatment programme into a highly structured system 
(Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 2012a). Furthermore, the “culture of risk aversion” 
within the criminal justice and mental health systems (Jacobson and Hough 2010, p.5) 
reflected in Parole Board and Mental Health Review Tribunal decision-making in 
relation to the DSPD group (Trebilcock and Weaver 2010a; 2012a; 2012b) is likely to 
continue to pose further barriers to release.  
Viewed together, the developments in law, policy and practice that have taken place 
since 1999 indicate that a significant extension of preventive detention and control over 
personality disordered offenders has been achieved through administrative means 
without the need to create a “radical” third service. Rather than taking place in a 
separate service, however, preventive detention on the grounds of risk is secured 
through a combination of indeterminate sentences and transfer to hospital for detention 
at the end of sentence. By staying within existing legal frameworks, and in particular 
using discretionary life sentences and IPP sentences to facilitate preventive detention, 
the DSPD programme and the OPDP present a risk of excessive punishment for 
prisoners who are selected for participation. Supervision in the community has also 
been significantly increased, and breaches of licence conditions or civil orders such as 
VOOs and SOPOs have the effect of triggering detention. This can come into play even 
where the offender has been found not guilty by reason of insanity or unfit to plead.  
 
5. Prioritising Punishment and Public Protection 
The legal and policy framework also reflects a clear preference for managing 
personality disordered offenders in the prison system and for punishing them rather than 
attending to their welfare. A choice was made under the OPDP to focus on building a 
criminal justice pathway and treatment is predominantly to be delivered in prison. This 
trend may also be discerned in Vowles as the CA prioritises punishing mentally 
disordered offenders for “any element or particle of responsibility” they bear for their 
offences (Ashworth and Mackay 2015). The prioritisation of punitive outcomes for 
personality disordered offenders has the potential to be anti-therapeutic and ignores the 
risks imprisonment poses for vulnerable individuals with a history of trauma and social 
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deprivation. The case law also prioritises punishment and public protection even where 
this is likely to result in increased risks to staff and inmates in the institutions that house 
personality disordered offenders (Cooper). This indicates that the safety of prison staff 
and other inmates may also be sacrificed in the name of public protection.  
The current pragmatic and precautionary approach of the law obscures the deeper 
question of whether personality disordered offenders can rightly be held criminally 
responsible given the volitional and emotional deficits associated with their disorders. It 
also overlooks the difficulties such offenders may have in responding to the experience 
of punishment and efforts at their rehabilitation in the expected ways. While regarding 
personality disordered offenders as culpable for offending resulting from their own 
defective personality traits and failures in self-government, the system also treats them 
as responsible for working on their characters by engaging in rehabilitation. Their 
failure to meet their moral duty to participate in rehabilitative interventions and reassure 
others that they do not pose a threat results in continued detention and punishment 
through deprivation of liberty.  
Where an individual can no longer be detained in prison, secure hospitals continue to be 
used as a venue for preventive detention in order to protect the public. This approach 
may perpetuate the long term “custodial” approach of the hospital system towards 
“undischargeable” patients outlined by Dell and Robertson (1988) in the mid-1980s. 
The practice of “ghosting” (Taylor 2011, p.294) or late transfers to hospital remains a 
legal possibility and may be expected to increase following the abolition of the IPP 
sentence. The hospitals are to cater for this disgruntled group without the benefit of the 
extra resources and higher staffing levels of the DSPD programme. This casts further 
doubt on the extent to which the OPDP can be viewed as an improvement on the DSPD 
programme that went before it. It also indicates that the OPDP is unlikely to be an 
adequate response to the myriad of difficulties posed by the DSPD group for the prison 
and hospital systems.    
 
6. Balancing Rights? 
In its early days, the DSPD initiative aimed to strike an appropriate “balance” between 
the competing “rights” of the public and those of personality disordered offenders 
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(Boateng and Sharland 1999). However, it was clear that, in the case of conflict, the 
need to protect the public would prevail (Tyrer et al. 2009).  Here it has been argued 
that the current legal framework also prioritises the rights of a nebulous “public” to 
protection from uncertain harms over the right of concrete offenders not to be subjected 
to disproportionate punishment and to have the chance to re-integrate into society. At 
first glance, the ECtHR’s position in cases such as James and Vinter appears to 
recognise a “right to rehabilitation” for prisoners and a duty on behalf of the state to 
provide such interventions (Van Zyl Smit et al. 2014). However, the ECtHR’s 
enforcement of a broad duty on behalf of governments “to afford general protection to 
society against the potential acts” of prisoners serving sentences for violent crimes 
(Mastromatteo para. 69) has clear potential to conflict with its commitment to offender 
re-integration. The Maiorano case demonstrates the weakness of the ECtHR’s 
attachment to the rights of offenders in cases of serious reoffending. The risk aversion 
demonstrated by the ECtHR also casts doubt on the potential for rehabilitation to act as 
a means of rendering the preventive detention of dangerous offenders proportionate to 
the risks they pose to the public. The implication in Vinter that rehabilitation can act as 
a brake on the inhuman and degrading treatment imposed by a whole life sentence 
appears to be misguided. Current technical capabilities do not allow us to accurately 
assess the need to protect the public from individual offenders and rehabilitative 
interventions may be experienced as punitive in themselves.  
It is argued, therefore, that the combination of the OPDP and the legal framework 
cannot be said to strike a fair “balance” between the rights of the public and those of the 
offender. More than this, it is argued that it cannot be expected to. The priority placed 
on the protection of the public over the rehabilitation of the offender in both law and 
policy indicates that rather than striking a balance between competing individual rights, 
the bargain in fact trades individual liberty for collective security. As Mark Neocleous 
argues, the idea of a “balance” between security and liberty “is essentially a liberal myth 
[…] that in turn masks the fact that liberalism’s key category is not liberty, but security” 
(Neocleous 2007, p.131).  
Building on Peter Ramsay’s (2012a) analysis of “the ideology of vulnerable autonomy”, 
it has been argued that, by detaining dangerous personality disordered offenders, the 
state seeks to reassure its vulnerable citizens that they will be protected from dangerous 
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individuals who are not deterred from violent or sexual offending by the force of the 
criminal law. As in the time of the “platonic guardians” described by Ian Loader (2006), 
the appeal to rehabilitation may be considered a means of rendering the “troubling and 
distasteful practice” (Loader 2006, p.565) of preventive detention and punishment easier 
for liberal governments to swallow. In this way, it also serves to obscure the “profound 
questions of morality” surrounding the use of imprisonment that Mary Bosworth argues 
“should detain us all” (Bosworth 2007, p.69). 
 
7. Contribution  
The research and critical analysis presented in this thesis contribute significantly to the 
existing state of knowledge on the interactions between law and policy governing 
personality disordered offenders in two large and complex systems. The thesis also 
draws on original insights from policymakers, practitioners and academics with first-
hand knowledge of the inner workings of policy and practice in this area, bringing to 
light aspects of the policy development and implementation processes not previously 
available. Furthermore, the research has examined in detail the claims made by the 
criminological literature in relation to the DSPD initiative and broader trends in 
criminal justice policy and has developed a more nuanced account of the assumptions 
underlying recent attempts to govern personality disordered offenders. In particular, the 
thesis has drawn attention to the punitive potential of rehabilitative interventions with 
personality disordered offenders and has called into question the reliance on 
rehabilitation as a legal limit on preventive detention and punishment. 
The thesis contributes to current debates on the relationship between rehabilitation and 
punishment and trends in penal policymaking and practice by highlighting the 
continuing relevance of the modernist project of rehabilitation and its relationship with 
Victorian approaches to the “reform” of defective criminal characters. It has also shown 
that the concept of criminal character is a more useful lens than positivism or classicism 
for interpreting the seemingly conflicting conceptions of the personality disordered 
offender deployed in law, policy and practice. Rather than conceiving of the personality 
disordered offender as an entirely free actor or as the victim of his own biology, it has 
been argued, following Rose, that the DSPD offender is “the responsible subject of 
moral community guided – or misguided – by ethical self-steering mechanisms” (Rose 
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2000, p.321). In this light, the offender can be held responsible not only for his 
offending but also for redeeming himself through engagement with rehabilitative 
interventions.  
The concept of character also helps to highlight the role of coercion and the reform of 
the offender, which is more compatible with the enterprise of punishment than a 
medical model that removes responsibility from the patient. Ironically, enforcing a duty 
for offenders to engage in treatment as an administrative requirement to show their 
suitability for release may be expected to undermine the effectiveness of treatments that 
require willing participation and lead to ever longer periods of incarceration.  
The discussion in this thesis has also countered accounts that see DSPD merely as a 
continuation of exclusionary practices towards dangerous “monsters” (Seddon 2008). 
Rather, rehabilitation and eventual release may be characterised as a response to the 
redeemable offender whilst preventive detention is a response to the irredeemable 
“monster”. As scientific expertise has not yet been able to offer a means of 
distinguishing between these two groups, preventive detention is deployed for all while 
the prospect of reform is left open. It has further highlighted that scientific expertise 
continues to be relevant for penal policy but is drawn upon selectively. Thus, rather than 
stemming from a “loss of faith in the capacity of psychiatric experts to reform 
offenders” (McRae 2013, p.53), the DSPD initiative was a means of engaging with 
those professionals who share the government’s optimistic stance on treatment.      
The thesis has also brought insights from criminological literature to bear on the legal 
literature, going beyond the question of whether detention in hospital is intended to be 
punitive (Stanton-Ife 2012) to uncover its punitive effects. Furthermore, the research 
has highlighted the possibility that punishment may be experienced more harshly by 
those marked out for therapeutic interventions in coercive environments that may be re-
traumatising for vulnerable individuals (Jones 2015; Moore and Hannah-Moffat 2005; 
Genders and Player 2014).   
The research presented in this thesis is timely given that the resurgence of forms of 
character liability including increased powers of supervision and forms of risk-based 
detention (Lacey 2011; 2016) has been accompanied by a revival of rehabilitation as an 
aim of the criminal justice system (Robinson 2008). While acknowledging that 
  
259 
rehabilitative interventions increasingly focus on reducing reoffending, the research 
presented in this thesis highlights that welfarist considerations have not been forgotten. 
Thus, the rehabilitation of dangerous offenders in the English context differs from the 
Canadian system studied by Kelly Hannah-Moffat (2005) and incorporates a concern 
for meeting the non-criminogenic treatment needs of a troubled and troubling group of 
patients and prisoners.  
 
8. Limitations and Future Research 
It has been argued in this thesis that the combination of preventive detention achieved 
through the use of indeterminate sentencing and detention under the MHA 1983 leads to 
disproportionate punishment and that the use of rehabilitative interventions in prisons 
can increase the experience of punishment. The analysis draws on empirical research 
conducted with prisoners, such as Ben Crewe’s (2011) work on the modern pains of 
imprisonment, and also on the accounts of patients and prisoners on the DSPD 
programme (Tyrer et al. 2007; Burns et al. 2011). A fuller empirical study would 
explore in further detail whether placement on the OPDP and transfer to hospital is 
subjectively experienced as additional punishment. Another relevant area for future 
research is the conflict between therapeutic aims and prison culture and whether 
healthcare ethics, including the aims of beneficence and non-malfeasance, can be 
reconciled with an institution that is primarily intended to deprive individuals of their 
liberty as a punishment.     
It seems from the analysis of the structure of the Parole Board system and the research 
conducted by Julie Trebilcock and Tim Weaver (2010a; 2012a) with Parole Board 
members that placement on the DSPD programme or the OPDP has the potential to 
slow progress through prison. It has also been argued that participation on the DSPD 
programme and the OPDP has become an administrative requirement and that this can 
be expected to result in longer periods of incarceration. A fuller study of the trajectories 
of personality disordered offenders through the prison and health systems could provide 
empirical evidence of this process. The post-conviction stage in the criminal justice 
process, and in particular categorisation decisions and Parole Board decision-making, is 
a neglected area of research that warrants greater attention. In particular, administrative 
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decision-making within the prison system in relation to the security categorisation of 
prisoners requires greater scrutiny in light of the importance of these decisions for 
prisoner progress through the system. 
The empirical element of the current study is limited to 17 interviews conducted with 
practitioners, academics and policymakers and drew on a small sample of key 
informants. It was not possible to interview all those involved but attempts were made 
to achieve a balanced sample of views by interviewing both critics and proponents of 
the DSPD programme and the OPDP. The present research cannot pretend, however, to 
replicate the scale of previous studies of penal policy making in which much larger 
numbers of actors were interviewed (e.g. Annison 2015). On the other hand, the 
normative analysis and discussion of case law and human rights law undertaken in the 
second half of the thesis goes beyond accounts that focus on the political context of 
policymaking. In this sense, the thesis takes a more critical look at aspects of the system 
that have been neglected by other accounts, such as the potential for excessive 
punishment arising from the use of indeterminate sentences as a preventive measure and 
the reliance on rehabilitative intervention as a limit on excessive periods of detention.  
The sentencing guidance issued by the Court of Appeal in Vowles suggests a continuing 
role for the notion of “treatability” and a trend towards courts taking a more sceptical 
view of psychiatric evidence and focusing more closely on reassuring and protecting the 
public. These trends deserve further exploration, particularly in light of the role of 
“treatability” as a double-edged sword for personality disordered offenders highlighted 
in this thesis. It suggests that the judiciary has become increasingly risk-averse, perhaps 
due to the focus of successive governments on protecting the public from dangerous 
offenders. As indicated in this thesis, the sentencing of mentally disordered offenders 
and the role of expert evidence in judicial decision-making is an under-researched area 
and one that warrants further exploration in light of broader trends in criminal justice 
policy. 
The research in this thesis has focused on the legal regime governing the detention and 
treatment of personality disordered offenders considered dangerous in England and 
Wales and on a treatment programme located in English prisons and secure hospitals. 
The choice was made to focus on this jurisdiction due to the availability of literature on 
the controversial DSPD proposals and the recent changes to mental health law under the 
  
261 
MHA 2007 and the law of sentencing under the CJA 2003 and LASPO 2012. A 
comparative dimension to the research was not feasible given the timeframe of the study 
and the scale of the mental health and criminal justice systems studied. Future research 
in this area could draw a comparison with the Scottish approach to dangerous offenders 
and the different direction taken in the reform of mental health law in this jurisdiction. 
The Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003 took a more liberal 
direction than the MHA 2007 and is structured by a number of principles, including that 
treatment should be of maximum benefit to the patient and that powers of detention and 
compulsory treatment should be exercised in a manner least restrictive of the patient’s 
freedom.  
The experiences of other jurisdictions could also be drawn upon in devising suggestions 
to improve the English and Welsh system and open up new avenues of inquiry. It has 
been suggested that a new form of non-punitive preventive detention drawing on the 
“third service” idea could present one way forward. The Dutch and German systems 
touched on in this thesis warrant further study given the influence of these systems on 
the ECtHR jurisprudence. Comparisons can also be drawn with the Canadian and 
American systems, which appear to focus more narrowly on managing and reducing 
risk rather than on addressing mental health needs. A comparison between the cultures 
of different jurisdictions and their relative tolerance and intolerance of the risk of 
reoffending by convicted offenders would also prove illuminating. It may also present 
further insights into the need for symbolic efforts to reassure the public.  
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